Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered a case involving Gerald Wayne Timms, who was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, following his sentence for a child pornography conviction. During his civil commitment, Timms was convicted of and sentenced for two separate federal crimes. After serving the prison terms for these offenses, his civil commitment continued. Timms argued that his civil commitment should have ended when his first criminal sentence started, and he claimed that certain conditions of his criminal confinement violated the requirements of the Act. He also contended that the application of the Act violated his constitutional rights.However, the court held that a person ordered to be civilly detained after a finding of sexual dangerousness remains committed until a court finds that he is no longer sexually dangerous and that an intervening criminal sentence has no impact on the civil commitment. The court also held that the Attorney General did not fail to meet his statutory obligation to detain Timms in a suitable facility and that the Attorney General was not required to seek recommitment following Timms' sentences. Thus, the court affirmed the dismissal of Timms' petition for habeas corpus relief. View "Timms v. U. S. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had to decide whether a defendant could waive his right to be physically present at a resentencing hearing, and whether such an order denying his request for resentencing in absentia is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The defendant, Heverth Castellon, argued that he could waive his right to be present at the resentencing hearing per Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(1)(B), which allows a defendant who is voluntarily absent during sentencing to waive his right to be present. The district court had ruled that the Rule allows a defendant to exercise this right only by "absconding or disrupting the [sentencing] proceedings."While the court explained that the text of the Rule and their previous precedent suggest that a noncapital defendant can voluntarily waive his right to be present at sentencing, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This is because the district court's order compelling the defendant's presence at resentencing did not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. The court concluded that the defendant’s right to waive his presence at resentencing was not an "important right" that would be lost irreparably if review awaited final judgment, which is a necessary condition for invoking the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court could not entertain the defendant's appeal until after the imposition of a sentence. View "US v. Castellon" on Justia Law

In a federal case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the petitioner, James Rosemond, appealed a district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. Rosemond, who was serving multiple life sentences for offenses related to drug trafficking and murder, claimed that his continued detention was unconstitutional because then-President Donald Trump had commuted his sentence to time served during a phone conversation with two of Rosemond's supporters, Jim Brown and Monique Brown. The Browns signed declarations stating that during the December 2020 call, they believed President Trump had decided to commute Rosemond's sentence. However, no clemency warrant or official record of clemency for Rosemond exists, and his clemency petition is still listed as "pending" on the Department of Justice’s Office of the Pardon Attorney website.The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Rosemond’s petition. The court held that while a written document is not constitutionally required for a presidential commutation, the evidence provided by Rosemond, namely the Browns' declarations, did not establish that President Trump actually commuted his sentence. The court found that President Trump's alleged statements during the phone call were forward-looking and indicative of a desire to commute Rosemond's sentence in the future, rather than a declaration of a completed act of clemency. The court also noted the established practice of documenting acts of presidential clemency, which was consistently followed by President Trump throughout his presidency, and emphasized the constitutional separation of powers, which vests the clemency power exclusively in the President. View "Rosemond v. Hudgins" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the appellant, Ricky Demarco Robinson, challenged the enhanced sentence he received for possession of a firearm by a felon. The enhancement was based on U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2), which increases the advisory sentencing range when the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions qualifying as either a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” Robinson argued that his prior conviction for North Carolina assault inflicting physical injury by strangulation should not be deemed a "crime of violence," even though a previous ruling (United States v. Rice) had categorized it as such. Robinson claimed that the Rice decision was no longer binding because it relied on an analysis that the Supreme Court later prohibited in United States v. Taylor. The Taylor decision rejected an analysis that depends on survey evidence as to how the crime is “normally committed or usually prosecuted.”The Court of Appeals disagreed with Robinson's contention. It concluded that the Rice decision remains valid and binding because it was based on an interpretation of the text of the North Carolina assault by strangulation legislation and on North Carolina case law. The court stated that the Rice decision’s reference to survey evidence was only used to confirm the holding and was not fundamental to it. Consequently, the court affirmed Robinson’s enhanced sentence, ruling that his prior North Carolina conviction for assault by strangulation qualifies categorically as a conviction for a crime of violence. View "US v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Adonis Perry, was arrested in 2017 for possessing a firearm as a felon and for possessing marijuana after he was found with both during a traffic stop. While awaiting trial, Perry repeatedly tried to convince his girlfriend, a key witness for the government, to refuse to cooperate, leading to four witness-tampering and obstruction-of-justice charges. Perry was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 210 months and three years of supervised release. Perry appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds, including that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. They found that Perry was not unconstitutionally seized during the traffic stop, his girlfriend had authority to consent to the search of his phone, the charges against him should not have been dismissed due to the failure to preserve dashcam footage, the evidence supporting his convictions was sufficient, his convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, his counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, and his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "US v. Perry" on Justia Law

The case involves Joel Smithers, who was a doctor of osteopathy and was convicted on 861 counts associated with his opioid prescription practices. He was sentenced to a total of 480 months in prison. Smithers was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without authorization. Authorization is defined by Drug Enforcement Agency regulations as a prescription issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States clarified the mens rea required to convict someone of unauthorized dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that, in light of the Ruan decision, Smithers' jury instructions were incorrect, and the errors were not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. View "United States v. Joel Smithers" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, the defendant Darrius Andrez King pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon after firing a handgun in the air outside a crowded nightclub. During the plea colloquy, the district court did not inform King about the significance of supervised release—that if he violated it, he could face additional prison time exceeding the statutory maximum period for the underlying offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 does require the district court to inform defendants who intend to plead guilty about the effect of supervised release. However, the court decided not to vacate King’s plea, concluding that the omission did not affect his substantial rights. The court reasoned that there was no indication that King would have tried to withdraw his plea if he had been correctly informed about the potential consequences of violating supervised release, especially given the strength of the case against him. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. King" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Curtis Davis, had been arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses after law enforcement officers executing a search warrant observed him attempting to place baggies of controlled substances into an air vent. More baggies of controlled substances, firearms, cash, cell phones, and additional controlled substances were found in the residence. The district court denied Davis's motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the search warrant was valid at least as to evidence of firearms offenses. The controlled substances found on Davis's person and in his bedroom were lawfully seized either incident to Davis's arrest or because they were in plain view of the officers conducting the search. Furthermore, Davis's cell phone was lawfully seized as an instrumentality of drug trafficking found in plain view. The court emphasized that for a cell phone to be seized in plain view, the "additional evidence or indicators" of criminality have significant work to do to establish probable cause. In this case, Davis's phone was found in the residence along with substantial quantities of controlled substances that were packaged for distribution, cash, firearms, and ammunition, all found on Davis's person or in his bedroom. This evidence provided law enforcement with sufficient probable cause to seize Davis's cell phone. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Curtis Davis" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hart was convicted of drug dealing, sex trafficking, and witness tampering. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him for the witness tampering charge within thirty days of his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act on the witness tampering conviction, but rejected his evidentiary challenges.The court held that the government failed to indict Hart for witness tampering within the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window. So it vacated only Hart’s witness-tampering conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on the four counts added by the superseding indictment. Hart also contended that the district court erred by allowing certain prejudicial evidence at trial, but the court disagreed and affirmed the district court’s rulings on these evidentiary challenges. View "US v. Hart" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Trezith Rashad Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions. He argued that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops.Smart was initially stopped for speeding in Louisiana in 2017. During this stop, a drug-sniffing dog was deployed and alerted officers to the presence of cocaine in Smart's car. Smart was later linked to a drug dealing operation in Virginia and further evidence of drug trafficking was gathered during a second stop in 2018. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.On appeal, the court rejected Smart's arguments. It held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, noting that delays in the proceedings, including changes of counsel and the complexity of the case, were justified and fell within the exceptions provided in the Act. It also held that both traffic stops were constitutional. Specifically, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the first traffic stop and deploy a drug-sniffing dog based on Smart's extreme nervousness, inconsistent answers about his travel plans, and the presence of a gas can in his car, which the officer, based on experience, associated with drug trafficking. Consequently, the court affirmed Smart's conviction. View "United States v. Smart" on Justia Law