Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that the force clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is inapplicable because one of his predicate convictions—Maryland assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension or detainer—is not a categorically "violent felony" for ACCA purposes. The court explained that Maryland courts have clearly held that an assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension can be accomplished with de minimis conduct such as an offensive touching. Therefore, because such conduct does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another, the assault-with-intent-to-prevent-lawful-apprehension offense is not categorically a violent felony under the force clause. The court remanded with instructions to correct defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Proctor" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition, holding that the district court erred in finding that defendant's prior South Carolina convictions qualified as serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court explained that South Carolina's definition of "marijuana," as defined in 2013, is broader than the definition of "marijuana," as defined by the 2018 Farm Bill in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus there is no categorical match. Therefore, defendant's prior state convictions do not meet the definition of a serious drug offense and should not have triggered the ACCA minimum enhancement. Even if the court were to adopt plain error review, rather than de novo review, the outcome would be the same. In this case, the error affected defendant's substantial rights and the district court remanded. View "United States v. Hope" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various offenses stemming from a series of armed home-invasion robberies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court agreed with defendant that Hobbs Act conspiracy does not constitute a crime of violence, but concluded that the district court's contrary jury instruction was not plain error because the jury's special verdict form reveals that defendant was convicted under a Pinkerton theory of liability, which remains valid. In this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the improper jury instruction. The court also concluded that defendant's bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a sentence reduction where the "greed" and "extensive" violence characterizing defendant's offenses did not warrant a lesser sentence. View "United States v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to petitioner on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's introduction and use of prison-conditions evidence at the penalty phase. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to state officials, concluding that the state postconviction court properly applied Strickland v. Washington to petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim, and in doing so, it was not unreasonable in finding no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the jury would not have sentenced petitioner to death.Applying the prejudice analysis in Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1094 (2021), the court did not think it was unreasonable for the state court to have found that the substantial aggravating evidence overcame petitioner's offered mitigation case based on his mental health. With that conclusion firmly in mind, the state court weighed the effect of the prison-conditions evidence and determined that there was a relative equality of presentation by both sides on this evidence and that the defense scored as many points if not more than the State. In this case, the court could not say that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it weighed the prison-conditions evidence and found its effect on the verdict inconsequential. Furthermore, petitioner's challenges to the state court's consideration of his mitigation evidence are unavailing. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that the state court unreasonably discounted his mental health evidence; nor did the state court unreasonably conflate the adaptability and prison-conditions testimony. Finally, the court did not fault the state court for not expressly considering the jury's deadlock in its prejudice analysis. View "Wood v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Duroseau, a naturalized U.S. citizen, served in Afghanistan in the Marines and suffered PTSD and a possible traumatic brain injury. He was convicted of unlawful exportation and (Count Five) transporting firearms to the Haitian Army, an entity that is not a licensed firearms importer or dealer, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(5), springing from his attempt to take weapons to his native Haiti in an attempt to help the Haitian government quell gang violence. He was sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment.Duroseau challenged the conviction on Count Five. The Fourth Circuit vacated that conviction. The government failed to prove a violation of section 922(a)(5), which provides that it is unlawful for any unlicensed person “to transfer, sell, trade, give, transport, or deliver any firearm to any [unlicensed] person” who does not reside in the defendant’s state of residence. Count Five alleged that Duroseau “willfully transport[ed] firearms . . . to the Haitian Army.” The government is bound by the allegations of the indictment and cannot now claim that the conviction was based on the police seizure of the firearms at the airport, a theory that was never presented to the jury. The statute does not criminalize attempts. View "United States v. Duroseau" on Justia Law

Said and six other Somali citizens attacked the USS Ashland. Said and another held loaded AK–47s. The codefendant fired at the Ashland. The Ashland returned fire, killing one attacker. Six survivors were brought to Virginia for prosecution.Said was convicted of conspiracy to commit hostage-taking, 18 U.S.C. 1203(a); conspiracy to commit kidnapping, (1201(a)(2), (c)); conspiracy to perform an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6), (9)); conspiracy to use and carry a firearm and a destructive device during and in relation to, and to possess a firearm and a destructive device in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(o)) (Count 4); piracy, (1651); attack to plunder a vessel, (1659); assault with a dangerous weapon on a federal officer or employee, (111(a)(1), (b)); performing an act of violence against persons on a vessel, (2291(a)(6)); using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)) (Count 9); and using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, (924(c)(1)(A)(iii)) (Count 10). The verdict form did not require the jury to identify the predicate offenses upon which the firearms convictions were based.On habeas review, the district court vacated Said’s convictions on two firearm counts because the Count 1-3 convictions on which they could be based were no longer valid after the Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” defining crimes of violence. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Said did not establish that the error in the jury instructions had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” View "United States v. Said" on Justia Law

Officers approached Buster as he was walking; 30 minutes earlier, the officers had responded to “a domestic assault where a firearm discharged in the air.” The officers believed Buster matched descriptions of the assailant and that he was the person they had seen outside the victim’s apartment earlier. Buster declined to stop and eventually ran but tripped. The officers tackled him. Buster was wearing a cross-body bag. The officers pulled the bag to Buster’s back and handcuffed him. Buster said the strap was choking him. An officer cut the strap, removed the bag, which felt “[h]ard to the touch,” then opened the bag and found a gun and ammunition. The officers questioned Buster without giving the Miranda warnings. At the police station, an officer gave Buster the Miranda warnings, and elicited “‘essentially’ the same material discussed in the pre-Miranda interview.”The government agreed not to use the pre-Miranda statements. The court suppressed Buster’s post-Miranda statements, as “the product of an impermissible two-step interview tactic” but concluded the initial stop was valid and that “the pat-down of Buster’s person and the search of his bag were reasonable.” Buster was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit reversed. The “Terry” exception does not cover a warrantless search of a bag recently possessed by a person who was—by the time the bag was opened— handcuffed and face-down on the ground. View "United States v. Buster" on Justia Law

Then-lieutenant Hasson was arrested at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. Agents found 196 Tramadol pills in Hasson’s backpack and another 106 in his desk. A search of Hasson’s residence uncovered another 122 Tramadol pills; 15 firearms; silencers; hundreds of rounds of ammunition, hormones, and steroids. Hasson had Tramadol in his bloodstream. The government alleged Hasson was “a domestic terrorist,” contemplating “biological attacks followed by attack on food supply” and “a bombing/sniper campaign.” His emails stated: Looking to Russia ... or any land that despises the west’s liberalism. … appropriate individual targets, to bring greatest impact. Professors, DR’s, Politian’s, Judges, leftists in general. He compiled manifestos of murderers and terrorists and information about explosives and other weapons.Hasson was charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearm silencers, 26 U.S.C. 5861(d); unlawful possession of firearm silencers unidentified by serial number, 5861(i); possession of firearms by an unlawful user of and addict to a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3); and possession of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The district court rejected Hasson's argument that Section 922(g)(3)'s phrases “unlawful user” and “addicted to” were unconstitutionally vague on their face and increased Hasson’s Guidelines range (U.S.S.G. 3A1.4), concluding that his offense was intended to promote a federal crime of terrorism. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that Section 922(g)(3) is facially vague and that Section 3A1.4 cannot apply because he was not convicted of a federal crime of terrorism. View "United States v. Hasson" on Justia Law

Barringer was the Executive Vice President and a Board member of J&R, a Virginia manufacturing company. By 2014, J&R was delinquent on filing and paying its 941 (employee withholding) taxes. Fearing personal liability, Barringer submitted a Hardship Withdrawal Form requesting $311,859.04 from her 401(k) account “[t]o prevent eviction or ... foreclosure of the mortgage on [her] principal residence.” Barringer deposited the funds into J&R's account to pay the delinquent taxes. Barringer’s mortgage balance was approximately $200,000 at the time; her payments were not delinquent. In 2016, J&R was again behind on its 941 taxes. Barringer requested a final distribution from her 401(k) account, falsely citing the end of her employment with J&R. Barringer again deposited the funds, plus some of her personal savings, into the J&R account. Instead of paying delinquent taxes, Barringer paid herself and vendors. After providing misinformation to federal agents, Barringer was convicted of willfully failing to collect and truthfully account for and pay taxes, 26 U.S.C. 7202, and making materially false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 36-month sentence. Any error in the denial of Barringer’s pretrial motion to dismiss the wire fraud counts was harmless because the court subsequently granted her motion for a judgment of acquittal on those charges. Barringer’s false statements to investigators were “material to a matter within the jurisdiction of the agency.” The court upheld an abuse-of-trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1. View "United States v. Barringer" on Justia Law

West Virginia State Troopers Elliott and Cornelius received three 911 calls about Crumbley. Two different callers stated that Crumbley was armed and dangerous and keeping his family hostage. Another caller stated Crumbley made threats about shooting the police. The troopers, heading to Crumbley’s property, discussed Crumbley’s rumored drug connections. Crumbley came out of the house screaming and threatened a shootout. He had nothing in his hands but threatened to get a weapon. Crumbley went between the yard where the troopers were and the house, threatening to get a weapon and shoot the troopers. Crumbley pulled down his pants to expose his genitals while spinning in a circle. Crumbley then got a shovel, threatened the troopers with it, then ran, throwing the shovel. Cornelius fell in the snow. When Elliott turned a corner, he saw Crumbley turned away from him. Crumbley then abruptly turned toward Elliott and began to raise his hands, causing Elliot to believe that he might have a gun. Elliott fatally shot him. Crumbley did not have a gun.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elliott. Crumbley was shot in the back, raising a genuine dispute about Elliot’s version of events. The facts might show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. View "Stanton v. Elliott" on Justia Law