Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An administrative law judge (ALJ) working for the United States Department of Labor (DOL) ordered K & R Contractors, LLC to pay living miner’s benefits to its former employee pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act. K & R filed a petitioner for review challenging to the constitutionality of the ALJs' appointment.The Fourth Circuit found that both ALJs were constitutionally appointed and that, even if the dual good-cause removal protections were unconstitutional, K & R was not entitled to relief because it had not identified any harm resulting from those removal provisions. View "K & R Contractors, LLC v. Michael Keene" on Justia Law

Defendant n served five years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. He was released in 2020 subject to a lifetime of supervised release. Three years later, the district court found that Defendant had violated numerous conditions of his supervised release. The court sentenced him to a year’s imprisonment and reimposed a lifetime of supervised release. Defendant brought several challenges to this sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant claims the lifetime term of his supervised release is an “extreme and unusual remedy” that should be “viewed critically.” He suggests that lifetime release should typically be affirmed only in cases involving “child pornography or violent crimes.” But the appropriateness of lifetime supervised release in one serious class of cases does not render it inappropriate for another. Defendant combined extremist ideology and technical sophistication to build widespread support online for ISIS’s brutal campaign of terror and violence. He simultaneously coaxed men into traveling to Syria with deadly consequences. Upon his release from prison, Defendant continued to spread toxic messages online, including a call to “exterminate” all non-believers of ISIS’s jihadist ideology—the vast majority of the global population. It was eminently reasonable for the district court to reimpose a lifetime of supervised release under these circumstances. View "US v. Ali Amin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against Judge Goldston and others present at the search. Plaintiff claimed that the warrantless search and seizure of his property violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, that the restrictions on recording the incident violated the First Amendment, and that Judge Goldston’s practice of conducting “home visits” violated the Equal Protection Clause by disadvantaging pro se litigants like himself. He sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive and declaratory relief. Judge Goldston moved for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied her motion. At issue on appeal is whether Judge Goldston is entitled to judicial immunity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that judicial immunity protects only judicial acts. It does not shield the conduct of judges who step outside their judicial role, as Judge Goldston did when searching Plaintiff’s home. The court explained that while Judge Goldston might have had the authority to order a search, the proper authority to conduct the operation was the local sheriff’s department or some other appropriate law enforcement agency. The court explained that just as “judges do not do double duty as jailers,” so too they do not do double duty as sheriffs. View "Matthew Gibson v. Louise Goldston" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence. View "US v. Diana Toebbe" on Justia Law

Following a series of COVID-19-related continuances and other setbacks, Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of fentanyl distribution. Defendant argued that these delays violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Defendant also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, in total, 357 days of 401 days were properly excluded. This means that, at most, only 44 days accrued towards Defendant’s speedy trial clock. The court concluded that Defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated. Moreover, the court noted that Defendant has not “shown, or even argued, that any evidence was damaged or lost, that any witnesses could not be found, or that his case was harmed in any manner by the delay.” Further, the court wrote that substantial evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. Much of the evidence at trial came from the testimony of the confidential informant who purchased the drugs from Defendant. This informant testified that he knew Defendant because they had a mutual friend whose apartment they both frequented. He also testified that he and Pair had discussed doing business together prior to the informant cooperating with law enforcement. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party below, any reasonable finder of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of distributing fentanyl. View "US v. Quotez Pair" on Justia Law

Defendant sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 and, in the alternative, coram nobis relief. His Section 2255 motion and his coram nobis petition were both denied by the district court. In this appeal, Defendant challenged only the denial of his petition for coram nobis relief, asserting that the court erred and abused its discretion in so ruling. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a writ of coram nobis because (1) he was convicted in that very court in 1993 under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), (2) he has served his sentence for that offense, and (3) the sole predicate for his 1993 conviction — a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111 — is no longer a crime of violence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two issues involve (1) whether a violation of Section 111(b) constitutes a crime of violence and (2) whether Defendant has shown that his 1993 conviction does not rest on a Section 111(b) violation. The court wrote that an error of the most fundamental character has not been shown, Defendant is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying coram nobis relief. The court explained that Defendant was obliged to show that his 1993 conviction rested solely on Section 111(a). Defendant has not carried that burden, and he therefore has not satisfied the fourth requirement for coram nobis relief. View "US v. Antonio McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment, applying the sentencing enhancement provided by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), after finding that Defendant had three qualifying predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” But after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, striking down the “residual clause” of ACCA’s violent-felony definition as unconstitutional, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015), Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his ACCA sentence. He argued that Maryland first-degree assault—which formed the basis for two of his ACCA predicate offenses—was not a “violent felony” under ACCA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and he appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion, vacated Defendant’s ACCA sentence. The court explained that it is quite plain from Maryland’s statutory scheme and from the case law interpreting it, that reckless conduct is included. Therefore, Defendant’s inability to point to a specific case is not dispositive. Rather, the terms of the statute and the decisions of Maryland courts show that a Maryland prosecutor could bring charges for first-degree assault against a defendant for recklessly committing an assault with a firearm. The court concluded that the Maryland first-degree-assault statute sets out an indivisible offense and that one of the modalities of that offense—assault with a firearm—can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "US v. Garfield Redd" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs hired Defendant o renovate their home in Washington, D.C. Because Defendant told Plaintiffs he was properly licensed, they thought everything was above board. Yet, delayed and defective, the renovations did not go well. And, as it turned out, Defendant was not properly licensed. So the Plaintiff sued him in D.C.’s Superior Court. But then Defendant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Plaintiffs pursued him, filing a two-claim complaint against him in bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court rejected Count II, finding that, if a debt existed, it was dischargeable. So it partially dismissed the adversary proceeding. But it allowed Count I to proceed toward trial to determine whether Defendant owed the Plaintiffs any money. Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the surviving claim without prejudice. They could then immediately appeal the court-dismissed claim and decide afterward whether it was worth further litigating the party-dismissed claim. Plaintiffs appealed their Count II loss to the district court, who affirmed it.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order. The court explained that bankruptcy courts are not Article III courts. So Article III constraints do not apply to them. They only apply if Congress said so in a statute. But it hasn’t. And that means whether Count I was constitutionally moot is beside the point. The bankruptcy court could still adjudicate it. Since Plaintiffs cannot argue that their adversary proceeding was constitutionally moot when Count II was dismissed, they have not shown the proceeding was legally doomed when they dismissed Count I. They are thus left arguing the order was final because Count I was practically over post-dismissal. View "Roee Kiviti v. Naveen Bhatt" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that two sheriff deputies unlawfully entered his home. The deputies claim Armstrong’s then-wife invited them in. But although they disagree on whether the deputies’ conduct was reasonable, they do not dispute the historical facts as to what happened. Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The deputies moved for summary judgment on the merits claiming that, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, their conduct was objectively reasonable. Alternatively, the deputies claimed they should be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court agreed with the deputies on the merits, finding the deputies reasonably believed that Roadcap had the authority to consent to the deputies’ entry.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies did, as the district court concluded, briefly detain Plaintiff. But the court agreed with the district court that the deputies acted reasonably as a matter of law because they were responding to a domestic situation, there were guns in the house, and Plaintiff was argumentative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the seizure of person claim as well. Moreover, the court wrote that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies exercised some care. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the gross negligence claim. Last, as to the conversion claim, the district court properly explained that there is no evidence in the record that the deputies possessed, touched or exercised any authority over Plaintiff’s personal property. View "Adam Armstrong v. Bryan Hutcheson" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At the time of his offense, Defendant had numerous prior felony convictions. The Government requested an enhanced sentence under ACCA. “ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of a firearms offense who has three or more prior convictions for either a ‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony.’” The Government argued that two of Defendant’s prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses, which he does not dispute, and that his 2017 conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee Code Section 39-13-102 qualified as a violent felony. The district court agreed, overruling Defendant’s objection, and sentenced him to 210 months in prison. The only issue Defendant raised on appeal is whether his Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a violent felony.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that Defendant’s Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Defendant argued that aggravated assault cannot be a violent felony because the second element of the crime—simple assault—requires only de minimis force. While it is true that “de minimis physical force, such as mere offensive touching, is insufficient to trigger the ACCA’s force clause,” the court explained that Defendant overlooks the third, aggravating element of the offense. Each of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force. View "US v. Bryan Ogle" on Justia Law