Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Three months after Defendant was arrested for various child pornography offenses—his lawyer moved to have him declared mentally incompetent. The district court found Defendant incompetent and committed him to the custody of the Attorney General. The government requested an involuntary medication order, and the district court set a hearing. The district court concluded an involuntary medication order was appropriate and granted the government “four months within which to” restore Defendant’s competency. Defendant appealed the involuntary medication order and his continued detention.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it understands that involuntary medication orders “carry an unsavory pedigree” and prolonged pretrial detention of a presumptively innocent person “is serious business.” However, given the deferential standards of review, the court concluded the district court committed no reversible error in deciding an involuntary medication order was warranted and found it appropriate to grant one final four-month period of confinement to attempt to restore Defendant’s competency. View "US v. Christopher Tucker" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a child pornography conviction, Defendant submitted to polygraph testing. During his polygraph exam, Defendant admitted to possessing adult pornography. In addition, his answers to other questions indicated possible deception. After the exam, Defendant’s probation officer asked him if he possessed child pornography. Linville admitted he did. Then, after he and the probation officer traveled to Defendant’s home, he turned the adult and child pornography over to probation. In addition to petitioning for the revocation of his supervised release, the government charged Defendant with possession of child pornography. Defendant moved to suppress his statement to his probation officer, admitting that he possessed child pornography and that the child pornography was at his home.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the special condition did not indicate invoking the Fifth Amendment would lead to the revocation of Defendant’s supervised release. Nor did Defendant demonstrate a reasonable belief that he would be punished for invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that the government did not expressly or implicitly assert that it would revoke Defendant’s supervised release if he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. And even if Defendant believed invoking the Fifth Amendment would have risked revocation, his belief was not reasonable. View "US v. Eugene Linville" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felon. Defendant filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion when they seized him. Following an evidentiary hearing, during which the two officers testified, the district court found the stop was valid and denied the suppression motion. Defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, vacated Defendant’s conviction, and remanded. The court held that the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify seizing Defendant. The court reasoned that although the officers did not physically restrain Defendant until he lifted his shirt high enough for the officer to see the outline of a firearm, the officers did continue to seize Defendant without reasonable suspicion. It was only after “requesting” that Defendant lift his shirt at least fifteen times, inferring that Defendant should submit to a pat down two times, and mentioning that Defendant could be taken to jail for trespass two times that the officer observed “what appeared to be like the bulge or the outline of a muzzle of a pistol” below Defendant’s belt buckle. The court concluded that the Government’s factors—when weighed and assessed in the totality of the circumstances—do not constitute reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure. View "US v. Anthony Peters" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of methamphetamine. The offense carried a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. At sentencing, Defendant argued that she was eligible for relief from that mandatory minimum under the First Step Act’s safety valve provision. The sole issue on appeal is whether the word “and” in Section 3553(f)(1) connecting the criminal history characteristics applies conjunctively or disjunctively.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed and concluded that “and” is conjunctive. The court wrote that it is persuaded that the plain text of Section 3553(f)(1) requires a sentencing court to find that a defendant has all three of the listed criminal history characteristics before excluding a defendant from safety valve eligibility. View "US v. Cassity Jones" on Justia Law

Habeas Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for thirty years in South Carolina state court for a number of crimes he committed in 1987, including two murders. But in 2004, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (“Department”) notified Petitioner that he would never be eligible to seek parole because of an earlier armed-robbery conviction. Petitioner contends that, in reaching this conclusion, the Department violated his federal due-process rights because, in his view, a temporary change in South Carolina parole-eligibility law in 1994 permanently “vested” his parole eligibility, such that the Department could not legally determine him ineligible to ever seek parole. The district court rejected Petitioner’s contention.   The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that there is no dispute that Petitioner received a statement of reasons why he was not eligible for parole. The 2004 letter from the Department makes clear that Petitioner is ineligible because his 1992 murder convictions followed a 1979 armed-robbery conviction, and pursuant to S.C. Code Section 24-21-640, a defendant convicted of a violent crime who has previously been convicted of another violent crime is not eligible for parole. Accordingly, Petitioner received the limited process required by the Federal Constitution for a parole-eligibility determination. View "Thomas Torrence v. Scott Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography. The district court sentenced him to twelve years in prison and lifetime supervised release, subject to certain conditions. Defendant has struggled to comply with the conditions, returning to prison three times for violating them. Defendant challenged the sentence imposed after his third revocation of supervised release. He argued that the court erred in reimposing a special condition limiting his access to pornography (broadly defined), and in imposing a plainly unreasonable 24-month prison term.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order rejecting Defendant’s objection to the condition, vacated the judgment, and remanded for resentencing. The district court based the revocation sentence on three special-condition violations: Defendant’s possession of a smartphone, his possession of five adult pornographic movies, and his unapproved contact with two minors. The court noted its fear that Defendant’s “getting a smartphone and accessing adult pornography” would soon “lapse into something else.” It also emphasized that Special Condition Nine, “[n]ot viewing pornography,” was “all part of the same thing that brought you here, the child pornography.” In other words, the district court based its sentence in large part on the violation of a condition that the court now vacates as not reasonably related and overbroad. The court, therefore, held that the district court didn’t state a “proper basis” for imposing the statutory maximum, rendering the revocation sentence substantively unreasonable. View "US v. Joseph Castellano" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts — conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for discharging a firearm during and in relation to that conspiracy. Under subsequent controlling precedent, Defendant now stands convicted of, and imprisoned for, conduct that does not violate Section 924(c) and in fact, is not criminal. Accordingly, he brought this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion asking the district court to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The district court refused to do so, and Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction. The court explained that when Defendant pled guilty in 2012 and was sentenced in 2013, the Supreme Court had implicitly approved Section 924(c)’s residual clause. Only several years later, in 2015, did the Court in Johnson cause a sea change in the law, disapproving its prior precedent upholding similar residual clauses against void-for-vagueness challenges. And it was not until 2019 that Davis dealt the final blow to Section 924(c)’s residual clause. The court wrote that Defendant’s case falls squarely within Reed’s “novelty” framework, and so he has shown cause for his procedural default. Further, Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction subjects him to imprisonment for conduct that the law does not make criminal. Because the error here worked to Defendant’s “actual and substantial disadvantage,” he has established prejudice to excuse his procedural default. View "US v. Donzell McKinney" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1951, and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c) and 924(j)(1). In a pretrial motion to suppress, Defendant argued that certain statements he made to detectives and witness identifications should be suppressed. The district court disagreed, admitting the evidence. Defendant was convicted.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's robbery and firearm convictions. While the district court erred in admitting Defendant's statements and the witness identifications, in light of the admissible evidence, any error was harmless. The court also rejected Defendant's claim that the cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly instructed the jury that a Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Demarcus Ivey" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec 922(g)(1) after he fled a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 99 months’ imprisonment, which included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds. For his procedural argument, Defendant argued that he was not given the required notice of the enhancement because the presentence report identified “another felony offense” as the basis for the enhancement. For his substantive argument, Defendant argued that he did not possess the firearm found in the vehicle in connection with the blue-light offense. The district court rejected Defendant's arguments.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's firearm conviction and sentence, finding that although the district court erred in determining Defendant was provided with the required notice, the error was harmless given the circumstances of the case. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with numerous child pornography crimes. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. After a jury later convicted Defendant on all counts, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months imprisonment and to a life term of supervised release. As part of Defendant’s supervised release, the court imposed special conditions, including prohibitions against (1) viewing sexually explicit images of minors, (2) engaging in employment or volunteer activities with access to computers, (3) viewing adult pornography, and (4) using any video game system that would allow communication with other people. On appeal, Defendant argued that the initial warrant authorizing a search of his residence was overbroad and that, therefore, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He also contends that the court procedurally and substantively erred by imposing a 240-month term of imprisonment and the above-stated special conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, his term of imprisonment, and the special condition of supervised release that prohibits Defendant from viewing sexually explicit images of minors. However, the court held that the district court erred by failing to explain the other challenged special conditions of supervised release. The court, therefore, vacated these conditions as procedurally unreasonable, and remand that portion of Defendant’s sentence to the district court for further consideration. View "US v. Christopher Sueiro" on Justia Law