Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Montgomery County Board of Education adopted Guidelines for Gender Identity for 2020–2021 that permit schools to develop gender support plans for students. The Guidelines allow implementation of these plans without the knowledge or consent of the students’ parents. They even authorize the schools to withhold information about the plans from parents if the school deems the parents to be unsupportive. In response, three parents with children attending Montgomery County public schools challenged the portion of the Guidelines that permit school officials to develop gender support plans and then withhold information about a child’s gender support plan from their parents. Terming it the “Parental Preclusion Policy,” the parents alleged the policy unconstitutionally usurps the parents’ fundamental right to raise their children under the Fourteenth Amendment.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for the case to be dismissed. The court explained that the parents have not alleged that their children have gender support plans, are transgender or are even struggling with issues of gender identity. As a result, they have not alleged facts that the Montgomery County public schools have any information about their children that is currently being withheld or that there is a substantial risk information will be withheld in the future. Thus, under the Constitution, they have not alleged the type of injury required to show standing. Absent an injury that creates standing, federal courts lack the power to address the parents’ objections to the Guidelines. Thus, the court remanded to the district court to dismiss the case for lack of standing. View "John and Jane Parents 1 v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted—and issued three concurrent life sentences—for conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death and aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and one count of aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant’s third conviction. Defendant now appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. He argued that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under Section 924(c)(3)(A), Defendant’s 924(j) conviction must stand. The court wrote that that predicate, alone, is sufficient to support his Section 924(j) conviction. Moreover, the court concluded that post-Davis and Taylor, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a crime of violence under either Sections 924(c)(3)(A)’s force or elements clause. Due to this, the court wrote, it need not reach the validity of Defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death predicate, and the court held that his Section 924(j) conviction stands irrespective of the ambiguity in the general verdict form. View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant's third conviction.Defendant filed a motion to vacate, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under 18 USC 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

Defendant robbed the CresCom Bank in Conway, South Carolina. During the robbery, Council fatally shot the bank teller and the bank manager. Defendant was convicted of (1) bank robbery resulting in death (Count One); and (2) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in a manner causing death (Count Two). The government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The jury found Defendant guilty on both charges. The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death on each count. On appeal, Defendant raised four challenges to the district court’s handling of the guilt phase.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that the district court fulfilled its obligations under Sections 4241 and 4247. The court raised the issue of competency on its own initiative several times, including before and during a pretrial conference held roughly a year and a half before trial. Further, the court explained that Defendant’s arguments about his need for more time and the preferability of alternatives to denying his motion outright asked the court to second-guess the district court’s case-specific judgments in “areas where the district court’s comparative expertise is at its zenith and ours its nadir.” Thus, the court held district court made no reversible error in denying Defendant’s fifth continuance motion. Finally, the court explained that B at least one of Defendant’s current arguments—that the Federal Death Penalty Act makes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by incorporating state law execution practices—was plainly available when Defendant filed his first Rule 33 motion. View "US v. Brandon Council" on Justia Law

After receiving a long suspension, Jacob Doe sued Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) and several university officials, alleging that Virginia Tech’s Title IX investigation, hearing, and appeal process denied him due process of law. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding that he hadn’t alleged a cognizable liberty or property interest in his continuing education.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed for a different reason. The court held that even assuming Doe has such an interest, he hasn’t alleged that he was deprived of it without sufficient process. The court wrote that Doe complains that his witnesses couldn’t appear in person at the hearing because it was held during the summer. But he doesn’t allege that the witnesses weren’t able to provide testimony by phone, video, or in writing. Nor does Doe claim he sought to continue the hearing until his witnesses were available. And Doe admits that the investigator interviewed his witnesses during her investigation into Roe, and the allegations against Roe were adjudicated at the same hearing. So these allegations too, don’t rise to the level of a due-process violation.   Moreover, the court explained that to find that Doe alleged a due-process violation on this sparse record, the court would have to hold that university students have a right—in effectively every disciplinary hearing—to advance notice of the evidence to be presented against them. The ask is even more striking here because Doe doesn’t allege that he sought a continuance or that Virginia Tech relied on the surprise testimony. Therefore, the court rejected Doe’s claim of error. View "Jacob Doe v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Universit" on Justia Law

A Virginia statute required the automatic suspension of residents’ driver’s licenses if they failed to pay certain court fines and fees. in 2016, a group of indigent Virginians who lost their licenses when they were unable to pay court debts initiated a putative class action against the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“Commissioner”), alleging that the Commonwealth’s license-suspension scheme was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs raised several claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: that the statute’s requirement of automatic suspension without notice or a hearing violated their procedural due process rights; and that the statute’s enforcement against those who were unable, not unwilling, to pay violated both their substantive due process rights and their equal protection rights. As relief, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the statute’s enforcement and requiring license reinstatement to the “hundreds of thousands of Virginians” with suspended licenses. Plaintiffs then petitioned for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. Section 1988(b), which provides that the district court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party” in Section 1983 actions “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remanded. The court held that Plaintiffs here prevailed” in every sense needed to make them eligible for a fee award. The court explained that the named plaintiffs sought not only reinstatement of their own licenses but also class certification, a declaratory judgment that Section 46.2-395 was unconstitutional, and hence permanent license reinstatement for hundreds of thousands of Virginians. Those are precisely the kinds of considerations that bear on the “extent of a plaintiff’s success” – a critical factor in assessing a reasonable fee award in any fee litigation under Section 1988. View "Damian Stinnie v. Richard Holcomb" on Justia Law

John Telly King was murdered by a fellow inmate. King’s estate sued the South Carolina Department of Corrections prison guards on duty and their supervisors, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to King’s safety and medical needs and, therefore, responsible for his death. A magistrate judge disagreed, granting summary judgment to the defendants, and King appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the prison guards on duty failed to violate a clearly established right so are entitled to qualified immunity. And Plaintiff failed to allege, or raise a disputed material fact of, any individual involvement by the supervisor Defendants. The court explained that nowhere does Plaintiff identify how each defendant violated the constitution. This is a prerequisite to a supervisory-liability claim. Nor does Plaintiff present a material dispute about any individual Defendant’s knowledge. Instead, Plaintiff only claims that Defendants “either maintained actual or constructive knowledge of the risk” (whatever that risk may be). The court wrote that this boilerplate conclusion—lacking defendant specificity and factual support— does not state a claim for relief or allow a plaintiff to get past summary judgment. View "David King v. Timothy Riley" on Justia Law

Defendant is fifteen years into his twenty-year prison sentence for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. A few years after he was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity. If sentenced today, Smith’s mandatory minimum would be half his current sentence. Under the retroactivity provisions of the First Step Act, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction to time served. The district court denied his motion, determining that twenty years remained appropriate. Defendant appealed, claiming among other things that the district court miscalculated his Guidelines range and that our recent decision in United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022), reveals substantive errors in the district court’s analysis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that “The Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act, together, are strong remedial statutes, meant to rectify disproportionate and racially disparate sentencing penalties.” The district court considered these remedial aims, as well as all other nonfrivolous arguments, before exercising its broad discretion to deny sentencing relief. Further, while the court recognized the disparity between Defendant’s new Guidelines range and his current sentence, the district court properly explained why it remained substantively reasonable. View "US v. Danny Smith" on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law

Defendant received a 13-year sentence for Hobbs Act robbery and a related firearm offense. The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence on procedural grounds and remanded for resentencing. At resentencing, the district court increased Defendant’s sentence by six months and ran that term consecutively to an intervening state sentence on unrelated charges. Defendant argued that he was resentenced vindictively as punishment for successfully exercising his right to appeal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court expressly based its increased sentence on objective information post-dating Defendant’s initial sentencing – namely, Defendant’s new state convictions and his lengthy disciplinary record while incarcerated. The district court provided a careful explanation of its decision to increase Defendant’s sentence and run it consecutively to a newly imposed sentence. And it grounded this decision in objective developments post-dating Defendant’s initial sentencing. That suffices to dispel any presumption of vindictiveness that otherwise would arise. View "US v. Christopher Singletary" on Justia Law