Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

William White, a federal prisoner serving a lengthy sentence, was transferred from one federal correctional institution to another, spending three days at a federal transfer center in Oklahoma City, where he was held in a Special Housing Unit for security reasons. During this brief transit period, he was not offered, nor did he participate in, any evidence-based recidivism reduction programming required under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). White later sought to have his time at the transfer center count toward FSA time credits, which could reduce his period of incarceration.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied White’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) refusal to award FSA time credits for the three-day transfer period was consistent with BOP regulations and policy statements, which generally do not consider prisoners in transit or in certain housing statuses to be “successfully participating” in qualifying programs. The court also rejected White’s claim that his due process rights were violated, holding that the FSA does not create a protected liberty interest in earning time credits during every day of incarceration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the FSA, a prisoner is entitled to time credits only for days in which he actually participates in qualifying programming or productive activities. Because White did not participate in any such programming during his three days in transit, he was not statutorily entitled to those time credits. The court further held that the FSA does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earning time credits, so the BOP’s actions did not violate due process. View "White v. Warden of Fed Correctional Ins - Cumberland" on Justia Law

Ali Al-Timimi, a respected lecturer at an Islamic center in Virginia, became acquainted with a group of young Muslim men who engaged in activities including paintball, which some saw as preparation for “jihad in the form of combat.” While Al-Timimi did not directly participate in these preparations, he offered advice on discretion after FBI attention. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Al-Timimi attended a gathering where he urged attendees to repent, leave the United States, and join militant groups abroad, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in Pakistan. His statements inspired several individuals to make concrete plans to travel overseas for training, though he did not provide operational details or set timelines. Some group members subsequently traveled to Pakistan but did not engage in combat.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted and convicted Al-Timimi on multiple counts, including conspiracy, solicitation, and aiding terrorist groups. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and other consecutive terms. Over two decades, his case saw numerous appeals and remands, including vacatur of certain counts based on changes in law regarding “crimes of violence” (as in Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis). Ultimately, Al-Timimi appealed his remaining convictions (Counts 2–6, 9, and 10), asserting First Amendment protection for his speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Al-Timimi’s speech constituted unprotected incitement, solicitation, or facilitation of criminal acts. The court held that his speech, though inflammatory and disturbing, did not incite imminent lawless action nor did it intentionally solicit or assist a specific crime. As his advocacy did not meet the narrow exceptions to First Amendment protection, the court vacated Al-Timimi’s remaining convictions and remanded for judgments of acquittal. View "US v. Al-Timimi" on Justia Law

The defendant operated an immigration services business, preparing self-petition visa applications under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for clients who claimed abuse by U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses. Investigators found that the defendant submitted applications containing forged psychological evaluations—some altered from a psychologist’s prior reports—and fabricated residential lease documents for multiple clients. These documents were used as evidence to satisfy VAWA eligibility criteria, such as establishing residence and proof of abuse. The defendant was not a licensed attorney and did not sign the applications as preparer.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the defendant’s trial. After the government presented its case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the fraudulent documents were not “required” by immigration law and that the statute required submission under oath, which he claimed was not satisfied. The district court denied the motion, ruling that while the regulations did not mandate specific documents, any evidence submitted to establish eligibility became “required” for that application. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The defendant did not renew his acquittal motion and later appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for several counts and alleging a sentencing error based on a discrepancy between oral and written conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. The court held that documents submitted to establish eligibility in VAWA self-petitions—including psychological evaluations and lease agreements—constitute “required” documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) once chosen and presented. It further held that the statute’s “knowingly presents” clause does not require an oath for criminal liability. Regarding sentencing, the court found no material discrepancy between oral and written supervised release conditions and concluded that resentencing was not warranted. View "US v. Aborisade" on Justia Law

Two plainclothes detectives in Baltimore, acting on a tip about drug activity, observed Robert Gary Moore and another individual near a parked vehicle. When approached, Moore dropped a plastic bag and fled but was apprehended. The police recovered the bag, which was later analyzed in a laboratory report stating it contained cocaine. During Moore’s trial for possession and possession with intent to distribute, the State introduced two chain-of-custody reports: one disclosed before trial and another (the ECU report) disclosed only mid-trial. The latter did not mention the chemist who performed the analysis, raising questions about whether the correct bag was tested. Moore’s counsel did not object to the late disclosure or use the discrepancy in his defense. Moore was convicted by a jury.After his conviction was affirmed on appeal by Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, Moore sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing that the State’s belated disclosure of the ECU report violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and that his counsel was ineffective. The Maryland trial court initially granted relief under Brady but, upon remand from the intermediate appellate court for further factfinding, ultimately denied both claims, finding that disclosure during trial did not constitute suppression under Brady. Moore’s application for leave to appeal this denial was rejected.Moore then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court found a Brady violation and granted habeas relief, ordering Moore’s conviction vacated unless retried within sixty days. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied federal law and that a Brady violation warranted habeas relief. However, it held that federal district courts lack authority to vacate state convictions directly and thus vacated the district court’s order, remanding for a new order consistent with the proper bounds of federal habeas relief. View "Moore v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

A dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan, the defendant traveled from the U.S. to Pakistan in 2009, along with four others, with the intent to join jihad in Afghanistan. Upon arrival, the group attempted to make contact with terrorist organizations and made efforts to cross into Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested them in Sargodha, Pakistan, and subsequently tried and convicted them on terrorism-related offenses. The defendant served approximately ten years in a Pakistani prison. After completing his sentence, he was extradited to the United States, where he faced federal charges arising from the same underlying conduct.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia arraigned the defendant and, after he waived his Speedy Trial Act rights, considered his motion to dismiss the indictment on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds. The motion argued that the government’s delay in seeking his extradition and prosecution in the U.S. violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the motion, finding that, although the length of the delay was significant, the government made reasonably diligent and good-faith efforts to secure his return, and the remaining factors weighed against finding a violation. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the speedy trial ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo. The appellate court agreed that only the length of the delay favored the defendant, but reasoned that the government’s efforts, the defendant’s own conduct in resisting extradition, and the absence of actual prejudice outweighed that factor. The court held there was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and affirmed the conviction. View "US v. Chaudhry" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2020 to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin and fentanyl, in violation of federal drug laws. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined he qualified as a career offender, which substantially increased his advisory sentencing range under the Guidelines. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release.Subsequently, the defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that changes in the law meant he would not now be classified as a career offender, and, therefore, his Guidelines range would be much lower if sentenced today. He asked the court to reduce his sentence to time served. The district court found that the significant difference between his original and recalculated Guidelines ranges constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. However, the court ultimately denied the motion, concluding that the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—particularly the defendant’s lengthy and serious criminal history and the need to promote respect for the law—outweighed his arguments for release. The court also noted his rehabilitative efforts but found them insufficient to demonstrate a reduced danger to the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for compassionate release. Applying a deferential standard, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had considered all relevant arguments and provided sufficient reasoning for its decision. The appellate court affirmed the denial of compassionate release, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally and satisfied all statutory requirements in its analysis. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Drug task force officers in West Virginia observed a car with expired registration, dark window tint, and a malfunctioning taillight, driven by Cornelious Johnson—an individual known to them from a prior drug conviction and currently on federal supervised release. The officers watched as Johnson and his passenger interacted with a man, Jackie Byrd, at an apartment complex previously associated with drug investigations. Although the officers suspected a drug transaction, they did not witness any exchange of items. Shortly after, Tremayne Hawkins entered the back seat, and the car left the complex. Officer Stanley, informed by the task force, stopped the car for the observed traffic violations and, suspecting drug activity, separated and questioned the occupants about their interaction with Byrd. Citing minor inconsistencies in their answers, Stanley called for a K9 unit, which alerted to drugs. A subsequent search yielded a firearm on Hawkins, who admitted to being prohibited from possessing one due to a prior conviction.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied Hawkins’ motion to suppress the firearm, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop based on the area’s reputation, Johnson’s prior conviction, the observed interaction with Byrd, and the inconsistent statements from the occupants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that none of the cited factors—alone or in combination—provided reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. The court emphasized that presence in an area associated with prior investigations, a dated conviction, innocuous interactions, and minor, reconcilable inconsistencies in statements did not collectively amount to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "US v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

Christopher Arthur was investigated after founding a business that sold military gear and later provided training and manuals on tactics including the use of explosives. The FBI became involved after a customer, Joshua Blessed, died in a shootout and was found to possess pipe bombs and Arthur’s manuals. Subsequently, an undercover informant, “Buckshot,” sought training from Arthur, who instructed him on fortifying his home and making explosive devices, knowing Buckshot claimed he wanted to use such tactics against federal agents. Arthur was arrested in January 2022 and a search of his home revealed illegal firearms and improvised explosives.A grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina indicted Arthur under 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) for teaching explosives use with knowledge of criminal intent, and on additional firearms and explosives charges. Arthur moved to dismiss the primary count, arguing the statute was facially overbroad under the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding the statute’s knowledge requirement limited its scope to conduct integral to criminal acts, not protected speech. After a three-day trial, the jury found Arthur guilty on all counts. At sentencing, the court applied the U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4 terrorism enhancement, increasing his guidelines range, and sentenced Arthur to a total of 300 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(B) is not unconstitutionally overbroad, concluding that the statute targets speech integral to criminal conduct and does not criminalize a substantial amount of protected expressive activity. The Fourth Circuit also found no reversible error in applying the terrorism enhancement, and determined any alleged guidelines error was harmless given the district court’s alternative sentencing rationale. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Arthur" on Justia Law

The case centers on Jessie Glass, whose estranged wife, April, reported to law enforcement that she witnessed a significant quantity of child sexual abuse material on Glass’s phone. April provided specific details about the alleged material, the devices Glass owned, and information for accessing his online accounts. Detective Jason Lowrance investigated April’s claims, which included reviewing her prior allegations against Glass as well as Glass’s history of previous investigations for similar offenses. Some of these earlier investigations had been closed without charges or with findings labeled “[u]nfounded.” Lowrance then prepared affidavits for search warrants to search Glass’s home and electronics, securing evidence of child sexual abuse material.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Glass’s motion to suppress, which argued that Lowrance recklessly omitted information in his warrant affidavits that would have undermined April’s credibility and thus probable cause. The district court found that any omissions were not made with intent to mislead or recklessness, and that the omitted facts would not have altered the probable cause determination. A jury later found Glass guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment and imposed financial penalties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. It held that Lowrance’s affidavits contained sufficient detail to support probable cause, and that the omitted information about April’s credibility would not have defeated probable cause. The appellate court also rejected Glass’s double jeopardy argument, finding the convictions and sentences were based on distinct conduct. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s imposition of a $5,000 special assessment, concluding the required statutory considerations were adequately addressed. The judgment was affirmed in all respects. View "US v. Glass" on Justia Law

A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims. View "Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC" on Justia Law