Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was found in the United States after having previously been removed under the expedited removal procedure of 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1). Defendant was charged with reentry without permission after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a).The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, rejecting defendant's claim that his 2016 expedited removal order was "fundamentally unfair" for lack of representation by counsel during the removal proceeding, as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and afforded by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and therefore was invalid. The court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not entitle defendant to counsel when apprehended at the border and promptly removed. Furthermore, the court rejected defendant's contention that the APA requires — as an additional procedural right in removal proceedings — that the alien have the opportunity to obtain counsel in expedited removal proceedings under section 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). View "United States v. Guzman" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part defendant's sentence for one count of receiving child pornography. The court concluded that defendant's prior conviction for Tennessee statutory rape categorically qualifies under the federal child pornography statute for the recidivist enhancement as relating to abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2252A(b)(1). Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory recidivist enhancement. However, the court vacated the district court's imposition of a life term of supervised release and associated conditions because the district court failed to explain its reasoning. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hardin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and armed robbery, and sentenced to death for the murder and 20 years' imprisonment for the robbery. After exhausting his state remedies, petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court vacated petitioner's death sentence, concluding that the state postconviction court (1) unreasonably determined that a juror who was hearing impaired was competent to sit on the jury and unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in so concluding; and (2) unreasonably concluded that petitioner's state trial counsel was not ineffective in allowing the hearing-impaired juror to sit on the jury. However, the district court rejected a claim by petitioner that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press a Batson challenge.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror, concluding that the postconviction court did not unreasonably apply federal law in determining that the juror's presence on the jury did not violate petitioner's right to a competent jury. In this case, the postconviction court found that the juror heard all testimony during the guilty phase and was able to compensate for her hearing deficiencies. Furthermore, there was not a sufficient showing that the juror missed material testimony at trial or that her hearing difficulty was of such degree as to indicate she missed material testimony. Furthermore, the state postconviction court's denial of petitioner's related ineffectiveness claim was not unreasonable. Finally, the court concluded that petitioner failed to satisfy the requirement of Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012), that his underlying Batson-based claim of ineffective assistance was sufficiently substantial to allow the district court to excuse his procedural default of that claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's rulings on petitioner's claims relating to the hearing-impaired juror and otherwise affirmed. The court remanded with instructions to deny petitioner's application for habeas relief under section 2254 with prejudice. View "Bryant v. Stephan" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court ruled that defendant had two prior convictions for controlled substance offenses and imposed an increased base offense level pursuant to USSG 2K2.1.The court concluded that South Carolina Code section 44-53-375(B)'s permissive inference does not remove the "intent to distribute" element from defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Therefore, defendant's February 2003 conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under section 44-53-375(B) is categorically a controlled substance offense under the Guidelines. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed defendant's conviction and sentence for using "abusive language" in violation of Virginia Code 18.2-416, as assimilated by 18 U.S.C. 13. The court explained that the First Amendment permits criminalization of "abusive language," but only if the Government proves the language had a direct tendency to cause immediate acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, it was addressed.The court concluded that the ugly racial epithet used by defendant undoubtedly constituted extreme "abusive language," but the Government failed to prove (or even to offer evidence) that defendant's use of this highly offensive slur tended to cause immediate acts of violence by anyone. In this case, the record contains no evidence that defendant employed other profanity, repeated the vile slur, or issued any kind of threat, let alone one dripping with racism. Furthermore, the Government failed to offer any contextual evidence that defendant's "mode of speech" was likely to provide violence by the store employee or the African American man or anyone else present. View "United States v. Bartow" on Justia Law

In 2010, Lancaster was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment for conspiracy to traffic in crack cocaine and cocaine powder. In 2020 he sought a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018, 132 Stat. 5194, to the sentence that would have been imposed, had the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 been in effect at the time of his offense. The district court denied Lancaster’s motion, concluding on the merits that it would have imposed the same sentence on him had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect. The court did not recalculate Lancaster’s Guidelines range and apparently did not consider the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors in light of current circumstances. Lancaster argued that he no longer qualifies as a career offender for purposes of sentencing.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Additional analysis was required. Lancaster was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 846, a statute for which sentences were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, and is eligible for discretionary relief under the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive. The court was, therefore, required to consider that Lancaster no longer could be sentenced as a career offender and consider section 3553's factors. View "United States v. Lancaster" on Justia Law

About a year after High was released from state prison, where he had served 20 years for murder, he began trafficking in illegal drugs. In 2017-2018, he distributed at least 168 grams of crack cocaine, 6.61 grams of marijuana, and 10,325 grams of cocaine powder. He pleaded guilty to distributing crack cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, which represented a downward departure under U.S.S.G. 5K1.1 of over 60 months based on "substantial assistance." In May 2020, 16 months after his sentencing, High (age 42) sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). He cited as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” the Covid-19 pandemic confronting the prison system and argued that he is not a danger to the community. High had been diagnosed with cardiovascular conditions. The government noted the absence of any infection at the institution where he was confined.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce High’s term of imprisonment by approximately two-thirds, based on its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. The court was aware of the arguments, considered the relevant sentencing factors, and had an “intuitive reason” for adhering to what was already a below-Guidelines sentence; its explanation for denying High’s motion for compassionate release was adequate. View "United States v. High" on Justia Law

DHS Agent Swivel saw someone whom he thought he recognized from a prior case. It was Santos-Portillo, a Honduran national who was in the U.S. illegally, having been deported in 2011. Agents staked out Santos-Portillo’s house, arrested Santos-Portillo. and took him to an ICE office, where he was fingerprinted. Agent Swivel then gave Santos-Portillo Miranda warnings and interrogated him. Santos-Portillo admitted he was from Honduras, that he had previously been deported, and that he had not obtained permission to return to the U.S. Santos-Portillo was charged with violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). At Santos-Portillo’s detention hearing Swivel testified that he neither sought nor secured an administrative arrest warrant to detain Santos-Portillo. Santos-Portillo unsuccessfully moved to suppress all post-arrest evidence, citing 8 U.S.C. 1357(a), which permits warrantless arrests only if agents have probable cause and have a “reason to believe . . . there is [a] likelihood of the person escaping before a warrant can be obtained.”Santos-Portillo was convicted and deported again. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1357(a) does not authorize courts to suppress evidence for violations of the provision. Based on a “proper respect for Congress’s role in determining the consequences of statutory violations,” the court rejected a request to exercise its discretion to create a suppression remedy. View "United States v. Santos-Portillo" on Justia Law

Officer Richardson stopped a car driven by Davis because he believed that the vehicle’s windows were tinted too dark. Davis had a history of felony drug charges and convictions. Other officers arrived. About three minutes into the stop, while Richardson talked with the other officers, Davis drove off without his license or proof of insurance, which were in Richardson’s possession. The officers gave chase. Davis raced through a residential neighborhood until he reached a dead-end, drove between houses and into someone’s backyard, got out of his vehicle carrying a backpack, ran into a swamp, and got stuck. Richardson drew his service weapon and ordered Davis to come out.Davis returned to dry land, dropping the backpack, and lying down on his stomach. Richardson patted Davis down and found a large amount of cash. Richardson handcuffed Davis, placed him under arrest, then unzipped the backpack and discovered large amounts of cash and plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine. A search of Davis’s vehicle revealed a digital scale and bundles of cash. The officers also received a report that Davis tossed a firearm out of his car window, then recovered a handgun from Davis’s path through the residential area. The district court denied Davis’s motion to suppress.The Fourth Circuit vacated. Incident to an arrest, a vehicle may be searched without a warrant if it was reasonable for the police to believe that the arrestee “could have accessed his car at the time of the search.” The court extended that holding to the search of the backpack. Davis was handcuffed and lying on his stomach during the search. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendants Johnson and Stewart were convicted of distributing heroin that, when used, resulted in the death of an 18-year-old, Jorge Armando Mercado-Medrano. Johnson was also convicted of a second offense, for distributing heroin to 22-year-old, Joel Custer.In regard to defendants' challenges to the Government's failure to disclose and preserve Medrano's cell phone, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court erred by relying on an incomplete evidentiary record to reject defendants' claim that the Government's failure to disclose and preserve the cell phone constituted a denial of due process. The court discussed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference from the loss of the cell phone, but the court did not resolve whether the district court thereby committed further error. In regard to Johnson's contention that the prosecution's presentation of evidence that Custer, like Medrano, died soon after using heroin provided by Johnson, the court concluded that the district court erred in allowing the irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of Custer's death. Accordingly, the court vacated defendants' convictions and sentences, remanding for further proceedings. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law