Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Defendant of conspiring to transmit national defense information to Chinese agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 794(c), and making materially false statements to FBI agents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(2). On appeal, Defendant challenges the district court’s application during trial of the “silent witness rule” — under which sensitive evidence is disclosed to the jury and the trial’s other participants but not to the public — contending that it violated his right to a public trial, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and his right to present a complete defense, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He also mounted two distinct challenges to the district court’s instruction of the jury.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s challenges and affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court wrote it does not suggest that the use of the silent witness rule could never implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, as reliance on the silent witness rule has the potential to interfere meaningfully with the public’s ability to understand what is happening in the proceedings, despite their physical presence in the courtroom. But it doubts that the limited use of the silent witness rule as it was applied in this case amounted to a sanctionable closure of the courtroom.   Further, in response to Defendant’s argument that the district court “watered down” the mens rea requirement for the conspiracy offense, the court found Defendant’s reasoning unpersuasive, as he focuses too narrowly on one small segment of the instructions without context. View "US v. Kevin Mallory" on Justia Law

Defendants led a violent street gang known as the Black Mob Gangstas, which was responsible for two murders. Several gang members were indicted, most of which entered guilty pleas and then testified against Defendants. Defendants were convicted of various offenses including murder in aid of racketeering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana. Each defendant received multiple consecutive life sentences.Defendants appealed on several issues, each of which was rejected by the Fourth Circuit. The court determined that the evidence was sufficient to support each of Defendants' convictions. The court also rejected Defendants' claim that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes their convictions for drug conspiracy, firearms murder, and VICAR murder because they constituted the "same offense." The Fourth Circuit also held that the district court did not err in severing Defendants' trials, finding that Defendants did not suffer a miscarriage of justice as a result of the joint trial. Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not err in imposing consecutive life sentences.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants' convictions and sentences in full. View "US v. Demetrice Devine" on Justia Law

A jury in the Eastern District of Virginia convicted Defendant of defrauding investors in his technology company out of millions of dollars. The district court sentenced him to 151 months in prison, the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. Defendant appealed, raising two issues. First, he claimed that the indictment against him did not adequately allege venue in the Eastern District of Virginia. Second, he contended that the Fourth Circuit must vacate his sentence because the district court did not address his argument for a downward variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that Defendant’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The court explained that although the district court did not address Defendant’s specific contention about the alleged policy failings of the fraud Guidelines, it did address and reject his argument that the fraud enhancements consequently overstated his culpability. Defendant did not raise any other objection to his sentence, and the record reveals that the district court provided a thorough and individualized explanation for its sentencing decision. View "US v. Andrew Powers" on Justia Law

Defendant operated a multimillion-dollar fraud scheme out of Israel which targeted unsophisticated victims worldwide. Defendant was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud, and sentenced to 22 years in prison.On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Defendant raised several challenges, including that she did not commit a crime under United States law because the wire-fraud statute does not apply to hee conduct that occurred out of the county. The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's position, finding that, although the wire-fraud statute does not apply extraterritorially, the focus of the statute is on the misuse of American wires. Because Defendant's conduct involved the misuse of American wires, the statute applied to her.The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's remaining challenges, with the exception of her challenge to the district court's restitution order that went beyond victims of domestic wire fraud. View "US v. Lee Elbaz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a False Claims Act challenge against two doctors, five medical companies, and an accounting firm, collectively referred to hereinafter as Defendants. She alleged that Defendants (1) knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare following the dissolution of one company’s corporate charter and the revocation of its certificate of corporate authorization and (2) engaged in a fraudulent medical upcoding scheme.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the falsity of statements made by one of the defendants. And she failed to adequately allege scienter, materiality, and the presentment of false claims regarding the remaining seven Defendants.   The court explained that the False Claims Act prohibits the knowing presentment of a “false or fraudulent claim” or a “false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.” 31 U.S.C. Section 3729(a)(1)(A), (B). At common law, a false statement encompassed any “words or conduct” that “amount[] to an assertion not in accordance with the truth.” But even under the broad, common-law definition of falsity, Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the allegedly false statement made by one of the defendants. Further, the court wrote that it doesn’t help that Plaintiff inconsistently describes what that false statement was. View "United States ex rel. Taylor v. Michael Boyko" on Justia Law

Defendants were convicted of honest services fraud and federal funds bribery in connection with a series of payments and offers of payment, in the form of campaign contributions, made to the elected Insurance Commissioner for North Carolina. The jury found that these payments were made in exchange for the official assigning a different Deputy Commissioner to oversee the affairs of Defendant’s insurance companies. Defendants now challenge the district court’s jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s judgment sentencing Defendants for honest services fraud and federal funds bribery. The court held that the district court erred by instructing the jury that an “official act”—an element of the crime of honest services fraud—was present as a matter of law. Further, the court found that the error was not harmless and, therefore, vacated Defendants’ convictions on Count One. The court also vacated Defendants’ convictions on Count Two because we find that the verdicts were improperly infected by the instructional error on Count One. The case is, therefore, remanded for a new trial. The court, however, did not find that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that an official act is an element of federal funds bribery. View "US v. Greg Lindberg" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two child pornography offenses and was sentenced to 60 months' imprisonment and ten years' supervised release. Subsequently, Defendant moved to challenge eight of his supervised-release conditions, claiming that six of the conditions restrict his liberty more than necessary and that intervening Supreme Court precedent rendered two other conditions limiting his internet use unconstitutional. The district court denied Defendant's motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's first claim pertaining to six of the challenged conditions because his arguments should have been raised at sentencing. By not doing so, he deprived the district court of jurisdiction to modify them. However, regarding Defendant's second claim, the court acknowledged that Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), created “new, unforeseen, or changed legal . . . circumstances” relevant to Defendant's internet-use conditions. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to consider Defendant's challenge. The court remanded the case for the district court to decide whether to modify those conditions. View "US v. Sebastian Morris" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of two sex offenses in Illinois state court. Subsequently, Defendant failed to register as a sex offender and then pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to update his sex-offender registration. At a revocation hearing for a violation of supervisor release, Defendant was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration to be followed by five years of supervised release. The district court noted that this was the "statutory available sentence" and that it was also recommended under the U.S.S.G. Defendant did not object.Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court misconstrued the sentencing guidelines and that there was no mandatory minimum term of supervised release. Reviewing for plain error, the Fourth Circuit agreed with Defendant. The language of Sec. U.S.C. Sec. 3583(h) is clear and the district court's misinterpretation affected Defendant's substantial rights. View "US v. Keith Nelson" on Justia Law

In 2012, Defendant was sentenced to 219 months of incarceration for drug conspiracy charges involving powder and crack cocaine. Defendant moved for relief under the First Step Act, which reduced penalties under the Fair Sentencing Act. The District Court determined Defendant was eligible for relief under the First Step Act but denied Defendant's motion finding that his sentence was already at the statutory minimum.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, albeit on alternate grounds. The court held that Defendant was ineligible for relief under the First Step Act. Section 404 of the First Step Act excludes defendants whose sentences previously were imposed in accordance with the Fair Sentencing Act. Defendant committed the offense before the Fair Sentencing Act became effective date but was convicted and sentenced after that date. His sentencing also came after the Supreme Court clarified, in Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260 (2012), that the Fair Sentencing Act was to be applied to pre-Act offenders, like Defendant, who had yet to be sentenced when that Act became effective. Thus, Defendant was ineligible for relief. View "US v. Leroy Goodwin" on Justia Law

In 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. Under the Armed Career Criminals Act, Defendant received a 15-year sentence. Included in Defendant's plea agreement was a waiver of the right to appeal and to collaterally attack his conviction for any reason aside from ineffective assistance of counsel of prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant did not appeal, but filed a Sec. 2255 petition raising prosecutorial misconduct and ineffectiveness claims. The district court denied Petitioner's petition and he was denied a certificate of appealability.Subsequently, Defendant filed a second Sec 2255 petition in the wake of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). The Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on this issue; however, the matter was resolved against Petitioner based on the waivers in his plea agreement.Following the denial of his second Sec. 2255 petition, Petitioner filed a Sec. 2241 petition. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding that Sec. 2241 was unavailable to Petitioner because he could not satisfy the requirements of Sec. 2255(e), which limits federal prisoners’ access to Section 2241.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. A federal prisoner may pursue habeas relief through a Sec. 2241 petition only if it “appears that the [Section 2255] remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Here, the court determined that Sec. 2255 adequately provided an avenue of review, as evidenced by the Sixth Circuit's consideration of Petitioner's Johnson claim. View "Larry Slusser v. Acting Warden Vereen" on Justia Law