Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A decorated Army sergeant was convicted in Virginia after pleading guilty to two counts of malicious wounding and other charges stemming from separate incidents occurring on a single day in March 2011. At the time, he had recently returned home from combat in Afghanistan, where he had suffered multiple serious injuries, including two traumatic brain injuries. His crimes included shooting a woman during an altercation and, later that day, assaulting a man in a bar. He received a sentence of 46 years, well above the state’s discretionary sentencing guidelines.On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals of Virginia and the Supreme Court of Virginia both affirmed his convictions and sentence, finding no error in the sentencing court’s weighing of mitigating evidence. The defendant then pursued state habeas relief in the Circuit Courts for the City and County of Roanoke, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. He contended his lawyer failed to present readily available mitigating evidence, including details of his military service, combat injuries, mental health struggles (especially PTSD), and failed to object to the use of his expunged juvenile criminal record. The state court denied relief, concluding there was no prejudice, and the Supreme Court of Virginia summarily refused further appeal.In subsequent federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied relief, holding that the state decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held that the state court applied the wrong legal standard for prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, failed to consider the totality of available mitigating evidence, and that there was a reasonable probability of a different sentence had counsel performed adequately. The case was remanded with instructions to grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the Commonwealth provides plenary resentencing within a reasonable time. View "Coleman v. Dotson" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in 2002 on multiple federal drug and firearm charges, receiving a lengthy sentence. He unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentence through direct appeals and several motions for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, including claims of ineffective assistance, vindictive prosecution, and arguments based on later Supreme Court rulings. After a First Step Act sentence reduction in 2019, which resulted in an amended judgment and a reduced sentence, the defendant filed another pro se § 2255 motion in 2022, arguing that he was actually innocent of one of his firearm convictions because both firearm offenses occurred as part of the same drug conspiracy.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina dismissed the defendant’s 2022 habeas motion on two alternative grounds: first, that it was an unauthorized “second or successive” motion because a First Step Act sentence reduction does not create a “new judgment” for purposes of AEDPA; and second, that it was untimely under the one-year limitations period, with no basis for equitable tolling. The district court found that even if the motion was not successive, it was still time-barred, and the merits of his claim did not justify tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only the question of whether a First Step Act sentence reduction results in a “new judgment” under AEDPA, having denied the defendant’s request to expand the appeal to include the timeliness issue. The Fourth Circuit held that, because the district court’s alternative ruling of untimeliness was not appealable and would remain unaffected regardless of the outcome on the “new judgment” issue, the court had no ability to redress the defendant’s injury. As a result, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant applied for U.S. citizenship in 2011 and, on his application and during an interview, denied ever having committed a crime for which he was not arrested. However, in 2013, he pleaded guilty in North Carolina state court to attempted statutory rape for conduct that occurred in 2008, admitting to engaging in a sexual act with a minor. He did not disclose this conduct on his naturalization application. Years later, a federal grand jury indicted him for naturalization fraud, alleging he knowingly concealed his criminal history to obtain citizenship.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for unconstitutional preindictment delay, finding he had not shown actual prejudice from the delay. The court also denied his motion to suppress evidence of his state guilty plea, ruling that he could not collaterally attack the validity of his state conviction in federal court except for a deprivation of counsel, which did not apply here. At trial, the court limited the testimony of the defendant’s expert witness regarding his cognitive abilities, excluding certain opinions about his capacity to understand the application question. The jury convicted the defendant, finding he knowingly made a false statement, and the court sentenced him to six months in prison and revoked his citizenship.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant failed to demonstrate substantial actual prejudice from the preindictment delay, that the district court properly refused to suppress the state guilty plea, and that while the limitation of the expert’s testimony was error under recent Supreme Court guidance, the error was harmless given the other evidence presented. The conviction and sentence were therefore affirmed. View "US v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Several individuals associated with the Reccless Tigers, a Northern Virginia-based drug gang, were charged with a range of offenses, including drug trafficking, racketeering, kidnapping, and murder. The gang was involved in distributing marijuana and cocaine, and members targeted those who failed to pay drug debts or cooperated with law enforcement. The case centered on the murder of Brandon White, who owed a drug debt and had testified against a gang member. Evidence showed that gang members, including the defendants, orchestrated White’s abduction and murder, with some directly participating in the killing.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia presided over a joint trial. The court denied several pretrial motions, including requests for continuances, motions to substitute counsel, and a motion to dismiss based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment. The jury convicted three defendants—Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter—of racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, kidnapping conspiracy, kidnapping resulting in death, drug conspiracy, and killing while engaged in drug trafficking, with Lamborn also convicted of using a firearm resulting in death. Tony was convicted of racketeering and drug conspiracy but acquitted of destructive device charges. The court sentenced Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter to life imprisonment and Tony to 312 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the convictions and most sentences, finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of continuances or substitution of counsel, and sufficient evidence supported the convictions. The court also upheld the district court’s application of sentencing enhancements and rejected the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth Amendment claims. However, it vacated the sentences of Lamborn, Yoo, and Peter due to inconsistencies between the oral pronouncement and written judgments regarding supervised release conditions, remanding for resentencing on that issue. View "US v. Lamborn" on Justia Law

Three individuals, all Cameroonian Americans, participated in a secretive group dedicated to sending firearms and ammunition from Maryland to Anglophone fighters in Cameroon. The group, known as the “Peanut Project,” operated out of a basement in Baltimore County, where they assembled, modified, and packaged weapons and ammunition for overseas shipment. Their concealment methods included obliterating serial numbers from firearms and hiding the items within compressor tanks and other cargo. In 2019, law enforcement intercepted a shipping container en route to Nigeria containing over 35,000 rounds of ammunition and 39 firearms, many with defaced serial numbers. A subsequent search of the group’s base revealed a full-scale operation for manufacturing and preparing firearms for export.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland indicted the defendants on five counts, including conspiracy, illegal exportation, transportation of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and smuggling. After a ten-day jury trial, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy, transporting firearms with obliterated serial numbers, and smuggling, but acquitted on the exportation counts. The district court denied post-trial motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and various trial rulings. At sentencing, the court applied enhancements for the number of firearms involved and for trafficking, sentencing each defendant to 63 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary or instructional rulings, and the sentencing enhancements were properly applied. The court also found no error in the oral and written pronouncement of supervised release conditions. The judgments of the district court were affirmed. View "US v. Nji" on Justia Law

Law enforcement stopped a vehicle in which Michael Henderson was a passenger. During a search, a K-9 alerted to drugs in Henderson’s bag, which contained approximately 1,921.2 grams of pure methamphetamine. Henderson was arrested, and while in jail, he made phone calls instructing associates on drug distribution using coded language. One associate, Bonnie Cagle, revealed to police that Henderson’s references to “puppies” were code for firearms, and “sockets” and “tools” referred to drugs. Police recovered two firearms linked to Henderson from Cagle and her mother’s home.Henderson pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia to possessing 500 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. The presentence investigation report initially recommended a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm, but after Henderson’s timely objection and the government’s lack of response, the probation officer removed the enhancement. The revised report also recommended a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court later requested supplemental briefing on Henderson’s eligibility for “safety valve” relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The government then argued for sentencing enhancements and against the reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which Henderson claimed were untimely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in considering the government’s late arguments for sentencing enhancements, finding that the request for supplemental briefing constituted good cause. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the firearm enhancement, concluding that Henderson constructively possessed firearms in connection with drug trafficking. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding Henderson’s sentence. View "US v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Gregory Bonnie was serving a 144-month federal prison sentence in South Carolina, consisting of 120 months for drug trafficking convictions and a consecutive 24 months for violating supervised release, which included a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While incarcerated, Bonnie sought to earn time credits under the First Step Act (FSA) for the 120-month portion of his sentence related to drug offenses, acknowledging that the 24-month portion for the § 924(c) conviction was disqualifying under the FSA.The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied Bonnie’s request, treating his consecutive sentences as a single, aggregate term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), and finding him ineligible for FSA time credits because his aggregate sentence included a disqualifying § 924(c) conviction. After exhausting administrative remedies, Bonnie filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The district court granted summary judgment for the warden, holding that the plain text and statutory context of the FSA and § 3584(c) required aggregation of sentences, making Bonnie ineligible for FSA time credits for the entire 144-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that, under the FSA and § 3584(c), the BOP must treat multiple consecutive or concurrent sentences as a single, aggregate sentence for administrative purposes, including the computation of FSA time credits. Because Bonnie’s aggregate sentence included a conviction under § 924(c), he was ineligible for FSA time credits for any portion of the sentence. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying Bonnie’s habeas petition. View "Bonnie v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted on three charges related to the production and possession of child pornography. He pleaded guilty to one count—production of child pornography—and was sentenced to 256 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. The terms of his supervised release included both mandatory and special conditions. Of particular relevance was a special condition requiring him to submit to substance abuse testing and contribute to the cost of such testing, as determined by a sliding scale approved by the Probation Office.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina imposed these conditions at sentencing. The defendant did not object to the special condition regarding substance abuse testing during the sentencing proceedings. On appeal, he argued that this special condition unconstitutionally delegated a core judicial function—specifically, the authority to determine the number of drug tests—to the Probation Office.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, given the lack of objection below. The court found that the plain language of the special condition did not delegate authority to determine the number of drug tests to the Probation Office; rather, it addressed only the payment for drug testing ordered by the court. The court concluded that the discretion over the number of drug tests remained with the district court, and the special condition merely facilitated payment. As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that there was no error, let alone plain error, in imposing the special condition and affirmed the defendant’s sentence. The government’s motion to dismiss the appeal based on an appeal waiver was denied as moot. View "US v. Jones" on Justia Law

The defendant purchased fifty-nine firearms over sixteen months, completing federal transaction records for each purchase and listing two Virginia addresses as his residence. However, he did not live at either address—one did not even exist. A grand jury indicted him on twenty-four counts of making false statements to a federal firearms licensee. The government had substantial evidence, including testimony from residents of the listed addresses and GPS data showing the defendant’s actual residence in Maryland. On the eve of trial, the defendant entered into a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a sentencing recommendation for acceptance of responsibility.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia accepted the guilty plea after a colloquy that omitted several requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, such as explicit discussion of the appeal waiver and the nonbinding nature of the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant did not object at the time. Months later, after replacing his original counsel due to alleged ineffectiveness and disciplinary issues, the defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing it was not knowing and voluntary. The district court denied the motion and sentenced him to fourteen months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case, applying plain error review to the Rule 11 colloquy and abuse of discretion review to the denial of the motion to withdraw. The court held that, despite the procedural deficiencies, the defendant failed to show a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the errors. The court also found no fair and just reason to permit withdrawal of the plea, given the evidence, the delay in seeking withdrawal, and the lack of prejudice to the defendant. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

A man was accused of sexually abusing a minor, referred to as Jane Doe, based on allegations that surfaced in 2018 and 2019. Initially, the police received a referral from Child Protective Services after Doe made statements to a suicide hotline about being abused by her “father’s friend.” The case was closed when Doe refused to discuss the allegations. In 2019, after another suicide attempt, Doe identified the man by name during therapy, and this information was relayed to the police. Detective Thorsdottir conducted a forensic interview with Doe, who provided detailed accounts of abuse and identified the accused. The investigation included interviews with Doe’s parents and therapists, surveillance, and searches of the accused’s home, which yielded a handgun but no evidence of child pornography. The accused was arrested and indicted, but the charges were later dropped after new evidence suggested Doe had previously identified a different individual as her abuser.The accused filed a civil suit in Virginia state court, later removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging malicious prosecution under both state law and the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff failed to plausibly allege a lack of probable cause for his arrest and prosecution, and that the detective was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the complaint and its exhibits did not plausibly allege that the detective acted with deliberate or reckless disregard for the truth, nor that she omitted material facts necessary to negate probable cause. The court concluded that probable cause existed based on Doe’s identification and corroborating evidence, and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of both the federal and state malicious prosecution claims. View "Moretti v. Thorsdottir" on Justia Law