Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the defendant, Malek Lassiter, appealed his convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Lassiter argued that his convictions were erroneous due to a change in legal authority in the form of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor which altered the definition of a "crime of violence".Lassiter's convictions were based on attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity, arguing that this did not constitute a crime of violence in light of the Taylor decision. However, the court disagreed, distinguishing between the requirements for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which was the focus of the Taylor case, and murder, asserting that murder requires the use of force, therefore attempted murder necessarily requires the attempted use of force, fitting within the definition of a crime of violence.The court rejected Lassiter's arguments and affirmed his § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions. However, due to an inconsistency between the oral and written descriptions of one of Lassiter’s supervised-release conditions, the court vacated his sentence in its entirety and remanded the case for a full resentencing. View "US v. Lassiter" on Justia Law

In 2019, Michael Scott Hoover was arrested on multiple counts of indecent liberties with a minor. Subsequent investigations led to the discovery of videos and images of child pornography on his work-issued iPhone. The videos depicted two minors, both relatives of Hoover, engaging in explicit sexual conduct. Hoover was subsequently indicted on two counts of child pornography production and one count of possession of child pornography. Following a trial, Hoover was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 840 months' imprisonment. He appealed his conviction and sentence, raising several arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected all of Hoover's claims and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of Hoover's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, or in instructing the jury on the elements of child pornography production. The court also found that the district court did not err in sentencing Hoover to 840 months' imprisonment. The court found sufficient evidence supporting Hoover's child pornography production convictions, including the specific-intent and interstate-nexus elements of the offenses. The court also rejected Hoover's challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, finding that the district court had adequately explained its conclusion that the sentence was not unfairly harsh for Hoover. View "United States v. Hoover" on Justia Law

The appellant, Terry George, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The government's key witness, Prince Frazier, had given inconsistent accounts of who was in the car at the time of the traffic stop leading to George's arrest. This inconsistency was not disclosed to George prior to trial. After being convicted, George sought to have his conviction vacated or a new trial ordered, arguing that the government's failure to disclose this inconsistent testimony violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, which requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to an accused. The district court denied George's motion, finding that the government's failure to disclose was not material to George's defense.George was also serving a term of supervised release as a result of a separate criminal conviction at the time of his felon in possession conviction. The district court revoked George's supervised release based on his new conviction.George appealed both decisions. Upon review, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that while the government should have disclosed the inconsistent statement, it was not material to George's defense because George's conviction would stand independently of any question about Frazier's credibility. Furthermore, the court affirmed the revocation of George's supervised release, as it was based on a valid conviction. View "United States v. George" on Justia Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "US v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In this case, Kenneth Kelley pled guilty to twenty-eight counts arising from a fatal car accident that resulted in the death of five people. The charges ranged from manslaughter by auto to driving with an expired license. Kelley later argued that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he wasn't informed of the nature and elements of the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument. The Court held that Kelley was informed of the offenses' elements as he testified at his plea hearing that he had read the indictment, his attorney had discussed the matter thoroughly with him, and he had signed a waiver acknowledging that he understood the charges and their elements. The Court also noted that the judge at the plea hearing had explained the charges to Kelley and that the prosecution had read its factual basis into the record at the plea hearing. The Court therefore concluded that Kelley's plea was knowing and voluntary. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to deny Kelley's habeas corpus petition. View "Kelley v. Bohrer" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, a registered sex offender, was convicted for knowingly failing to update his registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). The appellant argued that as he was mobile without a fixed abode, he was not required to register anywhere under SORNA. He also contested the district court's jury instruction on SORNA’s definition of “resides,” claiming it expanded the definition. Furthermore, he argued that SORNA, as applied to him, violated the Tenth Amendment. He also contested two aspects of his sentence: an eight-level enhancement for his third degree sexual abuse of a minor and possession of child pornography, and his lifetime term of supervised release.The court held that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the meaning of “resides” and “habitually lives” under SORNA and that SORNA, as applied to the appellant, did not violate the Tenth Amendment. The court also affirmed the district court’s sentence as procedurally and substantively reasonable. It concluded that the appellant, who was required to register as a sex offender due to a previous conviction, failed to update his registration while residing in West Virginia, thus violating SORNA. The court found that his argument of not having a fixed abode did not exempt him from the registration requirements of SORNA. View "United States v. Kokinda" on Justia Law

The case in question originated from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellant, Carlos Emanuel Kinard, had been convicted on twelve counts related to a drug and racketeering conspiracy in 1994. One of the counts was for the use of a firearm during and in relation to a "crime of violence" under § 924(c), with the predicate offense arising under the violent crimes in aid of racketeering statute (VICAR) for VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon, which incorporated the North Carolina statutory crime of assault with a deadly weapon. In 2016, Kinard moved to vacate his sentence under § 2255, arguing that the VICAR assault offense was not a "crime of violence" as per the definition in Johnson v. United States. The district court rejected this as untimely and meritless.In 2019, Kinard moved for authorization to file a successive habeas petition based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which held that the residual clause of § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague. Kinard argued that the VICAR assault offense is not categorically a "crime of violence" as it could be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another and could be committed negligently or recklessly. The district court denied this motion, leading to Kinard's appeal.The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon, incorporating the North Carolina assault offense, qualifies as a § 924(c) "crime of violence". The court relied on its recent decision in United States v. Thomas to conclude that the purposeful or knowing conduct element of the VICAR assault offense satisfies the mens rea requirement for a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "US v. Carlos Kinard" on Justia Law