Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When a deputy sheriff in Lexington County, South Carolina, began to follow a vehicle because he thought the driver was behaving suspiciously, the vehicle sped away, failing to stop when the deputy activated his patrol car’s blue light and siren and leading the deputy on a high-speed chase. After the vehicle crashed, the driver, identified as Defendant, was arrested and a firearm and ammunition were recovered from the front floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the district court sentenced him to 99 months imprisonment. The 99-month sentence included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds.   The Fourth Circuit agreed. The court explained that the district court erred in relying on the blue-light offense to apply a Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement when Defendant received notice of that basis for the first time at the sentencing hearing. However, the court also concluded that the error was, in the circumstances of this case, harmless. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement when the firearm was lying at Defendant’s feet while he failed to stop for a blue light. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendant sought an award of attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment following the district court’s dismissal of the government’s criminal case against her. She argued that her prosecution satisfied the Hyde Amendment’s criteria for fee shifting because it was vexatious, frivolous, and in bad faith. She also requests discovery to support her claim. The district court denied discovery and denied attorney’s fees based on its review of the evidence available to the government when it initiated Drake’s prosecution. The appeal here challenged the district court’s exercise of discretion at every turn.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court acted within its discretion throughout. The court explained that given the significant evidence against her, Defendant was fortunate to receive a Rule 29 dismissal from the court. The court wrote that, as this case illustrates, such dismissals will not invariably result in an award of Hyde Amendment attorney’s fees. Allowing awards as a matter of course in such cases would contradict the limiting language of the statute and discourage the granting of such dismissals even when taking such action is the right thing to do. View "US v. Shannon Drake" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). That provision makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to “possess . . . any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). At the time of Defendant’s offense, anyone who “knowingly violate[d]” this provision could be imprisoned for up to ten years. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to appoint counsel and his Section 2255 motion in its entirety.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Rehaif does not apply to felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) and that Rehaif does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The court held that on remand, the district court should consider any issues related to procedural default and prejudice in addition to the merits of Defendant’s claim. Accordingly, the court wrote that in any prejudice analysis, the district court should conduct a fact-intensive inquiry under the Supreme Court’s careful guidance in the Greer decision. However, if the defendant establishes that he did not, in fact, know of his felony status, the district court would be free to award appropriate relief. View "US v. Thomas Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant and his partner conspired to ensnare drug-addicted women in debt-cycle sex trafficking. Defendant would give the women heroin and cocaine they could not afford and then insist they repay their debt by prostituting themselves for his benefit throughout Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Defendant provided fentanyl to two women who overdosed. Defendant left the women for dead and destroyed the evidence. One of the women died, but the other survived and testified against him. A jury convicted Defendant of (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) interstate transportation for the purpose of prostitution, (3) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death and (4) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury. At sentencing, the district court found that Defendant had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense, triggering a mandatory life sentence on Counts 3 and 4. The court sentenced Defendant to life in prison on Counts 1, 3, and 4 and 120 months imprisonment on Count 2, all to be served concurrently. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s speculation about positional isomers of cocaine fails to show that the district court plainly erred in not finding overbreadth on this ground. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s determination that Defendant’s Virginia conviction was for a “felony drug offense” that supports the application of Section 841(b)(1)(C) sentencing enhancement. View "US v. Kendall Wysinger" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion for a sentence reduction under Section 404 of the First Step Act. Defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion when it chose to retain his original sentence despite reducing his Guidelines range to account for his erroneous designation as a career offender.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the First Step Act does not permit a district court to recalculate a defendant’s benchmark Guidelines range “in any way other than to reflect the retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2402 n.6 (2022). Arguments based on other changes in law must be considered after determining the benchmark Guidelines range that will “anchor” the proceeding. Here, the Fair Sentencing Act did not affect Defendant’s original Guidelines range. The district court considered Defendant’s arguments and provided an adequate explanation for retaining his original sentence. The court explained that given that starting point, the district court’s retention of his original sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "US v. David Troy, III" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two firearm possession offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). In determining Defendant’s sentence, the trial court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) sentence enhancement, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1), based on Defendant’s prior state felony convictions. Defendant moved to vacate and correct his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2255, challenging the sentencing court’s application of the ACCA enhancement. After concluding that Defendant’s three Virginia robbery convictions qualified as predicate “violent felonies” under Section 924(e), the district court denied his motion.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Defendant’s Section 2255 motion and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that while Defendant’s appeal of that decision was pending, the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia common-law robbery is not a violent felony for purposes of Section 924(e). Thus, the court concluded that White controls this case and precludes Defendant’s robbery convictions from qualifying as valid ACCA predicates. View "US v. Joseph Williams" on Justia Law

Defendant entered the United Stated without authorization in 2004. He was then convicted of malicious wounding in Virginia and was deported back to El Salvador. Defendant later re-entered the United States before being convicted of another crime in 2020. He was indicted for illegal entry. moved to dismiss that indictment, arguing that the five year statute of limitations on his prosecution had run and that his crime of malicious wounding was not a deportable offense. The district court rejected Defendant's claims.On appeal, Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's collateral attack of his removal order, finding that Defendant entered the United States without authorization, committed a deportable offense, re-entered again illegally, and then committed another crime. The court explained that Defendant's "case falls right at the heart of what Congress sought to criminalize and the executive branch seeks to stop with the illegal reentry statute of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326." View "US v. Omar Alas" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s dismissal of his motion for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. A jury found Defendant guilty of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin, as well as one count of attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin. At sentencing, the district court deemed these offenses “controlled substance offense[s]” under Sections 4B1.1 and 4B1.2—the career offender provisions—of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also had past convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 846 and assault. The district court considered the former to be a controlled substance offense and the latter to be a crime of violence under the career offender provisions. The district court applied the career offender enhancement to his sentence. While Defendant’s appeal was pending, he moved for a new trial based on newly discovered. The district court granted the motion, and the government appealed. On remand, the government moved to reinstate the judgment of conviction and Defendant’s sentence, to which Defendant’s counsel consented. Defendant now argues that, on remand, his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court held that Defendant’s counsel rendered deficient performance by failing to make this objection. This failure resulted in prejudice to Defendant, whose 16-year sentence far exceeded the high end of what the Guidelines range would have been without the career offender enhancement. View "US v. Germaine Cannady" on Justia Law

Defendant filed a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2254, raising constitutional challenges to his death sentence in South Carolina state court. In 2021, the Fourth Circuit held that Defendant’s death sentence was constitutionally defective because his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during sentencing. In reaching that conclusion, the court relied in part on evidence from an evidentiary hearing a magistrate judge conducted during federal habeas proceedings. Both Defendant and the State of South Carolina (“the State”) asked the court to consider that evidence when evaluating Defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the State’s petition for certiorari, vacated the court’s 2021 judgment, and remanded for further consideration in light of its decision in Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).   The Fourth Circuit reaffirm its prior decision, holding that Defendant’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court directed the district court to issue the writ of habeas corpus unless the State grants Defendant a new sentencing hearing within a reasonable time. The court vacated and remanded the district court’s order dismissing Defendant’s habeas petition. The court explained that nothing in Shinn requires the court to excuse the State’s forfeiture here. Here, the State abandoned the Section 2254(e)(2) argument as soon as the magistrate judge recommended denying Defendant relief on the merits and actually relied on the new evidence when arguing that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective. This “suggests that the State ‘strategically’ withheld the defense or chose to relinquish it.” View "Sammie Stokes v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing child pornography and was sentenced to five years in prison followed by five years of supervised release. The sentencing court later agreed to transfer Defendant’s supervision to South Carolina so long as he consented to new conditions. When the probation officer told Defendant’s treatment provider, the provider responded that Cohen’s behavior violated the program’s pornography rules and would be raised at an upcoming group therapy session. The district court directed probation to issue a warrant for Defendant’s arrest for violating the terms of his supervised release. At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted trading photos of his erect penis for pictures of undressed women during sexually explicit conversations but argued his behavior did not violate his supervised release conditions. The district court revoked Defendant’s release. The district court sentenced Defendant to time served followed by lifetime supervision, during which he would be subject to various special conditions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release and the imposition of lifetime supervision. The court vacated the first clause of special condition eleven and remanded for entry of a modified judgment striking that clause. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in all other respects and remanded for further proceedings. The court reasoned that because the district court identified no other basis for concluding Defendant violated the participation condition, its determination on that point was legally erroneous. View "US v. Marshall Cohen" on Justia Law