Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a former Sheriff of Buncombe County, was convicted by a jury of numerous conspiracies and other charges relating to his receipt of bribes in connection with the unlawful operation of video poker machines in Buncombe and other North Carolina counties. Defendant appealed his convictions. The court held that even if the district court erred in admitting into evidence the recording of the December 19 meeting at issue, such error was harmless. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever. The court further held, under the plain error standard of review, that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conspiracy conviction for "the obtaining of property of another" by conduct and under circumstances proscribed in the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. The court finally held that the district court did not exhibit unfair treatment or bias toward defendant. The court rejected defendant's argument that the Honest Services Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1346, was unconstitutionally vague and affirmed his convictions for violating the statute.

Defendant challenged his sentence for a drug conspiracy conviction, arguing that the district court erroneously denied his request for new counsel and improperly imposed an obstruction of justice sentencing enhancement. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for new counsel but reversed and remanded the case for resentencing because the district court did not find the necessary factual predicates to impose an obstruction of justice enhancement.

Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to 78 months' imprisonment, based in part on its finding that defendant had committed the offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions for a "crime of violence." On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in relying on his Maryland second degree assault conviction to enhance his offense level. The court found that it was uncontested that the district court relied upon an officer's sworn statements contained in a statement of probable cause that was not expressly incorporated into the statement of charges to determine that defendant's Maryland second degree assault constituted a predicate offense under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2). Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in relying on facts contained in the unincorporated affidavit to find that defendant had two qualifying convictions. Accordingly, the judgment was vacated and remanded.

Defendants were charged with offenses related to their membership in the Pagans Motorcycle Club. At issue was whether 18 U.S.C. 922(h), which prohibited a person from possessing a firearm while "employed for" a convicted felon, applied only to persons employed for tangible compensation. After holding that section 922(g) required the government to prove some form of payment - and noting the government's concession that it could not make such a showing here - the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss all charges based on section 922(h). The court held that the statute, however, did not contain an inflexible requirement that compensation be involved. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the charges and remanded for further proceedings.

A jury convicted of Daryl Taylor and Antwan Thompson of being felons in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) after they were caught with a loaded handgun on a Baltimore Street. The district court imposed an eight-year sentence on Taylor and a fifteen-year sentence on Thompson because his prior convictions qualified him for the mandatory minimum under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 19 U.S.C. 924(e). On appeal, Taylor challenged both his conviction and sentence and Thompson objected only to his sentence under the ACCA. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find Taylor guilty of unlawful possession under section 922(g)(1). The court declined Taylor's invitation to invalidate the enhancement in section 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines and held that the district court's sentence fell within the range of reasonable punishments. The court also held that, taken as a whole, Thompson's plea proceedings afforded ample support for the finding of the district court that his plea of guilty constituted an admission of the violent conduct reflected in the sole proffered factual basis for the plea. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924. On appeal, defendant objected to the district court's application of the section 924(e)(1) sentencing enhancement, asserting that recent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions undermined the PSR's contention that his previous convictions were for Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) violent felonies. A divided panel of the court affirmed defendant's sentence, employing the "modified categorical approach" first announced in Taylor v. United States, for the purpose of analyzing prior offenses to determine whether they constituted ACCA violent felonies. Upon granting defendant's petition for rehearing en banc, the court vacated the panel opinion. When the court considered defendant's charging documents in their proper legal context, the court could not determine that he was convicted of violating N.C. Gen. State 14-202(a)(2). Consequently, defendant's indecent liberties offenses were not ACCA violent felonies.

Defendant, a Maryland attorney, was convicted of offenses related to a scheme to launder proceeds that he obtained from a client. On appeal, defendant challenged several counts of conviction for money laundering, as well as his obstruction of justice conviction, and the denial of his motion to sever the failure-to-file counts. The court affirmed the convictions for money laundering under 18 U.S.C. 1956 and 1957, and affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to sever. The court reversed, however, defendant's conviction on the obstruction-of-justice charge for insufficient evidence. Therefore, the court remanded for resentencing.

After defendant pled guilty to federal drug trafficking, the district court held that his prior state convictions for marijuana possession, for which he faced no possibility of imprisonment, was for an offense "punishable by imprisonment for more than one year," triggering a sentencing enhancement under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 841. This enhancement doubled defendant's minimum sentence. The court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The Supreme Court vacated that judgment and remanded the case to the court for "further consideration in light of Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder." A panel of the court then held that Carachuri did not require any change in the court's prior holding. The court voted to rehear the case en banc and subsequently vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant conditionally plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a drug user and one count of possession of marijuana where he had moved to suppress the gun and drugs on the ground that the officer's frisk was unlawful. At issue was whether evidence seized during a street encounter between law enforcement and citizens was properly admitted into evidence during a subsequent criminal prosecution. The court held that the seizure of the evidence did not comport with settled Fourth Amendment principles, and therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant pled guilty to maintaining a place at his residence for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using cocaine base. The United States subsequently appealed the district court's grant of defendant's motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), arguing that the district court lacked the authority to grant such relief because defendant's sentence was not "based on" a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered but, rather, on his plea agreement entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). The court held that, in light of the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Freeman v. United States, defendant's agreement did not satisfy the limited exception recognized in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence. Consequently, the plea agreement was the foundation for the term of imprisonment imposed and the district court lacked the authority under section 3582(c)(2) to grant defendant's motion for a reduced sentenced. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order granting defendant's motion.