Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, who had pled guilty to arson under Maryland's arson-in-the-first-degree statute, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of her appeal from the IJ's ruling that the arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(E), and order of removal. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that petitioner's state arson conviction unambiguously qualifies as an aggravated felony under section 1101(a)(43)(E), and even if an ambiguity existed, the BIA's interpretation was reasonable. The court rejected as meritless petitioner's alternative arguments that the BIA should have applied the rule of lenity and that the BIA's application of Matter of Bautista was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Espinal-Andrades v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Honduras, sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal of the IJ's order of removal. The BIA determined that petitioner was removable based on his past conviction under Virginia Code 18.2-102 for the unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. The court concluded, however, that the Virginia offense did not constitute an "aggravated felony," where the full range of conduct covered by the Virginia crime of "unauthorized use" does not qualify as a "theft offense," as that term has been defined by the BIA. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the order of removal. View "Castillo v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss commitment proceedings arising from a 2007 insanity acquittal of a separate set of offenses, as well as the district court's order to delay those proceedings until he is released from prison. 18 U.S.C. 4243 provides a procedural framework for the evaluation and commitment of defendants adjudicated not guilty only by reason of insanity (NGI). Defendant is currently incarcerated for a crime unrelated to the one for which he was adjudicated NGI. The court concluded that the statute does not permit an NGI acquitee to nullify the statute's application by committing subsequent offenses and that delaying the hearing until defendant is released from prison is consistent with the statutory framework of section 4243. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Conrad, III" on Justia Law

Defendants Barker, Dunigan, and Hill plead guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute heroin and appealed the denial of their motions to suppress. Law enforcement officers, suspecting Barker of moving without notification while on federal supervised release, obtained a warrant for his arrest and executed it at his new home. The officers found Barker and Dunigan and Hill, also on supervised release, inside the home and conducted a walk-through of the apartment to look for contraband and other evidence of supervised release violations. After a drug-detection dog sniffed around the apartment, the officers sought a search warrant. The court concluded that the court's precedent required the officers in this situation to have a search warrant rather than merely reasonable suspicion to search Barker's home; held that the walk-through and dog sniff were unlawful searches; rejected the government's contention that the good-faith exception applies with respect to the evidence seized as a result of the dog sniff; and vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to properly consider whether, under the "independent source" doctrine, the officers in this case would have sought a warrant even if they had not conducted the unlawful searches. View "United States v. Hill" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against prison doctors and medical staff, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff did not appeal from the district court order dismissing the staff as a party to this case, depriving the court of jurisdiction to review this order. However, the court has jurisdiction over the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against the doctors. The court held that while the claim against Dr. Lightsey was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff has alleged facts supporting a plausible claim of deliberate indifference against Dr. Guleria where plaintiff alleged that Dr. Guleria failed to enter the orders necessary to provide him with the promised care. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim against Dr. Guleria and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Lightsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of powder cocaine, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for collateral relief. The court rejected petitioner's claim that he received ineffective assistance because counsel declined to raise an Equal Protection claim of racially selective law enforcement where petitioner's counsel, by choosing to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim, acted effectively under Strickland v. Washington. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to evaluate whether counsel were ineffective for failing to raise an Equal Protection claim. Further, counsel was not ineffective by failing to properly challenge the use of petitioner's post-arrest silence in the prosecutor's closing remarks. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Mason" on Justia Law

Sanya recruited restaurant employees to steal customers’ credit card information, using a device that he provided. With the stolen information, Sanya made counterfeit credit cards, which co-conspirators used to purchase gift cards that were used to buy consumer goods. Co-conspirators returned the goods for cash. In 2012, Sanya pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit access-device fraud, was released pending sentencing, and resumed his fraud scheme. He was charged with state crimes, then transferred to federal custody; state charges were dismissed. In 2013, Sanya was indicted for access-device fraud and aggravated identity theft. Sanya’s sentencing for the 2012 plea was postponed, but the parties failed to reach agreement. The district judge expressed his strong preference that Sanya enter a plea to the second set of charges and agree to have all charges consolidated for sentencing. Days later, Sanya pleaded guilty. The charges were consolidated and the same district judge sentenced Sanya to a total of 212 months’ imprisonment. Sanya argued that the district court improperly participated in plea discussions, rendering his second plea invalid. The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for assignment to a different judge. View "United States v. Sanya" on Justia Law

A magistrate judge in the District of Columbia determined that petitioner, a Mexican citizen, was extraditable under the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, U.S. - Mex., May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059. Petitioner owned and operated pharmaceutical businesses in and around Mexico City that illegaly imported psychotropic substances into Mexico. On appeal, petitioner claimed that the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to conduct the extradition proceeding and that the Treaty bars his extradition. The court found no merit in petitioner's claim that the fact that he was moved from Maryland to the District of Columbia against his will precludes the D.C. Magistrate from exercising jurisdiction over him where, under the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, a defendant's involuntary presence in a court is not a bar to personal jurisdiction. Further, when construing other jurisdiction and venue statutes concerning foreign nationals that, like 18 U.S.C. 3184, require a defendant to be "found in" a place, the court has held that this "found in" requirement is satisfied even when the defendant is brought there against his will. The court rejected petitioner's argument that the Treaty's Non Bis In Idem provision in Article 6 bars his extradition where the court declined to follow Sindona v. Grant's "same conduct" framework, and adopted the Blockburger v. United States' "same elements" test as the proper mode of analysis. The court rejected petitioner's remaining claims regarding the Treaty's dual criminality provision in Article 2 and rule of specialty provision in Article 17. The court affirmed the denial of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. View "Gon v. Holt" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of knowingly failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16913(a). Defendant argued that the government failed to prove an essential element of a SORNA violation - that he knew he had an obligation to register - based on comments made by a state court judge in a separate proceeding, which defendant argued suggested that his obligation to register had expired. The court agreed with the district court's determination that the state judge appeared to be giving advice rather than a binding legal opinion, and there is substantial evidence in the record to support the district court's conclusion that defendant knowingly avoided an obligation to register. Further, the court concluded that defendant's 30-month sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court vacated the supervised release portion of the sentence, however, because the U.S. Sentencing Commission recently issued a clarifying amendment that a failure to register under SORNA is not a sex offense for the purposes of the Guidelines. The court vacated the supervised release portion of defendant's sentence, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

After his felon-in-possession conviction was vacated, petitioner sought a certificate of actual innocence under 28 U.S.C. 2513. The court concluded that petitioner did not satisfy the second section 2513 predicate where petitioner cannot prove that he "did not commit any of the acts charged" and so cannot satisfy the first part of the second predicate. Because petitioner concedes that he also did not prove the alternative second part of that predicate, he is not entitled to a certificate of innocence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition. View "United States v. Mills, Sr." on Justia Law