Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. He appealed, arguing that the district court made four errors warranting reversal. First, the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitations. Second, the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of “monetary transaction.” Third, the court erred by instructing the jury on conscious avoidance. And fourth, the conviction must be vacated under Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), because there is no way to determine whether he was convicted on a legally valid theory.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that here Defendant offered no affirmative evidence showing that the conspiracy was terminated or that he affirmatively withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the operative July 2, 2014, limitations date. The court wrote that because some conspiratorial acts in Defendant’s case occurred before July 2, 2014, the limitations date did not mean that the district judge was required to provide a statute of limitations instruction. Declining to give one was, therefore, not an abuse of the substantial discretion the court affords district judges in fashioning jury instructions. Moreover, the court held that the government did, in fact, present evidence of conduct undertaken in furtherance of the money laundering conspiracy past July 2, 2014, even though it was not needed for a non-overt act conspiracy. View "US v. Kenneth Ravenell" on Justia Law

A jury found Defendant guilty of six drug-related offenses, and the district court sentenced him to 40 years in prison. The district court increased Defendant's offense level by two because it found he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor” within the meaning of Guidelines Section 3B1.1(c). Second, the court increased Defendant’s offense level by four because it concluded Defendant misrepresented fentanyl as heroin. Defendant raised two challenges to the verdict. Defendant also raised two challenges to his sentence.   The Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence challenge and his claim that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury. The court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court held that the government was not required to prove that the victim died from a fentanyl overdose—it was required to show that she died from using a “substance” containing fentanyl for whose distribution Defendant was legally responsible. The government introduced sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude it had met that burden. The jury heard evidence Defendant supplied the drugs the victim consumed on the day of her death and that she died around three hours later from a drug overdose. Here, a jury could conclude a substance distributed by Defendant was the cause of the victim’s death. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in applying a provision that was not part of the Sentencing Guidelines when Defendant committed his offenses and that Defendant is entitled to relief even under the plain-error standard. View "US v. Rodney Coby" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from the district court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. An incarcerated person at Federal Correctional Institution Williamsburg, Petitioner alleged that the Bureau of Prisons had miscalculated his release date by not retroactively applying the First Step Act to his previous sentence and crediting the resulting good conduct time to his release date. After the Warden moved for summary judgment, a magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) concluding that Petitioner’s petition should be dismissed. Petitioner objected to the recommendation in detail; nonetheless, the district court did not review the R&R de novo because Petitioner had only “reargue[d] his case.” After reviewing for clear errors, the district court adopted the R&R and dismissed Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, Petitioner first submits—and the Warden concedes—that the district court erred by failing to review the R&R de novo. Petitioner further requests that the Fourth Circuit proceed to the merits of his habeas petition and consider the retroactive applicability of the First Step Act. Finally, Petititioner asked this Court to recall its previous mandate dismissing his 2015 appeal of his revocation sentence.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with Petitioner that his grounds for objection were clear and thus should have prompted a de novo review of the magistrate’s R&R. Because the district court only reviewed the R&R for clear error, the court vacated and remanded with directions to review Petitioner’s grounds for objection de novo. The court declined, however, to consider the merits of Petitioner’s petition or recall of the court’s previous mandate. View "Larone Elijah v. Richard Dunbar" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the sentence he received after pleading guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm and ammunition in contravention of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). Defendant contends that the district court erred by treating a federal drug offense on which he was convicted in 2014 — aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2 — as being a “controlled substance offense” that increased his Sentencing Guidelines offense level. Defendant has proffered two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines. First, he asserts that aiding and abetting in a drug offense cannot be treated as a “controlled substance offense” in Guidelines calculations. Second, Defendant maintains that, in any event, each and every Section 841(a)(1) distribution offense is disqualified from such treatment.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and rejected Defendant’s challenge to his sentence. The court wrote that it must reject each of Defendant’s two principal arguments as to why his 2014 offense — aiding and abetting in a 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(1) drug distribution offense — is not a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. First, the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense” includes aiding and abetting in a drug offense. Second, although the Guidelines exclude attempt offenses, Section 841(a)(1) does not criminalize attempt such that an  841(a)(1) distribution offense would be categorically disqualified from being treated as a “controlled substance offense.” View "US v. Patrick Groves" on Justia Law

A superseding indictment charged two defendants, husband and wife, with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine and conspiracy to commit money laundering. To address safety concerns, prior to their trial, the district court ordered Defendants to file a joint position as to whether they were vaccinated against COVID-19 or intended to be by the start of the trial. The district court further ordered the government and Defendants to inform the court as to whether they would agree to strike unvaccinated individuals from the jury. Defendants responded that they were not vaccinated and did not intend to be vaccinated. However, they agreed they would test for COVID-19 and provide the test results to the court. Defendants objected to the court’s suggestion of striking unvaccinated jurors for cause. At issue on appeal is whether a district court’s sua sponte decision to strike unvaccinated prospective jurors for cause from a properly assembled venire during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section requirement.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that Defendants do not have a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge. The court explained that the fair-cross-section requirement applies to jury venires, not petit juries. And the district court’s decision to strike unvaccinated jurors based on their perceived inability to serve without creating unnecessary safety risks affected the composition of the petit jury for this particular case, not the individuals represented in the venire from which the petit jury is selected. View "US v. Jose Colon" on Justia Law

A confidential informant tipped off law enforcement that Defendant was dealing drugs out of his residence in Henderson, North Carolina. In the span of a week, officers used the informant to make two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Defendant at his residence. Officers presented the informant with a photo of Defendant following the buys, and the informant confirmed Defendant sold him the crack cocaine. A jury convicted Defendant of possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon, possessing cocaine and marijuana with intent to distribute, and maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing, manufacturing, or using cocaine and marijuana. On appeal, Defendant challenged his convictions on numerous grounds.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that contrary to Defendant’s argument, probable cause did not require the officers to test the crack cocaine after the buys to confirm its illicit nature. In the warrant application, the lead officer stated that he had eight years of law enforcement experience, was assigned to investigate “the possession and sale of illegal controlled substances,” and had received training about controlled substances. The magistrate could reasonably conclude the officer visually identified the substance the informant purchased from Defendant as crack cocaine, even though the warrant application did not say whether the officer tested it.   Further, the court found that here, there was no plain error. The warrant authorized law enforcement to search the duplex and a silver Mercedes. It also authorized officers to seize “Vehicles” and “all 14 electronics.” Officers had an objectively reasonable belief that both the BMW and the cell phone fell within the warrant’s scope. View "US v. Kacey Hicks" on Justia Law

When a deputy sheriff in Lexington County, South Carolina, began to follow a vehicle because he thought the driver was behaving suspiciously, the vehicle sped away, failing to stop when the deputy activated his patrol car’s blue light and siren and leading the deputy on a high-speed chase. After the vehicle crashed, the driver, identified as Defendant, was arrested and a firearm and ammunition were recovered from the front floorboard of the driver’s side of the vehicle. Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and the district court sentenced him to 99 months imprisonment. The 99-month sentence included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds.   The Fourth Circuit agreed. The court explained that the district court erred in relying on the blue-light offense to apply a Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement when Defendant received notice of that basis for the first time at the sentencing hearing. However, the court also concluded that the error was, in the circumstances of this case, harmless. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement when the firearm was lying at Defendant’s feet while he failed to stop for a blue light. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendant sought an award of attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment following the district court’s dismissal of the government’s criminal case against her. She argued that her prosecution satisfied the Hyde Amendment’s criteria for fee shifting because it was vexatious, frivolous, and in bad faith. She also requests discovery to support her claim. The district court denied discovery and denied attorney’s fees based on its review of the evidence available to the government when it initiated Drake’s prosecution. The appeal here challenged the district court’s exercise of discretion at every turn.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and held that the district court acted within its discretion throughout. The court explained that given the significant evidence against her, Defendant was fortunate to receive a Rule 29 dismissal from the court. The court wrote that, as this case illustrates, such dismissals will not invariably result in an award of Hyde Amendment attorney’s fees. Allowing awards as a matter of course in such cases would contradict the limiting language of the statute and discourage the granting of such dismissals even when taking such action is the right thing to do. View "US v. Shannon Drake" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). That provision makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to “possess . . . any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g). At the time of Defendant’s offense, anyone who “knowingly violate[d]” this provision could be imprisoned for up to ten years. The district court sentenced Defendant to ten years imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to appoint counsel and his Section 2255 motion in its entirety.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Rehaif does not apply to felon-in-possession convictions under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1) and that Rehaif does not apply retroactively on collateral review. The court held that on remand, the district court should consider any issues related to procedural default and prejudice in addition to the merits of Defendant’s claim. Accordingly, the court wrote that in any prejudice analysis, the district court should conduct a fact-intensive inquiry under the Supreme Court’s careful guidance in the Greer decision. However, if the defendant establishes that he did not, in fact, know of his felony status, the district court would be free to award appropriate relief. View "US v. Thomas Waters" on Justia Law

Defendant and his partner conspired to ensnare drug-addicted women in debt-cycle sex trafficking. Defendant would give the women heroin and cocaine they could not afford and then insist they repay their debt by prostituting themselves for his benefit throughout Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. Defendant provided fentanyl to two women who overdosed. Defendant left the women for dead and destroyed the evidence. One of the women died, but the other survived and testified against him. A jury convicted Defendant of (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, (2) interstate transportation for the purpose of prostitution, (3) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death and (4) distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, fentanyl, the use of which resulted in serious bodily injury. At sentencing, the district court found that Defendant had a prior conviction for a felony drug offense, triggering a mandatory life sentence on Counts 3 and 4. The court sentenced Defendant to life in prison on Counts 1, 3, and 4 and 120 months imprisonment on Count 2, all to be served concurrently. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Defendant’s speculation about positional isomers of cocaine fails to show that the district court plainly erred in not finding overbreadth on this ground. The court, therefore, affirmed the district court’s determination that Defendant’s Virginia conviction was for a “felony drug offense” that supports the application of Section 841(b)(1)(C) sentencing enhancement. View "US v. Kendall Wysinger" on Justia Law