Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to apply retroactively a federal procedural rule first announced in 2019 to overturn the result of his state disciplinary proceedings that took place in 2015. At issue is whether the principles articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting the retroactive application of procedural rules on federal collateral review, apply to bar the inmate's effort in the circumstances of this case.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the retroactivity principles stated in Teague do indeed apply and that they preclude retroactive application of Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2019), to this case. The court concluded that Virginia made judicial relief available, even though no Virginia court addressed the relief claimed, and thus petitioner's assertion that the district court was his only "opportunity" for judicial review is a misstatement. Furthermore, defendant's argument that federal habeas review in this case is "direct review" in which new procedural rules apply is also not legally supportable. In regard to petitioner's alternative argument, the court concluded that, at bottom, petitioner's section 2254 petition is a federal collateral proceeding, not direct review of a state administrative proceeding, and therefore Teague's principle that a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review governs. In this case, the court concluded that all the requirements of Teague have been met. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Wall v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 120 month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to distribution of a detectable amount of fentanyl. Defendant's conviction was related to Trevor Nelson's death stemming from a drug overdose.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an upward variance under the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors where the district court cited defendant's awareness of the risk involved with distribution of fentanyl, his pattern of recidivism, and the need for general deterrence to support the variance. The court also concluded that defendant's sentence was substantively reasonable where the substantial upward variance was supported by the record and the district court's lengthy sentencing explanation. The court noted that, when drug dealers knowingly ply their customers with what could well be lethal doses, district courts do not abuse their discretion by taking behavior simultaneously destructive of society and individual life into account. View "United States v. McKinnie" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to distribute and three offenses related to possessing a firearm. The court concluded that defendant lacked standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim where he had neither a privacy interest in the car nor a personal interest in being free from detention since he was nowhere in or near the car at the time of its seizure. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. 844 where defendant's intent was not sufficiently in dispute to warrant a jury instruction on simple possession. Finally, there was more than sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

After an explosion at Massey’s West Virginia coal mine killed 29 miners, Blankenship, then Massey’s Chairman of the Board and CEO, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate federal mine safety and health standards, 30 U.S.C. 820(d) and 18 U.S.C. 371. The evidence indicated that Blankenship had willfully failed to address numerous notices of mine safety violations that Massey had received, favoring production and profits over safety. Following the trial and in response to Blankenship’s ongoing requests, the government produced documents to Blankenship that it had not produced before trial and that it should have produced under applicable Department of Justice policies. The suppressed documents fell broadly into two categories: memoranda of interviews conducted of seven Massey employees and internal emails and documents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showing, among other things, some MSHA employees’ hostility to Massey and Blankenship.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. While the documents were improperly suppressed, they were not material in that there was not a reasonable probability that they would have produced a different result had they been disclosed before trial. The verdict that Blankenship conspired to willfully violate mandatory mine standards was supported by ample evidence. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

Officers, investigating drug trafficking at a shopping plaza, abandoned their surveillance and followed Dennis and Guess, who had stopped to talk with their suspect. Guess ran a stop sign. Officers activated their emergency equipment, A high-speed chase ensued. Officer McAndrew saw Dennis discard a gun and a bag containing a white substance. Guess eventually stopped. Officers found a bag concealed in Guess’s anal cleft and a scale in the door pocket. Nothing was found on Dennis. A loaded gun and another bag containing apparent narcotics were found where McAndrew indicated they would be. Officers did not investigate ties the men might have had to broader criminal enterprises nor arrest the original suspect. The discarded packet contained heroin; the substance Guess concealed constituted crack cocaine. The scale had traces of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl. There was no fingerprint analysis. The men were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine base, and fentanyl; possession with intent to distribute heroin; possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking; and being felons in possession of a firearm.The Fourth Circuit affirmed Dennis’s conviction and 96-month sentence, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the court allowing the prosecutor to peremptorily strike a Hispanic juror and instructing the jury there is no legal requirement that the government use specific investigative techniques to prove its case. The court noted the “ease with which our law permits conspiracy convictions for conduct that overlaps almost entirely with underlying substantive offenses,” but stated that it was constrained by its precedent. View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Moss filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was a pretrial detainee, jail officials put him in disciplinary confinement without a hearing, in violation of his procedural due process rights, and that they delayed his access to urgent medical care, again violating his due process rights. Moss claims that he informed the intake officer that he was taking a medication for a thyroid condition, Vyvanse for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and Zoloft for PTSD and alleges delays in providing him with those medications while he was detained.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Moss failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his procedural due process claim and that any delay in the provision of medical treatment did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Moss argued that jail officials made administrative remedies unavailable by denying him access to the grievance system while he was in disciplinary confinement but undisputed record evidence establishes that Moss was able to use the grievance system during that time, compelling the conclusion that administrative remedies were available to him. There is no evidence that the defendants knew of but deliberately ignored a substantial risk to Moss’s health. View "Moss v. Harwood" on Justia Law

Lewis and two others robbed a pawnshop. Lewis pointed his firearm at the manager and struck him in the back of the head three times, causing him to fall to the floor. The robbers stole 28 firearms, more than $61,000 worth of jewelry, and $2,000 in cash. The police found a “red spot” on the back of the manager’s head, which was not bleeding. The manager felt “dizzy” and was taken to the hospital. His medical expenses totaled $3,676.92. Lewis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), Hobbs Act robbery, and brandishing a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The PSR recommended a two-level enhancement because a victim sustained bodily injury. Lewis objected that an injury must be “significant” to sustain the enhancement and that an injury must have “more than momentary consequences” to be “significant.”The district court “guess[ed]” that the manager had suffered a “mild concussion,” applied the enhancement and sentenced Lewis to 46 months followed by 84 months for Count III. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court erred in imposing the injury enhancement. The prosecution failed to produce police reports, medical records, photographs, or testimony with respect to the injury to establish that the manager received more-than-precautionary medical attention. Nor did it establish that the manager’s injuries lasted for a “meaningful period.” View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Burr was convicted for the 1991 murder of an infant, “Susie.” Burr was living with Susie’s mother, Bridges, and was physically abusive to Bridges. Bridges had returned home to find Susie unconscious, having seizures, bruised, and with broken bones. Burr was sentenced to death. Burr has pursued habeas remedies before the state and federal courts. In 2020, the district court declined to grant habeas relief on the basis of claims under "Brady" and "Napue," related to transcripts of interviews with two witnesses, Susie’s brother, Scott, and Bridges.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Burr has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The state court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it concluded that “any inconsistencies between the trial testimony of [Bridges and Scott] and their pre-trial comments to the prosecutors are of de minimis significance.” Burr did not explain how the transcript would have allowed him to impeach that testimony. The jury could make its own determination of how much weight to give the statements of a young child who repeatedly stated that he could not remember key details. Burr has not pointed to any “false impression” about Scott’s testimony that prosecutors should have been aware of and flagged but that the jury would not also have been aware of after listening to that testimony. View "Burr v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendants Williams, Bennett, Johnson, and Farris pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. Although defendants' pleas did not specify that the methamphetamine was of Ice-level purity, the district court at sentencing found that the conspiracy involved Ice and that each was responsible for its distribution. The district court sentenced defendants using the drug-quantity table in USSG 2D1.1(c) .The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendants' sentences, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to reject the Ice Guidelines because of the vastness of this conspiracy and the danger posed by Ice and the appropriateness of treating higher purity methamphetamine more seriously than lower purity methamphetamine. The court concluded that the district court must have latitude to consider whatever reliable evidence is available to make its 80% purity determination. While such evidence may be used, it must be sufficiently reliable and specific that it actually supports the government's position that the drug's purity is 80% or above. The court explained that, given the evidence presented as to each of the defendants, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to determine that the government met its burden of proving the conspiracy involved Ice. Finally, there was no error in sentencing Johnson under criminal history category II. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law