Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Criminal Law
US v. Donzell McKinney
Defendant pled guilty to two counts — conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for discharging a firearm during and in relation to that conspiracy. Under subsequent controlling precedent, Defendant now stands convicted of, and imprisoned for, conduct that does not violate Section 924(c) and in fact, is not criminal. Accordingly, he brought this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion asking the district court to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The district court refused to do so, and Defendant appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction. The court explained that when Defendant pled guilty in 2012 and was sentenced in 2013, the Supreme Court had implicitly approved Section 924(c)’s residual clause. Only several years later, in 2015, did the Court in Johnson cause a sea change in the law, disapproving its prior precedent upholding similar residual clauses against void-for-vagueness challenges. And it was not until 2019 that Davis dealt the final blow to Section 924(c)’s residual clause. The court wrote that Defendant’s case falls squarely within Reed’s “novelty” framework, and so he has shown cause for his procedural default. Further, Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction subjects him to imprisonment for conduct that the law does not make criminal. Because the error here worked to Defendant’s “actual and substantial disadvantage,” he has established prejudice to excuse his procedural default. View "US v. Donzell McKinney" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US v. Demarcus Ivey
Defendant was arrested for one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1951, and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c) and 924(j)(1). In a pretrial motion to suppress, Defendant argued that certain statements he made to detectives and witness identifications should be suppressed. The district court disagreed, admitting the evidence. Defendant was convicted.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's robbery and firearm convictions. While the district court erred in admitting Defendant's statements and the witness identifications, in light of the admissible evidence, any error was harmless. The court also rejected Defendant's claim that the cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly instructed the jury that a Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Demarcus Ivey" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US v. Jason Dix
Defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec 922(g)(1) after he fled a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 99 months’ imprisonment, which included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the
use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds. For his procedural argument, Defendant argued that he was not given the required notice of the enhancement because the presentence report identified “another felony offense” as the basis for the enhancement. For his substantive argument, Defendant argued that he did not possess the firearm found in the vehicle in connection with the blue-light offense. The district court rejected Defendant's arguments.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's firearm conviction and sentence, finding that although the district court erred in determining Defendant was provided with the required notice, the error was harmless given the circumstances of the case. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US v. Christopher Sueiro
Defendant was charged with numerous child pornography crimes. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. After a jury later convicted Defendant on all counts, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months imprisonment and to a life term of supervised release. As part of Defendant’s supervised release, the court imposed special conditions, including prohibitions against (1) viewing sexually explicit images of minors, (2) engaging in employment or volunteer activities with access to computers, (3) viewing adult pornography, and (4) using any video game system that would allow communication with other people. On appeal, Defendant argued that the initial warrant authorizing a search of his residence was overbroad and that, therefore, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He also contends that the court procedurally and substantively erred by imposing a 240-month term of imprisonment and the above-stated special conditions of supervised release.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, his term of imprisonment, and the special condition of supervised release that prohibits Defendant from viewing sexually explicit images of minors. However, the court held that the district court erred by failing to explain the other challenged special conditions of supervised release. The court, therefore, vacated these conditions as procedurally unreasonable, and remand that portion of Defendant’s sentence to the district court for further consideration. View "US v. Christopher Sueiro" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US v. Larry Reed
Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court determined that Defendant was eligible for relief but declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Defendant’s sentence. Defendant argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum under the Fair Sentencing Act. Alternatively, he contends that the district court should have addressed its rejection of that argument.
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court explained that it disagreed with Defendant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum. However, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), instructs that district courts need not reduce any sentence under the First Step Act. But Concepcion also requires district courts to demonstrate that they have considered all nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties. And under this record, the court is unable to determine if the district court considered and rejected Defendant’s statutory maximum argument. View "US v. Larry Reed" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
US v. Larry Reed
Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court determined that Defendant was eligible for relief but declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Defendant’s sentence. Defendant argued that the district court should have reduced his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum under the Fair Sentencing Act. Alternatively, he contends that the district court should have addressed its rejection of that argument.
The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for reconsideration of Defendant’s motion. The court explained that it disagreed with Defendant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), instructs that district courts need not reduce any sentence under the First Step Act. But Concepcion also requires district courts to demonstrate that they have considered all nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties. And under this record, the court wrote, it is unable to determine if the district court considered and rejected Defendant’s statutory maximum argument. View "US v. Larry Reed" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
US v. George Fowler
Defendant pled guilty to two federal weapons charges after local law enforcement executed a search warrant at his residence and discovered a multitude of firearms, ammunition, and drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant to 117 months imprisonment, at the lowest end of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The Fourth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument on two issues– (1) whether the district court plainly erred in assigning one criminal history point to Defendant’s criminal domestic violence offense; and (2) whether the district court adequately explained its rejection of Fowler’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure or variance.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found no reversible error in this case. As a general proposition, this court reviews a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” The court reasoned that procedural reasonableness requires the court to “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” which includes “improperly calculating . . . the Guidelines range.” Thus, any claim of error that was not pursued and preserved in the district court is reviewed only for plain error. The court explained that since Defendant failed to object to the PSR’s inclusion of his CDV conviction, the court found no error by the district court in adopting it. Moreover, Defendant has not borne the heavy burden of satisfying the plain error criteria, as he cannot prove “that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would be different.” View "US v. George Fowler" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
US v. Ervin Leggette
Defendant and another person were trespassing in a public park after it closed. When officers saw their car, they investigated the trespass. The officers found a gun abandoned in a nearby trash can, so they frisked Defendant and questioned him about the gun. After first denying the gun was his, Defendant admitted he was a felon and that he owned the gun. The officers arrested Defendant, who was then federally indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He sought to suppress his incriminatory statements, arguing that his statements in the park were inadmissible because he was “in custody” under Miranda, and so the officers needed to read him his Miranda rights before questioning him about the gun. The district court disagreed, and Defendant pleaded guilty.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Miranda warnings are not required every time an individual has their freedom of movement restrained by a police officer. Nor are they necessarily required every time “questioning imposes some sort of pressure on suspects to confess to their crimes.” Instead, they are required only when a suspect’s freedom of movement is restrained to the point where they do not feel free to terminate the encounter, and the circumstances reveal “the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” The court found that, in this case, no such pressures existed. View "US v. Ervin Leggette" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
US v. Michael Mangarella
Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), relying primarily on his vulnerability to COVID-19 due to his advanced age and chronic lung-related health conditions. Although the government originally supported Defendant’s motion, it later changed its position, and the district court ultimately denied relief. Defendant appealed that denial, arguing in part that the district court, in weighing the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), failed to address or consider his heightened risk of death or serious illness if infected with COVID-19.
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant and vacated the district court’s denial of compassionate release and remand for reconsideration. The court explained that it cannot say with any confidence that in denying Defendant’s motion, the district court properly “reconsidered the Section 3553(a) factors in view of” his age and health conditions, the COVID-19 outbreak at his correctional facility, and the “severe risks arising out of those circumstances.” Thus, the court wrote it cannot meaningfully review its denial of Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Michael Mangarella" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
US v. Lonnie Malone
Defendant was sentenced to 330 months in federal prison for the use of a firearm to facilitate a drug offense and for a drug conspiracy. After serving eleven years in prison, Defendant filed his first motion for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant argued that his significant health decline and advanced age justified his release. The district court denied his motion, relying solely upon a now in applicable policy statement, United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”). The following year, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) deemed Defendant severely at risk of contracting COVID-19 and placed him in home confinement through authority granted by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). Defendant filed a subsequent motion for compassionate release reiterating his advanced age and severe health conditions. In addition, Defendant presented supplementary arguments that focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors, the “extreme” nature of his sentence, and his inability to receive government benefits while in home confinement. The district court again denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release.
The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court’s decision with instructions to grant Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by failing to properly assess the following factors which would warrant Defendant’s compassionate release: his ailing health, advanced age, and relevant 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) factors. Had it addressed that evidence, as more fully discussed below, its analysis of whether Defendant is entitled to compassionate release would have likely merited a different outcome. View "US v. Lonnie Malone" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law