Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit held that defendant's conditions of supervised release banning legal pornography and internet access cannot be sustained as "reasonably related" under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d)(1) and are overbroad under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d)(2). The court explained that the district court abused its discretion in imposing an outright ban on defendant possessing legal pornography or entering any location where it may be accessed. In this case, defendant violated his release by travelling outside the judicial district without permission, skipping therapy appointments, and lying to his probation officer, among other similar violative conduct. The court stated that pornography use was not the basis of any violation. Furthermore, when defendant lied about watching pornography during a polygraph exam at the outset of his sex offender treatment, the violative conduct was dishonesty, not pornography consumption. Finally, the pornography restriction impermissibly restricts more liberty than is reasonably necessary.The court also concluded that an outright ban on defendant's internet access cannot be sustained under section 3583(d)(1)'s "reasonably related" requirement absent some evidence linking his offense or criminal history to unlawful use of the internet. The government’s remaining arguments fail for the same reasons as the pornography restriction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to strike those conditions of supervised release. View "United States v. Ellis" on Justia Law

In 2001, defendant was convicted of one count of possessing a firearm as a felon and sentenced under the heightened penalties of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) based on then uncontested proof that he had at least three violent felony convictions. After the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), defendant filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion contending that he had been improperly sentenced as an armed career criminal and sought resentencing without the ACCA's enhanced penalties.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the section 2255 motion, holding that defendant's 1971 conviction for attempted rape, in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.1-44, does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA's force clause and cannot be used to support his ACCA-based conviction. The court explained that every conviction for section 18.1-44 does not necessarily involve a use of force sufficient to satisfy the ACCA's force clause. The court also held that defendant's 1990 burglary conviction does not qualify as an ACCA predicate under the force clause. The court took no position on the substantive question of whether defendant's conviction for use of a firearm during an abduction qualifies as an ACCA violent felony. The court remanded with instructions for the district court to consider the parties' arguments in the first instance. View "United States v. Al-Muwwakkil" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for hire, carjacking resulting in death, and murder with the use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. Defendant was sentenced to death, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Defendant now files this motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate or correct his sentence, asserting 18 grounds for relief. The district court denied his motion and denied a certificate of appealability (COA).The Fourth Circuit granted a COA as to four issues: (1) whether defendant's 18 U.S.C. 924 conviction is invalid; (2) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (3) whether the government violated Brady v. Maryland; and (4) whether the government exercised its peremptory jury strikes in a discriminatory manner. The court vacated the district court's ruling dismissing defendant's claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate mitigating evidence of brain injury and potential mental illness and remanded that claim for an evidentiary hearing. The court otherwise affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Runyon" on Justia Law

After defendant, the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, was convicted of mail fraud and wire fraud for the misuse of public assets, he filed a motion challenging the fairness of his trial on the grounds that a juror allegedly engaged in misconduct and was biased. The district court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, sentenced defendant to 24 months' imprisonment, and imposed a fine and restitution. In the present appeal, defendant challenged the district court's judgment dated February 25, 2019, alleging only that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing to investigate the juror's potential misconduct and bias.The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant's contention that a juror's use of social media during the trial constituted misconduct in violation of Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In this case, the juror's Twitter activity related to football and did not refer to any facts about the case or the scandal at large. The court concluded that, at bottom, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing under Remmer because defendant failed to make a credible allegation that an improper contact occurred. The court also held that because defendant has not made a colorable showing that the juror dishonestly answered material questions during voir dire, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate McDonough bias. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on actual bias. View "United States v. Loughry" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction of one count of employing, using, persuading, inducing, enticing, or coercing a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct "for the purpose of producing [a] visual depiction of such conduct" in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). The court agreed with defendant that the district court incorrectly instructed the jury that section 2251(a) merely requires filming to be "a purpose," which can arise at any time, of engaging in the sexual conduct. The court stated that the instructional error in this case—which was objected to and went to the absolute heart of the defense—is too much to overlook because it fundamentally misconstrued the statute, prejudicing defendant. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McCauley" on Justia Law

Defendant sought to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Fourth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether defendant's counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to assert a double jeopardy defense.The court affirmed the portion of the district court's order denying relief on defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court first joined its sister circuits in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits imposition of cumulative punishments for 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and 924(j) convictions based on the same conduct. However, the court cannot conclude that the double jeopardy claim that defendant now presses was sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of trial to render his counsel's failure to raise it constitutionally deficient representation. The court denied a certificate of appealability as to the remaining issues and dismissed the remainder of the appeal. View "United States v. Palacios" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks relief from his sentence, which was enhanced based on the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, USSG 2D1.1(a)(1), based on the Supreme Court's decision in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). Petitioner argues that he meets the four-part test for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241 from the court's decision in United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018). The district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the petition, concluding that because Burrage had not previously been applied to the Sentencing Guidelines, petitioner's invocation of Burrage was premature.The Fourth Circuit agreed and concluded that neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit had applied Burrage's statutory interpretation to the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the court now concludes that Burrage's interpretation does, in fact, apply to the "death results" provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, at least those in effect prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Accordingly, while the court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of the petition, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings based on its decision today. View "Young v. Antonelli" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition as untimely. The court rejected petitioner's contention that McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), extended his limitations period by recognizing a new constitutional right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Rather, the court explained that McCoy refines the Gideon rule, but it is an extension of a watershed rule rather than a watershed rule itself. Therefore, the rule announced in McCoy is not retroactively applicable on collateral review. View "Smith v. Stein" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of making false statements on an ATF form (Count One) and possessing a firearm after being "adjudicated as a mental defective" (Count Two). On appeal, defendant challenged his firearms conviction, arguing that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders the indictment and jury instructions deficient, that the conviction runs afoul of the Second Amendment, and that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that because defendant had notice of the allegations against him and has not demonstrated that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different without the indictment error, his challenge to the indictment cannot survive plain-error review. The court also held that the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was guilty of Count One. In doing so, it necessarily found that defendant knew he had been committed to a mental institution, satisfying Rehaif's knowledge-of-status element in Count Two. The court rejected defendant's Second Amendment claim where United States v. Midgett, 198 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1999), foreclosed his argument that his commitment under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) does not fall within the realm of ordinary 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4) challenges because a different West Virginia statute, W. Va. Code 27-5-1 to -11, governs "final commitment proceedings." Rather, defendant's commitment to restore him to competency under W. Va. Code 27-6A-3(f) falls squarely within the definition of committed as used in section 922(g)(4). Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motions to reduce their sentences under the First Step Act and reduce their sentences to time served. In these consolidated appeals, defendants were convicted of robberies and accompanying firearms violations under 18 U.S.C. 924(c).The court concluded that the district courts appropriately exercised the discretion conferred by Congress and cabined by the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The court saw no error in the district courts' reliance on the length of defendants' sentences, and the dramatic degree to which they exceed what Congress now deems appropriate, in finding "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for potential sentence reductions. In this case, the district courts took seriously the requirement that they conduct individualized inquiries, basing relief not only on the First Step Act's change to sentencing law under section 924(c) but also on such factors as defendants' relative youth at the time of their offenses, their post-sentencing conduct and rehabilitation, and the very substantial terms of imprisonment they already served. The court concluded that these individualized determinations were neither inconsistent with any "applicable" Sentencing Commission guidance nor tantamount to wholesale retroactive application of the First Step Act's amendments to section 924(c). View "United States v. McCoy" on Justia Law