Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Faver, a practicing Muslim inmate, sued, alleging the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), had denied him the ability to practice tenets of his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. He alleged that, because of the VDOC’s single-vendor policy for its commissaries, he was required to purchase “his perfumed oils [for prayer] from Keefe,” which also sells “swine and idols” to other inmates. While he did not allege that the Keefe prayer oil was itself unsuitable, he alleged that “Islam prohibits the acquisition of religious accouterments from a company that sells swine and idols.” VDOC explained that before 2013, under a multiple-vendor policy, VDOC experienced “negative and harmful results” to the security, safety, and efficiency of its facilities.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that VDOC did not violate Faver’s rights under RLUIPA. While Faver had a sincerely-held religious belief and his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the single-vendor policy, the policy furthered the VDOC’s compelling interest of “preventing contraband, which promotes prison safety and security, and reducing the time prison personnel must devote to checking commissary shipments, which controls costs.” The policy was “the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests.” View "Faver v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Hobbs’ former girlfriend, Foreman, called Baltimore police around 7:00 p.m. and stated that Hobbs had come to her home, brandished a semi-automatic handgun, broke a window, forcibly entered the home, removed a television, threatened to kill Foreman and her seven-year-old daughter, and stated that he also would kill responding officers. Detective Nesbitt verified that Hobbs had a violent criminal history and concluded that there was “an extreme urgent threat.” Around midnight, he submitted an “exigent form” to T-Mobile, Hobbs’ cell phone provider. T-Mobile responded with real-time “pings” that alerted Nesbitt to Hobbs’ general location. Another detective used call logs obtained from T-Mobile to determine which of Hobbs’ associates lived within the geographical range of each “ping.” About six hours after the domestic incident, officers attempted a traffic stop. Hobbs tried to flee but collided with a parked vehicle. Officers placed Hobbs under arrest and recovered a loaded handgun.Hobbs moved to suppress evidence of the firearm, arguing that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the use of the cell phone “pings” and call logs. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The court also rejected an argument that the jury was not instructed to find that Hobbs knew he was a felon at the time of the offense, as required by the Supreme Court’s “Rehaif” decision. View "United States v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

White was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. In determining White’s sentence, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 18 U.S.C. 924(e), based on three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” including Virginia common law robbery. The court imposed the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment. White argued that he did not qualify as an armed career criminal because Virginia common law robbery can be committed without the actual, attempted, or threatened use of physical force, by threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy. The Virginia Supreme Court responded to a certified question: Under Virginia common law, an individual can be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy “if the accusation of ‘sodomy’ involves a crime against nature under extant criminal law.” The Eighth Circuit then vacated the sentence. Virginia common law robbery can be committed without proving as an element the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” an element required for prior convictions to qualify as predicate offenses under the “violent force” provision of the ACCA. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

On rehearing en banc, the court vacated defendant's sentence for possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone and oxycodone. Instead of pursuing defendant's objections, counsel relied entirely on a motion to enter a drug court diversion program (the BRIDGE program) that could have permitted defendant, if admitted, to enter treatment instead of going to prison.The court concluded that defendant clearly received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel was unequivocally wrong on the law when he waived her meritorious objections to the PSR on the ground that none of those objections reduce the number that is relevant to this court. Rather, if successful, defendant's objections would have reduced the low end of her Sentencing Guidelines range by almost ten years. Because counsel's deficient performance prejudiced plaintiff, the court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion seeking to vacate his sentence. The district court found that defendant qualified as an armed career criminal by relying on prior convictions that were not identified as predicates in defendant's presentence report and of which he had no notice at sentencing. The court concluded that the district court's finding was contrary to United States v. Hodge, 902 F.3d 420 (4th Cir. 2018), which held that the government cannot rely on collateral review on ACCA predicates that were not identified at sentencing, in order to preserve an enhancement that no longer can be sustained by the original predicates. Because there was a Hodge violation in this case, the court vacated defendant's 18 U.S.C. 922(g) sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Benton" on Justia Law

North Carolina inmate Moskos asked Officer Hardee for permission to cross the prison yard to get cold water. Hardee denied this request. Shortly thereafter, Moskos encountered Officer Butler, who allowed him to use a nearby cooler. Returning, Moskos encountered Hardee again. According to Butler and Hardee, Moskos attacked Hardee. Officer Horne ran to the scene and used pepper spray when Moskos refused to stop. According to Moskos, he had threatened to file a grievance against Hardee and Hardee struck him in the head without warning. Moskos complained that his eyes were burning, and according to an officer, he was given a shower within 30-45 minutes, subjected to a full medical assessment, then transferred to a medical center. Moskos disputes the timing and claims that when he returned from the hospital, he was placed in a segregation unit with horrible conditions and not allowed to shower or shave for about 20 days. Moskos was found guilty of assault on an officer, profane language, and disobeying an order. He lost 15 good-credit days, was sentenced to 60 days in segregation, and was transferred to a maximum-level security facility,Moskos unsuccessfully submitted a prison grievance then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Fourth Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on his deliberate indifference and due process claims and a defense jury verdict on the remaining claims. View "Moskos v. Hardee" on Justia Law

Moses was convicted of two counts of drug trafficking. The district court sentenced him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, based on two prior drug-trafficking convictions. Moses argued that the conduct involved in one prior conviction was part of the same course of conduct as his current offenses and should have been considered “relevant conduct” under section 1B1.3, rather than as criminal history. Application Note 5(C) to section 1B1.3 states that “conduct associated with a sentence that was imposed prior to” the conduct of the instant offense “is not considered” to be relevant conduct. Moses argued that Application Note 5(C) is not entitled to controlling weight.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, declining to apply the Supreme Court’s 2019 “Kisor” rule, which limited controlling deference to an executive agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own regulations to where “the regulation is genuinely ambiguous.” The court applied the 1993 “Stinson” ruling, which held that Guidelines commentary, even when the related Guideline is unambiguous, is authoritative and binding on courts unless the commentary is inconsistent with law or the Guideline itself. Noting disagreement among the circuits, the court reasoned that subjecting Guidelines commentary to the Kisor framework would deny courts the benefit of much of the Guidelines commentary. The Guidelines themselves state that the failure to follow commentary could result in “an incorrect application of the guidelines” and subject sentences to “possible reversal on appeal,” U.S.S.G. 1B1.7. View "United States v. Moses" on Justia Law

Skaggs was indicted, along with 20 others, in a 39-count indictment. Two counts related to Skaggs, charging him with possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); (b)(1)(C) and a related conspiracy offense, sections 841(b)(1)(A); 846. The government notified Skaggs that it intended to seek a sentencing enhancement under section 841(b)(1)(A), based on a prior “serious drug felony”: a July 2015 Virginia conviction for distributing a schedule-III controlled substance. Skaggs pleaded guilty, conceded the fact of his 2015 conviction but reserved the right to challenge whether it qualified as a “serious drug felony.” Skaggs argued that he had not “served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months,” 21 U.S.C. 802(57)(A), although the state court sentenced him to 26 months’ imprisonment as part of six concurrent sentences.The court concluded that Skaggs’s 2015 Virginia drug-distribution conviction was a “serious drug felony,” so his mandatory minimum on his conspiracy charge increased from 120 to 180 months and his Guidelines sentencing range increased to 180-188 months. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his 180-month sentence. Skaggs “served a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months” on his Virginia drug-distribution conviction, notwithstanding its concurrent nature, and qualified for section 841(b)(1)(A)’s enhanced mandatory-minimum sentence of 180 months. View "United States v. Skaggs" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state court for killing a police officer in 2005. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing direct and collateral review of his conviction and sentence in state court, Porter filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition in 2012, asserting claims of actual juror bias and that juror Treakle failed to disclose in response to voir dire questioning that his brother, Pernell was a law enforcement officer. The district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or any further discovery. The Fourth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed without an evidentiary hearing or any discovery. The Fourth Circuit again remanded. Discovery following remand revealed that Juror Treakle also withheld information in response to other voir dire questions about being the victim of a violent crime and about whether relatives had ever been arrested or prosecuted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, deferring to the district court’s finding that the juror was credible when he testified that he did not intentionally withhold information in response to those questions. Porter did not establish that Juror Treakle would have been dismissed for cause if he had not withheld any information in response to the voir dire questions. View "Porter v. White" on Justia Law