Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A former employee of a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company improperly calculated and reported its “Best Price” for certain drugs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as required under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. The plaintiff claimed that, during a period from 2005 to 2014, the company failed to aggregate multiple rebates and discounts given to different entities on the same drug, resulting in inflated “Best Price” reports and underpayment of rebates owed to Medicaid. The complaint asserted that the company was subjectively aware that CMS interpreted the statute to require aggregation of all such discounts, especially after the company’s communications with CMS during a 2006–2007 rulemaking process and the company’s subsequent internal audit.After the government and several states declined to intervene, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the amended complaint, finding that, even under the subjective scienter standard established in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the company acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of its reports. The district court also suggested that ambiguity in the statute precluded a finding of falsity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations—including the company’s awareness of CMS’s interpretation of the rule, its targeted audit and compliance efforts, and its continued use of non-aggregated reporting—plausibly alleged the requisite subjective scienter under the False Claims Act. The court clarified that statutory ambiguity does not, at the pleading stage, negate scienter or falsity, and remanded for the district court to address other elements, including falsity, in the first instance. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law

Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

The case arose after a technology company, using hash-matching technology, flagged files uploaded to a user’s cloud storage account as child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and reported them to a national crimes center, as required by federal law. Some of the files were reviewed and confirmed by company employees, while others were not. The report was forwarded to law enforcement in Virginia, but after a delay, the investigation shifted to North Carolina, where the user had moved. There, local law enforcement conducted two consensual interviews with the user, obtained consent to search his devices, and later executed a search warrant at his home, discovering additional CSAM.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the user’s motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud storage files due to the service provider’s privacy policy, the contraband nature of CSAM, and the reliability of the hash-matching process. Alternatively, the district court found that even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, suppression was not warranted because the connection between the warrantless search and the later discovered evidence was too attenuated, citing the exclusionary rule’s attenuation doctrine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in cloud-based accounts, and that law enforcement’s warrantless opening and viewing of such files violates the Fourth Amendment unless a warrant or exception applies. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of suppression, holding that the evidence eventually used against the user was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search due to significant temporal gaps and intervening voluntary acts, such as interviews and consent to search, making suppression unwarranted. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Lowers" on Justia Law

A group associated with gangs in Franklin, Virginia, including members of the “Low Lives” and subsets of the Bloods, became involved in a violent series of events after their leader, Brandon Leonard, was killed. The group, which operated from a house called the “Railroad,” engaged in drug trafficking, shared firearms, and sought control over local drug operations. Tensions with a rival gang, the 00s (Crips), escalated after Leonard’s death, leading to retaliatory shootings against suspected rivals. In addition, one defendant, while detained pretrial, attempted to persuade witnesses to provide false alibis.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia tried the defendants—Jenkins, Brooks, and Newsome—on various charges, including conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering (VICAR), attempted murder, firearms offenses, and witness tampering. The jury convicted all three on some counts. The district court denied their motions for acquittal and sentenced Jenkins, Brooks, and Newsome to lengthy prison terms. All three defendants appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and their sentences.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the convictions and sentences of Jenkins and Newsome—including upholding the existence of an “enterprise” under VICAR, Jenkins’ attempted murder conviction, and Newsome’s conviction and sentence for witness tampering. However, the appellate court found insufficient evidence to support Brooks’ convictions for VICAR attempted murder (Count II) and the related firearms offense (Count III), concluding the government failed to prove Brooks had the specific intent to kill required under Virginia law. The court reversed and vacated those convictions, vacated Brooks’ sentence, and remanded for resentencing. The remainder of the district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who, in 2012, pled guilty to a federal drug conspiracy charge and was sentenced in 2013 to a 120-month prison term followed by five years of supervised release. At sentencing, the district court orally imposed four special conditions of supervised release but did not mention any standard, non-mandatory conditions. However, the written judgment issued later that day included both the special conditions and fourteen standard conditions. Years later, after his release from prison, the defendant was accused of violating several of these standard conditions, specifically those requiring notification of changes in residence or employment and permitting home visits by a probation officer.After allegations of these violations, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland held a revocation hearing. The defendant admitted to violating the standard conditions regarding home visits, and the government agreed to dismiss the other violations. The court revoked supervised release and imposed a new sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment and an additional 42 months of supervised release with the same conditions as previously imposed. The defendant appealed, arguing that, under United States v. Rogers, the standard conditions were invalid because they were not orally pronounced at his sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the defendant’s appellate waiver barred the claim, whether the appeal was procedurally proper, and whether there was plain error. The court held that the appellate waiver did not bar the challenge because the defendant was not appealing the original sentence but the revocation based on conditions never validly imposed. The court found the appeal timely and procedurally proper under recent circuit precedent. Applying plain error review, the court ruled that revocation based on unpronounced, discretionary conditions was error, affected substantial rights, and undermined the integrity of the proceedings. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s revocation judgment and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. McLaurin" on Justia Law

A noncitizen and lawful permanent resident was arrested in Virginia after participating in a cocaine transaction observed and recorded by law enforcement. He was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. Through retained counsel, he negotiated a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, avoiding a mandatory minimum sentence, while the government dropped the other charge. The final agreement omitted certain adverse immigration provisions, but included an acknowledgment that he wished to plead guilty regardless of immigration consequences, including potential automatic removal.After sentencing, the defendant learned he would be subject to mandatory deportation. He filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming his attorney provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him that his guilty plea would result in mandatory deportation. The district court initially denied relief, finding he had not shown prejudice, relying on his plea agreement’s language. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that he had demonstrated prejudice and remanded for the district court to consider whether counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.On remand, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court found the attorney had advised the defendant he was “deportable” and would face deportation proceedings, but did not state he would definitely be deported or was subject to “mandatory deportation.” The court held that, given the complexities and uncertainties of immigration outcomes, counsel’s advice met constitutional standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, when the clear consequence of a plea is deportability, counsel need only advise that the plea will render the defendant deportable and subject to removal proceedings; there is no constitutional requirement for counsel to state that deportation is mandatory or absolutely certain. View "United States v. Murillo" on Justia Law

A physician was charged with unlawfully distributing oxycodone, a controlled substance, after prescribing it to a patient he knew was addicted to opioids, and who subsequently died of a drug overdose. The government alleged that the prescriptions were not issued for legitimate medical purposes and were outside the usual course of professional practice. The physician pled guilty to all charges in 2019. At his plea hearing, the district court explained that the government would have to prove the prescriptions were unauthorized but, following then-binding Fourth Circuit precedent, did not tell him the government also had to prove he knew his conduct was unauthorized.Nearly three years later, the Supreme Court decided Ruan v. United States, holding that, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the government must prove that a physician “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner when prescribing controlled substances. The physician filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions, arguing his guilty plea was invalid because he had not been informed of the scienter requirement articulated in Ruan. The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina denied the motion, finding the claim procedurally defaulted because it was not raised earlier and that Ruan was not so novel as to excuse the default, since similar arguments were available and made by others at the time of the plea.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the legal basis for the physician’s Ruan-style mens rea claim was reasonably available at the time of his guilty plea, given existing Supreme Court precedent such as Rehaif v. United States. Therefore, the claim was not sufficiently novel to provide cause to overcome procedural default, and collateral relief was precluded. View "United States v. Dimkpa" on Justia Law

A student with autism, Y.A., reported to his family that he had been sexually assaulted by fellow students at his middle school. The family’s report to the school prompted an investigation led by Detective Jonathan Graham. Another student, A.D., claimed to have witnessed the assault and identified three perpetrators, including a boy with the same first name as L.M. Although A.D. could not pick L.M. out of a photo lineup, the school later identified L.M. as the individual A.D. had previously accused of bullying. Based on the forensic interviews and supporting evidence, Graham submitted his findings to the Loudoun County Juvenile Intake Office, which determined that probable cause existed for a juvenile petition and issued a detention order for L.M. The charges against L.M. were later dropped when inconsistencies in A.D.’s statements came to light.L.M., joined by other plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, asserting a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Graham and others, alleging violations of Virginia law and the Fourth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim, concluding that L.M. had not plausibly alleged that his seizure was unsupported by probable cause or that Graham was the cause of his detention, given the independent determination by the Juvenile Intake Officer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the facts alleged did not support a plausible claim for malicious prosecution under federal or state law because probable cause existed and there were no allegations that Graham withheld material information or misled the Juvenile Intake Officer. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "L.M. v. Graham" on Justia Law

Steven Jamerson was on supervised release in Western North Carolina after serving a sentence for a federal conviction. He violated the terms of his supervised release, prompting the initiation of revocation proceedings. In November 2023, a magistrate judge released him pending the outcome of these proceedings, under the condition that he remain in the custody of his mother, Connie Jamerson, who agreed to act as his third-party custodian and ensure his compliance with all release conditions, including self-surrender if sentenced to imprisonment.At the February 2024 revocation hearing, the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina revoked Steven Jamerson’s supervised release and imposed a four-month prison sentence. Rather than remanding him immediately, the court allowed him to self-surrender at a later date, maintaining the same release conditions, including his mother’s custodial responsibility. Both Steven Jamerson and Connie Jamerson received notice of the surrender date. When Steven failed to report as directed in March 2024, Connie Jamerson took no action to ensure his compliance, later stating that her son was responsible for himself. Steven was apprehended nearly a month later.The government moved for an order to show cause why Connie Jamerson should not be held in indirect criminal contempt. Following a bench trial, the District Court found that the November 2023 Release Order—and the custodial relationship it established—remained in effect through the self-surrender date. The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Connie Jamerson willfully violated this order by failing to ensure her son’s surrender and sentenced her to three days’ imprisonment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment, holding that a valid and sufficiently clear court order existed and that Connie Jamerson willfully violated it. View "United States v. Jamerson" on Justia Law

The case concerns two individuals who previously worked for a consulting firm that provided proprietary software to several state agencies. After leaving the company, they joined a competitor and helped secure a contract to develop similar software for other states. In 2016, a whistleblower alleged that the defendants' new employer was using materials misappropriated from their former company. This triggered a multi-agency federal investigation that lasted approximately six years. By the time charges were brought, two potentially significant witnesses had died, and several state agencies had destroyed documents that might have been relevant to the defense.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, after the defendants moved to dismiss, found that the loss of the witnesses' testimony and the destruction of documents resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendants. The district court concluded that the government's lengthy investigation did not sufficiently justify the preindictment delay, given the prejudice to the defense, and dismissed ten out of fourteen counts in the superseding indictment on due process grounds. The government appealed this dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that, even assuming the defendants suffered actual and substantial prejudice, the government's preindictment delay was the result of a good faith, ongoing investigation and not motivated by bad faith or an attempt to gain a tactical advantage. The Fourth Circuit clarified that investigative delay, without improper motive, does not violate due process, even if it results in prejudice to the defendant. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the counts and remanded the case for further proceedings on all counts. View "US v. Minkkinen" on Justia Law