Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant n served five years in federal prison after pleading guilty to conspiring to provide material support to ISIS. He was released in 2020 subject to a lifetime of supervised release. Three years later, the district court found that Defendant had violated numerous conditions of his supervised release. The court sentenced him to a year’s imprisonment and reimposed a lifetime of supervised release. Defendant brought several challenges to this sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant claims the lifetime term of his supervised release is an “extreme and unusual remedy” that should be “viewed critically.” He suggests that lifetime release should typically be affirmed only in cases involving “child pornography or violent crimes.” But the appropriateness of lifetime supervised release in one serious class of cases does not render it inappropriate for another. Defendant combined extremist ideology and technical sophistication to build widespread support online for ISIS’s brutal campaign of terror and violence. He simultaneously coaxed men into traveling to Syria with deadly consequences. Upon his release from prison, Defendant continued to spread toxic messages online, including a call to “exterminate” all non-believers of ISIS’s jihadist ideology—the vast majority of the global population. It was eminently reasonable for the district court to reimpose a lifetime of supervised release under these circumstances. View "US v. Ali Amin" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to conspiracy to communicate, transmit, or disclose Restricted Data of the United States Navy relating to Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines with the intent to injure the United States or to secure an advantage to a foreign nation. At sentencing, the district court calculated her Sentencing Guidelines range and sentenced Defendant to 262 months imprisonment, which was at the bottom of that range. Defendant contends that “the district court so severely infected the sentencing [and] the sentencing process that [her] due process rights were violated during the course of the sentencing hearing to an extent that could not have been contemplated by, and transcends, the appeal waiver.” She also contends that the government, in its appellate brief, breached the plea agreement and therefore that the agreement “is now void” and the “waiver in it is invalid.” The government filed a motion to dismiss the appeal based on the appeal waiver in Defendant’s plea agreement.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court concluded that Defendant had failed to make a sufficient showing to avoid the clear terms of her plea agreement, which she acknowledges she entered into knowingly and intelligently. The court also concluded that the government did not breach the plea agreement. Further, the court noted that the plea agreement provided further that once the district court exercised its authority to sentence Defendant, the government was authorized to advance arguments on appeal in support of that sentence. View "US v. Diana Toebbe" on Justia Law

Following a series of COVID-19-related continuances and other setbacks, Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of fentanyl distribution. Defendant argued that these delays violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Defendant also argues the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, in total, 357 days of 401 days were properly excluded. This means that, at most, only 44 days accrued towards Defendant’s speedy trial clock. The court concluded that Defendant’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated. Moreover, the court noted that Defendant has not “shown, or even argued, that any evidence was damaged or lost, that any witnesses could not be found, or that his case was harmed in any manner by the delay.” Further, the court wrote that substantial evidence supports Defendant’s convictions. Much of the evidence at trial came from the testimony of the confidential informant who purchased the drugs from Defendant. This informant testified that he knew Defendant because they had a mutual friend whose apartment they both frequented. He also testified that he and Pair had discussed doing business together prior to the informant cooperating with law enforcement. The court explained that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government as the prevailing party below, any reasonable finder of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant was guilty of distributing fentanyl. View "US v. Quotez Pair" on Justia Law

Defendant sought post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 and, in the alternative, coram nobis relief. His Section 2255 motion and his coram nobis petition were both denied by the district court. In this appeal, Defendant challenged only the denial of his petition for coram nobis relief, asserting that the court erred and abused its discretion in so ruling. Defendant maintains that he is entitled to a writ of coram nobis because (1) he was convicted in that very court in 1993 under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), (2) he has served his sentence for that offense, and (3) the sole predicate for his 1993 conviction — a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 111 — is no longer a crime of violence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the two issues involve (1) whether a violation of Section 111(b) constitutes a crime of violence and (2) whether Defendant has shown that his 1993 conviction does not rest on a Section 111(b) violation. The court wrote that an error of the most fundamental character has not been shown, Defendant is not entitled to a writ of coram nobis, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying coram nobis relief. The court explained that Defendant was obliged to show that his 1993 conviction rested solely on Section 111(a). Defendant has not carried that burden, and he therefore has not satisfied the fourth requirement for coram nobis relief. View "US v. Antonio McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Defendant to 240 months imprisonment, applying the sentencing enhancement provided by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), after finding that Defendant had three qualifying predicate convictions for a “serious drug offense” or “violent felony.” But after the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, striking down the “residual clause” of ACCA’s violent-felony definition as unconstitutional, 576 U.S. 591, 606 (2015), Defendant filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his ACCA sentence. He argued that Maryland first-degree assault—which formed the basis for two of his ACCA predicate offenses—was not a “violent felony” under ACCA. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, and he appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion, vacated Defendant’s ACCA sentence. The court explained that it is quite plain from Maryland’s statutory scheme and from the case law interpreting it, that reckless conduct is included. Therefore, Defendant’s inability to point to a specific case is not dispositive. Rather, the terms of the statute and the decisions of Maryland courts show that a Maryland prosecutor could bring charges for first-degree assault against a defendant for recklessly committing an assault with a firearm. The court concluded that the Maryland first-degree-assault statute sets out an indivisible offense and that one of the modalities of that offense—assault with a firearm—can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. View "US v. Garfield Redd" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At the time of his offense, Defendant had numerous prior felony convictions. The Government requested an enhanced sentence under ACCA. “ACCA mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for a defendant convicted of a firearms offense who has three or more prior convictions for either a ‘serious drug offense’ or a ‘violent felony.’” The Government argued that two of Defendant’s prior convictions qualified as serious drug offenses, which he does not dispute, and that his 2017 conviction for aggravated assault in violation of Tennessee Code Section 39-13-102 qualified as a violent felony. The district court agreed, overruling Defendant’s objection, and sentenced him to 210 months in prison. The only issue Defendant raised on appeal is whether his Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault qualifies as a violent felony.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The court concluded that Defendant’s Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault is a violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Defendant argued that aggravated assault cannot be a violent felony because the second element of the crime—simple assault—requires only de minimis force. While it is true that “de minimis physical force, such as mere offensive touching, is insufficient to trigger the ACCA’s force clause,” the court explained that Defendant overlooks the third, aggravating element of the offense. Each of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force. View "US v. Bryan Ogle" on Justia Law

A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the firearm and other physical evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. After the district court denied his motion, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to appeal the suppression ruling.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity when they first detained Defendant. The court explained that in considering the totality of the circumstances known to the officers when they stopped Defendant, it concludes the officers did not have objectively reasonable suspicion that Defendant was, or had been, engaged in theft. The court wrote that when the officers stopped Defendant, they knew he was a man with a weighed-down sweatshirt pocket who had walked through a residential neighborhood past an occasionally unoccupied home next to a commercial area in broad daylight and who had behaved evasively when a neighborhood resident watched and followed him. These circumstances, without more, do not give rise to reasonable suspicion of theft. As such, the court held that at bottom, the totality of the circumstances does not support a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Defendant had engaged, or was about to engage, in theft. View "US v. Daniel Critchfield" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, challenged the district court’s denial of his request for a preliminary injunction (the “Injunction Denial”). Petitioner sought— in connection with his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 — to prevent the defendant government officials from carrying out his extradition to Lithuania. The district court denied Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief, deeming him unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his extradition to Lithuania would contravene the extradition treaty between that country and the United States. More specifically, Petitioner maintained that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request fails to comply with the treaty’s mandate that Lithuania produce what is called “the charging document” (the “charging document contention”). The Injunction Denial ruled, however, that the documents produced by Lithuania comply with the extradition treaty, and that Petitioner is therefore not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it is satisfied that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request does not satisfy the charging document mandate of the extradition treaty. The court wrote that Petitioner has demonstrated that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request to return him to that country does not satisfy the Treaty’s requirements. And the public’s interest in the Secretary of State recognizing and fulfilling Treaty obligations outweighs any detrimental impact that the denial of an improper extradition request could have. View "Darius Vitkus v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

A South Carolina jury convicted Petitioner of voluntary manslaughter concerning the death of his girlfriend. Almost 20 years later—following three rounds of collateral litigation in state court and one 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition in federal court—Petitioner sought permission to file a second Section 2254 petition. In that application, Petitioner claims he now remembers that his girlfriend died by suicide. According to Petitioner, his memory was repressed at the time of his trial and his regained memory satisfies the rigorous newly discovered evidence requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(B), allowing him to file a second habeas petition.     The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that one of those requirements is that Petitioner demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder, considering his alleged regained memory with the rest of the evidence, would find Petitioner guilty of manslaughter. Because Petitioner failed to meet this burden, the court denied his application to file a successive Section 2254 habeas petition View "In re: Weldon Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty without a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At issue in this appeal is the district court’s application of two enhancements to Defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines offense level. First, the court applied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically felony possession of drugs. Second, the court applied a six-level enhancement for the knowing creation of a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of the six-level enhancement. As to the four-level enhancement, because the court made no findings connecting Defendant’s possession of a firearm to his felony drug possession, the court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that battery is a general intent crime that requires only the intentional performance of the unlawful act. With these principles in mind, the court concluded the evidence on this record establishes that Defendant’s conduct encompassed the requisite intent to satisfy Section 3A1.2(c)(1)’s assault requirement where Defendant did not simply throw one reflexive punch at Jones but threw repeated punches to his head and arms. Further, the court explained that without deciding whether the application of Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is supported under the facts of the present case, the court restated that the district court must first evaluate whether evidence exists to support a finding that Defendant’s possession of the gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate his possession of drugs. View "US v. Patrick Mitchell" on Justia Law