Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Campbell, convicted of possession with intent to distribute opiates, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), received an enhanced sentence as a career offender, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. The district court identified only two predicate “controlled substance offense[s]” justifying the enhancement: a West Virginia conviction for delivery of crack cocaine in violation of a statute that criminalizes attempt offenses, and a federal conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a school. The career offender enhancement increased Campbell’s recommended imprisonment range from 63-78 months to 210-240 months. Campbell objected, arguing that the Sentencing Guidelines did not include attempt crimes within its definition of “controlled substance offense.”The Fourth Circuit vacated Campbell’s 180-month sentence. The plain text of U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is inconsistent with the Commission’s Commentary to that Guideline, and the only “reasonable construction of” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(b) is that “controlled substance offense” does not include an "attempt" crime. Campbell’s West Virginia conviction is not a controlled substance offense and so cannot support a career offender sentence enhancement View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Perez violated the conditions of an initial supervised release sentence. The district court revoked that release, imposed a six-month term of imprisonment, and sentenced him to an additional 36 months of supervised release. Perez argued that this new supervised release sentence would exceed the maximum term set by 18 U.S.C. 3583, a provision generally authorizing courts to include supervised release as part of a sentence. The district court disagreed, holding that Perez’s supervised release sentence was governed instead by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(D), the controlled-substance statute under which he originally was convicted, which imposes no maximum on terms of supervised release.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, noting that 11 courts of appeals have concluded that section 3583(b) does not limit the length of supervised release sentences authorized by section 841(b)(1). Rather, the provisions of section 841(b)(1) itself, which expressly apply “[n]otwithstanding section 3583 of title 18,” alone set the bounds on supervised release in 841(b)(1) cases. Section 841(b)(1)(D) establishes a 24-month minimum but no maximum term of supervised release; the district court’s 36-month sentence falls squarely within the statutory range. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Sitton pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm. The district court calculated an enhanced base offense level under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(3) based on his South Carolina first-degree assault and battery (A&B) conviction. The enhancement applies if a defendant has a prior felony conviction for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; a “felony conviction” is “an adult conviction" under that jurisdiction's laws.Sitton appealed, arguing that his A&B conviction arose from an incident when he was 16 years old; he pled guilty and was sentenced under South Carolina's Youthful Offender Act (YOA) at age 18. The YOA defines “youthful offender” as an offender who is under 17 years of age and has been charged with a non-violent crime. Upon conviction of a youthful offender in general sessions court, the court may: place the youthful offender on probation; sentence the youthful offender to an indeterminate sentence not to exceed six years; or, if the court finds that the offender will not benefit from treatment, sentence the youthful offender “under any other applicable penalty provision.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court and statutes distinguish juvenile adjudications in family court from adult convictions in general sessions court. Where, as here, a defendant is convicted in general sessions court, that conviction is an “adult conviction” for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines even if the defendant committed the offense before turning 18. View "United States v. Sitton" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Defendant argued that his pre-existing medical conditions placed him at a heightened risk for contracting and suffering severe complications from COVID-19. The record compelled the court to conclude that the delay between the filing of the form order and memorandum opinion was merely a clerical error. Therefore, both the form order and the memorandum opinion may be considered on appeal. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where the district court determined that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against granting relief in this case. View "United States v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to apply retroactively a federal procedural rule first announced in 2019 to overturn the result of his state disciplinary proceedings that took place in 2015. At issue is whether the principles articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting the retroactive application of procedural rules on federal collateral review, apply to bar the inmate's effort in the circumstances of this case.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the retroactivity principles stated in Teague do indeed apply and that they preclude retroactive application of Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2019), to this case. The court concluded that Virginia made judicial relief available, even though no Virginia court addressed the relief claimed, and thus petitioner's assertion that the district court was his only "opportunity" for judicial review is a misstatement. Furthermore, defendant's argument that federal habeas review in this case is "direct review" in which new procedural rules apply is also not legally supportable. In regard to petitioner's alternative argument, the court concluded that, at bottom, petitioner's section 2254 petition is a federal collateral proceeding, not direct review of a state administrative proceeding, and therefore Teague's principle that a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review governs. In this case, the court concluded that all the requirements of Teague have been met. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Wall v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 120 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of a detectable amount of fentanyl. Defendant's conviction was related to Trevor Nelson's death stemming from a drug overdose.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors where the district court cited defendant's awareness of the risk involved with distribution of fentanyl, his pattern of recidivism, and the need for general deterrence to support the variance. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the substantial upward variance was supported by the record and the district court's lengthy sentencing explanation. The court noted that, when drug dealers knowingly ply their customers with what could well be lethal doses, district courts do not abuse their discretion by taking behavior simultaneously destructive of society and individual life into account. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute and three offenses related to possessing a firearm. The court concluded that defendant lacked standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim where he had neither a privacy interest in the car nor a personal interest in being free from detention since he was nowhere in or near the car at the time of its seizure. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844 where defendant's intent was not sufficiently in dispute to warrant a jury instruction on simple possession. Finally, there was more than sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

After an explosion at Massey’s West Virginia coal mine killed 29 miners, Blankenship, then Massey’s Chairman of the Board and CEO, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate federal mine safety and health standards, 30 U.S.C. 820(d) and 18 U.S.C. 371. The evidence indicated that Blankenship had willfully failed to address numerous notices of mine safety violations that Massey had received, favoring production and profits over safety. Following the trial and in response to Blankenship’s ongoing requests, the government produced documents to Blankenship that it had not produced before trial and that it should have produced under applicable Department of Justice policies. The suppressed documents fell broadly into two categories: memoranda of interviews conducted of seven Massey employees and internal emails and documents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showing, among other things, some MSHA employees’ hostility to Massey and Blankenship.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. While the documents were improperly suppressed, they were not material in that there was not a reasonable probability that they would have produced a different result had they been disclosed before trial. The verdict that Blankenship conspired to willfully violate mandatory mine standards was supported by ample evidence. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Officers, investigating drug trafficking at a shopping plaza, abandoned their surveillance and followed Dennis and Guess, who had stopped to talk with their suspect. Guess ran a stop sign. Officers activated their emergency equipment, A high-speed chase ensued. Officer McAndrew saw Dennis discard a gun and a bag containing a white substance. Guess eventually stopped. Officers found a bag concealed in Guess’s anal cleft and a scale in the door pocket. Nothing was found on Dennis. A loaded gun and another bag containing apparent narcotics were found where McAndrew indicated they would be. Officers did not investigate ties the men might have had to broader criminal enterprises nor arrest the original suspect. The discarded packet contained heroin; the substance Guess concealed constituted crack cocaine. The scale had traces of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. There was no fingerprint analysis. The men were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute heroin; possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and being felons in possession of a firearm.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dennis’s conviction and 96-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the court allowing the prosecutor to peremptorily strike a Hispanic juror and instructing the jury there is no legal requirement that the government use specific investigative techniques to prove its case. The court noted the “ease with which our law permits conspiracy convictions for conduct that overlaps almost entirely with underlying substantive offenses,” but stated that it was constrained by its precedent. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law