Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty to a federal offense that prohibits possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, his presentence report recommended an enhanced base offense level because of a prior 2008 conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-53.1 for using a firearm in the commission of a felony, specifically robbery. This enhancement was based on the conclusion that the prior conviction constituted a “crime of violence” as defined by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant, through counsel, objected, arguing that his prior conviction did not meet the Guidelines’ definition of a crime of violence, and the parties’ written and oral arguments focused primarily on whether the elements clause or the enumerated offense clause of the Guidelines applied.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia overruled the defendant’s objection and applied the enhancement, basing its conclusion on the elements clause. The court’s reasoning mirrored the elements clause language, and its supporting citations were to cases addressing that clause or similar provisions. The resulting advisory Guidelines range was higher, and the defendant received a 33-month sentence. On appeal, he argued that the court erred in finding his prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The government defended the application of the elements clause and also raised arguments under the enumerated offense clause and harmless error doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding the prior Virginia conviction satisfied the elements clause, adopting circuit precedent holding that Virginia robbery does not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another. The Fourth Circuit found the government had not demonstrated harmless error and declined to affirm based on the enumerated offense clause. The court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "US v. Scott" on Justia Law

Jaron Starkey pleaded guilty to a federal drug-trafficking offense and was sentenced to 300 months in prison. His sentence was enhanced under the career-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior felony drug-distribution convictions in Delaware from 2012 and 2019. Starkey challenged the use of these convictions as predicates for the enhancement, contending that the Delaware statutes under which he was convicted criminalized attempted drug distribution, which, according to Fourth Circuit precedent prior to a 2023 Guidelines amendment, would not qualify as “controlled substance offenses” under the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected Starkey’s argument and applied the career-offender enhancement, concluding that his prior Delaware convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the Guidelines. Starkey appealed this determination.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that the Delaware statutes under which Starkey was convicted define “delivery” to include “attempted transfers,” but this does not mean they criminalize attempted delivery as an inchoate offense. Instead, the offense of delivery encompasses completed acts that may include attempted transfers, which are distinct from mere attempts prosecuted under separate attempt statutes. The court found that Delaware law does not prosecute inchoate attempted deliveries under its drug-distribution statutes. Therefore, Starkey’s prior convictions properly qualified as controlled substance offenses for the career-offender enhancement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. Starkey" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant participated in two incidents at a North Carolina bank: an armed robbery in which employees were assaulted with firearms, and a subsequent attempted armed robbery where the group was foiled when the bank manager recognized them and secured the building. The defendant was convicted by a jury of both armed bank robbery and attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), as well as for brandishing firearms during these crimes in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii).Following his conviction and sentence, which were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2014, the defendant filed several postconviction motions in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. These were denied. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to the question of whether the defendant’s conviction for attempted armed bank robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” for purposes of supporting his related conviction under Section 924(c).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether attempted armed bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) categorically constitutes a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The court held that because Section 2113(d) requires either assaulting another person or putting another’s life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon or device during the course of an attempted bank robbery, the offense necessarily entails the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The court also found that the statute requires intentional, rather than merely reckless, conduct. Therefore, the court affirmed that attempted armed bank robbery under Section 2113(d) is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "US v. Straite" on Justia Law

Rami Mhana operated businesses that purchased fraudulently obtained Apple iPhones and other electronics at below-market prices, paying in cash and often shipping these goods overseas in bulk. His suppliers included individuals who acquired electronics using stolen personal information to make purchases from major retailers and wireless carriers. Mhana did not verify his suppliers’ identities or the legitimacy of the goods, nor did he provide receipts. He also paid third-party services to unlock phones, enabling their use on any network. The government’s investigation began after a ruptured overseas shipment revealed the scheme, ultimately leading to the discovery of thousands of fraudulent transactions.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina indicted Mhana on multiple counts, including transportation of stolen goods, conspiracy, and money laundering. Following a six-day trial, the jury convicted him on all charges. The indictment included a forfeiture notice, and the jury found a nexus between certain property and Mhana’s crimes. The district court initially granted a preliminary order of forfeiture but, at sentencing, declined to enter a final forfeiture judgment, citing concerns about double payment with restitution. The district court entered final judgment, prompting Mhana to appeal his convictions and the government to cross-appeal the forfeiture ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed Mhana’s convictions, finding no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary rulings, and determined that any assumed errors were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of forfeiture, holding that forfeiture is mandatory under federal law when the statutory prerequisites are satisfied, even if restitution is also imposed, and remanded the case for entry of a forfeiture judgment. View "US v. Mhana" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in March 2021 for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a convicted felon after a police encounter outside a convenience store. During the arrest, he resisted and threatened officers, and was found in possession of a loaded ghost gun and distributable amounts of fentanyl. He was charged with possession of ammunition as a convicted felon and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, ultimately pleading guilty to the ammunition charge. At sentencing, the court weighed the seriousness of his offense and history, including his mental health issues and young age, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 70 months' imprisonment.After sentencing, a retroactive amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Amendment 821) reduced the impact of "status points," lowering the defendant's criminal history category and decreasing his advisory Guidelines range from 57-71 months to 51-63 months. In March 2024, he moved for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), citing rehabilitation efforts while incarcerated. The government opposed, documenting three disciplinary violations by the defendant in prison, including threatening prison staff.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the defendant eligible for a reduction but denied the motion, concluding that the relevant § 3553(a) factors and his disciplinary record weighed against a reduction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The court held that a sentence reduction motion does not trigger a plenary resentencing or require a detailed explanation for retaining a sentence above the amended Guidelines range. The district court’s acknowledgment and consideration of relevant factors sufficed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion and that the presumption of judicial consideration was not rebutted. View "US v. Davis" on Justia Law

A former software developer and naval reservist from Virginia, the defendant became the subject of a federal investigation after participating in the events of January 6, 2021, for which he was later pardoned. In the following months, he purchased several firearms and accessories, including devices labeled as “solvent traps” from an online retailer. These devices, although purportedly for cleaning firearms, were constructed in a manner similar to silencers, with features such as threaded ends and internal baffles. The defendant discussed with an undercover FBI employee how these devices could be converted into silencers, despite not possessing the necessary tools for such modification.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia heard the case after a federal grand jury indicted the defendant for possessing unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act (NFA). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the statutory definition of a silencer was unconstitutionally vague and that his conviction would violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied these motions and, after a mistrial, the second jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. He was sentenced to 36 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court’s jury instructions accurately reflected the statutory definition of a silencer, which does not require operability or exclude dual-use devices. The court found sufficient evidence for the conviction, as the devices’ design and the defendant’s statements supported their classification as silencers. The court also determined the NFA was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. Finally, the court concluded that, even if silencers are protected by the Second Amendment, the NFA’s shall-issue registration regime is presumptively constitutional and the defendant had not shown otherwise. The conviction was affirmed. View "US v. Hatchet Speed" on Justia Law

Steven Clark Lefemine participated in an anti-abortion protest at a reproductive healthcare facility in Columbia, South Carolina, where he intentionally blocked the entrance by sitting in front of the doorway, preventing patients and staff from entering. After refusing requests to move, the police were called, and Lefemine was arrested. He was initially charged with trespassing under state law, for which he was fined, and subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act) under 18 U.S.C. § 248.In the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Lefemine was first charged under a provision of the FACE Act carrying a maximum penalty of one year in prison. However, the government amended the penalty sheet—an auxiliary document to the indictment—to reflect a lower maximum penalty: six months’ imprisonment and/or a fine of $10,000. The indictment was also amended to conform to this reduced penalty. Lefemine’s counsel acknowledged and consented to these amendments. The district court denied Lefemine’s request for a jury trial, finding that the charged offense was a “petty” offense not subject to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, and proceeded with a bench trial that resulted in Lefemine’s conviction.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Lefemine argued that he was entitled to a jury trial both because of the original indictment and because Congress intended all FACE Act violations to require a jury trial. The Fourth Circuit held that the amendments did not require resubmission to a grand jury and that the maximum penalty Lefemine faced rendered the offense “petty” under Supreme Court precedent. The court affirmed that the first-time, nonviolent exception under the FACE Act does not require a jury trial, joining the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Lefemine" on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with distributing fentanyl and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. During jury selection, one of the prospective jurors, a retired police chief with decades of law enforcement experience, disclosed his background in policing and drug task force work, but did not reveal that he had previously been the target of a federal investigation into corruption involving local officials. When asked if he or his family had been involved in any controversy or litigation with a federal agency, the juror answered “no.” The defendant was convicted on all counts.After trial, defense counsel discovered the juror’s undisclosed involvement as a target in a prior federal investigation. The defendant moved for a new trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, arguing that the juror’s dishonesty during voir dire deprived him of an impartial jury. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found that the juror had given dishonest answers to material questions, but concluded that there was no evidence of actual bias or that the juror should have been struck for cause if he had answered truthfully. The court denied the motion for a new trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not commit manifest error in finding no actual bias and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the juror’s prior experience did not require exclusion under any per se rule of implied or inferred bias. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that under the standard of review, the defendant was not deprived of a trial by an impartial jury. View "US v. Williamson" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers pursued the defendant, Austin Lodge, after a traffic stop in Clarksburg, West Virginia. During the pursuit, Lodge attempted to place a camouflage backpack inside a residence where his children’s grandmother lived, but was turned away by the occupant. He then fled to the backyard and discarded the backpack next to a shed. Lodge was apprehended without the backpack. Later, officers searched the area, found the bag, and searched it without a warrant, uncovering controlled substances. Lodge admitted ownership of the backpack but argued that his actions were meant to conceal, not abandon, the bag because it was left on familiar, semi-private property.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia first reviewed Lodge’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the warrantless search. The case was referred to a magistrate judge, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Lodge had abandoned the bag, thus forfeiting any reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents. The district court adopted these findings and denied the suppression motion, concluding that Lodge’s conduct amounted to abandonment, relying on the Fourth Circuit’s precedent in United States v. Small.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s findings for clear error and the legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court emphasized that abandonment is a factual finding based on the objective circumstances known to officers at the time. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s finding—that Lodge abandoned the backpack when he discarded it after being denied entry at the residence—was not clearly erroneous. Because Lodge abandoned the backpack, he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in it, and the denial of the motion to suppress was affirmed. The court declined to resolve whether a different result would obtain if the property had not been abandoned but was merely concealed on private property. View "US v. Lodge" on Justia Law

Late at night in downtown Raleigh, police were investigating a stolen vehicle when Milton Allen repeatedly interfered with the officers’ work, ignoring their commands and disrupting the scene while riding his bicycle. Allen’s actions, which included impeding traffic and resisting multiple direct orders to leave, led officers to attempt an arrest. During the arrest, Allen resisted and struggled with officers, who eventually subdued him using handcuffs and ankle restraints. While Allen was restrained but still squirming, officers searched two cross-body bags he had been wearing and found firearms, illegal drugs, cash, and related items. Based on these discoveries, Allen was charged with firearm and drug offenses.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina reviewed Allen’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the bags. The district court found that the search of the bags was not a lawful search incident to arrest because Allen was already secured and could not access the bags, relying on United States v. Davis and Arizona v. Gant. The court also rejected the government’s argument that the evidence would inevitably have been discovered under established inventory search policies, concluding that the government had not sufficiently demonstrated that the policies were particular enough to limit officer discretion or that the bags would have inevitably been searched.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the evidence should have been suppressed. The Fourth Circuit held that the search of Allen’s bags would inevitably have occurred pursuant to standardized inventory search policies of both the Raleigh Police Department and Wake County Detention Center, which required the search of all arrestees’ personal property and limited officer discretion. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the evidence would have been lawfully discovered and thus should not have been suppressed, reversing the district court’s order. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law