Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, six men affiliated with the transnational criminal organization MS-13 were convicted of sex trafficking a thirteen-year-old girl by force, fraud, or coercion, and conspiracy to do the same. The accused appealed the district court’s denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from Facebook warrants, arguing the warrants failed the probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. One of the accused also appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, contending that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction.The court held that the Facebook warrants were supported by probable cause, as they were based on substantial evidence linking the accused’s use of Facebook to their criminal activities. The court also held that the warrants were sufficiently particular as they identified the items to be seized by reference to the suspected criminal offenses and confined the officers’ discretion by restricting them from rummaging through the accused’s social media data in search of unrelated criminal activities. However, the court noted that future warrants enhance their claims to particularity by requesting data only from the period of time during which the defendant was suspected of taking part in the criminal conspiracy.The court rejected one appellant's sufficiency challenge to his conviction and affirmed his convictions, finding that substantial evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking of a minor under fourteen or of a minor by force, fraud, or coercion, and of conspiracy to transport a minor in interstate commerce with intent for the minor to engage in prostitution or illegal sexual activity.Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "United States v. Zelaya-Veliz" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Maurice Owen Wiley, Jr., for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence. Wiley and his coconspirators planned to rob the owners of a restaurant, believing the owners kept the business's profits at their home. Wiley drove the group to the owners' home, where they exchanged gunfire with the owners, resulting in the death of one of the owners. Wiley appealed his convictions on several grounds.First, he argued that his indictment for conspiracy to possess firearms in furtherance of a crime of violence failed to state an offense and that the district court constructively amended it. The court rejected this argument, stating that the indictment alleges the statutory conspiracy offense proscribed by § 924(o) by mirroring the statute’s wording, and the government is not required to specify a predicate crime of violence offense in an indictment for a § 924(c) offense.Second, Wiley contended that the district court erred in denying his Batson challenges (claims that the prosecution excluded jurors on the basis of race). The court found no clear error in the district court's denial of Wiley's Batson claim.Third, Wiley argued that the district court violated his due process rights by not allowing him to define “reasonable doubt” in his closing argument. The court rejected this argument, stating that the district court has broad authority to limit closing argument to ensure that it doesn’t impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.Lastly, Wiley challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The court found there was sufficient evidence that Wiley entered into an agreement that contemplated both Hobbs Act robbery and using a firearm to execute the robbery. Additionally, the court found there was sufficient evidence to show that Wiley and his coconspirators targeted the proceeds of a business engaged in interstate commerce. View "US v. Wiley" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving Gerald Wayne Timms, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, following his sentence for a child pornography conviction. During his civil commitment, Timms was convicted of and sentenced for two separate federal crimes. After serving the prison terms for these offenses, his civil commitment continued. Timms argued that his civil commitment should have ended when his first criminal sentence started, and he claimed that certain conditions of his criminal confinement violated the requirements of the Act. He also contended that the application of the Act violated his constitutional rights.However, the court held that a person ordered to be civilly detained after a finding of sexual dangerousness remains committed until a court finds that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that an intervening criminal sentence has no impact on the civil commitment. The court also held that the Attorney General did not fail to meet his statutory obligation to detain Timms in a suitable facility and that the Attorney General was not required to seek recommitment following Timms' sentences. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Timms' petition for habeas corpus relief. View "Timms v. U. S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to decide whether a defendant could waive his right to be physically present at a resentencing hearing, and whether such an order denying his request for resentencing in absentia is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The defendant, Heverth Castellon, argued that he could waive his right to be present at the resentencing hearing per Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1)(B), which allows a defendant who is voluntarily absent during sentencing to waive his right to be present. The district court had ruled that the Rule allows a defendant to exercise this right only by "absconding or disrupting the [sentencing] proceedings."While the court explained that the text of the Rule and their previous precedent suggest that a noncapital defendant can voluntarily waive his right to be present at sentencing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This is because the district court's order compelling the defendant's presence at resentencing did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the defendant’s right to waive his presence at resentencing was not an "important right" that would be lost irreparably if review awaited final judgment, which is a necessary condition for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court could not entertain the defendant's appeal until after the imposition of a sentence. View "US v. Castellon" on Justia Law

In a federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner, James Rosemond, appealed a district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Rosemond, who was serving multiple life sentences for offenses related to drug trafficking and murder, claimed that his continued detention was unconstitutional because then-President Donald Trump had commuted his sentence to time served during a phone conversation with two of Rosemond's supporters, Jim Brown and Monique Brown. The Browns signed declarations stating that during the December 2020 call, they believed President Trump had decided to commute Rosemond's sentence. However, no clemency warrant or official record of clemency for Rosemond exists, and his clemency petition is still listed as "pending" on the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney website.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rosemond’s petition. The court held that while a written document is not constitutionally required for a presidential commutation, the evidence provided by Rosemond, namely the Browns' declarations, did not establish that President Trump actually commuted his sentence. The court found that President Trump's alleged statements during the phone call were forward-looking and indicative of a desire to commute Rosemond's sentence in the future, rather than a declaration of a completed act of clemency. The court also noted the established practice of documenting acts of presidential clemency, which was consistently followed by President Trump throughout his presidency, and emphasized the constitutional separation of powers, which vests the clemency power exclusively in the President. View "Rosemond v. Hudgins" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the appellant, Ricky Demarco Robinson, challenged the enhanced sentence he received for possession of a firearm by a felon. The enhancement was based on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which increases the advisory sentencing range when the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions qualifying as either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” Robinson argued that his prior conviction for North Carolina assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation should not be deemed a "crime of violence," even though a previous ruling (United States v. Rice) had categorized it as such. Robinson claimed that the Rice decision was no longer binding because it relied on an analysis that the Supreme Court later prohibited in United States v. Taylor. The Taylor decision rejected an analysis that depends on survey evidence as to how the crime is “normally committed or usually prosecuted.”The Court of Appeals disagreed with Robinson's contention. It concluded that the Rice decision remains valid and binding because it was based on an interpretation of the text of the North Carolina assault by strangulation legislation and on North Carolina case law. The court stated that the Rice decision’s reference to survey evidence was only used to confirm the holding and was not fundamental to it. Consequently, the court affirmed Robinson’s enhanced sentence, ruling that his prior North Carolina conviction for assault by strangulation qualifies categorically as a conviction for a crime of violence. View "US v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Adonis Perry, was arrested in 2017 for possessing a firearm as a felon and for possessing marijuana after he was found with both during a traffic stop. While awaiting trial, Perry repeatedly tried to convince his girlfriend, a key witness for the government, to refuse to cooperate, leading to four witness-tampering and obstruction-of-justice charges. Perry was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 210 months and three years of supervised release. Perry appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds, including that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. They found that Perry was not unconstitutionally seized during the traffic stop, his girlfriend had authority to consent to the search of his phone, the charges against him should not have been dismissed due to the failure to preserve dashcam footage, the evidence supporting his convictions was sufficient, his convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, his counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, and his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "US v. Perry" on Justia Law

The case involves Joel Smithers, who was a doctor of osteopathy and was convicted on 861 counts associated with his opioid prescription practices. He was sentenced to a total of 480 months in prison. Smithers was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without authorization. Authorization is defined by Drug Enforcement Agency regulations as a prescription issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States clarified the mens rea required to convict someone of unauthorized dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that, in light of the Ruan decision, Smithers' jury instructions were incorrect, and the errors were not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. View "United States v. Joel Smithers" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, the defendant Darrius Andrez King pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon after firing a handgun in the air outside a crowded nightclub. During the plea colloquy, the district court did not inform King about the significance of supervised release—that if he violated it, he could face additional prison time exceeding the statutory maximum period for the underlying offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 does require the district court to inform defendants who intend to plead guilty about the effect of supervised release. However, the court decided not to vacate King’s plea, concluding that the omission did not affect his substantial rights. The court reasoned that there was no indication that King would have tried to withdraw his plea if he had been correctly informed about the potential consequences of violating supervised release, especially given the strength of the case against him. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. King" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Curtis Davis, had been arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses after law enforcement officers executing a search warrant observed him attempting to place baggies of controlled substances into an air vent. More baggies of controlled substances, firearms, cash, cell phones, and additional controlled substances were found in the residence. The district court denied Davis's motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the search warrant was valid at least as to evidence of firearms offenses. The controlled substances found on Davis's person and in his bedroom were lawfully seized either incident to Davis's arrest or because they were in plain view of the officers conducting the search. Furthermore, Davis's cell phone was lawfully seized as an instrumentality of drug trafficking found in plain view. The court emphasized that for a cell phone to be seized in plain view, the "additional evidence or indicators" of criminality have significant work to do to establish probable cause. In this case, Davis's phone was found in the residence along with substantial quantities of controlled substances that were packaged for distribution, cash, firearms, and ammunition, all found on Davis's person or in his bedroom. This evidence provided law enforcement with sufficient probable cause to seize Davis's cell phone. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Curtis Davis" on Justia Law