Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence for Hobbs Act robbery, asserting that the district court erred in applying the U.S.S.G. Section 3C1.2 sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight when he discarded a loaded firearm in view of pursuing law enforcement officers.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing without application of the Section 3C1.2 enhancement. The court agreed with Defendant that the record does not reflect sufficient evidence that he created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person when he fled from police.  The court explained that the Government relies on this exchange to support its contention that any error in applying the enhancement was harmless. But even if the Guidelines range—and, therefore, the enhancement—was not a “significant factor” in the court’s sentence, the district court did not say that the enhancement was irrelevant to its sentencing decision despite several opportunities to do so. View "US v. Shamauri Shivers" on Justia Law

Less than a year after being released from federal prison, Defendant “engaged in an unjustified, merciless beating” of an unarmed, 72-year-old security guard that caused “permanent damage” to one of the victim’s eyes. The probation officer petitioned to revoke Defendant’s supervised release. In rulings not challenged here, the district court found Defendant committed the alleged offense and that it constituted first-degree assault and battery under South Carolina law. The primary issue on appeal was whether that offense is a “crime of violence” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that South Carolina Code Section 16-3- 600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a crime of violence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The court explained that even if it might be possible to imagine a case of first-degree assault and battery via a reckless offer, that would not change the court’s conclusion. To exclude a state offense under the elements clause, “there must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that a state would actually punish that conduct.” But given the text of this statute—and “the total absence of case law” involving any such prosecutions—we conclude “there is not a realistic probability that South Carolina would punish” a reckless offer as first-degree assault and battery. View "US v. Sonny Mack" on Justia Law

Four years into Defendant’s prison term for a felony drug offense, the government transferred him to Mexico to serve the rest of his sentence. But after Mexican authorities released him from prison, Defendant returned to the United States in violation of his conditions of supervised release. The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to another two years in prison. On appeal, Defendant claimed that a 1976 U.S.-Mexico treaty stripped the district court of its subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release. And even if the district court did have jurisdiction, he argues, it erred in considering his “early” release from Mexican custody in imposing an upward variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court declined to vacate Defendant’s sentence finding that the Treaty doesn’t strip U.S. courts of their jurisdiction—and particularly not for transferees like Defendant, who return to the country before completing their original sentences. Further, the court explained that Defendant is incorrect in his claim that the district court based the sentence on its “disapproval of the transfer decisions and Mexico’s incarceration term.” Rather, the court disapproved of Defendant’s behavior after he was released. Defendant’s sentence wasn’t procedurally or substantively unreasonable, much less plainly so. View "US v. Escovio Rios" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his Section 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. The Government opposed Defendant’s motion, citing a number of measures that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has taken to protect inmates, like Defendant, from COVID-19. Further, it argued that the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a) weigh against reducing Defendant’s term of imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant contends the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that both Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. The court explained that the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Defendant claimed were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior during the hearing’s resentencing phase. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law

Defendant was resentenced to a 188-month term of imprisonment, the district court denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing district courts to “reduce the term of imprisonment” on finding “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to do so). In his § 3582(c) motion, Defendant argued that he has significant health issues that place him at an elevated risk of serious illness were he to contract COVID-19 and that the relevant Section 3553(a) factors warrant his immediate release. On appeal, Defendant contended the district court abused its discretion by essentially applying a per se rule that individuals vaccinated against COVID-19 were ineligible for Section 3582(c) release. In addition, he argues the district court improperly based its Section 3553(a) analysis on one factor to the exclusion of others.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and found that Defendant’s arguments misrepresent the record and are without merit. Rather, the district court considered numerous Section 3553(a) factors, responding both to Defendant’s arguments for release and the Government’s arguments against release. Critically, Defendant’s resentencing and his motion for compassionate release both took place in front of the same district judge on the same day during the same hearing. Nearly all the considerations that Bethea claims were absent from the court’s compassionate-release analysis were comprehensively addressed immediately prior to the hearing’s resentencing phase. In assessing the adequacy of its Section 3553(a) assessment, it is appropriate to consider the totality of the district court’s statements. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Rayco Bethea" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of various offenses relating to his leadership of a drug-trafficking ring, including a charge of distribution of fentanyl resulting in death. On appeal, Defendant advanced three main arguments. First, he contends he was denied his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. Section 3161. Second, he argued the government failed to prove that fentanyl was the but-for cause of the victim’s death and that the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction on but-for causation. Finally, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his other convictions.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court first concluded that the eight-month period between the filing of the indictment and the appearance of Defendant’s codefendant was a “reasonable period of delay” that the district court properly excluded under the Act. Next, the court wrote that on balance, the four constitutional speedy-trial factors weigh in the government’s favor. Thus the court held that the district court didn’t err in denying Defendant’s motion. Further, the court concluded that the jury could have found that “the [fentanyl] was not only a necessary, but-for cause of the death, but it was also independently sufficient, by itself, to cause the victim’s death, even without the influence of any other factors.” As such, while this case may have been more appropriately tried under a but-for causation theory, the court found no reversible error on Count Ten. View "US v. Terrick Robinson" on Justia Law

Defendant appeals the district court’s order denying relief on her 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her sentence. Defendant claimed that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move to suppress information obtained from a search warrant that relied, in part, on the Government’s warrantless procurement of certain data from her cell phone service provider.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that because the Government relied in good faith on court orders issued in accordance with the Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C. Section 2703 et. seq., did not request the data in its subpoenas, and the use of a subpoena to obtain the data was lawful at the time; the court held the district court’s admission of the challenged evidence must be sustained. Thus, any motion to suppress filed before Defendant’s trial would not have been meritorious. View "US v. Gloria Taylor" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant on two counts of lying to the FBI, violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to concurrent 60-month prison terms. On appeal, Defendant challenged (1) the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Count Two of his indictment as multiplicitous, (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, (3) the district court’s allegedly prejudicial statements to the jury, (4) the district court’s refusal to give an entrapment instruction, and (5) the district court’s application of a terrorism enhancement at sentencing.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Count Two, vacated the judgment, and remanded for resentencing. The court otherwise affirmed. The court concluded that Defendant’s false statements denying relevant knowledge could have influenced the FBI’s investigation. The court further wrote that Defendant claims the district court erred in applying the terrorism enhancement because it failed to expressly find specific intent. However, the court explained it need not delve into this question given that the court is remanding for resentencing because of the district court’s error on multiplicity. On remand, the district court can address the merits of Defendant’s claim regarding the terrorism enhancement. View "US v. Alexander Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s order denying his First Step Act motion, which asked the court to reduce his completed sentence of incarceration or retroactively declare that he is a misdemeanant rather than a felon. Insofar as Defendant has moved for a reduction of his already-completed sentence, his request is moot because he has no continuing interest in serving less time on a sentence that he is no longer serving.   The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with directions that it be dismissed. The court explained that insofar as Defendant has moved for a reduction of his already-completed sentence, his request is moot because he has no continuing interest in serving less time on a sentence that he is no longer serving. Insofar as Defendant has moved for a retroactive reclassification of his offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, the court was powerless to grant relief because no statute authorized such reclassification. View "US v. Darwyn Payne" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to a drug offense and a related firearms offense in violation of federal law. He was sentenced as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines based on two prior state convictions: a 2007 conviction for assault with intent to kill (AWIK) and a 2013 conviction for what the district court determined was possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (PWID). On appeal, Defendant challenged his career-offender status and the resulting sentence. He first argued that the district court erred in relying on inconclusive state-court sentencing documents to find that Defendant’s 2013 drug conviction was, in fact, a conviction for PWID. Second, Defendant questions whether his 2007 AWIK conviction remains a Guidelines crime of violence following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Borden v. United States. 
 The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the district court did not err in relying on Defendant’s state-court sentencing sheet to determine that his 2013 conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense. And because Defendant did not contest that his AWIK conviction qualified as a predicate offense in his initial briefing with this Court, that argument is waived. View "US v. Cory Boyd" on Justia Law