Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A West Virginia defendant was indicted in 2018 on multiple sexual offense charges involving a seven-year-old girl. Prior to trial, the court granted the defendant’s motions to exclude a video interview of the victim and records from her therapy sessions, limiting both the State and the defense from introducing certain hearsay evidence. During opening statements at the first trial, defense counsel referenced specific statements made by the victim in the excluded materials, suggesting an alternative perpetrator. The State objected after the opening statements, arguing that the defense had violated pretrial evidentiary rulings. The trial court found that the defense’s actions had gone “far afield” of its orders and, over the defendant’s objection, granted the State’s motion for a mistrial.The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the mistrial was not required by “manifest necessity.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that the defense had created the necessity for a mistrial. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia later affirmed, holding that the defendant’s right against double jeopardy was not violated because defense counsel’s conduct in opening statement created a manifest necessity for the mistrial. The defendant subsequently filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which granted relief, concluding that the defense had not violated any pretrial orders and that manifest necessity was lacking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the highly deferential standard of review required by AEDPA, the state court’s conclusion that manifest necessity justified the mistrial was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. The case was remanded with instructions to deny the habeas petition. View "Wood v. Straughn" on Justia Law

Stephen Snyder, a veteran Maryland attorney, was charged with attempted extortion and Travel Act violations after threatening to launch a damaging media campaign against a hospital unless it paid him $25 million in a personal consultancy deal. Snyder had represented patients in medical malpractice cases against the hospital and, during negotiations, repeatedly demanded the payment, suggesting it would "bury" incriminating findings about the hospital’s transplant program. Despite declining health and cognitive concerns, Snyder insisted on representing himself at trial, supported by standby counsel.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland held two Faretta hearings, where Snyder’s competency and voluntary waiver of counsel were confirmed. Throughout pretrial and trial, Snyder’s health issues became evident, and the court repeatedly advised against self-representation, but Snyder persisted. During the nine-day trial, the court addressed issues including limiting testimony from a witness bound by a nondisclosure agreement, denying Snyder’s request for a reliance-on-counsel jury instruction, and refusing to voir dire the jury after Snyder’s contempt arrest. The jury convicted Snyder on all counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s rulings. It held that Snyder’s concession of competence to stand trial precluded his argument for reversal based on self-representation, reaffirming that a defendant competent to stand trial is competent to waive counsel. The court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the reliance-on-counsel instruction, the limitation of testimony due to the nondisclosure agreement, or the refusal to voir dire the jury regarding publicity about Snyder’s contempt. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in full. View "US v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Kirsten Ball, a licensed physician, was indicted in April 2023 for conspiracy to distribute oxycodone and twenty counts of distribution of oxycodone, based on her practice of prescribing unusually large quantities of the drug from her home office between 2005 and 2022. The government presented evidence that her prescribing practices deviated from accepted medical standards, which Ball did not dispute. Her appeal focused on whether the jury instructions at trial properly conveyed the correct mens rea standard required for conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruan v. United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a five-day jury trial, after which Ball was convicted of conspiracy and all but one distribution count. The parties had jointly proposed jury instructions that required proof Ball knew she was acting outside the “course of her professional practice.” The district court revised these instructions, removing the possessive pronoun “her” to avoid confusion about idiosyncratic medical practice. Ball’s counsel objected to the change, arguing it was inconsistent with the Ruan decision, which clarified the subjective mental state required for conviction.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied a de novo standard to the jury instructions. The court held that the instructions, read as a whole, accurately reflected the law: the government must prove both that Ball’s prescriptions were objectively unauthorized under professional standards and that she subjectively knew or intended her conduct to be unauthorized. The court determined that the charge sufficiently required the jury to find this subjective knowledge, distinguishing the instructions from those found insufficient in prior Fourth Circuit cases. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Ball’s convictions. View "US v. Ball" on Justia Law

A traveler arriving in the United States from Bolivia was subject to inspection by U.S. Customs and Border Protection at Washington Dulles International Airport. The officer requested that the traveler unlock his two iPhones, which he did. Within approximately two minutes, the officer accessed the photo galleries, including hidden folders, and discovered sexually explicit images of prepubescent girls. The traveler was subsequently arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on multiple counts relating to child pornography.The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his phones, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, during which the officer explained her suspicions. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding that either individualized suspicion was present or, alternatively, that the officer acted in good faith. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to all counts, preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison and 25 years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether manual searches of cell phones at the border are “routine” and thus exempt from the requirement of individualized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that manual searches of cell phones at the border are routine border searches and do not require individualized suspicion, distinguishing such searches from forensic searches, which are nonroutine and require some level of individualized suspicion. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress. View "US v. Cardozo" on Justia Law

While serving a term of supervised release for prior, unrelated convictions, an individual was found by probation officers to have acquired several weapons, including a loaded assault-style rifle. During subsequent proceedings, the individual attempted to persuade a young man to falsely claim ownership of the rifle at a revocation hearing, offering payment and making threats against the young man’s mother. The young man later recanted and disclosed the threats and payment. As a result, a jury convicted the individual of unlawful possession of a firearm and of witness tampering.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia received a presentence investigation report that set the base offense level at twenty-six under the Sentencing Guidelines, citing the type of firearm and the defendant’s two prior controlled substance felony convictions—one federal and one under West Virginia law. The defendant objected pro se to considering the state conviction as a qualifying offense, and also argued for a downward departure based on alleged mistreatment while in pretrial detention. At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report in full, imposed enhancements for obstruction, and, after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and considering arguments from both sides, denied a downward departure. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 120 months for the firearm offense and 180 months for witness tampering, citing the seriousness of the conduct and the defendant’s lengthy, violent criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the sentence. It held that the district court did not plainly err in treating the West Virginia conviction as a qualifying controlled substance offense for Guidelines purposes and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in addressing the defendant’s sentencing arguments. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Wable" on Justia Law

A noncitizen, originally from El Salvador, unlawfully entered the United States in 2003. In 2018, he was convicted of serious crimes, after which he was placed in removal proceedings while still incarcerated. During those proceedings, he conceded removability but sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, fearing for his life if returned to El Salvador. The immigration judge denied his application, finding his testimony not credible and ordering his removal. He was informed of his right to appeal by a set deadline. The noncitizen informed his attorney he wished to appeal, but due to delays in receiving and returning a fee waiver form, the notice of appeal was filed after the deadline. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely, and the noncitizen was removed.After unlawfully reentering the United States and being convicted of new state felonies, he was indicted for illegal reentry under federal law. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his prior removal order was invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, as his attorney failed to timely file the notice of appeal. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion, holding that he had not exhausted available administrative remedies, specifically by failing to properly present his ineffective-assistance claim to the Board in accordance with procedural requirements set forth in Matter of Lozada.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), a noncitizen must exhaust administrative remedies before collaterally attacking a removal order. It found that the appellant did not substantially comply with Lozada’s requirements for raising an ineffective-assistance claim before the Board, and thus failed to exhaust his remedies. Accordingly, the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "US v. Gil" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated an online community involved in trafficking personal information, focusing on an individual who, after arrest, became a confidential informant. The informant communicated with a user known as Pit Boss 2600 (also CIA INTEL), who offered to sell debit card information. Undercover agents deposited money into Pit Boss 2600’s bank account, which was later withdrawn by Jonathan Giannone, the account holder. The government matched statements made by Pit Boss 2600 in online chats to Giannone’s travel records to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Giannone was indicted and, after a jury trial, convicted of three counts of wire fraud and two counts of aggravated identity theft.Following his conviction in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Giannone filed a series of FOIA requests and later pursued a writ of coram nobis, asserting that the government had withheld exculpatory evidence that would have materially affected his trial. The district court denied the petition, finding it untimely because Giannone delayed over eight years after receiving the relevant documents before seeking relief, and also finding no error of a fundamental character justifying the writ.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Giannone failed to provide a valid reason for his delay in seeking relief and that, even considering his claims cumulatively, the identified withheld evidence was not material enough to undermine confidence in the verdict. The court concluded that Giannone did not meet the stringent requirements for coram nobis relief, as he failed to show either timely pursuit of his claims or an error of the most fundamental character, and thus affirmed the denial of his petition. View "US v. Giannone" on Justia Law

Officers responding to reports of suspected drug activity at a public housing development in Asheville, North Carolina, began surveilling individuals frequenting the area. One individual, Jermaine Derrick Carson, Jr., was observed as a passenger in a vehicle whose driver had a suspended license. Weeks later, during a joint law enforcement operation targeting crime near downtown bars, officers recognized the same vehicle at a gas station and initiated a traffic stop before it returned to the housing complex. During the stop, officers detected the odor of marijuana and observed drug paraphernalia in the car. Carson was frisked and found to possess a loaded firearm.After Carson was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, he moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged and that the frisk lacked reasonable suspicion. A magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing, during which officers testified and body camera footage was reviewed. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the suppression motion, finding the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle after the detection of marijuana and that the frisk was lawful. The district court adopted the recommendation, denied the motion, and subsequently accepted Carson’s conditional guilty plea, sentencing him to 24 months imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision, applying de novo review for legal questions and clear error for factual findings. The court held that the officers had independent reasonable suspicion—specifically, the detection of marijuana odor—which justified the extension of the stop and the search. Additionally, the frisk was permissible due to reasonable suspicion of illegal drugs in the vehicle. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Carson’s suppression motion. View "US v. Carson" on Justia Law

George Steen, a foster parent, was convicted by a North Carolina jury of sexually abusing a young foster child, M.S., who had lived with Steen and his wife for several years. The prosecution relied heavily on M.S.’s detailed descriptions of the alleged abuse, arguing such knowledge was unlikely unless M.S. had experienced the acts. The defense countered by attempting to show M.S.’s reputation for untruthfulness and identifying alternative sources for his sexual knowledge, including prior experiences with his biological family and other incidents. Despite this, the jury found Steen guilty on three counts of sexual offenses against a child.Following his conviction, Steen sought relief in the North Carolina state courts, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, as articulated in Strickland v. Washington. He focused on his attorney’s failure to uncover and present specific social services records, counselor’s notes, and medical records that, he claimed, further supported his theory that M.S. fabricated the allegations and had other sources of sexual knowledge. The state trial court denied relief, finding Steen failed to demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, assuming deficient performance but holding Steen could not show prejudice because the additional records were cumulative of evidence already before the jury.Steen then filed for federal habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. That court denied relief but erroneously deferred to the trial court’s analysis of deficient performance rather than the appellate court’s reasoning on prejudice. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit clarified that only the last reasoned decision of the North Carolina Court of Appeals was entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Fourth Circuit held that this court had reasonably found no prejudice, and thus affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Steen v. Dismukes" on Justia Law

Police officers responded to an anonymous 911 call reporting that individuals inside a white Mercedes sedan parked near the pool area of an apartment complex might be selling or possessing narcotics. The officers received this information through their department’s computer-aided dispatch system. Upon arrival, the officers stopped their marked police vehicles in the roadway, positioning themselves such that one car was partially in front of the Mercedes and another behind. They exited their vehicles, approached the Mercedes, and immediately smelled marijuana. Williams, the defendant, admitted to smoking marijuana, after which he and the other occupants were directed to exit the vehicle. In the ensuing search, officers found a handgun, and Williams admitted ownership.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Williams’ motion to suppress the evidence found during the search. The district court found that Williams was not seized when the officers stopped their cars, reasoning that there was physical room for him to leave and a reasonable person would have felt free to do so. The court further concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Williams after smelling marijuana and that the search was supported by probable cause. Williams was subsequently convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after a bench trial.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Williams was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers blocked his vehicle with their marked patrol cars, as a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances. The court further held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify this seizure based solely on the anonymous tip and the fact the encounter occurred in a high-crime area. The court reversed the district court’s denial of the suppression motion, vacated Williams’ conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "US v. Williams" on Justia Law