Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a medical doctor, pleaded guilty to multiple charges under Section 841 for prescribing oxycodone and other controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate medical need. After Defendant was sentenced, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ruan v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2370 (2022), which held that the statutory knowing-or-intentional mens rea applies not only to the distribution-related elements of the crime but also to the question of authorization. Accordingly, if a defendant charged under Section 841 “produces evidence that he or she was authorized to dispense controlled substances, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that he or she was acting in an unauthorized manner, or intended to do so.” Defendant contends his plea was not valid because the district court did not inform him that, if he went to trial, the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant subjectively knew or intended that his conduct was unauthorized, as required by Ruan.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even if the district court’s explanation of the charges alone did not properly reflect the mens rea required by Ruan, the language of the indictment does reflect Ruan’s holding. The Fourth Circuit has made it clear that when explaining the nature of the charges, a district court may rely on the defendant’s sworn statement that he has read the indictment and discussed it with his attorney. View "US v. Jong Kim" on Justia Law

After Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), the district court sentenced him to 120 months imprisonment, the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. That range was determined, in part, by the district court’s conclusion that Defendant was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment that is required by Section 2252A(b)(2) when a defendant has a prior conviction for a qualifying sex offense. The district court found that Defendant’s prior conviction under Maryland law for a sexual offense in the third degree qualified as a predicate for the Section 2252A(b)(2) enhancement. Defendant then sought a review of the district court’s ruling that his prior Maryland conviction qualified as a predicate conviction under Section 2252A(b)(2), which triggered the 120-month mandatory minimum sentence.   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Defendant’s appeal. The court agreed with the government that Defendant waived his right to appeal that issue in his plea agreement. The court explained the indictment’s allegation that a 120-month minimum sentence applied because of Defendant’s prior Maryland conviction and the limitations that Defendant’s plea agreement placed on his right to challenge that allegation, as well as Defendant’s broad waiver of his right to appeal any determination that the district court made on that issue, preclude the present appeal. And this is confirmed by Defendant’s express waiver of the district court’s determination of the applicable sentencing guidelines range. View "US v. Bruce Sturtz" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. Section 2254. He claimed that his guilty plea wasn’t voluntary because he didn’t know that Maryland’s sentencing guidelines were merely advisory. But a Maryland court denied his request for postconviction relief, finding that he understood the terms of his plea agreement, including his maximum sentencing exposure. The district court held that the Maryland court’s decision denying Defendant postconviction relief was reasonable.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that AEDPA forecloses habeas relief unless the PCR court’s decision was “based on” an erroneous finding, 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d)(2), and Defendant doesn’t make that showing. Further subsection (d)(1) corrects only the most “extreme malfunctions.” Here, the PCR court’s decision wasn’t “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent because it didn’t “arrive at a result different from” a Supreme Court case with “materially indistinguishable” facts. Nor was the PCR court’s decision an “unreasonable application” of principles announced by the Supreme Court. Here, the PCR court concluded that Defendant couldn’t reasonably believe that the guidelines were mandatory or that he was entitled to a sentence between 30 and 51 years. That’s because the plea court correctly advised him that each of his charges carried a possible sentence of 30 years. So this isn’t a case in which Defendant was clueless about the endpoints of his sentencing exposure. View "Calvin Currica v. Richard Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of illegally reentering the United States after an aggravated felony conviction. He challenged his conviction on numerous fronts, claiming vindictive prosecution and violations of his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, due process, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant failed to demonstrate that the presumption of vindictiveness applies. The presumption of regularity that attends a prosecutor’s pretrial charging decision, therefore, remains in place. Further, the court wrote that Defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial on the aggravated reentry charge attached when the government obtained the indictment charging him with that offense, the second indictment in this case. Because Defendant does not argue that the time between the second indictment and his trial—just short of 6 months—is presumptively prejudicial, he has not met the threshold requirement for evaluating the remaining Barker factors. Finally, the court held that Defendant has not shown that officers arrested and fingerprinted him for an investigative purpose; therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of his second suppression motion. View "US v. Francisco Villa" on Justia Law

Defendant a citizen and resident of New Zealand, carried on an online relationship with a thirteen-year-old girl in Virginia that involved several sexually explicit video calls. A federal grand jury charged him with nine counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a). He entered a conditional guilty plea to one of the counts and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. Defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence on appeal. He first argued that his conviction involves an impermissible extraterritorial application of Section 2251(a) because he was in New Zealand when the unlawful images and videos were produced. Second, he contends that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because he lacked adequate notice that the victim was underage. Third, and finally, he challenges his sentence on the grounds that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for offenses involving “sexual contact.”   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s conviction stands as a permissible domestic application of Section 2251(a) because the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in Virginia, where the visual depiction that forms the basis of Defendant’s conviction was produced and transmitted. Further, the court held that although Defendant argued otherwise, the fact that a violation of Section 2251(a) carries a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence does not give him a due process right to a reasonable-mistake-of-age defense. Finally, the court held that because Defendant admitted to masturbating during the video calls,it was appropriate for the sentencing court to apply the two-level enhancement. View "US v. Troy Skinner" on Justia Law

After committing or attempting to commit thirteen robberies, Defendant was indicted on twenty-two counts of robbery-related activity and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before a jury could return a verdict in Defendant’s original trial, it was deemed a mistrial. Before a retrial the district court severed Defendant’s charges into two trials—one for the felon in possession of a firearm charge and another for the robbery-related charges. After both trials resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts, Defendant filed motions for a judgment of acquittal in each case, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. The district court denied the motions. Defendant appealed, contesting the district court’s decisions on both motions for acquittal, the district court’s enforcement of a stipulation in the retrial, and the district court’s use of certain jointly proposed jury instructions, and alleging a speedy trial violation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties entered into an open-ended stipulation in which they both agreed that Defendant’s alleged robberies affected commerce. That Defendant later regretted entering into the stipulation is not sufficient to relieve him of its continuing effect. Further, there was sufficient evidence supporting Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant stipulated that he was previously convicted of a felony and knew of his status as a felon. As to the possession element, the relevant firearm was purchased by Defendant’s on-again-off-again girlfriend. Finally, the court held that Defendant waived his right to assert a speedy trial violation. View "US v. Christopher Robertson" on Justia Law

In 2009, a jury convicted Movant of knowingly possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He was sentenced to 180 months imprisonment. His direct appeal and initial application for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 were unsuccessful. Now, he moved the Fourth Circuit for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application premised on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United States. And he argued in the alternative that if his motion is denied, he will be authorized to file a traditional Section 2241 habeas application through Section 2255(e)’s savings clause.   The Fourth Circuit denied Movant’s motion for authorization to file a second or successive Section 2255 application because Rehaif did not announce a constitutional rule. But as a consequence of our determination that he may not file a Section 2255 application, the court held that he may file a Section 2241 application under the savings clause. The court explained that it is true that, after Rehaif, possessing a firearm as a felon remains criminal under Section 922(g). But the government did not charge Movant with simply “possessing” a firearm in violation of Section 922(g). It charged him with “knowingly” doing so under Sections 922(g) and 924(a). That his conviction might have survived Rehaif if the government had charged him under Section 922(g) alone is of no moment: the government chose not to do so. View "In re: Randolph McNeill" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of one count of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government and one count of criminal conspiracy. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to both charges and conditionally granted a new trial in the event the judgment of acquittal was reversed on appeal. On appeal, in Rafiekian I, the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgments of acquittal, vacated and remanded the court’s new-trial order, and noted that the district court “may have additional justifications for its decision” that it failed to explain. On remand, ordered a new trial. The government appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the government’s case relied on the jury’s drawing inferences of guilt, the district court had no choice but to examine those inferences in considering the new trial motion. Barring the district court from granting a new trial based solely on disagreement with the jury’s inferences of guilt would place this class of cases beyond the reach of the new-trial standard. The government is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, but it is not entitled to special deference when it does so.   In this case, because the district court determined that a new trial was warranted based on the weight of the evidence, the court’s role is only to ask whether the court abused its discretion in doing so. Exercising “great deference” to the district court’s “discretionary assessments of the balance of the evidence,” the court held that it did not. View "US v. Bijan Rafiekian" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of using a firearm to commit murder in the course of a “crime of violence,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(j). In 2016, he filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. In the motion, he cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which held that the “residual clause” in the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “violent felony,” was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the motion. The court concluded that Johnson did not affect the validity of Defendant’s Section 924(j) convictions because they rested on predicate “crimes of violence”, not on the ACCA definition of “violent felony.” While Defendant’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause in Section 924(c)’s definition of a “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague, recognizing the specific right Defendant asserted in his Section 2255 motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence on the other Section 924(j) count because the conviction is unsupported by a valid predicate offense, and the Government concedes that he is entitled to relief. The court explained that because Defendant filed his motion within one year of Johnson and Davis extended the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Johnson, the court held that it was timely. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dismissal of Defendant’s motion as to one of his Section 924(j) convictions because Defendant procedurally defaulted his claim challenging the conviction and cannot establish grounds for excusing the default. View "US v. Andra Green" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Appellant. On May 20, 2009, a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Appellant’s mental condition improved with treatment. The district court ordered his conditional discharge. Appellant returned home and lived with his mother after conditional discharge. The district court revoked the term and recommitted him. This appeal presents two consequential questions. Both relate to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. A commitment wrongly perpetuated is an unwarranted restraint of liberty; a commitment errantly discontinued poses a danger to the committee and the public.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the record is unclear whether the district court’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. It also appears from the record that the district court collapsed both inquiries of Section 4246(f) into a single question, focusing only on whether Appellant violated the conditions of his release and not explaining why “in light of” those violations his continued release created a substantial risk to other persons or property. Additionally, the record would benefit from further development respecting the violations alleged and the available, recent records from the facility. Further, the court wrote that the government should take note of its evidentiary burden, develop evidence on the point, and provide the district court a sound basis for making reasoned findings on the matter of dangerousness for that particular alleged violation. View "US v. Christopher Perkins" on Justia Law