Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a mentally retarded handyman, was in prison for nearly thirty years for the murder of an elderly woman who had sporadically employed him. The 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition on appeal was part of defendant's very first effort to secure federal habeas corpus relief. The federal habeas proceedings were prolonged in part because of the court's stay of the appeal to await further state court action. Having scrutinized volumes of records of defendant's three trials and his state PCR proceedings, the court recognized that there were grave questions about whether it really was defendant who committed the murder. The court held that defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel premised on his trial lawyers' blind acceptance of the State's forensic evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment denying relief and remanded for the court to award the writ unless the State of South Carolina endeavored to prosecute defendant in a new trial within a reasonable time.

In this appeal, the court considered whether defendant's sentence for possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), was properly enhanced, as provided in 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(2), based on his prior conviction under South Carolina common law for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN). Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred in applying the modified categorical approach, and that the district court should have limited its consideration of the prior conviction to a categorical analysis. The court disagreed and held that defendant's ABHAN conviction qualified as a predicate offense under section 2252A(b)(2). Accordingly, the district court properly determined that defendant was subject to the minimum statutory sentence of 10 years' imprisonment under the sexual abuse enhancement, and the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Defendant was convicted of simple possession of crack cocaine and sentenced to a 63-month term of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained by police after a patdown where defendant was a passenger in a vehicle that was subject to a routine traffic stop. The court held that the government failed to meet its burden of establishing that officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous when the patdown began. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine and heroine. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentence on multiple grounds. The court held that the for-cause striking of prospective jurors based on their perceived inability to accept an interpreter as the final arbiter of what was said or written did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the district court's decision to strike the prospective jurors was not a manifest abuse of discretion and did not contravene the Sixth Amendment; Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) records were admissible under the public records exception to hearsay; defendant's challenge to his conviction under an indictment that charged him with conspiracy to import and distribute "1 kilogram or more" of heroin and "5 kilograms or more" of cocaine failed because the lesser included offense was included in the charged offense and there was no variance; because defendant failed to provide a showing of good cause, his claim that the indictment was defective was waived; the court could not conclude that the district court judge committed plain error in giving the modified Allen charge after receiving two jury notes expressing an inability to reach a verdict; nor could the court conclude that the district court plainly erred by not, sua sponte, ordering a mistrial after approximately two days of jury deliberations; substantial evidence supported the verdict and the district court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal; the district court acted within its discretion in admitting testimony of a certain witness; and the district court did not commit clear error in finding, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant was a manager or supervisor in the conspiracy; and the district court did not err in finding that five participants were involved pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3B.1(b). Accordingly, the convictions and sentence were affirmed.

Plaintiff, a North Carolina registered lobbyist, commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the North Carolina State Board of elections to challenge the constitutionality of North Carolina's "Campaign Contributions Prohibition," N.C. Gen. Stat. 163-278.13C, which prohibited any registered lobbyist from contributing to the campaign of any candidate for the North Carolina General Assembly or the Council of State. Applying the "closely drawn" standard of scrutiny that the court concluded was applicable to such contribution restrictions, the court held that the statute was constitutional, both facially and as applied to plaintiff, as a valid exercise of North Carolina's legislative prerogative to address potential corruption and the appearance of corruption in the State.

Defendant, a former Sheriff of Buncombe County, was convicted by a jury of numerous conspiracies and other charges relating to his receipt of bribes in connection with the unlawful operation of video poker machines in Buncombe and other North Carolina counties. Defendant appealed his convictions. The court held that even if the district court erred in admitting into evidence the recording of the December 19 meeting at issue, such error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever. The court further held, under the plain error standard of review, that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conspiracy conviction for "the obtaining of property of another" by conduct and under circumstances proscribed in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The court finally held that the district court did not exhibit unfair treatment or bias toward defendant. The court rejected defendant's argument that the Honest Services Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1346, was unconstitutionally vague and affirmed his convictions for violating the statute.

Defendant challenged his sentence for a drug conspiracy conviction, arguing that the district court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and improperly imposed an obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for new counsel but reversed and remanded the case for resentencing because the district court did not find the necessary factual predicates to impose an obstruction of justice enhancement.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to 78 months' imprisonment, based in part on its finding that defendant had committed the offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions for a "crime of violence." On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in relying on his Maryland second degree assault conviction to enhance his offense level. The court found that it was uncontested that the district court relied upon an officer's sworn statements contained in a statement of probable cause that was not expressly incorporated into the statement of charges to determine that defendant's Maryland second degree assault constituted a predicate offense under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2). Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in relying on facts contained in the unincorporated affidavit to find that defendant had two qualifying convictions. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and remanded.

Defendants were charged with offenses related to their membership in the Pagans Motorcycle Club. At issue was whether 18 U.S.C. 922(h), which prohibited a person from possessing a firearm while "employed for" a convicted felon, applied only to persons employed for tangible compensation. After holding that section 922(g) required the government to prove some form of payment - and noting the government's concession that it could not make such a showing here - the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all charges based on section 922(h). The court held that the statute, however, did not contain an inflexible requirement that compensation be involved. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the charges and remanded for further proceedings.

A jury convicted of Daryl Taylor and Antwan Thompson of being felons in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after they were caught with a loaded handgun on a Baltimore Street. The district court imposed an eight-year sentence on Taylor and a fifteen-year sentence on Thompson because his prior convictions qualified him for the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 19 U.S.C. 924(e). On appeal, Taylor challenged both his conviction and sentence and Thompson objected only to his sentence under the ACCA. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Taylor guilty of unlawful possession under section 922(g)(1). The court declined Taylor's invitation to invalidate the enhancement in section 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines and held that the district court's sentence fell within the range of reasonable punishments. The court also held that, taken as a whole, Thompson's plea proceedings afforded ample support for the finding of the district court that his plea of guilty constituted an admission of the violent conduct reflected in the sole proffered factual basis for the plea. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.