Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

BP appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Charles V. Stanley, Jr., and his business (defendants), in BP's action seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed. BP also appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. The court held that the district court erred in finding the Petroleum Restriction (PR), in the Special Warranty Deed that was attached to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) at issue, was overbroad and unenforceable where the PR did not prohibit Stanley from operating a non-BP-branded vehicle repair business on his property so long as the business did not also sell non-BP-branded gasoline. The court also concluded that the PR's prohibition of the sale of certain enumerated items was too inconsequential to invalidate the entire PR. Therefore, the PR on the whole "afford[s] a fair protection" to BP's interest without being "so large as to interfere with the interests of the public." Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, vacated the fee and cost award, remanding for further proceedings. View "BP Products North America, Inc. v. Stanley, Jr." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a contract entered into by Iraq's Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and Wye Oak for the refurbishment and disposal of Iraqi military equipment. At issue was whether, for purposes of analyzing subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-11, a foreign state and its armed forces were separate legal persons. The court concluded that, for jurisdictional purposes, they were not. Therefore, the court held that Wye Oak's claim against Iraq alleging breach of contract entered into by IMOD fell within the FSIA's commercial activities exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Iraq's motion to dismiss Wye Oak's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

This case involved the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 14706, which set up a framework for the timely filing of claims against carriers for damaged cargo. In this case, it was undisputed that neither the shipper nor the shipping broker filed either a claim or a lawsuit within the prescribed time limitations. Therefore, were the court to create some exception to the statutorily authorized, contractually mandated requirements of prompt filing, the court would blow a hole in the balance struck by the Carmack Amendment and undermine Congress's intent to protect carriers against stale claims. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the shipping broker and remanded with instructions to dismiss the lawsuit.

In this appeal, accounting firm Bryan Brothers sought coverage under a professional liability insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Company for liability arising from illegal acts of a former Bryan Brother's employee. Under the policy, it was a condition precedent to coverage that no insured had knowledge, prior to the inception of the policy, of an act that was reasonably likely to become the basis for a claim. The court held that because Bryan Brothers had such knowledge, the claims at issue were not covered. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Continental Casualty Company.

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision.

A 1997 coal supply contract provided that "[a]ll disputes under" the agreement would be referred to arbitration in Charleston. The parties extended the 1997 Agreement until 2006, but disagree as to whether a series of emails effectuated extension through 2008. In July 2008, buyer and supplier signed a new contract with an increased price, providing for arbitration in Richmond and containing a merger clause. Buyer paid the higher price under protest, claiming that the 1997 agreement remained in effect and filed for arbitration in Charleston; supplier filed for arbitration in Richmond under the 2008 agreement. The Charleston panel found that the parties had extended the 1997 agreement and that the 2008 agreement was "a glaring breach" of the extension. The Richmond panel stayed proceedings. A Virginia district court dismissed supplier's suit. A West Virginia district court granted summary judgment for buyer. The Fourth Circuit upheld the West Virginia award under the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. 10(a). The issue of which panel should decide the validity of the 2008 agreement was procedural, not jurisdiction, and did not require a decision in court. The Charleston panel based its jurisdiction on a plausible reading of the 1997 agreement.

Appellants appealed an order revoking their pro hac vice admissions in connection with a putative class action suit where the suit alleged that appellants' clients breached supplemental cancer insurance policies that they had issued. At issue was whether the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice status where the revocation was based on motions appellants filed in response to plaintiffs' request for class certification, chiefly a motion to recuse the district judge based on his comments during an earlier hearing. The court vacated the revocation order and held that, even though the recusal motion had little merit, the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice admissions where it did not afford them even rudimentary process.

Plaintiffs, a West Virginia coal sales company, sued Mountain State Carbon, LLC ("Mountain State")and its member companies, on of which was Severstal Wheeling, Inc. ("Severstal Wheeling") in federal district court alleging that Mountain State wrongfully refused to accept coal deliveries in breach of a coal supply agreement with plaintiffs. At issue was whether the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia for diversity jurisdiction purposes under Hertz Corp. v Friend. The court held that the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia where the touchstone for determining a corporation's principal place of business for diversity purposes was "the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Therefore, Dearborn, Michigan was Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business where seven of its eight officers, including its chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer, set corporate policies and oversaw significant corporate decisions out of Dearborn, Michigan.