Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Reshod Jamar Everett, appealed his multiple convictions and sentences for six drug distribution and firearms offenses. The charges arose from his involvement in extensive criminal activities related to drugs and firearms in Cumberland County, North Carolina. Everett unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized from his residence, claiming that the authorities violated the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant mandate. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 480 months in prison, plus supervised release.On appeal, Everett challenged the denial of his suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of his convictions, and his 480-month prison sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Everett's contentions and affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the protective sweep of Everett's residence was justified due to the circumstances, including the fact that Everett was a substantial drug dealer with a known connection to firearms. The Court also held that there was substantial evidence to support Everett's convictions, even under a plain error review. Finally, it concluded that Everett's 480-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses, his conduct between the time of the offenses and sentencing, and the need to deter similar conduct in the future. View "United States v. Everett" on Justia Law

The case concerned Everett Maynard, a police officer in West Virginia, who was convicted of deprivation of rights under color of law. This conviction was based on his use of excessive force against an arrestee, Robert Wilfong, which resulted in Wilfong being hospitalized with a broken nose and lacerations on his upper head. During the trial, witnesses were required to wear face masks due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Maynard appealed his conviction, arguing that the mask requirement violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and that the district court erred in applying sentencing enhancements for obstruction of justice and for causing "serious bodily injury."The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. It held that the mask requirement did not violate Maynard's Sixth Amendment right, as the protection against the spread of COVID-19 is an important public policy interest and the reliability of the witnesses’ testimony was assured. This was because the witnesses were under oath, cross-examined, and the jury could observe their demeanor. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements. The court agreed with the district court's finding that the injuries inflicted on Wilfong constituted "serious bodily injury," and affirmed the application of the obstruction of justice enhancement, finding that a defendant's perjurious testimony at trial is relevant to sentencing because it reflects on a defendant’s criminal history, willingness to obey the law, and general character. View "US v. Maynard" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Chamber of Commerce and three other trade associations sued to stop the enforcement of a new state tax in Maryland known as the Digital Advertising Gross Revenues Tax Act. The law requires large technology companies to pay a tax based on gross revenue they earn from digital advertising in the state. The plaintiffs alleged that the Act violates the Internet Tax Freedom Act, the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed three of the counts as barred by the Tax Injunction Act, which prevents federal courts from stopping the collection of state taxes when state law provides an adequate remedy. The court dismissed the fourth count on mootness grounds after a state trial court declared the Act unconstitutional in a separate proceeding. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the first three counts, but vacated the judgment to the extent it dismissed those counts with prejudice, ordering that the dismissal be entered without prejudice. The appellate court also vacated the dismissal of the fourth count and remanded for further proceedings, as the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge to the Act's prohibition on passing the tax onto consumers was not moot. View "Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lierman" on Justia Law

The court case involves defendants Juan Alberto Ortiz-Orellana and Minor Perez-Chach, who were convicted under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering statute (VICAR). Ortiz and Perez were part of a gang known as MS-13 and were separately charged with murders related to their involvement in the gang in Maryland. Ortiz was also convicted of VICAR conspiracy to commit murder, discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and murder resulting from the same crime. Perez, on the other hand, was also convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and an alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the government seizure of historical cell site location information (CSLI) without a warrant did not violate the defendants' Fourth Amendment rights due to the good faith exception. The court also upheld the use of summary exhibits and denied the defendants' claim that their sentences were substantially unreasonable. The court agreed with Ortiz that his firearm convictions must be vacated because the underlying offenses for each VICAR count could not qualify as a "crime of violence" after a recent ruling. The court also rejected Ortiz's claim that his RICO and VICAR convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. As a result, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for resentencing on certain counts. View "US v. Ortiz-Orellana" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Jahsir Claybrooks, pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen firearm. The probation office determined that at the time of the offense, Claybrooks was an unlawful user of controlled substances and under indictment for a felony, making him a "prohibited person" not allowed to possess a firearm. As a result, his sentence was calculated based on this status. Claybrooks challenged this designation, arguing that he was not an unlawful drug user and that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. He also asserted that the district court erred in determining he was under indictment at the time of his offense and in imposing a sentence above the recommended guidelines. Finally, Claybrooks argued that the district court should have conducted an analysis of the firearms statutes at issue in accordance with a recent Supreme Court case. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that the district court did not commit reversible error. The court found that the district court correctly determined that Claybrooks was an unlawful user of controlled substances at the time of the offense, the relevant statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and the district court did not err in imposing an above-guidelines sentence. The court also dismissed Claybrooks' argument regarding the need for an analysis of the firearms statutes, as he raised this issue for the first time on appeal. View "US v. Claybrooks" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of claims brought by Charles Willis Short, the husband and estate administrator of Victoria Christine Short, who died by suicide while in custody at the Davie County Detention Center. Mr. Short filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the Davie County Sheriff’s Department, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to Ms. Short’s risk of suicide. The district court dismissed all of Mr. Short's claims, applying a subjective standard for determining deliberate indifference.The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application of the subjective standard, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, which established an objective standard for determining deliberate indifference in cases involving pretrial detainees. The court decided that pretrial detainees can state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk of harm on an objective standard, finding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under any standard. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Short v. Hartman" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), with the underlying crime of violence being VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon. Since his conviction, the Supreme Court has narrowed the kinds of crimes that can support a Section 924(c) conviction. At issue is whether VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon is still one of them.   The Fourth Circuit upheld Defendant’s conviction and found that VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon remains a valid crime-of-violence predicate. The court explained that the VICAR statute makes it a crime to commit any of the statute’s enumerated offenses “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States.” The court explained that it has interpreted this language to mean that one element of a VICAR conviction is that the defendant committed the enumerated federal offense, and another is that the defendant’s conduct violated an independent state or federal law. The court wrote that the federal assault with a dangerous weapon easily qualifies as a crime of violence. That this element of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence is sufficient in and of itself to render the offense a crime of violence; we need not progress to the state-law predicates. The court explained that to require courts to “look through” the VICAR offense to the underlying state crimes in every instance would unnecessarily send them on a scramble through innumerable state laws across the circuit. View "US v. Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the district court has unduly delayed holding a consolidated trial on the merits of her claims and a hearing on her motion for preliminary injunction.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after reviewing the petition and the record of the district court proceedings, that either of these latter two factors support the granting of a writ of mandamus. The court explained that in the petition, Petitioner refered to her right to a “prompt evidentiary hearing” and, alternatively, to her “clear and indisputable right to expedited treatment of her PI motion” She asserted that this right is rooted in a statute, 28 U.S.C. Section 1657(a), as well as Rule 40 and Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court wrote that none of the sources entitle Petitioner to a trial prior to the currently scheduled trial date of December 11, 2023. To be sure, Section 1657(a) requires the district court in this case to “expedite the consideration of” Petitioner’s PI motion, and Rule 40 similarly requires the district court to “give priority” to that motion. But the record in this case, despite Petitioner’s protestations to the contrary, establishes that the district court has repeatedly attempted to do so. View "In re: Caryn Strickland" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release after pleading guilty to drug distribution and firearms charges. At the sentencing hearing, the judge told Defendant that he would be “subject to the standard conditions” of supervised release “as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina.” However, the subsequent written judgment contained several special conditions of supervised release not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. These were no minor alterations. One special condition forbade Defendant from opening new lines of credit without permission. Another stipulated Defendant’s consent to warrantless searches of his person or his home whenever his probation officer saw fit. Defendant sent the district court a letter indicating his desire to appeal—223 days after the entry of judgment in his case and long after Rule 4(b)’s deadline had expired. The government promptly moved to dismiss his appeal as untimely.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court explained that in United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the addition of such unpronounced conditions is an error that violates the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing. When a defendant timely appeals a Rogers error, the court must vacate the sentence and remand for the defendant to be sentenced anew. However, here, Defendant filed his notice of appeal well outside the time limits imposed by Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that defendants who raise Rogers errors are not excused from the usual timeliness rules for filing a notice of appeal. View "US v. Gregory Brantley" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law