Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, an employee of NGA with a top secret security clearance, informed the NGA of his marriage after the investigation for his security clearance had been completed but before he had begun work. The NGA conducted a reinvestigation into his security clearance and then revoked the security clearance. Plaintiff commenced this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., against the NGA and its Director to reverse the NGA's decision, to reinstate his security clearance, and to award him back pay, benefits, and attorneys' fees. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review a security clearance determination. The court concluded that plaintiff's speculative and conclusory allegations of constitutional violations were essentially recharacterizations of his challenge to the merits of the NGA's security clearance determination and that the court did not have jurisdiction to review such a determination. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hegab v. Long" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted in 1993 of carnal knowledge of a minor without the use of force. In this appeal, plaintiff challenged Va. Code sections 9.1-900 et seq. and 18.2-370.5, which, together, classified her as a sexually violent offender and prevented her from entering the grounds of a school or daycare without first gaining permission from the Virginia circuit court and the school board or the owner of the daycare. Unless plaintiff gains such permission, she is not able to meet with her stepson's teachers at school, attend his school functions, or drop him off at or pick him up from school. Plaintiff's complaint included four counts: she alleged that defendants have violated her substantive due process, procedural due process, associational, and free exercise rights. The injuries she alleged with respect to the first, third, and fourth counts stemmed from impediments the Virginia statute and the school board policy placed on her ability to access school and church property. The court held that because she had not yet attempted to undertake the requisite steps to access these properties, she could not demonstrate that these claims were justiciable. While plaintiff's second count was justiciable, she failed to state a procedural due process claim upon which relief could be granted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of her claims. View "Doe v. Virginia Dept. of State Police" on Justia Law

Southern Walk, a homeowners association, brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment against OpenBand, the corporation with which it had contracted in 2001 for wire-based video services. Southern Walk alleged that the 2007 Exclusivity Order issued by the FCC rendered "null and void" OpenBand's exclusive rights under the 2001 contracts to provide such wire-based video services to Southern Walk homeowners. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court to the extent that it held that Southern Walk failed to allege facts supporting standing in this case, but vacated that judgment to the extent that it dismissed the case with prejudice, and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees to OpenBand. View "Southern Walk at Broadlands v. Openband at Broadlands, LLC" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Washington Gas' request to expand a natural gas substation (County Zoning Plans). On appeal, Washington Gas challenged the district court's order dismissing Washington Gas' mandatory referral claim and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment on Washington Gas' federal preemption claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the mandatory referral claim pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil; the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (PSA), 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because the PSA only preempted safety regulations and the County Zoning Plans were not safety regulations; and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because Washington Gas was a local distributor of natural gas and, therefore, was not subject to the NGA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Washington Gas Light Co. v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint against Home Loan and Deutsche Bank, alleging state law claims based on a mortgage contract. The district court determined that plaintiff's claims were preempted by the Home Owner's Loan Act (HOLA), 12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq., and its implementing regulation, 12 C.F.R. 560.2. The court concluded that plaintiff's allegations supporting her first count - that the mortgage contract was unconscionable - fell under section 560.2(b) and therefore, the court concluded that her claim was preempted and affirmed the dismissal of that claim. However, because plaintiff's state tort claim for fraud only incidentally affected lending, it was not preempted by HOLA or its implementing regulation. Therefore, dismissal of that claim on preemption grounds was unwarranted. Further, the court found no basis for dismissal of plaintiff's fraud count on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and plaintiff's complaint met the requirements of Rule 9(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding for further proceedings. View "McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, F.S" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her parents, sued the school principals and school board pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of her First Amendment right to free speech and expression and her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Defendants prohibited plaintiff from wearing and on one occasion punished her for wearing Confederate flag shirts at school. When, as here, student speech threatened to disrupt school, school officials could prohibit or punish that speech. The school officials therefore did not violate plaintiff's First Amendment right when they refused to allow her to wear Confederate flag shirts and protest shirts at school, and the dress codes and their enforcement did not infringe on plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Hardwick v. Heyward" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting, inter alia, that Maryland's good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit contravened the Second Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public on having "good and substantial reason" to do so. Because the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement could not pass constitutional muster, the court reversed the judgment. Under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State had demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime. The court also rejected plaintiffs' facial challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Woollard v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

This case arose when Calvary's application to the City for a special use permit was denied. On appeal, Calvary challenged the district court's procedural rulings, contending that the district court abused its discretion in denying Calvary's motion for leave to amend its complaint, which was filed after the district court had dismissed its original complaint, and in denying its motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Calvary failed to take account of the fact that it filed its motion to amend after its complaint had been dismissed, and there was simply no longer any complaint pending to amend. Calvary never made an effort to open or vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b), and the court rejected its argument that the district court should have construed its motion for reconsideration as a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Calvary Christian Center v. City of Fredericksburg, VA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of relief on her claims of discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, as well as wrongful discharge, assault, and battery, brought under Virginia law, against Huntington Ingalls, the successor to her former employer. According to plaintiff, Huntington Ingalls subjected her to an ongoing sexually hostile work environment and her claims centered on the actions of her supervisor. The court held that the district court properly declined to consider those allegations not included in plaintiff's EEOC charge; because the district court correctly determined that amending her complaint would be futile, it did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to do so; because the department manager did not know of the protected activity, and because the supervisor, who allegedly influenced him, was not principally responsible for the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Huntington Ingalls on the retaliatory discharge claim; and the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to the assault and battery claims. View "Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law