Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Habeas Petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for thirty years in South Carolina state court for a number of crimes he committed in 1987, including two murders. But in 2004, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services (“Department”) notified Petitioner that he would never be eligible to seek parole because of an earlier armed-robbery conviction. Petitioner contends that, in reaching this conclusion, the Department violated his federal due-process rights because, in his view, a temporary change in South Carolina parole-eligibility law in 1994 permanently “vested” his parole eligibility, such that the Department could not legally determine him ineligible to ever seek parole. The district court rejected Petitioner’s contention.   The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court explained that there is no dispute that Petitioner received a statement of reasons why he was not eligible for parole. The 2004 letter from the Department makes clear that Petitioner is ineligible because his 1992 murder convictions followed a 1979 armed-robbery conviction, and pursuant to S.C. Code Section 24-21-640, a defendant convicted of a violent crime who has previously been convicted of another violent crime is not eligible for parole. Accordingly, Petitioner received the limited process required by the Federal Constitution for a parole-eligibility determination. View "Thomas Torrence v. Scott Lewis" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to transporting child pornography. The district court sentenced him to twelve years in prison and lifetime supervised release, subject to certain conditions. Defendant has struggled to comply with the conditions, returning to prison three times for violating them. Defendant challenged the sentence imposed after his third revocation of supervised release. He argued that the court erred in reimposing a special condition limiting his access to pornography (broadly defined), and in imposing a plainly unreasonable 24-month prison term.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order rejecting Defendant’s objection to the condition, vacated the judgment, and remanded for resentencing. The district court based the revocation sentence on three special-condition violations: Defendant’s possession of a smartphone, his possession of five adult pornographic movies, and his unapproved contact with two minors. The court noted its fear that Defendant’s “getting a smartphone and accessing adult pornography” would soon “lapse into something else.” It also emphasized that Special Condition Nine, “[n]ot viewing pornography,” was “all part of the same thing that brought you here, the child pornography.” In other words, the district court based its sentence in large part on the violation of a condition that the court now vacates as not reasonably related and overbroad. The court, therefore, held that the district court didn’t state a “proper basis” for imposing the statutory maximum, rendering the revocation sentence substantively unreasonable. View "US v. Joseph Castellano" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts — conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c) for discharging a firearm during and in relation to that conspiracy. Under subsequent controlling precedent, Defendant now stands convicted of, and imprisoned for, conduct that does not violate Section 924(c) and in fact, is not criminal. Accordingly, he brought this 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion asking the district court to vacate his Section 924(c) conviction. The district court refused to do so, and Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to vacate Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction. The court explained that when Defendant pled guilty in 2012 and was sentenced in 2013, the Supreme Court had implicitly approved Section 924(c)’s residual clause. Only several years later, in 2015, did the Court in Johnson cause a sea change in the law, disapproving its prior precedent upholding similar residual clauses against void-for-vagueness challenges. And it was not until 2019 that Davis dealt the final blow to Section 924(c)’s residual clause. The court wrote that Defendant’s case falls squarely within Reed’s “novelty” framework, and so he has shown cause for his procedural default. Further, Defendant’s Section 924(c) conviction subjects him to imprisonment for conduct that the law does not make criminal. Because the error here worked to Defendant’s “actual and substantial disadvantage,” he has established prejudice to excuse his procedural default. View "US v. Donzell McKinney" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 1951, and one count of using a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 924(c) and 924(j)(1). In a pretrial motion to suppress, Defendant argued that certain statements he made to detectives and witness identifications should be suppressed. The district court disagreed, admitting the evidence. Defendant was convicted.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's robbery and firearm convictions. While the district court erred in admitting Defendant's statements and the witness identifications, in light of the admissible evidence, any error was harmless. The court also rejected Defendant's claim that the cumulative error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court properly instructed the jury that a Hobbs Act robbery constitutes a crime of violence as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Demarcus Ivey" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec 922(g)(1) after he fled a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 99 months’ imprisonment, which included an enhancement under U.S.S.G. Sec 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for the use or possession of the firearm “in connection with another felony offense,” namely failure to stop for a blue light. At sentencing, Defendant objected to the enhancement on both procedural and substantive grounds. For his procedural argument, Defendant argued that he was not given the required notice of the enhancement because the presentence report identified “another felony offense” as the basis for the enhancement. For his substantive argument, Defendant argued that he did not possess the firearm found in the vehicle in connection with the blue-light offense. The district court rejected Defendant's arguments.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's firearm conviction and sentence, finding that although the district court erred in determining Defendant was provided with the required notice, the error was harmless given the circumstances of the case. View "US v. Jason Dix" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with numerous child pornography crimes. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence. After a jury later convicted Defendant on all counts, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of 240 months imprisonment and to a life term of supervised release. As part of Defendant’s supervised release, the court imposed special conditions, including prohibitions against (1) viewing sexually explicit images of minors, (2) engaging in employment or volunteer activities with access to computers, (3) viewing adult pornography, and (4) using any video game system that would allow communication with other people. On appeal, Defendant argued that the initial warrant authorizing a search of his residence was overbroad and that, therefore, the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his residence. He also contends that the court procedurally and substantively erred by imposing a 240-month term of imprisonment and the above-stated special conditions of supervised release.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment with respect to the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, his term of imprisonment, and the special condition of supervised release that prohibits Defendant from viewing sexually explicit images of minors. However, the court held that the district court erred by failing to explain the other challenged special conditions of supervised release. The court, therefore, vacated these conditions as procedurally unreasonable, and remand that portion of Defendant’s sentence to the district court for further consideration. View "US v. Christopher Sueiro" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court determined that Defendant was eligible for relief but declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Defendant’s sentence. Defendant argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum under the Fair Sentencing Act. Alternatively, he contends that the district court should have addressed its rejection of that argument.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court explained that it disagreed with Defendant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum. However, the court wrote that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), instructs that district courts need not reduce any sentence under the First Step Act. But Concepcion also requires district courts to demonstrate that they have considered all nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties. And under this record, the court is unable to determine if the district court considered and rejected Defendant’s statutory maximum argument. View "US v. Larry Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018. The district court determined that Defendant was eligible for relief but declined to exercise its discretion to reduce Defendant’s sentence. Defendant argued that the district court should have reduced his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum under the Fair Sentencing Act. Alternatively, he contends that the district court should have addressed its rejection of that argument.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded for reconsideration of Defendant’s motion. The court explained that it disagreed with Defendant’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by not reducing his sentence to at least the revised statutory maximum. However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), instructs that district courts need not reduce any sentence under the First Step Act. But Concepcion also requires district courts to demonstrate that they have considered all nonfrivolous arguments raised by the parties. And under this record, the court wrote, it is unable to determine if the district court considered and rejected Defendant’s statutory maximum argument. View "US v. Larry Reed" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two federal weapons charges after local law enforcement executed a search warrant at his residence and discovered a multitude of firearms, ammunition, and drugs. The district court sentenced Defendant to 117 months imprisonment, at the lowest end of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. The Fourth Circuit ordered supplemental briefing and oral argument on two issues– (1) whether the district court plainly erred in assigning one criminal history point to Defendant’s criminal domestic violence offense; and (2) whether the district court adequately explained its rejection of Fowler’s nonfrivolous arguments for a downward departure or variance.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court found no reversible error in this case. As a general proposition, this court reviews a criminal sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” The court reasoned that procedural reasonableness requires the court to “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” which includes “improperly calculating . . . the Guidelines range.” Thus, any claim of error that was not pursued and preserved in the district court is reviewed only for plain error. The court explained that since Defendant failed to object to the PSR’s inclusion of his CDV conviction, the court found no error by the district court in adopting it. Moreover, Defendant has not borne the heavy burden of satisfying the plain error criteria, as he cannot prove “that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding would be different.” View "US v. George Fowler" on Justia Law

Defendant and another person were trespassing in a public park after it closed. When officers saw their car, they investigated the trespass. The officers found a gun abandoned in a nearby trash can, so they frisked Defendant and questioned him about the gun. After first denying the gun was his, Defendant admitted he was a felon and that he owned the gun. The officers arrested Defendant, who was then federally indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He sought to suppress his incriminatory statements, arguing that his statements in the park were inadmissible because he was “in custody” under Miranda, and so the officers needed to read him his Miranda rights before questioning him about the gun. The district court disagreed, and Defendant pleaded guilty.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Miranda warnings are not required every time an individual has their freedom of movement restrained by a police officer. Nor are they necessarily required every time “questioning imposes some sort of pressure on suspects to confess to their crimes.” Instead, they are required only when a suspect’s freedom of movement is restrained to the point where they do not feel free to terminate the encounter, and the circumstances reveal “the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” The court found that, in this case, no such pressures existed. View "US v. Ervin Leggette" on Justia Law