Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An officer shot an unarmed man wanted for failure to pay child support, when he started running away. In an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the parties stipulated that the officer intended to use his Taser rather than his gun. The district court granted him summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Fourth Circuit reversed, analyzing the shooting as a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment and applying an objective standard of reasonableness. The use of force could be viewed by a jury as objectively unreasonable. The officer knew he carried his Taser in the holster on his thigh, about a foot lower than the holster on his hip; he knew that the gun weighed twice what the Taser weighed; and he knew that the Taser had a thumb safety that the gun did not have. The shooting was not a split-second decision; well-established precedent prohibits shooting suspects who pose no significant threat of death or serious physical threat. A reasonable jury could also find that the officer was grossly negligent and not protected by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Md. Code State Govt, 12-101.

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine where he signed an acceptance of responsibility statement but declined to sign a plea agreement waiving certain rights to appellate review and collateral attack. Solely because defendant would not waive these rights, the government refused to move for an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b). Defendant appealed, challenging the district court's failure to compel the government to move for the U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) reduction. The court held that the government retained discretion to refuse to move for an additional one-level reduction, but only on the basis of an interest recognized by the guidelines itself. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that, if the government could not provide a valid reason for refusing to move for an additional one-level enhancement reduction under U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(b) and continued to refuse to move for such a reduction, the district should order the government to file the motion.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of aggravated felony theft where she posed as a bail bondsman at a North Carolina jail and secured identifying information, cash, and the title of two properties from an octogenarian attempting to post bond for his granddaughter. At issue was whether an abuse-of-trust enhancement was properly applied to defendant's sentence where defendant contended that a bail bondsman did not occupy a position of public or private trust. The court held that the Guidelines simply required that a position of trust "significantly facilitate[] the commission or concealment of the offense." The court also held that, because it was undisputed that defendant gained initial access to the octogenarian's personal information by posing as a bail bondsman and later used this information to commit her wire-fraud offenses, that standard was clearly met here. Therefore, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in imposing the enhancement for abuse of trust. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

This appeal stemmed from the district court's grant of a motion for reduction of sentence for substantial assistance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). In granting the motion, the district court reduced defendant's sentence for distribution of child pornography from 96 months imprisonment to one day. At issue was whether the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) because it did not base its grant of the motion on defendant's assistance to the government, but instead grounded the reduction solely on the court's concern that defendant would not receive his preferred medication while in prison. The court held that the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(b) by granting the motion based on factors other than the defendant's cooperation with the government. The court also held that the mere possibility that a change in treatment of the defendant's ADHD, based on the professional judgment of a prison's medical team, simply did not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court further held that, because reconsideration of the motion by the original sentencing judge would inevitably invite speculation as to whether the medical issue continued to play a role in the ultimate ruling, the court ordered the case reassigned to a new judge on remand.

Petitioner sought habeas relief from his capital sentence for convictions of murdering a husband and wife, as well as robbing the husband. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel and whether the State of North Carolina violated his Eighth Amendment and due process rights by presenting to the jury evidence and argument that contradicted those presented in the trials of his co-defendants. The court affirmed the denial of the petition for habeas relief and held that, in light of the circumstances and the evidence presented at trial, the federal district court correctly determined that the state court's decision did not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established law or an unreasonable determination of the facts.

Appellant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and aiding and abetting; possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of firearms. At issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's convictions; whether the district court erred in admitting Rule 404(b) evidence; and whether the court erred in continuing to poll the jury after one juror indicated that the verdict was not unanimous. The court affirmed the judgment and held that the government presented substantial evidence to support appellant's convictions on all three counts; that appellant's Rule 404(b) argument was without merit where there was no error in admitting the evidence of a prior arrest when the evidence was relevant to prove his knowledge and lack of mistake, as well as necessary to prove the element of intention; and that the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error where there was no objection to the continued polling, the district took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive, and the district court gave a fair and balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further.

After a nine-day trial, a jury found that police officers carrying out a search warrant for narcotics did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they performed a no-knock entry into a residence and fatally shot a woman with a gun therein. The woman's family and estate alleged that a variety of instructional and other errors tainted that verdict. The court held that the charge provided a complete and accurate statement of the law and afforded plaintiffs ample latitude to argue their case. The court concluded that, over the course of a nine-day trial, capable attorneys on each side thrashed out the propriety of the officers' actions before the body duly constituted to assess them, and the district court properly instructed that body in terms of the applicable standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding no other reason for reversal where there was neither instructional defects nor any other error undermining the verdict.

In consolidated appeals, the issues before the court concern the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, specifically the civil commitment provisions codified in 18 U.S.C. 4248. Invoking these provisions, the government initiated proceedings in district court seeking the civil commitment of respondents, all prisoners in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), because the government certified them as sexually dangerous persons. The district court collectively dismissed all nine proceedings under 18 U.S.C. 4241 and issued a dismissal order requiring the government first to release the prisoners from BOP custody, then obtain a commitment order under section 4241, and then finally seek a separate civil commitment order under the second category of persons eligible for certification under section 4248(a). The court held that the dismissal order approach to section 4248 was flawed where it departed from the plain meaning of section 4248(a); it erroneously read section 4248 in pari materia with section 4241; and erroneously invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance. Accordingly, and because the district court did not have the timely benefit of the United States v. Comstock and Timms v. Johns decisions, the court vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner appealed the Board of Immigration's ("BIA") decision that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal after he had amassed a substantial criminal record while in the United States. Petitioner conceded that he was removable for having been convicted of two or more crimes of moral turpitude but challenged the government's contention that an aggravated-felony conviction justified his removal. At issue was whether the BIA properly determined that petitioner had not satisfied his burden of showing that he was eligible for cancellation of removal. The court affirmed the removal and held that the BIA's ruling denying petitioner's request for relief from removal was faithful to the plain meaning of the statutory text governing eligibility for cancellation of removal and that petitioner's arguments to the contrary ignored Congress' burden-shifting framework.

Petitioner, a native of Jamaica, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a petition for review where the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") agreed with the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") that petitioner was removable because he was an alien who had committed a variety of gun and drug offenses. Petitioner claimed that he was a citizen under 8 U.S.C. 1432(a)(3). Petitioner also claimed that, because he was declared a United States citizen in a 1998 removal proceeding, DHS was precluded from litigating the issue of his alienage in later removal proceedings. The court held that, because 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(9) and 1503(a) prohibited petitioner from obtaining review of his citizenship claims through a habeas corpus petition, the court affirmed the district court's jurisdictional dismissal of petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court also held that the BIA read section 1432(a)(3) in accordance with its unambiguous meaning and the statute passed constitutional muster where the statute automatically conferred citizenship on legitimate children when the parent with sole custody after a legal separation naturalizes and on out of wedlock children only when the mother naturalizes. The court further held that petitioner had not satisfied the requirements of issue preclusion, and even if he could overcome that obstacle, preclusion still would not apply given the criminal misconduct apparent in his case.