Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After committing or attempting to commit thirteen robberies, Defendant was indicted on twenty-two counts of robbery-related activity and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before a jury could return a verdict in Defendant’s original trial, it was deemed a mistrial. Before a retrial the district court severed Defendant’s charges into two trials—one for the felon in possession of a firearm charge and another for the robbery-related charges. After both trials resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts, Defendant filed motions for a judgment of acquittal in each case, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The district court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, contesting the district court’s decisions on both motions for acquittal, the district court’s enforcement of a stipulation in the retrial, and the district court’s use of certain jointly proposed jury instructions, and alleging a speedy trial violation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties entered into an open-ended stipulation in which they both agreed that Defendant’s alleged robberies affected commerce. That Defendant later regretted entering into the stipulation is not sufficient to relieve him of its continuing effect. Further, there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony and knew of his status as a felon. As to the possession element, the relevant firearm was purchased by Defendant’s on-again-off-again girlfriend. Finally, the court held that Defendant waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation. View "US v. Christopher Robertson" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury convicted Movant of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. His direct appeal and initial application for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 were unsuccessful. Now, he moved the Fourth Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. And he argued in the alternative that if his motion is denied, he will be authorized to file a traditional Section 2241 habeas application through Section 2255(e)’s savings clause.   The Fourth Circuit denied Movant’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application because Rehaif did not announce a constitutional rule. But as a consequence of our determination that he may not file a Section 2255 application, the court held that he may file a Section 2241 application under the savings clause. The court explained that it is true that, after Rehaif, possessing a firearm as a felon remains criminal under Section 922(g). But the government did not charge Movant with simply “possessing” a firearm in violation of Section 922(g). It charged him with “knowingly” doing so under Sections 922(g) and 924(a). That his conviction might have survived Rehaif if the government had charged him under Section 922(g) alone is of no moment: the government chose not to do so. View "In re: Randolph McNeill" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so.   In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). In 2016, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. In the motion, he cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the motion. The court concluded that Johnson did not affect the validity of Defendant’s Section 924(j) convictions because they rested on predicate “crimes of violence”, not on the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague, recognizing the specific right Defendant asserted in his Section 2255 motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the other Section 924(j) count because the conviction is unsupported by a valid predicate offense, and the Government concedes that he is entitled to relief. The court explained that because Defendant filed his motion within one year of Johnson and Davis extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson, the court held that it was timely. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion as to one of his Section 924(j) convictions because Defendant procedurally defaulted his claim challenging the conviction and cannot establish grounds for excusing the default. View "US v. Andra Green" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Appellant. On May 20, 2009, a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Appellant’s mental condition improved with treatment. The district court ordered his conditional discharge. Appellant returned home and lived with his mother after conditional discharge. The district court revoked the term and recommitted him. This appeal presents two consequential questions. Both relate to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. A commitment wrongly perpetuated is an unwarranted restraint of liberty; a commitment errantly discontinued poses a danger to the committee and the public.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the record is unclear whether the district court’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. It also appears from the record that the district court collapsed both inquiries of Section 4246(f) into a single question, focusing only on whether Appellant violated the conditions of his release and not explaining why “in light of” those violations his continued release created a substantial risk to other persons or property. Additionally, the record would benefit from further development respecting the violations alleged and the available, recent records from the facility. Further, the court wrote that the government should take note of its evidentiary burden, develop evidence on the point, and provide the district court a sound basis for making reasoned findings on the matter of dangerousness for that particular alleged violation. View "US v. Christopher Perkins" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, Defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, an enhanced penalty that represents the mandatory minimum sentence required for such a violation when the provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) are satisfied. ACCA provides that when a defendant violates Section 922(g) and has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense . . . committed on occasions different from one another,” he shall be given the enhanced sentence. Defendant’s indictment did not allege the facts supporting the ACCA enhancement; instead, the district court found them as part of the sentencing procedure. Defendant maintained that, in light of Supreme Court cases and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, ACCA’s requirement that the defendant has committed the prior offenses on different occasions must be alleged in the indictment and found by a jury or admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea because that fact increases the penalty for his crime.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the ACCA enhancement remains a matter for sentencing. Under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the facts that support a recidivism enhancement are resolved by the district court during sentencing, and ACCA provides just such a recidivism enhancement, as the court recognized in Thompson. Despite Defendant’s arguments to the contrary, the court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps, Mathis, and Wooden have not narrowed or overruled Almendarez-Torres. And if they have done so by implication, the Supreme Court must say so, not a court of appeals. View "US v. Rico Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was originally charged with four federal offenses: (1) carjacking; (2) kidnapping; (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence; and (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The parties agreed Defendant would plead guilty to the kidnapping and Section 924(c) charges, and the government would dismiss the carjacking and felon in possession charges. Neither the indictment nor the plea agreement specified a predicate “crime of violence” for the Section 924(c) charge, and the plea agreement contained no agreed-upon factual statement. Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction based on intervening authority. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The court acknowledged it is now clear “kidnapping is not a Section 924(c) predicate offense.” But the court concluded Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction remained valid because.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate his firearm conviction and remanded him for resentencing. The court explained that the categorical approach does not deny the district court its ultimate discretion, nor does it deprive the facts of their force. Even if a statutory enhancement under Section 924(c) does not apply because of the categorical approach, as is the case here, judges may, at their discretion, calculate a guidelines range or grant upward variances based on the violent nature of the criminal activity. Even if the categorical approach renders violent predicates legally invalid, district courts are at liberty to sentence the violent character of the cases that come before them. View "US v. Elliott Graham" on Justia Law

After Defendant’s allocution, but before his attorney argued at his sentencing hearing, the district court forecast that the minimum sentence he would receive was 60 months in prison—his crime’s statutory max. Defendant’s attorney then advocated for a lower sentence. The court imposed a 60-month sentence. He claimed it was procedurally unreasonable for the court to state his term of imprisonment before his attorney argued. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because it was not adequately explained and was based on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range.The Fourth Circuit explained that because Defendant did not make this argument to the district court, the court reviewed it for plain error and found none. The court explained that the district court offered enough explanation to satisfy us that it considered Defendant’s alcohol addiction argument and had a reasoned basis for the sentence it imposed. Defendant and his defense counsel argued at sentencing that Defendant’s untreated alcohol addiction contributed to his crime and warranted a lighter sentence. In response, the district court suggested that it was Defendant’s own fault that he had not sought treatment for his addiction. The district court then discussed the nature of Defendant’s offense, the impact his actions had on his victims, and the danger he posed to the public. The record as a whole shows the district court’s rationale for discounting Defendant’s argument and why the court thought the Section 3553(a) factors outweighed it. Accordingly, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that the sentence was inadequately explained and, thus, procedurally unreasonable. View "US v. Joel Covington" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for crimes related to an armed robbery of a Circle K convenience store. He argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting liability, abused its discretion in seating a juror who expressed difficulty hearing during jury selection, and responded inadequately to his objections to several conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the jury been instructed on the intent requirement of aiding and abetting liability. Further, the court concluded that in context, it is clear the district court believed Juror Eight’s difficulty hearing was a temporary problem specific to the court’s questioning during jury selection. Even if the district court had not been clear, ambiguity alone cannot demonstrate a “manifest” abuse of discretion. Finally, reading the full transcript, it is clear the district court did not believe any of these conditions delegated too much authority to the Probation Office. Defendant does not challenge the substance of these conditions on appeal, and the court held that it is satisfied that the district court gave “specific attention” to Defendant’s objections before rejecting them. View "US v. Yakotus Odum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He appealed, arguing that the district court made four errors warranting reversal. First, the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitations. Second, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “monetary transaction.” Third, the court erred by instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. And fourth, the conviction must be vacated under Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), because there is no way to determine whether he was convicted on a legally valid theory.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here Defendant offered no affirmative evidence showing that the conspiracy was terminated or that he affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the operative July 2, 2014, limitations date. The court wrote that because some conspiratorial acts in Defendant’s case occurred before July 2, 2014, the limitations date did not mean that the district judge was required to provide a statute of limitations instruction. Declining to give one was, therefore, not an abuse of the substantial discretion the court affords district judges in fashioning jury instructions. Moreover, the court held that the government did, in fact, present evidence of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy past July 2, 2014, even though it was not needed for a non-overt act conspiracy. View "US v. Kenneth Ravenell" on Justia Law