Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, by and through her adoptive parents, brought this action challenging South Carolina's reduction of monthly adoption assistance benefits, claiming that the reduction violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq. The court held in this case that section 673(a)(3) did set forth a privately enforceable right under 42 U.S.C. 1983, but that the parents have failed to plead any violation of that right by defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Hensley v. Koller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the State Board, alleging that it violated his First Amendment rights by causing him to self-censor certain speech on his website wherein he offered both free and fee-based dietary advice to website visitors. The court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff did not have standing to bring these claims. The court concluded that the district court erred in not analyzing plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment standing framework where, under that analysis, plaintiff satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by showing that the State Board's action had an objectively reasonable chilling effect on his speech. The court also concluded that plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Futrell" on Justia Law

The Fund filed this garnishment proceeding against the Department to collect monies owed to a debtor construction company. The district court denied the Department's motion to quash the writ of garnishment on grounds of sovereign immunity and Maryland public law. The court concluded that a federal proceeding that seeks to attach the property of a state to satisfy a debt, whether styled as a garnishment action or an analogous common law writ, violated the Eleventh Amendment. Because the Department was immune from suit, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to quash the writ of garnishment. View "Carpenters Pension Fund v. Maryland Dept. of Health" on Justia Law

Defendant, indicted for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin, was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and deemed incompetent to stand trial. The district court, applying Sell v. United States, granted the government's motion to involuntarily medicate defendant for trial competency purposes. The district court did not mention or analyze any of the less intrusive alternatives suggested by the Supreme Court in Sell or by defendant himself. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings because careful findings concerning the availability of less intrusive means were necessary to vindicate the Supreme Court's admonition that forcible medication motions should be carefully scrutinized due to their impact on personal liberty. View "United States v. Chatmon" on Justia Law

This case involved two common methods employed to blend ethanol with conventional gasoline: inline blending and splash blending. Plaintiffs, API and AFPMA, brought federal preemption-based challenges in the district court seeking to enjoin enforcement of North Carolina's Ethanol Blending Statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. 75-90. Although the court agreed with the district court insofar as it rejected plaintiffs' Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C. 2801-2841, and federal renewable fuel program preemption challenges, the court held that genuine issues of material fact remained unresolved as to plaintiffs' Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1113, preemption challenge to the Blending Statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "American Petroleum Institute v. Cooper, III" on Justia Law

The Board petitioned for review of the FTC order finding that it violated the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45, by engaging in unfair competition in the market for teeth-whitening services in North Carolina. The court concluded that the Board was not exempt from the antitrust laws under the state action doctrine; the Board engaged in a combination or conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1; and substantial evidence supported the FTC's factual findings regarding the economic effects of the Board's actions and that those findings supported the conclusion that the Board's behavior violated section 1. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "The NC State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer, Mission, on her hostile work environment claim brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that plaintiff failed to establish that she had suffered a tangible employment action. The court also concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Mission satisfied both elements of its affirmative defense. Mission could not be held vicariously liable for a supervisor's alleged harassment of plaintiff. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Mission. View "Crockett v. Mission Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed the underlying action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the witness residency requirement on nominating petitions impermissibly burdened their rights to free speech and free association under the First Amendment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the Board's motion premised entirely on its assertion that plaintiffs have not suffered a legally cognizable injury and thus lacked standing. The district court denied the Board's motion as to standing and granted plaintiffs' motion on the merits. The district court declared the witness residency requirement unconstitutional and permanently enjoined its enforcement. Although the Board's witness residency requirement served the Commonwealth's interest in policing fraud potentially permeating the electoral process and therefore meeting the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, the Board produced no concrete evidence of persuasive force explaining why plaintiffs' proposed solution, manifestly less restrictive of their First Amendment rights, would be unworkable or impractical. Accordingly, the court affirmed in all respects the judgment of the district court. View "Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd" on Justia Law

HomeAway filed suit in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, against Eye Street and others, asserting, inter alia, state law claims for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Eye Street did not attempt to remove HomeAway's Texas suit to federal district court but, instead, filed its own action against HomeAway and others in federal district court. After HomeAway moved to dismiss Eye Street's action for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, the district court stayed the action pending the resolution of HomeAway's Texas lawsuit. On appeal, Eye Street challenged the propriety of the stay. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying Eye Street's action. Given the strong case for a stay under the United Capitol Insurance Co. v. Kapiloff factors and Eye Street's deliberate choice to forego removal, the district court's decision would be an appropriate exercise of discretion under either Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America/Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. or Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc." on Justia Law

Painter's Mill Grille, the owner and operator of a restaurant, and its principals filed a complaint against the restaurant's landlord and its agents. Plaintiff alleged that defendants, motivated by racial animus, interfered with plaintiff's business and its opportunity to sell the restaurant, including its leasehold interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, and 1985(3), as well as state tort principles. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's principals did not have standing to be plaintiffs and that Painter's Mill Grille did not set forth sufficient facts to state a claim to relief that was plausible on its face. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law