Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of a single count of cocaine distribution. He was tried for that offense in the Court of General Sessions for Horry County, South Carolina (the “trial court”). He brought federal habeas corpus proceedings in the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Concluding that the court had not unreasonably applied the standards set forth in Strickland. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability relative to his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the stand-up order.The trial court jury was initially unable to arrive at a verdict and requested that petitioner stand beside the enlarged image. The court inquired if petitioner's counsel had any objection. The court interjected before an objection could be lodged and directed petitioner to stand as the jury wished. The circuit court found that the PCR court unreasonably applied Strickland to the facts of the case in finding trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. The circuit court reasoned that trial counsel cannot be found to have operated within the broad scope of Strickland’s measure of competence when she only attempted — and thereby failed — to object to the stand-up order. Thus, petitioner’s trial counsel’s failure to object to the stand-up order constituted objectively deficient performance, that her performance prejudiced the defense and that she thereby rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. View "Lynel Witherspoon v. Donnie Stonebreaker" on Justia Law

Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the officers abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop and deliberately delayed their investigation so the canine unit could conduct its dog sniff. He also contends that the court clearly erred by crediting the officer’s testimony after he impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement.The circuit court found that though the stop could have been shorter (and begun more efficiently), it wasn’t impermissibly prolonged, and the officers’ actions were reasonably related to investigating an expired license plate. Reasoning that the acceptable length of a routine traffic stop can’t be stated with mathematical precision,” but the officers here were diligent enough to pass constitutional muster. United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2011).Regarding the other officer’s testimony, the circuit court was not persuaded that the district court erred in finding him credible. The district court acknowledged that the defendant impeached the officer with a prior inconsistent statement yet otherwise found the officer credible. The circuit court declined to disturb the district court’s credibility assessment. As such, the circuit court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "US v. Joffrey Perez" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Although the court agreed with defendant that application of a bright-line rule based on CDC risk categories would be overly restrictive, the court concluded that the district court did not apply such a rule and otherwise did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. The court stated, in light of the circumstances, that the district court provided sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review. In this case, the judge knew of defendant's circumstances, both favorable and unfavorable, and referenced them in the balancing of the 18 U.S.C. 3553 factors, noting that defendant had returned to the same criminal behavior after his first prison stint and that post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts did not outweigh the considerations that led the court to sentence him to 103 months in prison in the first place. View "United States v. Hargrove" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 162-month sentence for possessing with the intent to distribute cocaine base and being a felon in possession of ammunition. The court concluded that sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the district court's finding that defendant possessed a firearm on each occasion, and that all three incidents were sufficiently connected temporally and involved a regular pattern of similar conduct: illegal possession of like-kind firearms. The court also concluded that the district court did not clearly err when applying a base offense level of twenty-two. Furthermore, the district court did not clearly err in applying the three-firearm enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(1)(A), and the connection-with-another-felony-offense enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Finally, the court concluded that the district court adequately addressed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. McDonald" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 or more grams of methamphetamine. Defendant argued that the district court's jury instructions at his trial constructively amended his indictment by permitting the jury to convict on a basis not included in the indictment.The court previously held in United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706 (4th Cir. 1994), that constructive amendments must always be reversed without reference to the four factors of plain error review. However, Floresca's reasoning and holding are inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court opinions and thus no longer tenable. Rather, the court concluded that Supreme Court authority requires plain error review. In this case, defendant failed to establish that his conviction for possession with intent to distribute would seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court rejected defendant's other challenges to his conviction, concluding that the jury instructions were not duplicitous, and there was no error in the admission of the Facebook certificate and messages. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that a party, like the plaintiff here, who previously consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge, but who sought to withdraw such consent before any other party consented, need not show good cause to withdraw that consent. In this case, the district court erred in requiring plaintiff to show good cause to withdraw his consent. The court saw no reason that plaintiff should not have been allowed to withdraw his consent to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge and concluded that, on the record, plaintiff's request to withdraw should have been allowed. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order denying plaintiff's motion; vacated the magistrate judge's order entering final judgment; and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Muhammad v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct his sentence. The court agreed with defendant that the force clause under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is inapplicable because one of his predicate convictions—Maryland assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension or detainer—is not a categorically "violent felony" for ACCA purposes. The court explained that Maryland courts have clearly held that an assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension can be accomplished with de minimis conduct such as an offensive touching. Therefore, because such conduct does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force against another, the assault-with-intent-to-prevent-lawful-apprehension offense is not categorically a violent felony under the force clause. The court remanded with instructions to correct defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Proctor" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for knowingly possessing a firearm and ammunition, holding that the district court erred in finding that defendant's prior South Carolina convictions qualified as serious drug offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). The court explained that South Carolina's definition of "marijuana," as defined in 2013, is broader than the definition of "marijuana," as defined by the 2018 Farm Bill in 21 U.S.C. 802, and thus there is no categorical match. Therefore, defendant's prior state convictions do not meet the definition of a serious drug offense and should not have triggered the ACCA minimum enhancement. Even if the court were to adopt plain error review, rather than de novo review, the outcome would be the same. In this case, the error affected defendant's substantial rights and the district court remanded. View "United States v. Hope" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of various offenses stemming from a series of armed home-invasion robberies. The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence for carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The court agreed with defendant that Hobbs Act conspiracy does not constitute a crime of violence, but concluded that the district court's contrary jury instruction was not plain error because the jury's special verdict form reveals that defendant was convicted under a Pinkerton theory of liability, which remains valid. In this case, defendant was not prejudiced by the improper jury instruction. The court also concluded that defendant's bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion in declining to impose a sentence reduction where the "greed" and "extensive" violence characterizing defendant's offenses did not warrant a lesser sentence. View "United States v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to petitioner on the issue of whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to the State's introduction and use of prison-conditions evidence at the penalty phase. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to state officials, concluding that the state postconviction court properly applied Strickland v. Washington to petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim, and in doing so, it was not unreasonable in finding no reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's errors, the jury would not have sentenced petitioner to death.Applying the prejudice analysis in Sigmon v. Stirling, 956 F.3d 183, 193 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1094 (2021), the court did not think it was unreasonable for the state court to have found that the substantial aggravating evidence overcame petitioner's offered mitigation case based on his mental health. With that conclusion firmly in mind, the state court weighed the effect of the prison-conditions evidence and determined that there was a relative equality of presentation by both sides on this evidence and that the defense scored as many points if not more than the State. In this case, the court could not say that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland when it weighed the prison-conditions evidence and found its effect on the verdict inconsequential. Furthermore, petitioner's challenges to the state court's consideration of his mitigation evidence are unavailing. The court also rejected petitioner's contention that the state court unreasonably discounted his mental health evidence; nor did the state court unreasonably conflate the adaptability and prison-conditions testimony. Finally, the court did not fault the state court for not expressly considering the jury's deadlock in its prejudice analysis. View "Wood v. Stirling" on Justia Law