Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After pleading guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, Defendant was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, an enhanced penalty that represents the mandatory minimum sentence required for such a violation when the provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) are satisfied. ACCA provides that when a defendant violates Section 922(g) and has “three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense . . . committed on occasions different from one another,” he shall be given the enhanced sentence. Defendant’s indictment did not allege the facts supporting the ACCA enhancement; instead, the district court found them as part of the sentencing procedure. Defendant maintained that, in light of Supreme Court cases and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, ACCA’s requirement that the defendant has committed the prior offenses on different occasions must be alleged in the indictment and found by a jury or admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea because that fact increases the penalty for his crime.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the ACCA enhancement remains a matter for sentencing. Under Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the facts that support a recidivism enhancement are resolved by the district court during sentencing, and ACCA provides just such a recidivism enhancement, as the court recognized in Thompson. Despite Defendant’s arguments to the contrary, the court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Descamps, Mathis, and Wooden have not narrowed or overruled Almendarez-Torres. And if they have done so by implication, the Supreme Court must say so, not a court of appeals. View "US v. Rico Brown" on Justia Law

Defendant was originally charged with four federal offenses: (1) carjacking; (2) kidnapping; (3) using a firearm during a crime of violence; and (4) possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. The parties agreed Defendant would plead guilty to the kidnapping and Section 924(c) charges, and the government would dismiss the carjacking and felon in possession charges. Neither the indictment nor the plea agreement specified a predicate “crime of violence” for the Section 924(c) charge, and the plea agreement contained no agreed-upon factual statement. Defendant filed a pro se motion to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction based on intervening authority. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The court acknowledged it is now clear “kidnapping is not a Section 924(c) predicate offense.” But the court concluded Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction remained valid because.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to vacate his firearm conviction and remanded him for resentencing. The court explained that the categorical approach does not deny the district court its ultimate discretion, nor does it deprive the facts of their force. Even if a statutory enhancement under Section 924(c) does not apply because of the categorical approach, as is the case here, judges may, at their discretion, calculate a guidelines range or grant upward variances based on the violent nature of the criminal activity. Even if the categorical approach renders violent predicates legally invalid, district courts are at liberty to sentence the violent character of the cases that come before them. View "US v. Elliott Graham" on Justia Law

After Defendant’s allocution, but before his attorney argued at his sentencing hearing, the district court forecast that the minimum sentence he would receive was 60 months in prison—his crime’s statutory max. Defendant’s attorney then advocated for a lower sentence. The court imposed a 60-month sentence. He claimed it was procedurally unreasonable for the court to state his term of imprisonment before his attorney argued. Defendant also argued that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because it was not adequately explained and was based on an incorrectly calculated guidelines range.The Fourth Circuit explained that because Defendant did not make this argument to the district court, the court reviewed it for plain error and found none. The court explained that the district court offered enough explanation to satisfy us that it considered Defendant’s alcohol addiction argument and had a reasoned basis for the sentence it imposed. Defendant and his defense counsel argued at sentencing that Defendant’s untreated alcohol addiction contributed to his crime and warranted a lighter sentence. In response, the district court suggested that it was Defendant’s own fault that he had not sought treatment for his addiction. The district court then discussed the nature of Defendant’s offense, the impact his actions had on his victims, and the danger he posed to the public. The record as a whole shows the district court’s rationale for discounting Defendant’s argument and why the court thought the Section 3553(a) factors outweighed it. Accordingly, the court rejected Defendant’s argument that the sentence was inadequately explained and, thus, procedurally unreasonable. View "US v. Joel Covington" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for crimes related to an armed robbery of a Circle K convenience store. He argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of aiding and abetting liability, abused its discretion in seating a juror who expressed difficulty hearing during jury selection, and responded inadequately to his objections to several conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different had the jury been instructed on the intent requirement of aiding and abetting liability. Further, the court concluded that in context, it is clear the district court believed Juror Eight’s difficulty hearing was a temporary problem specific to the court’s questioning during jury selection. Even if the district court had not been clear, ambiguity alone cannot demonstrate a “manifest” abuse of discretion. Finally, reading the full transcript, it is clear the district court did not believe any of these conditions delegated too much authority to the Probation Office. Defendant does not challenge the substance of these conditions on appeal, and the court held that it is satisfied that the district court gave “specific attention” to Defendant’s objections before rejecting them. View "US v. Yakotus Odum" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He appealed, arguing that the district court made four errors warranting reversal. First, the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitations. Second, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “monetary transaction.” Third, the court erred by instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. And fourth, the conviction must be vacated under Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), because there is no way to determine whether he was convicted on a legally valid theory.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here Defendant offered no affirmative evidence showing that the conspiracy was terminated or that he affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the operative July 2, 2014, limitations date. The court wrote that because some conspiratorial acts in Defendant’s case occurred before July 2, 2014, the limitations date did not mean that the district judge was required to provide a statute of limitations instruction. Declining to give one was, therefore, not an abuse of the substantial discretion the court affords district judges in fashioning jury instructions. Moreover, the court held that the government did, in fact, present evidence of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy past July 2, 2014, even though it was not needed for a non-overt act conspiracy. View "US v. Kenneth Ravenell" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of six drug-related offenses, and the district court sentenced him to 40 years in prison. The district court increased Defendant's offense level by two because it found he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” within the meaning of Guidelines Section 3B1.1(c). Second, the court increased Defendant’s offense level by four because it concluded Defendant misrepresented fentanyl as heroin. Defendant raised two challenges to the verdict. Defendant also raised two challenges to his sentence.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge and his claim that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury. The court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the government was not required to prove that the victim died from a fentanyl overdose—it was required to show that she died from using a “substance” containing fentanyl for whose distribution Defendant was legally responsible. The government introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude it had met that burden. The jury heard evidence Defendant supplied the drugs the victim consumed on the day of her death and that she died around three hours later from a drug overdose. Here, a jury could conclude a substance distributed by Defendant was the cause of the victim’s death. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying a provision that was not part of the Sentencing Guidelines when Defendant committed his offenses and that Defendant is entitled to relief even under the plain-error standard. View "US v. Rodney Coby" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. An incarcerated person at Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg, Petitioner alleged that the Bureau of Prisons had miscalculated his release date by not retroactively applying the First Step Act to his previous sentence and crediting the resulting good conduct time to his release date. After the Warden moved for summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) concluding that Petitioner’s petition should be dismissed. Petitioner objected to the recommendation in detail; nonetheless, the district court did not review the R&R de novo because Petitioner had only “reargue[d] his case.” After reviewing for clear errors, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, Petitioner first submits—and the Warden concedes—that the district court erred by failing to review the R&R de novo. Petitioner further requests that the Fourth Circuit proceed to the merits of his habeas petition and consider the retroactive applicability of the First Step Act. Finally, Petititioner asked this Court to recall its previous mandate dismissing his 2015 appeal of his revocation sentence.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Petitioner that his grounds for objection were clear and thus should have prompted a de novo review of the magistrate’s R&R. Because the district court only reviewed the R&R for clear error, the court vacated and remanded with directions to review Petitioner’s grounds for objection de novo. The court declined, however, to consider the merits of Petitioner’s petition or recall of the court’s previous mandate. View "Larone Elijah v. Richard Dunbar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the sentence he received after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition in contravention of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). Defendant contends that the district court erred by treating a federal drug offense on which he was convicted in 2014 — aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2 — as being a “controlled substance offense” that increased his Sentencing Guidelines offense level. Defendant has proffered two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. First, he asserts that aiding and abetting in a drug offense cannot be treated as a “controlled substance offense” in Guidelines calculations. Second, Defendant maintains that, in any event, each and every Section 841(a)(1) distribution offense is disqualified from such treatment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and rejected Defendant’s challenge to his sentence. The court wrote that it must reject each of Defendant’s two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense — aiding and abetting in a 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) drug distribution offense — is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” includes aiding and abetting in a drug offense. Second, although the Guidelines exclude attempt offenses, Section 841(a)(1) does not criminalize attempt such that an  841(a)(1) distribution offense would be categorically disqualified from being treated as a “controlled substance offense.” View "US v. Patrick Groves" on Justia Law

A superseding indictment charged two defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. To address safety concerns, prior to their trial, the district court ordered Defendants to file a joint position as to whether they were vaccinated against COVID-19 or intended to be by the start of the trial. The district court further ordered the government and Defendants to inform the court as to whether they would agree to strike unvaccinated individuals from the jury. Defendants responded that they were not vaccinated and did not intend to be vaccinated. However, they agreed they would test for COVID-19 and provide the test results to the court. Defendants objected to the court’s suggestion of striking unvaccinated jurors for cause. At issue on appeal is whether a district court’s sua sponte decision to strike unvaccinated prospective jurors for cause from a properly assembled venire during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge. The court explained that the fair-cross-section requirement applies to jury venires, not petit juries. And the district court’s decision to strike unvaccinated jurors based on their perceived inability to serve without creating unnecessary safety risks affected the composition of the petit jury for this particular case, not the individuals represented in the venire from which the petit jury is selected. View "US v. Jose Colon" on Justia Law

A confidential informant tipped off law enforcement that Defendant was dealing drugs out of his residence in Henderson, North Carolina. In the span of a week, officers used the informant to make two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Defendant at his residence. Officers presented the informant with a photo of Defendant following the buys, and the informant confirmed Defendant sold him the crack cocaine. A jury convicted Defendant of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing, manufacturing, or using cocaine and marijuana. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on numerous grounds.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that contrary to Defendant’s argument, probable cause did not require the officers to test the crack cocaine after the buys to confirm its illicit nature. In the warrant application, the lead officer stated that he had eight years of law enforcement experience, was assigned to investigate “the possession and sale of illegal controlled substances,” and had received training about controlled substances. The magistrate could reasonably conclude the officer visually identified the substance the informant purchased from Defendant as crack cocaine, even though the warrant application did not say whether the officer tested it.   Further, the court found that here, there was no plain error. The warrant authorized law enforcement to search the duplex and a silver Mercedes. It also authorized officers to seize “Vehicles” and “all 14 electronics.” Officers had an objectively reasonable belief that both the BMW and the cell phone fell within the warrant’s scope. View "US v. Kacey Hicks" on Justia Law