Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a Title VII employment discrimination suit, seeking to recover for sexual harassment she allegedly experienced while working at a Drive factory. Drive argued that plaintiff was actually employed by a temporary staffing agency, ResourceMFG, and therefore Drive was not an “employer” subject to Title VII liability. Although the district court acknowledged that in some instances an employee can have multiple “employers” for Title VII purposes, it concluded that in this case ResourceMFG was plaintiff’s sole employer. The court agreed with the district court and its sister circuits and concluded that Title VII provides for joint employer liability. The court also concluded that the so-called “hybrid” test, which considers both the common law of agency and the economic realities of employment, is the correct means to apply the joint employment doctrine to the facts of a case. In this case, the district court did not explicitly use the "hybrid" test in its opinion and thus the court articulated the hybrid test for the joint employment context and applied it to the facts of this case, concluding that Drive was indeed plaintiff's employer. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Drive and remanded for further consideration of plaintiff's Title VII claims. View "Butler v. Drive Automotive Indus." on Justia Law

Appellants sought to intervene as plaintiffs in a civil RICO action brought by CVLR Performance Horses against John Wynne and his businesses. The district court denied the motions and appellants appealed. The underlying suit between CVLR and Wynne settled and was dismissed by the district court approximately ten weeks later, while this appeal was pending. Wynne then moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the settlement of the underlying action rendered the appeal moot. The court rejected claims of mootness and concluded that it had jurisdiction over the appeal because a ruling in appellants’ favor on the merits of their appeal would provide them effective relief. The court concluded that the district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling was not an abuse of discretion because appellants did not demonstrate diligent pursuit of their rights or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to excuse their delay. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Foster v. Wynne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, appealed from the dismissal of his pro se claims against the VDOC, alleging that defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq., by prohibiting him from consuming wine during communion, requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed sua sponte plaintiff's Sabbath claims, cell assignment claims, and deliberate indifference claim, and granted defendants summary judgment on the communion wine claim. The court reversed the district court's summary dismissal of the First Amendment wine communion claim where, as the parties agree, plaintiff did not have the opportunity to brief the issue of whether the wine ban substantially burdened his religious exercise and the record is insufficient to support the conclusion that the wine ban is the least restrictive means to address the government’s purported security interest. The court further concluded that plaintiff has successfully alleged facts supporting his remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Jehovah v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a member of the nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a group whose adherents are also known as "Five Percenters." Plaintiff participated in a prison riot in 1995 with other Fiver Percenters and was placed in solitary confinement, where he has remained for 20 years. Plaintiff challenged his confinement under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1, claiming that a Department policy required him to renounce his affiliation with the NOGE, which he alleges is a religion, before the Department will release him from solitary confinement. Plaintiff also argued that defendants violated his rights to procedural due process. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that plaintiff's 20-year period of solitary confinement amounts to atypical and significant hardship in relation to the general population and implicates a liberty interest in avoiding security detention. Further, there is a triable dispute as to whether the Department’s process for determining which inmates are fit for release from security detention meets the minimum requirements of procedural due process. Accordingly, the court reversed as to this claim and affirmed as to the RLUIPA claim. View "Incumaa v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an African-American flight attendant, filed suit alleging that United Airlines failed to adequately respond to a racist death threat left in her company mailbox. The district court concluded that plaintiff was subjected to a racially hostile work environment, but granted summary judgment to the airline after deciding that it was not liable for the offensive conduct. The court concluded that the district court properly concluded that a reasonable jury could properly construe the notes at issue as racially-tinged death threats so severe that it does not matter they were not pervasive. The court concluded that the anonymous nature of severe threats or acts of harassment may, in fact, heighten what is required of an employer, particularly in circumstances where the harassment occurs inside a secure space accessible to only company-authorized individuals. In this case, the conduct at issue is some of the most serious imaginable in the workplace – an unmistakable threat of deadly violence against an individual based on her race, occurring in the particularly sensitive space of an airport. Given the severity of the threat, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was neither prompt nor reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Indeed, a reasonable jury could find that United’s response was instead reluctant and reactive, intended to minimize any disruption to day-to-day operations instead of identifying a perpetrator and deterring future harassment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks review of the BIA's decision dismissing her appeal from an IJ's order of removal. At issue is the IJ's denial of petitioner's motion to suppress certain evidence and to terminate the removal proceeding. The court held that the exclusionary rule applies to egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment. The court joined the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits and applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine the egregiousness standard. The court rejected petitioner's claim that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the search warrant at issue was invalid because it identified the premises as single-family home as oppose to a multi-unit dwelling. The court rejected petitioner's alternative arguments, concluding that petitioner's claims do not make out a constitutional violation, let alone an egregious one. The court held, however, that the nighttime execution of a daytime warrant violates the Fourth Amendment, absent consent or exigent circumstances. In this case, the 5:00 a.m. search of the premises violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that, although the nighttime execution of the daytime warrant violated petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, such violation was not egregious under the totality of the circumstances. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims and denied the petition for review. View "Yanez-Marquez v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Board, alleging that it violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff was involved in an incident with a student at the high school where he was employed as an assistant principal. Plaintiff subsequently filed for medical leaves due to his post-traumatic stress disorder which was related to the CPS investigation that occurred after the incident. Plaintiff was also transferred to a different school. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that the Board did not interfere with plaintiff's FMLA rights and did not retaliate against plaintiff for exercising such rights. The court also rejected plaintiff's ADA claim, concluding that evidence demonstrated that the Board did not discriminate nor retaliate against him based on his disability. Further, the Board did not fail to accommodate plaintiff's condition. View "Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who is blind, filed suit against the County, alleging violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, or Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq. Plaintiff was employed by the County when the County opened a new call center using software that was inaccessible to blind employees. The County did not transfer plaintiff to the new call center along with her sighted coworkers and the County also did not hire her for a vacant position there. The court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on the Section 504 claim, finding that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether plaintiff could perform the essential job functions of a call center employee; whether the County reasonably accommodated her; and if the County did not, whether its failure to do so may be excused because of undue hardship. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County on the Title II claim where public employees cannot use Title II to bring employment discrimination claims against their employers. View "Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cnty, MD" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, police officers for the Town of Mocksville, filed suit alleging that the Town and others violated plaintiffs' First Amendment rights when plaintiffs were terminated for speaking out about corruption and misconduct at the Mocksville Police Department. The court concluded that the evidence demonstrated that plaintiffs acted as private citizens on a matter of undisputed public concern by privately reaching out to the Governor's Office about suspected corruption and misconduct. Such actions cannot be considered as part of plaintiffs' daily professional activities. Further, it was clearly established law at the time that speech about serious misconduct in a law enforcement agency is protected. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment to Defendants Cook and Bralley. View "Hunter v. Mocksville, NC" on Justia Law

In 1970, the district court determined that the City and the Board were operating racially segregated schools and directed them to submit desegregation plans that would establish a nonracial, unitary school district. This appeal stemmed from the district court's two desegregation orders. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin the implementation of the Board's 2011-2012 student assignment plan because it failed to move the school district toward unitary status. The district court denied relief. The court vacated the district court's ruling, holding that the district court erred when it failed to place the burden on the Board to show that the 2011-12 student assignment plan moved the school district toward unitary status. Subsequently, the district court granted the Board's motion requesting that the district court declare the school district unitary and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' request for an injunction as moot. The court affirmed, concluding that the district court acted within its discretion in choosing to address the Board’s motion for declaration of unitary status before ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. Further, the district court did not clearly err in determining that the school district is unitary. View "Everett v. Pitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law