Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Samuel Joseph was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during two encounters with law enforcement. The first encounter occurred in Charleston, West Virginia, where an officer, after receiving a tip about possible drug activity, observed Joseph's suspicious behavior and items consistent with drug distribution in a motel room. Joseph was apprehended after fleeing from officers, and a search of his duffel bag, which he abandoned during the chase, revealed drugs and firearms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Joseph's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounters. Joseph argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and Joseph's behavior, and that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Joseph based on their observations and his unprovoked flight. The court also found that the officers' actions following the stop, including the use of a drug-detection dog and obtaining a search warrant for the duffel bag, were permissible and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the court rejected Joseph's arguments regarding the lack of bodycam footage and the reliability of the initial tip, as well as his claim that the traffic stop in Parkersburg was impermissibly prolonged. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Edwin Leo Brown was indicted in October 2016 on four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government had evidence of Brown selling cocaine base and discovered a firearm upon his arrest. Brown faced up to 90 years in prison. His attorney, Frank Harper, initially advised him that he was likely facing up to 120 months’ imprisonment and presented two plea agreements limiting his prison exposure to ten years. Brown, skeptical of Harper’s advice, did not trust him and Harper withdrew as counsel. Brett Wentz then became Brown’s attorney and erroneously advised him that his sentencing exposure would be the same whether he accepted a plea deal or not. Brown rejected the plea offers and later pleaded guilty to all counts, receiving a 210-month sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that Brown’s attorney performed deficiently but concluded that Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The magistrate judge recommended denying Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence, stating that Brown presented no contemporaneous evidence to support his claim that he would have accepted the plea agreement if properly advised. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Brown’s motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in applying the standard from Lee v. United States, which concerns accepted plea deals, to Brown’s case involving a rejected plea deal. The Fourth Circuit held that Brown demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised, given the significant disparity between the plea offer and the sentence he received. The court reversed the district court’s denial of relief, remanded the case, and required the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

David Nutter was indicted in August 2021 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Nutter had three prior convictions in Ohio for domestic violence and child endangerment. He acknowledged possessing firearms and did not dispute his prior convictions but moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Nutter's motion, applying the means-end analysis from District of Columbia v. Heller. Nutter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which rejected the means-end analysis, Nutter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional under the new framework. The district court again denied the motion, concluding that § 922(g)(9) was consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals deemed a threat to public safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional, finding that it fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court noted that the statute's purpose and method align with historical analogues, such as surety and going armed laws, which were designed to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Nutter's motion to dismiss the indictment and upheld his conviction. View "United States v. Nutter" on Justia Law

Vincent Deritis was convicted by a jury of four offenses involving child sexual abuse material. Count One involved using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for producing a visual depiction, based on a video of his stepdaughter showering. Counts Two and Three involved similar charges based on photographs of his stepdaughter while she was sleeping. Count Four involved possession of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced him to 600 months of imprisonment and imposed a special assessment of $117,000.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Deritis's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Google account, finding that the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court also denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Counts One and Two, finding substantial evidence supported the convictions. Additionally, the court excluded exculpatory testimony from Deritis's ex-wife, which Deritis argued was impermissible hearsay. The district court instructed the jury on the definition of "lascivious exhibition" using the Dost factors, which Deritis challenged as erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, since the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court found that the jury instruction on "lascivious exhibition" was proper and consistent with precedent. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the convictions on Counts One and Two. The exclusion of the exculpatory testimony was deemed harmless error. However, the court found that the district court plainly erred by imposing a special assessment without considering the mandatory statutory factors on the record.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the special assessment and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "U.S. v. Deritis" on Justia Law

In October 2018, a sheriff’s deputy in Smyth County, Virginia, stopped Ashley Langley for erratic driving. Langley admitted there were drugs in the vehicle, and a search revealed methamphetamine, distribution paraphernalia, and a firearm. Langley and her passengers informed officers that more drugs were at Langley’s residence, where her out-of-state supplier, Jerada Henderson, was staying. Officers obtained a warrant to search Langley’s home, where they found more methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, and two cell phones belonging to Henderson. Henderson was arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied Henderson’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, finding the warrant valid and the officers’ reliance on it reasonable. The court also rejected Henderson’s proposed jury instruction regarding the insufficiency of a single drug transaction to prove conspiracy. Henderson was convicted of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute and conspiracy but acquitted of firearm charges. The district court calculated his sentence, attributing to him drugs sold by Langley before his October 2018 delivery and applying a firearm enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress, finding the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable. The court also upheld the rejection of Henderson’s proposed jury instruction, noting that evidence of a substantial drug quantity can support a conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court found no clear error in the district court’s drug quantity calculation or the application of the firearm enhancement, affirming Henderson’s convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Steven Fulton was convicted by a jury of knowingly making a false statement in connection with the attempted acquisition of a firearm. The evidence showed that Fulton denied having any felony convictions on a background check form at a gun shop in North Carolina, despite having a prior felony conviction in New Jersey. The district court overturned the jury’s verdict and entered a judgment of acquittal, reasoning that the Government did not present evidence to the jury demonstrating that Fulton’s New Jersey offense was punishable by more than a year in prison. The district court also conditionally granted Fulton a new trial in case the acquittal was reversed.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially reviewed the case. The district court granted Fulton’s motion for acquittal, holding that the Government failed to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony. The court reasoned that the criminal judgment did not define a third-degree offense, did not include the word “felony,” and did not identify the maximum punishment for the offense. The district court also conditionally granted a new trial, citing insufficient evidence of Fulton’s knowledge that he was a felon.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment of acquittal, holding that the Government had introduced sufficient evidence to prove that Fulton’s New Jersey conviction was a felony punishable by more than one year in prison. The court determined that whether a crime is punishable by more than one year in prison is a legal question for the judge to determine, not a factual question for the jury. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s conditional grant of a new trial, finding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdict. View "US v. Fulton" on Justia Law

Samir Fernandes Baptista, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted in Massachusetts of unarmed assault with intent to rob or steal. During his removal proceedings, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determined that this state crime is categorically an aggravated felony attempted theft offense under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Consequently, the immigration judge ordered Baptista removed for committing an aggravated felony after admission, and the BIA upheld this order.Baptista appealed the BIA's decision, arguing that his conviction does not qualify as an attempted theft offense under the INA. He contended that under Massachusetts law, a defendant could be convicted of unarmed assault by stealing property with the victim’s fraudulently obtained consent, which would make the state offense broader than the generic federal theft offense that requires the taking to be against the victim’s will. Baptista also argued that his conviction cannot qualify as an attempt because it does not require a defendant to commit an overt act toward a taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the BIA's legal conclusion de novo. The court concluded that the Massachusetts unarmed assault statute requires the taking to be against the victim’s will and involves force and violence, making it a categorical match to a generic federal theft offense. Additionally, the court found that the statute requires an overt act constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the theft, thus qualifying as an attempted theft offense under the INA. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit denied Baptista’s petition for review. View "Baptista v. Bondi" on Justia Law

The case involves Raymond Dugan, who was convicted and sentenced in the Southern District of West Virginia for accessing child pornography. Dugan raised three main issues on appeal: the denial of his motion to compel discovery related to a foreign law enforcement agency's investigation, the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant, and the restitution order requiring him to pay $22,000 to five child victims.In the lower court, Dugan was convicted by a jury of accessing child pornography. He was sentenced to 54 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $22,000 in restitution. Dugan filed pretrial motions to compel discovery and suppress evidence, both of which were denied by the district court. The court found that the foreign agency's tip was reliable and that the search warrant was supported by probable cause. The court also ruled that the officers acted in good faith when executing the warrant.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the denial of the motion to compel discovery was appropriate because Dugan's request was speculative and unsupported by evidence. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the search warrant was based on probable cause, given the deliberate steps required to access the child pornography website. Finally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the restitution order, as the district court had carefully considered the relevant factors and evidence in determining the amounts.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dugan's conviction and sentence, including the restitution order. View "US v. Dugan" on Justia Law

Julio Alvarado Dubon moved to suppress firearms and ammunition discovered during a warrantless search of his home. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Alvarado Dubon voluntarily consented to the search and, even if he had not, the items were found during a valid protective sweep. The case involves officers searching for a man named Rolman Balcarcel, who was reported to have weapons and potentially planning violent acts. Alvarado Dubon allowed officers into his home, where they saw a handgun magazine. After a brief interaction, Alvarado Dubon gestured and verbally indicated consent for the officers to check the rest of the house, where they found firearms.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Alvarado Dubon's motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search. The court found that Alvarado Dubon had voluntarily consented to the search and that the search was justified as a protective sweep. Alvarado Dubon entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He was sentenced to 16 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court's finding of voluntary consent was not clearly erroneous. The court noted that Alvarado Dubon's actions and body language indicated consent and that the conditions under which he consented did not suggest coercion or duress. The court also concluded that Alvarado Dubon did not effectively revoke his consent before the rifle was found. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Dubon" on Justia Law

Dr. Timothy Baxter, while working for Indivior, a pharmaceutical company, distributed misleading information to Massachusetts’s Medicaid program about the safety of new opioid drugs. This led to his conviction for misdemeanor drug misbranding. Following his conviction, the Secretary of Health and Human Services banned him from participating in federal healthcare programs for five years. Baxter challenged this exclusion, arguing that his crime did not categorically relate to the delivery of an item or service under a state healthcare program.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rejecting Baxter’s claims. Baxter then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the exclusion statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a), does not require a categorical approach. Instead, it employs a circumstance-specific approach, meaning it looks at the actual conduct of the individual rather than the elements of the statute of conviction. The court found that Baxter’s conduct—misbranding drugs to influence MassHealth’s coverage decisions—was related to the delivery of an item under a state healthcare program. Therefore, his exclusion was mandatory under the statute.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding Baxter’s exclusion from federal healthcare programs. View "Baxter v. Kennedy" on Justia Law