Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court agreed with the district court that (1) considering the plea agreement in this context reflected a “respect for the law” and (2) reducing Defendant’s sentence so far below the initial Guidelines range wouldn’t be “just punishment” for Defendant’s crimes.  Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to modify Defendant’s sentence. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law

Defendant facing at least 1,054 months in prison for a string of armed robberies, reached a plea agreement and instead was sentenced to 384 months. Soon after, Congress passed the First Step Act, changing the calculations of relevant mandatory minimums. Had Defendant been sentenced after the Act became law, his minimum sentence would have been 168 months, less than half of his current sentence. Yet the district court denied Defendant’s motion for compassionate release in part because it “declined to disturb the parties’ carefully negotiated [plea] agreement.” Defendant appealed, arguing the district court improperly considered the plea deal.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. The court explained that the original stacked sentence was properly calculated when imposed. And in any event, the district court’s task in weighing compassionate release “was not to assess the correctness of the original sentence it imposed. Rather, its task was to determine whether the Section 3553(a) factors counseled against a sentence reduction in light of the new, extraordinary circumstances identified.” The district court considered the relevant factors and concluded that the original sentence remained appropriate. Thus, the court wrote, that given its highly deferential standard of review, the district court was well within its purview to deny Defendant’s motion. View "US v. Keanan Bond" on Justia Law

Defendant s filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) motion for relief from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(3) motion and Defendant appealed. He argued that the district court erred in finding that his Rule 60(b)(3) motion, filed three and a half years after the district court’s Section 2255 order, was not entitled to equitable tolling.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Rule 60(b)(3)’s one-year time limit cannot be equitably tolled. The court explained that it recognizes the gravity of the stakes in habeas proceedings. Yet the court does not believe that equitable tolling can apply to motions brought under Rule 60(b)(3). And because Defendant filed his motion more than three and a half years after the applicable district court order, the district court correctly held that his motion was untimely filed. View "US v. Roderick Williams" on Justia Law

Appellee filed suit against two Transportation and Security Administration (“TSA”) officers, (collectively “Appellants”), alleging they violated the First Amendment by prohibiting Appellee from recording a pat-down search and the Fourth Amendment by seizing Appellee and seizing and searching his cell phone. To state a cause of action for damages, Appellee brought his claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellants moved to dismiss, challenging Appellee’s reliance on Bivens and also asserting qualified immunity as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. The district court denied Appellants’ motion, recognizing that both claims presented new Bivens contexts but finding that no special factor counseled hesitation in extending Bivens as to either claim.   The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court and concluded that Bivens remedies are unavailable in this case. The court explained that as “even a single sound reason to defer to Congress” will be enough to require the court refrain from creating a Bivens remedy, we decline to extend an implied damages remedy pursuant to Bivens against Appellants based on the existence of an alternative remedial structure and/or the interest of national security. And since Appellee has presented no cognizable claim for damages, we need not address Appellants’ qualified immunity defense as to Appellee’s First Amendment claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Appellants’ motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Dustin Dyer v. Shirrellia Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence for Hobbs Act robbery, asserting that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight when he discarded a loaded firearm in view of pursuing law enforcement officers.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing without application of the Section 3C1.2 enhancement. The court agreed with Defendant that the record does not reflect sufficient evidence that he created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person when he fled from police.  The court explained that the Government relies on this exchange to support its contention that any error in applying the enhancement was harmless. But even if the Guidelines range—and, therefore, the enhancement—was not a “significant factor” in the court’s sentence, the district court did not say that the enhancement was irrelevant to its sentencing decision despite several opportunities to do so. View "US v. Shamauri Shivers" on Justia Law

Less than a year after being released from federal prison, Defendant “engaged in an unjustified, merciless beating” of an unarmed, 72-year-old security guard that caused “permanent damage” to one of the victim’s eyes. The probation officer petitioned to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. In rulings not challenged here, the district court found Defendant committed the alleged offense and that it constituted first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law. The primary issue on appeal was whether that offense is a “crime of violence” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that South Carolina Code Section 16-3- 600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that even if it might be possible to imagine a case of first-degree assault and battery via a reckless offer, that would not change the court’s conclusion. To exclude a state offense under the elements clause, “there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that a state would actually punish that conduct.” But given the text of this statute—and “the total absence of case law” involving any such prosecutions—we conclude “there is not a realistic probability that South Carolina would punish” a reckless offer as first-degree assault and battery. View "US v. Sonny Mack" on Justia Law

Four years into Defendant’s prison term for a felony drug offense, the government transferred him to Mexico to serve the rest of his sentence. But after Mexican authorities released him from prison, Defendant returned to the United States in violation of his conditions of supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another two years in prison. On appeal, Defendant claimed that a 1976 U.S.-Mexico treaty stripped the district court of its subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. And even if the district court did have jurisdiction, he argues, it erred in considering his “early” release from Mexican custody in imposing an upward variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to vacate Defendant’s sentence finding that the Treaty doesn’t strip U.S. courts of their jurisdiction—and particularly not for transferees like Defendant, who return to the country before completing their original sentences. Further, the court explained that Defendant is incorrect in his claim that the district court based the sentence on its “disapproval of the transfer decisions and Mexico’s incarceration term.” Rather, the court disapproved of Defendant’s behavior after he was released. Defendant’s sentence wasn’t procedurally or substantively unreasonable, much less plainly so. View "US v. Escovio Rios" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his Section 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. The Government opposed Defendant’s motion, citing a number of measures that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has taken to protect inmates, like Defendant, from COVID-19. Further, it argued that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) weigh against reducing Defendant’s term of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that both Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. The court explained that the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Defendant claimed were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior during the hearing’s resentencing phase. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his § 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. On appeal, Defendant contended the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release. In addition, he argues the district court improperly based its Section 3553(a) analysis on one factor to the exclusion of others.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. Rather, the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Bethea claims were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior to the hearing’s resentencing phase. In assessing the adequacy of its Section 3553(a) assessment, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the district court’s statements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of various offenses relating to his leadership of a drug-trafficking ring, including a charge of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. On appeal, Defendant advanced three main arguments. First, he contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. Section 3161. Second, he argued the government failed to prove that fentanyl was the but-for cause of the victim’s death and that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction on but-for causation. Finally, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the eight-month period between the filing of the indictment and the appearance of Defendant’s codefendant was a “reasonable period of delay” that the district court properly excluded under the Act. Next, the court wrote that on balance, the four constitutional speedy-trial factors weigh in the government’s favor. Thus the court held that the district court didn’t err in denying Defendant’s motion. Further, the court concluded that the jury could have found that “the [fentanyl] was not only a necessary, but-for cause of the death, but it was also independently sufficient, by itself, to cause the victim’s death, even without the influence of any other factors.” As such, while this case may have been more appropriately tried under a but-for causation theory, the court found no reversible error on Count Ten. View "US v. Terrick Robinson" on Justia Law