Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A hospital employee discovered that someone had posted on social media a screenshot from the hospital’s internal system, revealing Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s name, dates of ten medical visits, and the types of services she received. The post, which first appeared on an anonymous online forum, fueled conspiracy theories regarding the Justice’s health. The hospital investigated and identified two employees who had inappropriately searched for the Justice’s information, ultimately focusing on Trent Russell, who worked for a non-profit with access to patient records. Forensic analysis linked Russell’s home computer to the search, and evidence showed he formatted his hard drive after his access was revoked. He was charged with unlawfully obtaining health information, unlawfully destroying records, and disclosing health information.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied Russell’s motion to suppress statements made to federal agents during an interview at his workplace. The court found no coercion despite the presence of his employer’s CEO. The court also limited cross-examination of an agent regarding Russell’s explanations for the search, sustaining a hearsay objection but allowing other avenues to explore bias. At trial, the jury convicted Russell of obtaining individually identifiable health information and destroying records, but acquitted him of disclosing health information. The district court sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Russell’s interview statements were voluntary, as there was no evidence of coercion or threats. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s limitation of cross-examination, and any error was harmless given the other evidence of bias. It also held that the information Russell obtained qualified as “individually identifiable health information” under federal law. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment in full. View "US v. Russell" on Justia Law

The defendant owned and operated a company that provided paycard services to restaurant employees, allowing them to receive wages on debit cards. Over time, he misused the funds entrusted to his company by transferring payroll money to his personal brokerage account and engaging in risky options trading, without disclosing these actions to his clients. When losses mounted and funds were missing, he misled both the client company and cardholders about the shortfall, imposed new fees retroactively, and restricted access to account information under the guise of privacy concerns. After the business relationship ended and his company lost its only client, he applied for a Paycheck Protection Program loan using falsified bank records, misrepresenting his company’s operations, and diverted those funds to his brokerage account as well.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted him on multiple counts of wire and mail fraud based on both the paycard and PPP loan schemes. He moved to sever the count relating to the PPP loan, arguing that combining the two schemes in one trial was improper and prejudicial, but the district court denied severance, finding the counts properly joined and prejudice curable. After a jury convicted him on all counts, the district court applied a sentencing enhancement for the use of sophisticated means, resulting in an 87-month prison sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraudulent intent and that the sophisticated-means sentencing enhancement was supported by the record. The court also found that joinder of the paycard and PPP fraud schemes was proper, as there were material overlaps in method and evidence, and affirmed the district court’s discretion in denying severance. The judgment was affirmed. View "US v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child sexual abuse material and was sentenced to 144 months in prison. Upon release, he was placed on lifetime supervised release with a special condition prohibiting access to any pornographic material, including legal pornography. The defendant repeatedly violated conditions of his supervised release, resulting in multiple revocations and returns to prison. Each time he was released, similar conditions were imposed. The defendant later consented to a special condition that barred him from viewing or possessing any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct on electronic devices, but later contested the imposition of a broader ban.After the defendant’s initial appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (in Castellano I) vacated the district court’s imposition of the pornography ban, finding it was not supported by individualized evidence, and remanded with instructions to strike the special condition. The district court complied. However, after subsequent violations and revocations, the government requested a new special condition banning all pornography, this time presenting testimony and a written evaluation from the defendant’s treatment provider, who offered individualized clinical reasons for the restriction based on years of treating the defendant.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing the pornography ban. The court held that the special condition was supported by individualized evidence specific to the defendant and his treatment needs. The court further held that neither the mandate rule from Castellano I nor other legal doctrines barred the district court from imposing the new condition in light of changed circumstances and new evidence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Castellano" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who pleaded guilty to two drug offenses and was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. During the sentencing hearing, the court orally pronounced certain discretionary conditions for supervised release, including a condition regarding warrantless searches. The court stated that such searches would be allowed only upon reasonable suspicion of a violation or, without suspicion, for safety issues. Later that day, the court entered a written judgment that imposed broader conditions, permitting warrantless searches by probation officers as part of their general supervision functions, without limiting such searches to the occasions described orally.After sentencing, the defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment contained conditions of supervised release that materially differed from those announced in open court. The government raised several arguments in response, including claims about waiver and harmlessness, and noted that the written condition matched the presentence report’s recommendation, which the defendant had not objected to. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed these arguments de novo, consistent with its precedent.The Fourth Circuit held that there was a material discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written judgment regarding the scope of warrantless searches, which constituted error under its Rogers–Singletary line of cases. The court rejected the government’s arguments that the error was harmless or waived by the plea agreement, emphasizing that the oral pronouncement controls and that a defendant has standing to challenge such discrepancies. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for resentencing. View "United States v. Tostado" on Justia Law

The case concerns a petitioner who was convicted in West Virginia state court in 2004 of sexually abusing his son. After the trial, it was discovered that, during jury deliberations, one juror told others that he knew the petitioner’s family and feared for his own family’s safety if the petitioner was acquitted. Four jurors later confirmed that the comments had been made, though the juror in question denied them. The petitioner argued this introduced an impermissible external influence into the deliberations, violating his right to an impartial jury.The trial court in West Virginia denied the petitioner’s request for a new trial, finding insufficient evidence of juror impartiality and concluding that the statements related only to the jury’s deliberative process, not to any external influence. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed this decision, holding that the comments were intrinsic to the deliberations and thus not grounds to set aside the verdict. The petitioner then sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, which denied his petition, concluding the state court had not unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of habeas relief de novo but applied the deferential standard required by § 2254. The Fourth Circuit held that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court law in finding that the juror’s comments were intrinsic, not external, to the deliberation process. The court concluded that, under existing Supreme Court precedent, the statements did not rise to the level of external influence necessary to violate the petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying habeas relief. View "Daugherty v. Dingus" on Justia Law

A man with two prior felony convictions crashed his car late at night in 2023. When law enforcement arrived, he admitted to drinking. Officers found a vodka bottle and a loaded handgun with a magazine on the ground near the vehicle, as well as a second magazine in the car’s front seat. Both magazines matched the firearm, which had been reported stolen. The man’s criminal record included a violent robbery and a prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, among other offenses. Based on these events, he was charged in the Middle District of North Carolina with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).In the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that § 922(g)(1) violated the Second Amendment. The district court rejected this argument. The defendant then pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue. At sentencing, the Presentence Report determined that the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, setting his base offense level accordingly. The defendant did not object to the report and confirmed his agreement in open court. The district court adopted the report and sentenced him to 66 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed his constitutional and sentencing challenges. The court held that circuit precedent foreclosed both his facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). The court also held there was no error in applying the “large capacity magazine” sentencing enhancement, and that the sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. Holman" on Justia Law

In late 2021, a man began communicating online with an individual named “Alice,” who claimed to have two young daughters. Over several months, he discussed his interest in engaging in sexual activities with the purported children, communicated using various means, and ultimately traveled from Montana to West Virginia with the intention of meeting Alice and her daughters. Upon arrival, he was arrested by federal agents, who revealed that Alice and the children were fictitious personas created by law enforcement. He subsequently pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia sentenced him to 324 months’ imprisonment, applying two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements—one for use of a computer to entice a minor and another for an offense involving a minor under 12 years old—based on his interactions with the fictitious children. At sentencing, the defendant did not object to these enhancements. Later, after the court granted his motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 due to ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a timely notice of appeal, he was allowed to pursue a direct appeal challenging the application of the enhancements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the sentence for plain error. The court held that the term “minor” as used in the relevant Guidelines enhancements is ambiguous as to whether it includes fictitious minors, and that the Guidelines commentary, which expressly includes fictitious minors, is entitled to deference. The court found no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court’s application of the enhancements and affirmed the sentence. View "US v. Hodges" on Justia Law

A former employee of a pharmaceutical manufacturer brought a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company improperly calculated and reported its “Best Price” for certain drugs to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as required under the Medicaid Rebate Statute. The plaintiff claimed that, during a period from 2005 to 2014, the company failed to aggregate multiple rebates and discounts given to different entities on the same drug, resulting in inflated “Best Price” reports and underpayment of rebates owed to Medicaid. The complaint asserted that the company was subjectively aware that CMS interpreted the statute to require aggregation of all such discounts, especially after the company’s communications with CMS during a 2006–2007 rulemaking process and the company’s subsequent internal audit.After the government and several states declined to intervene, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the amended complaint, finding that, even under the subjective scienter standard established in United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc., the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the company acted with actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of its reports. The district court also suggested that ambiguity in the statute precluded a finding of falsity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s allegations—including the company’s awareness of CMS’s interpretation of the rule, its targeted audit and compliance efforts, and its continued use of non-aggregated reporting—plausibly alleged the requisite subjective scienter under the False Claims Act. The court clarified that statutory ambiguity does not, at the pleading stage, negate scienter or falsity, and remanded for the district court to address other elements, including falsity, in the first instance. The Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law

Several Iraqi citizens detained at Abu Ghraib prison during the U.S. occupation of Iraq alleged that, between October and December 2003, they were subjected to severe abuse by military police. The plaintiffs claimed that employees of CACI Premier Technology, Inc., a contractor providing interrogation services to the U.S. military, conspired with military personnel to “soften up” detainees for interrogation, resulting in torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (CIDT). While CACI’s contract required its personnel to operate under military supervision, evidence suggested inadequate oversight and that CACI employees directed some of the abusive tactics. Plaintiffs did not allege direct physical abuse by CACI interrogators, but asserted conspiracy liability.The case was initially filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, advancing claims under both the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and state law. Over time, the plaintiffs narrowed their suit to ATS claims for torture, CIDT, and war crimes, proceeding on conspiracy and aiding-and-abetting theories. The district court dismissed some claims and parties, and after two trials—one ending in mistrial—the jury found CACI liable for conspiracy to commit torture and CIDT, awarding significant compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed multiple legal challenges by CACI, including justiciability, immunity, preemption, and the state secrets privilege. The court held that application of the ATS was proper because the conduct at issue occurred within U.S.-controlled territory (Abu Ghraib during the CPA regime), was actionable under universal jurisdiction principles, and enough domestic conduct was involved. The court found that conspiracy liability and corporate liability are recognized under the ATS, and rejected CACI’s defenses and challenges regarding sovereign immunity, political question doctrine, preemption, and evidentiary rulings. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment against CACI, vacated the district court’s judgment in favor of the United States on third-party claims due to sovereign immunity, and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims. View "Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc." on Justia Law

The case arose after a technology company, using hash-matching technology, flagged files uploaded to a user’s cloud storage account as child sexual abuse material (CSAM) and reported them to a national crimes center, as required by federal law. Some of the files were reviewed and confirmed by company employees, while others were not. The report was forwarded to law enforcement in Virginia, but after a delay, the investigation shifted to North Carolina, where the user had moved. There, local law enforcement conducted two consensual interviews with the user, obtained consent to search his devices, and later executed a search warrant at his home, discovering additional CSAM.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina denied the user’s motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that the user had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud storage files due to the service provider’s privacy policy, the contraband nature of CSAM, and the reliability of the hash-matching process. Alternatively, the district court found that even if a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, suppression was not warranted because the connection between the warrantless search and the later discovered evidence was too attenuated, citing the exclusionary rule’s attenuation doctrine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in cloud-based accounts, and that law enforcement’s warrantless opening and viewing of such files violates the Fourth Amendment unless a warrant or exception applies. However, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of suppression, holding that the evidence eventually used against the user was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search due to significant temporal gaps and intervening voluntary acts, such as interviews and consent to search, making suppression unwarranted. Thus, the judgment was affirmed. View "United States v. Lowers" on Justia Law