Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a defendant who, in May 2023, sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant on three occasions, totaling nearly 66 grams. When law enforcement later executed an arrest warrant for his failure to register as a sex offender, they discovered additional quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and crack cocaine in his possession. The defendant was indicted on three counts of distributing cocaine base and one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. He pled guilty to all four counts without a plea agreement.A probation officer preparing a Presentence Investigation Report determined that the defendant should be classified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, based on two prior state convictions for drug offenses. This classification significantly increased his sentencing range. The defendant objected, arguing that one of the predicate offenses—under Florida law—criminalized conduct not covered by the federal definition of a “controlled substance offense,” such as simple possession and purchase. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted the career-offender enhancement but, anticipating a possible error, stated it would impose the same 120-month sentence regardless, based on the defendant’s criminal history and other factors.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in applying the career-offender enhancement, because the underlying Florida statute was not a categorical match to the federal definition. However, the Fourth Circuit found this error harmless. The district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence even without the enhancement, and the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the court’s thorough consideration of statutory sentencing factors. The Fourth Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Cox" on Justia Law

In July 2023, law enforcement responded to an incident in which James Jacobs allegedly discharged a firearm during a dispute with his girlfriend at his home. During a subsequent search, officers discovered two firearms. Jacobs, who has a prior felony conviction and a previous misdemeanor conviction for domestic battery in West Virginia, admitted to knowing he was prohibited from possessing firearms. As a result, a grand jury in the Northern District of West Virginia indicted him for possessing firearms after a felony conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and after a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under § 922(g)(9).The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia granted Jacobs’ motion to dismiss both counts of the indictment. The district court, employing the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, found that the government failed to demonstrate a historical tradition of disarming individuals like Jacobs—nonviolent felons and domestic violence offenders. The court concluded that both statutes were unconstitutional as applied to Jacobs and dismissed the charges without reaching the facial challenges.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that recent decisions—including United States v. Rahimi, United States v. Canada, United States v. Hunt, and United States v. Nutter—foreclose Jacobs’ facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) and his facial challenge to § 922(g)(9). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 922(g)(1) charge and barred Jacobs from reviving those challenges. However, the Fourth Circuit determined that further proceedings were necessary regarding Jacobs’ as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(9), vacated the district court’s ruling on that count, and remanded for additional factfinding and analysis. View "United States v. Jacobs" on Justia Law

A group of defendants operated a drug trafficking ring in Virginia. When a customer failed to pay for drugs, two leaders of the organization sought retribution and offered one defendant $10,000 to murder someone close to the delinquent customer. That defendant recruited his cousin, and together they traveled from North Carolina to Virginia and murdered the customer’s aunt. All four defendants were charged with numerous offenses related to drug distribution, murder, and murder-for-hire. After a jury trial, each defendant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reviewed and denied several pretrial motions to suppress evidence, including challenges to GPS tracker warrants, pen register orders, cell-site location data, and wiretap authorizations. The district court also rejected arguments related to double jeopardy, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and severance of trials. The defendants raised sufficiency of the evidence challenges and various constitutional and statutory claims in the district court, many of which were preserved for appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions and sentences. Applying the relevant legal standards, the Fourth Circuit found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts on all counts for each defendant. The court held that convictions and sentences for both murder-for-hire and conspiracy to commit murder-for-hire do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because each offense requires proof of a fact the other does not. The court affirmed the denial of motions to suppress, finding no reversible error. It also rejected additional challenges related to jury instructions, evidentiary matters, severance, and duplicity. The judgments of the district court were affirmed. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Raymond Richardson was indicted for first-degree robbery under West Virginia law, specifically charged with using the threat of deadly force against Denise Cool to steal money. However, at trial, the prosecution presented evidence that Richardson accomplished the robbery by physically assaulting Cool rather than by threatening her with a deadly weapon. Richardson admitted to hitting Cool but denied taking her money. The jury found him guilty of first-degree robbery, assault during the commission of a felony, and possession with intent to deliver cocaine. The central issue on appeal concerned the alleged variance between the indictment and the State’s theory at trial.Following his conviction, Richardson sought post-conviction relief in state court, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. At an evidentiary hearing, Richardson and his trial counsel testified. Counsel acknowledged missing the indictment’s specific language but stated that the variance did not affect the defense strategy, which was focused on denying any theft rather than disputing the manner in which the robbery was committed. The state court denied habeas relief, finding Richardson had sufficient notice of the charges and was not prejudiced by the variance. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the difference between the indictment and trial evidence did not mislead Richardson or prejudice his defense.On federal habeas review, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Richardson’s petition, finding he received adequate notice under the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the variance did not violate due process because Richardson was convicted of the offense charged, had actual notice of the evidence to be presented, and failed to show that the variance hindered his defense. The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice and affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Richardson v. Frame" on Justia Law

William White, a federal prisoner serving a lengthy sentence, was transferred from one federal correctional institution to another, spending three days at a federal transfer center in Oklahoma City, where he was held in a Special Housing Unit for security reasons. During this brief transit period, he was not offered, nor did he participate in, any evidence-based recidivism reduction programming required under the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). White later sought to have his time at the transfer center count toward FSA time credits, which could reduce his period of incarceration.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied White’s habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) refusal to award FSA time credits for the three-day transfer period was consistent with BOP regulations and policy statements, which generally do not consider prisoners in transit or in certain housing statuses to be “successfully participating” in qualifying programs. The court also rejected White’s claim that his due process rights were violated, holding that the FSA does not create a protected liberty interest in earning time credits during every day of incarceration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the plain text of the FSA, a prisoner is entitled to time credits only for days in which he actually participates in qualifying programming or productive activities. Because White did not participate in any such programming during his three days in transit, he was not statutorily entitled to those time credits. The court further held that the FSA does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest in earning time credits, so the BOP’s actions did not violate due process. View "White v. Warden of Fed Correctional Ins - Cumberland" on Justia Law

Ali Al-Timimi, a respected lecturer at an Islamic center in Virginia, became acquainted with a group of young Muslim men who engaged in activities including paintball, which some saw as preparation for “jihad in the form of combat.” While Al-Timimi did not directly participate in these preparations, he offered advice on discretion after FBI attention. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, Al-Timimi attended a gathering where he urged attendees to repent, leave the United States, and join militant groups abroad, including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) in Pakistan. His statements inspired several individuals to make concrete plans to travel overseas for training, though he did not provide operational details or set timelines. Some group members subsequently traveled to Pakistan but did not engage in combat.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted and convicted Al-Timimi on multiple counts, including conspiracy, solicitation, and aiding terrorist groups. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and other consecutive terms. Over two decades, his case saw numerous appeals and remands, including vacatur of certain counts based on changes in law regarding “crimes of violence” (as in Johnson v. United States and United States v. Davis). Ultimately, Al-Timimi appealed his remaining convictions (Counts 2–6, 9, and 10), asserting First Amendment protection for his speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Al-Timimi’s speech constituted unprotected incitement, solicitation, or facilitation of criminal acts. The court held that his speech, though inflammatory and disturbing, did not incite imminent lawless action nor did it intentionally solicit or assist a specific crime. As his advocacy did not meet the narrow exceptions to First Amendment protection, the court vacated Al-Timimi’s remaining convictions and remanded for judgments of acquittal. View "US v. Al-Timimi" on Justia Law

The defendant operated an immigration services business, preparing self-petition visa applications under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for clients who claimed abuse by U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses. Investigators found that the defendant submitted applications containing forged psychological evaluations—some altered from a psychologist’s prior reports—and fabricated residential lease documents for multiple clients. These documents were used as evidence to satisfy VAWA eligibility criteria, such as establishing residence and proof of abuse. The defendant was not a licensed attorney and did not sign the applications as preparer.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland presided over the defendant’s trial. After the government presented its case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the fraudulent documents were not “required” by immigration law and that the statute required submission under oath, which he claimed was not satisfied. The district court denied the motion, ruling that while the regulations did not mandate specific documents, any evidence submitted to establish eligibility became “required” for that application. The jury subsequently convicted the defendant on all counts, and he was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. The defendant did not renew his acquittal motion and later appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for several counts and alleging a sentencing error based on a discrepancy between oral and written conditions of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and sentence. The court held that documents submitted to establish eligibility in VAWA self-petitions—including psychological evaluations and lease agreements—constitute “required” documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) once chosen and presented. It further held that the statute’s “knowingly presents” clause does not require an oath for criminal liability. Regarding sentencing, the court found no material discrepancy between oral and written supervised release conditions and concluded that resentencing was not warranted. View "US v. Aborisade" on Justia Law

Two plainclothes detectives in Baltimore, acting on a tip about drug activity, observed Robert Gary Moore and another individual near a parked vehicle. When approached, Moore dropped a plastic bag and fled but was apprehended. The police recovered the bag, which was later analyzed in a laboratory report stating it contained cocaine. During Moore’s trial for possession and possession with intent to distribute, the State introduced two chain-of-custody reports: one disclosed before trial and another (the ECU report) disclosed only mid-trial. The latter did not mention the chemist who performed the analysis, raising questions about whether the correct bag was tested. Moore’s counsel did not object to the late disclosure or use the discrepancy in his defense. Moore was convicted by a jury.After his conviction was affirmed on appeal by Maryland’s intermediate appellate court, Moore sought postconviction relief in Maryland state court, arguing that the State’s belated disclosure of the ECU report violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and that his counsel was ineffective. The Maryland trial court initially granted relief under Brady but, upon remand from the intermediate appellate court for further factfinding, ultimately denied both claims, finding that disclosure during trial did not constitute suppression under Brady. Moore’s application for leave to appeal this denial was rejected.Moore then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The district court found a Brady violation and granted habeas relief, ordering Moore’s conviction vacated unless retried within sixty days. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the state court had unreasonably applied federal law and that a Brady violation warranted habeas relief. However, it held that federal district courts lack authority to vacate state convictions directly and thus vacated the district court’s order, remanding for a new order consistent with the proper bounds of federal habeas relief. View "Moore v. State of Maryland" on Justia Law

A dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan, the defendant traveled from the U.S. to Pakistan in 2009, along with four others, with the intent to join jihad in Afghanistan. Upon arrival, the group attempted to make contact with terrorist organizations and made efforts to cross into Afghanistan. Pakistani authorities arrested them in Sargodha, Pakistan, and subsequently tried and convicted them on terrorism-related offenses. The defendant served approximately ten years in a Pakistani prison. After completing his sentence, he was extradited to the United States, where he faced federal charges arising from the same underlying conduct.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia arraigned the defendant and, after he waived his Speedy Trial Act rights, considered his motion to dismiss the indictment on Sixth Amendment speedy trial grounds. The motion argued that the government’s delay in seeking his extradition and prosecution in the U.S. violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied the motion, finding that, although the length of the delay was significant, the government made reasonably diligent and good-faith efforts to secure his return, and the remaining factors weighed against finding a violation. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the speedy trial ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying the four-factor balancing test from Barker v. Wingo. The appellate court agreed that only the length of the delay favored the defendant, but reasoned that the government’s efforts, the defendant’s own conduct in resisting extradition, and the absence of actual prejudice outweighed that factor. The court held there was no Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation and affirmed the conviction. View "US v. Chaudhry" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2020 to two counts of distributing a mixture containing heroin and fentanyl, in violation of federal drug laws. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia determined he qualified as a career offender, which substantially increased his advisory sentencing range under the Guidelines. The court ultimately imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release.Subsequently, the defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that changes in the law meant he would not now be classified as a career offender, and, therefore, his Guidelines range would be much lower if sentenced today. He asked the court to reduce his sentence to time served. The district court found that the significant difference between his original and recalculated Guidelines ranges constituted an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction. However, the court ultimately denied the motion, concluding that the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—particularly the defendant’s lengthy and serious criminal history and the need to promote respect for the law—outweighed his arguments for release. The court also noted his rehabilitative efforts but found them insufficient to demonstrate a reduced danger to the public.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed only whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for compassionate release. Applying a deferential standard, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court had considered all relevant arguments and provided sufficient reasoning for its decision. The appellate court affirmed the denial of compassionate release, holding that the district court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally and satisfied all statutory requirements in its analysis. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law