Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the district court’s judgment sentencing as a career offender under Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1(a), in that Defendant had seven prior South Carolina felony convictions supportive of such an enhancement (including, as relevant here, four South Carolina felony convictions for distribution of cocaine base). The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison for the distribution offense — plus 60 consecutive months for the firearm offense — for an aggregate prison term totaling 180 months. On appeal, Defendant pursued four challenges to his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the “distribution” offense of South Carolina Code section 44- 53-375(B) does not criminalize the attempt offense of “attempted distribution,” but rather the completed offense of “attempted transfer” Accordingly, the court ruled that a section 44-53-375(B) distribution offense is not categorically disqualified from being treated as a Guidelines “controlled substance offense.” As a result of that ruling, Defendant’s contention that four of his prior drug distribution convictions — as punished by section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code — is without merit. The district court thus did not err by deeming Defendant to be a Guidelines career offender. View "US v. Quintin Davis" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of two crimes arising out of an elaborate ploy to intimidate an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent into halting her efforts to collect his delinquent tax debt. On appeal, Defendant challenged the validity of both convictions along with three enhancements the district court imposed at sentencing.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that it found no reversible error in the district court’s analysis. Although Section 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) requires any personal injury to be “physical,” the Guideline does not limit the term “property damage” in the same way. And the Guideline explicitly encompasses “threatening” to cause property damage. Thus, we will not disturb the district court’s determination that, by filing a lien against the property, because Defendant “caused or threatened to cause” damage to their property. Finally, Reed contends the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement to Count 2 for conduct “otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.” The district court relied on Defendant’s efforts to convince Nelson not to garnish his wages, his numerous frivolous legal filings in multiple States, and his “campaign of serving notarized documents on the agent” purporting to show she “personally wronged him” and owed him “millions of dollars.” View "US v. Jeffrey Reed" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of violating 18 U.S.C. Section 1855 after he started a brush fire that burned 70 acres of the Nantahala National Forest in western North Carolina. Defendant asserted his innocence, claiming he did not act with a culpable mental state because he thought he was setting the fire on his family’s land, not on federal government property. His arguments required the Fourth Circuit to address the scope of Section 1855’s mens rea requirement.   The Fourth Circuit vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded. The court concluded that specific knowledge of federal ownership is not required for conviction. Therefore, the Government did not have to prove that Defendant knew he was on federal land or intended to burn federal land. But the Government did have to prove that Defendant acted willfully, and an honest mistake of fact about whether he was burning brush on his own property would be a viable defense. The district court excluded testimony about Defendant’s belief that he was on his family’s property when he set the fire, thereby preventing him from presenting his primary defense to the jury. The court explained that the jury, not the Fourth Circuit, must assess the credibility of the proffered testimony and weigh it against the Government’s evidence to make the judgment regarding whether Defendant made a factual mistake sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the willfulness of his actions in setting the fire. View "US v. Casey Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant appeald his conviction for two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. Section 922(g)(1). He contends that his guilty plea was invalid and that his sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fouth Circuit concluded that the district court did not plainly err when it accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. However, the court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing based on the Government’s concession that Defendant should not have received two criminal history points for being on probation. The court rejected Defendant’s other contentions of sentencing error. The court explained that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant’s guilty plea, in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement at sentencing, in finding that Defendant’s state conviction supported a base offense level of twenty under U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), or in making certain factual findings at sentencing. View "US v. Montes Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant victimized over a million Americans by furthering a country-wide “scareware” scam that tricked innocent computer users into paying for unnecessary software to remedy entirely fabricated issues purported to plague their devices. An apparent fugitive—having sought for years to evade paying even a cent of the $163,167,539.95 in restitution ordered for her role in the scheme—Defendant sought vacatur of that aging monetary judgment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that an arguable basis clearly supported the judgment imposed, and it cannot be said that there was a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “clear usurpation of power” such that any defect renders the judgment void under Rule 60(b)(4). Further, the court explained that Defendant’s aggregated circumstances are not extraordinary such that she is entitled to vacatur under Rule 60(b) catch-all, and the district court soundly exercised its discretion in denying her such relief. This outcome is wholly consonant with our directive to “delicately balance the sanctity of final judgments . . . and the incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts.” Thus, the court held that the district court properly denied Defendant’s motion for vacatur under Rule 60(b)(4) and (b)(6). Accordingly, Defendant remained liable for $163,167,539.95 in restitution—an amount that would justly recompense the victims. View "FTC v. Kristy Ross" on Justia Law

The jury convicted Petitioner of the four murders, and the court sentenced him to death.3 Id. at 475. On July 1, 2021, however, his sentence was commuted to life without parole after Virginia abolished the death penalty by legislation. Petitioner appealed his convictions and sentences, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court permitted the parties to engage in further discovery, during which Petitioner learned of additional evidence that he alleged was also Brady or Napue material. Petitioner appealed and sought a certificate of appealability on a single issue: “whether the suppression of evidence and knowing presentation of false and misleading testimony was cumulatively material” under a combined Brady and Napue analysis. The sole question on appeal is whether Petitioner can show that the evidence he cites as inappropriately suppressed under Brady and the testimony he cites as inappropriately offered under Napue was cumulatively material.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Petitioner cannot satisfy the Brady standard. The Brady and Napue evidence noted herein would have weakened certain aspects of the prosecution’s case but would not have undermined the core of the evidence against Juniper. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Brady and Napue evidence cannot “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict” and that there is not “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” View "Anthony Juniper v. Melvin Davis" on Justia Law

Shortly after witnessing a person leave Defendant’s home, Kannapolis, North Carolina police officer Jeremy Page discovered 0.1 grams of cocaine base during a search of Johnson’s vehicle. Officer Page then confronted Defendant about the cocaine sale and instructed him to turn over any drugs still in his possession. In return, Officer Page assured Bailey that he was “going to take it and . . . leave,” and everything would still be “squared away.” Prompted by Officer Page’s offer, Defendant handed over 0.7 grams of cocaine base. Defendant helped Officer Page locate and arrest an individual for whom the police had an outstanding warrant but did not otherwise aid in Officer Page’s investigations. Then Officer Page obtained two warrants for Defendant’s arrest. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should have granted his suppression motion because his arrest constituted a breach of Officer Page’s September 24 promise that all would be “squared away.”   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision denying Defendant’s motion to suppress and the judgment of conviction and remanded. The court concluded that if Officer Page did breach a promise not to arrest Defendant for either quantity of drugs recovered on September 24 in exchange for his cooperation, Defendant could seek to enforce that promise against the government. Further, the court wrote that a police officer is not entitled to arbitrarily breach these agreements, which have become a central feature of the many drug-related prosecutions that occupy our criminal legal system each year. View "US v. Maurice Bailey" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction and sentence entered against him in August 2020. Two years earlier, in August 2018, Defendant was indicted in that court for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and oxycodone, (the “distribution offense”), plus possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, (the “firearm offense”). In December 2018, a jury convicted Defendant on both those offenses. During the sentencing proceedings, the court found Defendant to be a “career offender” under Sentencing Guidelines section 4B1.1(a), in that Defendant had seven prior South Carolina felony convictions supportive of such an enhancement (including, four South Carolina felony convictions for distribution of cocaine base). The court then sentenced Defendant to 120 months in prison for the distribution offense — plus 60 consecutive months for the firearm offense — for an aggregate prison term totaling 180 months. On appeal, Defendant pursued four challenges to his convictions and sentence.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that he “distribution” offense of South Carolina Code section 44- 53-375(B) does not criminalize the attempt offense of “attempted distribution,” but rather the completed offense of “attempted transfer.” Accordingly, the court ruled today that a section 44-53-375(B) distribution offense is not categorically disqualified from being treated as a Guidelines “controlled substance offense.” As a result of that ruling, Defendant’s contention that four of his prior drug distribution convictions — as punished by section 44-53-375(B) of the South Carolina Code — is without merit. The district court thus did not err by deeming Defendant to be a Guidelines career offender. View "US v. Quintin Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of producing and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2251(a) and 18 U.S.C. Section 2252A, respectively, and sentenced to fifty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred by identifying him for a key government witness after the witness was initially unable to make the in-court identification herself. Defendant also contends that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his offenses in violation of the Eighth Amendment.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it cannot infer that Defendant’s fifty-five-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to his offenses. The court reasoned that even if it assumes that his sentence is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole,his child pornography offenses “are at least as grave as the drug offense in Harmelin, which the Supreme Court deemed sufficiently egregious to justify a similar sentence.” On multiple occasions, Defendant paid a woman in the Philippines not only to pose very young children in a pornographic manner, but also to molest them for his own sexual gratification. Defendant’s offenses, which directly facilitated the exploitation and sexual abuse of particularly vulnerable victims, are far from “one of the most passive felonies a person could commit.” View "US v. Jacob Ross" on Justia Law

Before his trial on child-pornography charges, Defendant moved to suppress evidence related to the search of his van. Defendant argued that the officers did not have an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required them to immediately enter the van without a warrant to see if anyone was in medical distress inside. He also argued that the officers did not have legal authority to tow the van. Last, he argued that the inventory search was a pretext for a warrantless criminal investigation. The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that police discovered while searching his van without a warrant.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that warrantless searches of vehicles carried out as part of law enforcement’s community caretaking functions do not violate the Fourth Amendment if reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court found no error in the district court’s determination that the officers searched Defendant’s van in exercising those community caretaking functions and not as a pretext for a criminal investigatory search. The court likewise concluded that the district court did not err in holding the search was reasonable. View "US v. Alexander Treisman" on Justia Law