Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant was charged with one count of wire fraud after orchestrating a scheme in which he falsely presented himself as a wealthy and experienced investor to at least ten individuals, promising guaranteed returns on investments in the stock market and a cannabis store. Instead of investing the funds, he used the money for personal expenses. To maintain the appearance of legitimacy, he provided promissory notes and sent updates to victims about their supposed investments. When victims requested their money, he made excuses and, at times, threatened them.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina accepted the defendant’s guilty plea to wire fraud. At sentencing, the court applied a two-level enhancement for abuse of trust under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, based on evidence that the defendant had assumed a position of trust with his victims by posing as a financial advisor and investor. The court also imposed two discretionary conditions of supervised release, requiring participation in substance abuse testing and treatment, and transitional support services. The defendant objected to the abuse-of-trust enhancement but did not object to the supervised release conditions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal interpretations de novo. The Fourth Circuit held that the abuse-of-trust enhancement was properly applied because the defendant provided sufficient indicia to his victims that he held a position of private trust, even though he was an imposter. The court also held that the challenged supervised release conditions did not constitute an improper delegation of judicial authority to the Probation Officer, relying on its precedent. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Two former employees of a large technology company, along with a real estate developer and related individuals and entities, were alleged to have engaged in a kickback scheme involving real estate transactions in Northern Virginia. The employees, responsible for managing real estate deals for the company, allegedly steered contracts to the developer’s firm in exchange for secret payments funneled through a network of trusts and entities. The scheme purportedly inflated the company’s costs for both leasing and purchasing properties, with millions of dollars in kickbacks distributed among the participants. The company discovered the scheme after a whistleblower report, conducted an internal investigation, and reported the matter to federal authorities.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on several claims, including those under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, fraud, unjust enrichment, and conversion, and partially on a civil conspiracy claim. The district court found that the company failed to establish the existence of a RICO enterprise, did not show injury to its business or property, and that equitable claims were precluded by the availability of legal remedies or the existence of contracts. The court also ruled that an attorney defendant could not be liable for conspiracy with his clients.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The appellate court held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding the existence of a RICO enterprise, whether the company suffered financial harm, and the viability of the fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, and civil conspiracy claims. The court clarified that the company was entitled to pursue legal and equitable remedies in the alternative and that the attorney’s potential liability for conspiracy could not be resolved on summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Amazon.com, Inc. v. WDC Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

Brandon Glen Jackson was indicted in Arizona for a state-law felony related to possessing a short-barreled rifle. While released on bail and with the felony charge still pending, Jackson lawfully acquired a handgun and traveled from Arizona to Maryland, bringing the handgun with him. In Maryland, he was arrested for carrying the gun without a permit. Upon discovering his pending Arizona felony indictment, federal prosecutors charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n), which prohibits individuals under felony indictment from transporting firearms in interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied Jackson’s motion to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds. Jackson then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the constitutional issue. He was sentenced to time served, and subsequently appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and applied the Supreme Court’s “text-and-history” standard from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). The Fourth Circuit held that Jackson’s conduct—transporting a handgun across state lines while under felony indictment—was presumptively protected by the Second Amendment. However, the court found that the government met its burden to show that § 922(n), as applied to Jackson, was consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court relied on historical surety laws and the tradition of disarming dangerous persons, as well as its own precedent in United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697 (4th Cir. 2024), to conclude that temporary disarmament of those under felony indictment is constitutionally permissible. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more of a mixture containing fentanyl. He entered into a written plea agreement with the government, in which he agreed to plead guilty. In exchange, the government stipulated to certain sentencing factors, including the drug weight used to calculate the base offense level and that the defendant was a manager or supervisor of criminal activity involving five or more participants. The agreement reserved the government’s right to present evidence, make a sentencing recommendation, and clarified that it was not promising to seek a downward departure.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted the guilty plea. At sentencing, the government moved for both an upward and a downward departure or variance from the Guidelines range, citing the defendant’s criminal history and role in the offense. The district court applied both departures and sentenced the defendant to 234 months’ imprisonment. The defendant did not object at sentencing but later appealed, arguing that the government breached the plea agreement by failing to request a below-Guidelines sentence and by making arguments inconsistent with the stipulations regarding drug weight and his role.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, as the defendant had not raised these arguments below. The court held that the plea agreement did not require the government to seek a below-Guidelines sentence or prohibit it from moving for both upward and downward departures. The court also found that, while some of the government’s arguments at sentencing created tension with the stipulations, the agreement’s language did not clearly prohibit such arguments. Therefore, the court concluded there was no plain error and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Amir Golestan, founder and CEO of Micfo, LLC, orchestrated a scheme to fraudulently obtain approximately 1.3 million valuable IPv4 Internet Protocol addresses from the American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) by creating fictitious companies and individuals. He then resold some of these addresses for profit. The scheme was uncovered when ARIN blocked a large attempted sale. Golestan and Micfo were indicted by a federal grand jury on 20 counts of wire fraud.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Golestan and Micfo’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that IP addresses constituted “property” under the wire fraud statute. During a bench trial, after the government presented substantial evidence, Golestan and Micfo changed their pleas to guilty. The district court accepted the pleas without advising Golestan of possible immigration consequences. Sentencing was delayed for 17 months, during which Golestan moved to continue sentencing pending the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ciminelli, and later sought to withdraw the guilty pleas, arguing that Ciminelli invalidated the prosecution’s theory and that he was not properly advised of immigration consequences. Micfo also argued Golestan lacked authority to plead on its behalf. The district court denied these motions and sentenced Golestan to 60 months’ incarceration and Micfo to probation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court held that the government’s theory of wire fraud did not rely on the “right-to-control” doctrine rejected in Ciminelli, but rather on deprivation of traditional property interests. The court found the district court’s failure to advise Golestan of immigration consequences was harmless error, as he was a naturalized citizen. The court also held that the record supported Golestan’s authority to plead for Micfo and declined to address ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. View "US v. Golestan" on Justia Law

A woman was convicted of first-degree murder in Maryland state court after being tried jointly with her husband. The prosecution’s case was largely circumstantial, focusing on motive and opportunity, and initially argued that she was the shooter. After her conviction, she moved for a new trial, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of her motion, she disclosed attorney-client privileged materials and testified about her defense strategy and communications with counsel. The trial court granted her a new trial but ordered her to turn over privileged materials to the State and allowed the same prosecution team, now privy to her defense strategy, to retry her case. The court also left open the possibility that her prior testimony could be used to impeach her if she testified at the new trial.On appeal, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals assumed, without deciding, that the trial court erred by allowing the same prosecution team to retry the case and by permitting the State to use information obtained from privileged materials. However, the appellate court found no prejudice, reasoning that the new evidence (including the existence of a second wig) did not harm her defense and that her decision not to testify was not prejudicial absent a proffer of her intended testimony. The Maryland Court of Appeals denied certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court also declined review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on habeas corpus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Maryland Court of Special Appeals’ finding of no prejudice was based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts, given the record showing the State’s use of privileged evidence and the impact on the defendant’s ability to testify. However, because the state appellate court had not actually decided whether a constitutional violation occurred, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of habeas relief and remanded for the district court to determine that question de novo. View "Kaur v. Warden" on Justia Law

In August 2022, law enforcement officers in Sterling, Virginia, stopped a Ford Explorer as part of an operation to execute an arrest warrant for a suspected armed robber. Herbert Murillo-Lopez was driving the vehicle. During the stop, officers recovered a firearm from a satchel worn by Murillo-Lopez. He admitted to being an undocumented non-citizen. Subsequent investigation confirmed he was born in El Salvador, had no lawful status in the United States, and had no record of legal entry.A grand jury indicted Murillo-Lopez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits possession of a firearm by an undocumented non-citizen. He moved to suppress the evidence from the stop, arguing the stop and search were unconstitutional, but the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied the motion. Shortly before trial, he moved to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds, but the district court found the motion untimely and unpersuasive. After a jury found him guilty, the district court denied his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to eight months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Murillo-Lopez knew he was unlawfully present in the United States. The court also found the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion that Murillo-Lopez might be the subject of the arrest warrant, and that the search of his satchel was consensual. Finally, the court rejected his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(5)(A), holding that existing circuit precedent remains valid after recent Supreme Court decisions. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Murillo-Lopez" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia to two charges: possession with intent to distribute heroin and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, a significant dispute arose over whether the defendant should be classified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would substantially increase his advisory sentencing range. The career offender designation was based on the defendant’s current conviction and two prior felony convictions, both deemed “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines.The district court, after extensive briefing and a continued hearing, determined that both the defendant’s prior Virginia state conviction for drug distribution and a prior federal conviction for distribution of crack cocaine qualified as predicate offenses for the career offender enhancement. The court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to 151 months in prison, at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. The defendant appealed, arguing that neither prior conviction should count as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Virginia statute at issue did not criminalize attempt offenses as part of completed distribution offenses, distinguishing it from a West Virginia statute previously found overbroad in United States v. Campbell. The court also held that, under its precedent and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, the proper approach for determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense is to look at the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction, not at the time of federal sentencing. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and upheld the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several individuals affiliated with the MS-13 gang were charged in connection with the kidnapping and murder of two teenage boys in Northern Virginia in 2016. Both victims, aged fourteen and seventeen, were low-ranking affiliates of the gang’s Park View Locos Salvatrucha (PVLS) clique. The first victim was killed after gang leaders mistakenly believed he was associated with a rival gang, while the second was murdered after rumors spread that he was cooperating with law enforcement. Both murders were carried out in a remote park, involved multiple assailants, and were documented with graphic videos and photographs. The perpetrators received promotions within the gang for their participation.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted the defendants on eight counts, including conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, and kidnapping resulting in death. After an eight-week jury trial, all defendants were convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on the most serious charges. The district court denied various defense motions, including those for acquittal, suppression of evidence, and requests for certain jury instructions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed numerous challenges, including evidentiary rulings, the denial of a duress defense, sufficiency of the evidence, joinder of defendants and counts, and sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences for four defendants. For one defendant, Henry Zelaya Martinez, the court affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence due to inconsistencies between the oral and written pronouncements at sentencing, remanding for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law