Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia to two charges: possession with intent to distribute heroin and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. During sentencing, a significant dispute arose over whether the defendant should be classified as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, which would substantially increase his advisory sentencing range. The career offender designation was based on the defendant’s current conviction and two prior felony convictions, both deemed “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines.The district court, after extensive briefing and a continued hearing, determined that both the defendant’s prior Virginia state conviction for drug distribution and a prior federal conviction for distribution of crack cocaine qualified as predicate offenses for the career offender enhancement. The court sentenced the defendant as a career offender to 151 months in prison, at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. The defendant appealed, arguing that neither prior conviction should count as a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Virginia statute at issue did not criminalize attempt offenses as part of completed distribution offenses, distinguishing it from a West Virginia statute previously found overbroad in United States v. Campbell. The court also held that, under its precedent and in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. United States, the proper approach for determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate offense is to look at the law in effect at the time of the prior conviction, not at the time of federal sentencing. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and upheld the career offender enhancement. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, originally from Mexico, was convicted for purchasing firearms in the United States and reselling them in Mexico without a license, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A). As a result of these unlicensed sales, he was sentenced to 78 months in prison. Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, alleging that his conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), specifically as “illicit trafficking in firearms.”An immigration judge determined that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed this decision, agreeing that the conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) matched the generic definition of “illicit trafficking in firearms” as used in the INA. The petitioner then sought review of the BIA’s order, arguing that the statute of conviction criminalized a broader range of conduct than the generic aggravated felony and thus was not a categorical match.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether a conviction under § 922(a)(1)(A) categorically constitutes “illicit trafficking in firearms.” The court held that the plain meaning of “illicit trafficking in firearms” is “unlawful trading or dealing in firearms,” and that the statute of conviction fits within this definition. The court rejected the petitioner’s arguments regarding overbreadth and found no ambiguity in the statutory language. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, holding that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) qualifies as an aggravated felony for “illicit trafficking in firearms” under the INA. View "Alvarez Ronquillo v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Several individuals affiliated with the MS-13 gang were charged in connection with the kidnapping and murder of two teenage boys in Northern Virginia in 2016. Both victims, aged fourteen and seventeen, were low-ranking affiliates of the gang’s Park View Locos Salvatrucha (PVLS) clique. The first victim was killed after gang leaders mistakenly believed he was associated with a rival gang, while the second was murdered after rumors spread that he was cooperating with law enforcement. Both murders were carried out in a remote park, involved multiple assailants, and were documented with graphic videos and photographs. The perpetrators received promotions within the gang for their participation.A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia indicted the defendants on eight counts, including conspiracy to commit kidnapping and murder in aid of racketeering, murder in aid of racketeering, and kidnapping resulting in death. After an eight-week jury trial, all defendants were convicted on all counts and sentenced to life imprisonment on the most serious charges. The district court denied various defense motions, including those for acquittal, suppression of evidence, and requests for certain jury instructions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed numerous challenges, including evidentiary rulings, the denial of a duress defense, sufficiency of the evidence, joinder of defendants and counts, and sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions and sentences for four defendants. For one defendant, Henry Zelaya Martinez, the court affirmed his conviction but vacated his sentence due to inconsistencies between the oral and written pronouncements at sentencing, remanding for resentencing. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "United States v. Contreras" on Justia Law

After a high-speed police chase in Colonial Heights, Virginia, Melvin Myrick abandoned a crashed vehicle and fled on foot. Law enforcement officers recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms from the car. Documents in the vehicle linked Myrick to the scene, and he was later identified and arrested. A federal grand jury initially indicted him for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and a superseding indictment later added two firearms charges and expanded the drug charge to include cocaine.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia managed the pretrial proceedings, during which Myrick changed counsel, filed motions to suppress evidence, and requested continuances, resulting in various delays. On the day his trial began, Myrick moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by not commencing trial within the required 70 days. The district court denied the motion, finding that excludable periods of delay brought the trial within the statutory timeframe. The jury convicted Myrick on all counts, and the court sentenced him to 270 months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed Myrick’s challenges to the denial of his Speedy Trial Act motion, aspects of his sentencing, and the sufficiency of the evidence for one firearms charge. The Fourth Circuit held that the district court correctly excluded certain periods of delay under the Speedy Trial Act, making the trial timely. The court also found no error in the application of sentencing enhancements, the calculation of criminal history points, or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the firearms conviction. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Myrick" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Onslow County, North Carolina, identified an individual as the leader of a White supremacist gang and conducted surveillance on his residence. After stopping vehicles leaving the residence and finding drugs, cash, and paraphernalia, officers obtained and executed a search warrant, recovering firearms, drugs, and related items. The individual was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon and later for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. He pleaded guilty to these charges, first without a plea agreement and then with one. While detained awaiting sentencing, he was involved in smuggling drugs into jail and assaulted sheriff’s deputies, leading to an additional federal indictment for assaulting persons assisting federal officers.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina accepted his guilty pleas after thorough Rule 11 colloquies. After discovery revealed that the government had initially provided an incomplete copy of the search warrant affidavit, the defendant moved to withdraw his first two guilty pleas, arguing the omission rendered his pleas unknowing and involuntary and that he lacked competent counsel. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, found the missing pages immaterial, and denied the motion. At sentencing, the court also denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility due to the defendant’s post-plea conduct and imposed a downward variant sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment, below the advisory Guidelines range.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that the incomplete search warrant affidavit was not material to the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, that he had the close assistance of competent counsel, and that the district court did not err in denying credit for acceptance of responsibility or in imposing the sentence. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Milam" on Justia Law

The defendant, while incarcerated at a federal correctional institution in Petersburg, Virginia, created and possessed obscene visual depictions of the sexual abuse of children. Correctional officers discovered these materials during a routine search of his cell, and the defendant admitted to making and possessing them. He was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1466A(a)(1) and (b)(1), which criminalize such conduct when committed within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia conducted a bench trial after the defendant waived his right to a jury. At trial, the government presented evidence that the defendant’s conduct occurred at FCI Petersburg and argued that the prison’s status as federal territory was a legal question for the court. The district court found the government had not established an interstate commerce basis for jurisdiction but concluded that FCI Petersburg was within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, relying on the federal government’s practical usage and dominion over the facility. The court took judicial notice of this status and convicted the defendant. The defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing insufficient proof of federal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion and imposed a 180-month sentence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that, while the government must prove to the factfinder where the offense occurred, the legal status of that location as within federal jurisdiction is a question for the court, based on legislative facts that may be judicially noticed. However, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by not fully analyzing the statutory requirements for federal territorial jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3). The appellate court vacated the conviction and remanded for the district court to properly determine FCI Petersburg’s jurisdictional status. View "United States v. Perez" on Justia Law

Lawrence Florentine killed his wife, Nicole, during an interstate trip that began in North Carolina. After her death, he attempted to conceal the crime by burning her body and burying the remains in a Kentucky cemetery. Surveillance and forensic evidence established that Nicole was already dead when Florentine set her body on fire. The government charged Florentine with several felonies, including interstate domestic violence resulting in death and use of fire to commit a felony, with the latter charge based on his burning of Nicole’s corpse after her death.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge, holding that interstate domestic violence is a continuing offense that had not ended at the time Florentine used fire. Florentine entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss Count 4. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, including a mandatory consecutive sentence for the use-of-fire count, and stated it would have imposed the same sentence even if the use-of-fire charge had been dismissed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that the crime of interstate domestic violence, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2), ends when the victim dies. Acts undertaken to conceal the crime after the victim’s death, such as burning the body, are not part of the offense. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Florentine’s motion to dismiss the use-of-fire charge. However, because the district court made clear it would have imposed the same sentence regardless, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded solely for entry of an amended judgment, finding resentencing unnecessary. View "United States v. Florentine" on Justia Law

The petitioner pleaded guilty in 2003 to attempted bank robbery and to carrying and using a firearm during a crime of violence. At sentencing, he was classified as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, resulting in a sentence of 274 months’ imprisonment. Over the years, he filed several postconviction motions, including a first motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was denied. After subsequent changes in Supreme Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of certain sentencing provisions, the petitioner argued that the mandatory Guidelines’ career-offender provision was unconstitutionally vague and sought habeas relief.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed his habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, finding that he could not proceed under § 2241 because he did not satisfy the requirements of the “saving clause” in § 2255(e). The district court determined that the petitioner was procedurally barred from bringing a second or successive § 2255 motion and that this procedural bar did not render § 2255 “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Hendrix, the inability to satisfy the procedural requirements for a second or successive § 2255 motion does not make § 2255 inadequate or ineffective, and thus does not permit recourse to § 2241 via the saving clause. The court also held that this result does not violate the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, relying on its en banc precedent in In re Vial. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Bell v. Streeval" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who kidnapped his estranged wife by luring her to his home, forcibly taking her keys and phone, and compelling her into his truck, where she saw a gun in the back seat. Throughout the ordeal, the victim was aware of the gun’s presence and testified that it deterred her from attempting escape, as she feared for her safety and the safety of others. The kidnapping followed two prior incidents of violence by the defendant against the victim, one of which also involved a gun. During the kidnapping, the defendant made explicit and implicit threats, including referencing the gun and threatening to drive off a cliff. The victim ultimately escaped and reported the crime to law enforcement, who arrested the defendant and recovered the firearm.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia initially convicted the defendant on three counts: kidnapping, interstate domestic violence, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. The court imposed a sentence that included a mandatory enhancement for the firearm offense. After subsequent Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit decisions clarified the definition of a “crime of violence,” the district court vacated the convictions for interstate domestic violence and the firearm offense, leaving only the kidnapping conviction. At resentencing, the government sought a sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon during the kidnapping, which the district court applied over the defendant’s objection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly applied the sentencing enhancement for “use” of a dangerous weapon. The Fourth Circuit held that the defendant’s conduct—employing the gun to convey an imminent threat, rather than merely intimidating the victim with the possibility of future harm—constituted “use” under the relevant Sentencing Guideline. The court affirmed the district court’s application of the enhancement and the resulting sentence. View "US v. Faulls" on Justia Law

Law enforcement officers suspected that the defendant was involved in a drug trafficking operation based out of his apartment in a large, multi-unit building. To investigate further, officers, with the building management’s permission, conducted a warrantless dog sniff in the common hallway immediately outside the defendant’s apartment door. The trained dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and this information was used to obtain a search warrant. The subsequent search uncovered drugs, firearms, and other evidence. The defendant was indicted on drug and firearm charges.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, rejecting his arguments that the dog sniff constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the dog sniff did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy because it only revealed the presence of contraband, and that the area outside the apartment door was not protected “curtilage” since it was a common hallway accessible to other residents and building staff. The defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts and sentenced to 150 months in prison.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The Fourth Circuit held that a dog sniff at an apartment door in a common hallway does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, as established by United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes, because it only reveals the presence of contraband. The court also held that the common hallway outside the apartment door is not curtilage protected by the Fourth Amendment, as the defendant had no right to exclude others from that area. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Johnson" on Justia Law