Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ayon-Brito was prosecuted and convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia of reentering the U.S. without permission after having been removed, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a). The district court had denied his pretrial motion to dismiss for improper venue. Ayon-Brito argued that although the indictment alleged that he was first “encountered” after his reentry by officers in Virginia, it also alleged, as an element of the offense, that he was “found” in the Middle District of Pennsylvania where he was first accurately identified. He argued that the crime charged was committed in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, so that venue was appropriate only there; 8 U.S.C. 1329 establishes venue for a section 1326 violation in the district where the violation “occurred.”The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss. The violation of 1326(a) was a continuing offense that began when he reentered the U.S. and continued wherever he was present until he was found and arrested. Because “found” does not itself refer to an act or conduct of the defendant, it does not describe a conduct element; the crime at issue is “being in” the U.S. If Ayon-Brito believed that he faced prejudice or inconvenience, he could have sought a transfer; he did not. He elected a bench trial in Virginia and was dealt with fairly. View "United States v. Ayon-Brito" on Justia Law

Varner’was having an alcoholic drink and lunch at a restaurant. Deputy Roane approached and requested that he leave the restaurant with him. Varner complied. Roane had previously arrested Varner on drug charges. Outside, Roane asked Varner to empty his pockets. Finding nothing, Roane patted Varner down. No incriminating items were found. Roane asked him to submit to a breath test. Varner stated he would not be driving and refused. K-9 officer Johnson then approached Varner’s car with a drug-sniffing dog, Zeke. Zeke and Johnson had successfully completed Police Narcotic Detection Training. Zeke gave a positive alert. Varner alleges that Johnson manufactured this alert by smacking the side of his car and that Zeke displayed erratic behavior. Johnson contradicted those assertions. No drugs were found in the car.Varner sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed Varner’s claim that he had been unlawfully seized during the pat-down, reasoning that Varner had failed to demonstrate the encounter was anything but consensual. After discovery, the court granted Roane summary judgment on the remaining Fourth Amendment claim, finding no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson had manufactured Zeke’s alert. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Roane did not use or threaten force, did not restrain Varner, and did not make any misrepresentation as to a warrant. There is nothing to suggest a conspiracy to manipulate Zeke’s behavior. View "Varner v. Roane" on Justia Law

Ka was convicted of possessing a firearm during a drug trafficking crime. While serving five years of supervised release, he tested positive for drug use three times. Ka stated, in the presence of his probation officer, Padilla, and her partner, that he had been helping friends sell drugs to make money. Padilla examined Ka’s phone, finding text messages related to drug sales. Ka then signed a statement admitting to selling marijuana and cocaine with an averment that “[t]hese are my own words and [are] given voluntarily.” Ka did not invoke his right against self-incrimination. Padilla petitioned to revoke Ka’s supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 3583(e).Ka moved to suppress statements he had made to Padilla concerning his possession and sale of drugs, citing the Fifth Amendment and arguing that the “penalty exception” applied to his situation. His terms of supervision required him to “answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation officer” so he would have been penalized for any assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ka’s motion to suppress, having previously held that the use of compelled, self-incriminating statements in a supervised release revocation hearing does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "United States v. Ka" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement that contained a waiver of appeal, to coercion and enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. On appeal, defendant argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable and that the district court violated his due process rights.The Fourth Circuit found that defendant's challenges to his sentence fall squarely within the waiver's scope. The court explained that, by its express terms, the appeal waiver is applicable to any sentence imposed "for any reason," including "the weighing of the sentencing factors, and any constitutional challenges to the calculation and imposition of any term of imprisonment . . . ." Therefore, the appeal waiver bars any appeal of defendant's sentence based on an alleged failure to consider his nonfrivolous statistical argument or any purported due process violation. Because defendant's 264 month sentence was far below the advisory Guidelines range of life in prison, the court dismissed defendant's appeal. View "United States v. McGrath" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction under two administrative regulations for repeatedly refusing to comply with directions from an immigration judge and a courtroom bailiff to cease distracting conduct during an immigration proceeding. The charges stemmed from an incident where court personnel requested defendant, who works as an immigration attorney, to stop using her cell phone. When defendant refused, she received a citation from Federal Protective Service officers. Count One charged defendant with failing to comply with the lawful direction of an authorized individual while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Direction Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 102-74.385. Count Two charged defendant with impeding and disrupting the performance of official duties by government employees while on property under the authority of the GSA in violation of the Conduct Regulation. See 41 C.F.R. 02-74.390. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 1315.The court concluded that the district court properly rejected defendant's vagueness challenge; the district court properly concluded that section 1315 is a constitutional delegation of authority and that the regulations do not exceed the scope of that authority; the district court properly concluded that the regulations do not violate the Tenth Amendment; the district court properly interpreted the Direction Regulation; and the district court properly found that sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction under Count Two. View "United States v. Moriello" on Justia Law

Brinkley was subject to an arrest warrant. An ATF analyst identified possible addresses. Because a water bill for one address was in Brinkley’s name, Agent Murphy believed that address was Brinkley’s most likely residence. Another address was an apartment. Detective Stark also found multiple addresses, including the apartment. Brinkley’s Facebook page led Starck to believe that Brinkley was dating Chisholm, who was associated with the apartment.Officers went to the apartment. Chisholm opened the door, denied that Brinkley was there, grew “very nervous” and looked behind her. The officers saw another woman and heard movement from a back room. Chisholm stated that she did not want the officers to enter and asked whether they had a warrant. Murphy later testified that the sounds and the women’s reactions led him to believe that Brinkley was in the apartment. Five uniformed, armed officers entered and found Brinkley in a bedroom, then conducted a protective sweep and saw digital scales, a baggie containing cocaine base, and a bullet. They obtained a search warrant and seized firearms. Brinkley was charged with felon-in-possession counts, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and firearm possession in furtherance of a drug offense.The Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of a motion to suppress. Though the officers developed a well-founded suspicion that Brinkley might have stayed in the apartment at times, they failed to establish probable cause that he resided there. Because they entered the apartment pursuant solely to the authority of the arrest warrant, their entry was unlawful. When police have limited reason to believe a suspect resides in a home, generic signs of life inside and understandably nervous reactions from residents, without more, do not amount to probable cause that the suspect is present within. View "United States v. Brinkley" on Justia Law

In 2003, Taylor and a co-conspirator went to rob Taylor’s marijuana customer, Sylvester. The co-conspirator carried a semiautomatic pistol, which discharged during the attempt. Sylvester sustained a fatal gunshot wound. An indictment alleged Taylor conspired to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; attempted Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951; and used a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c), citing as predicate crimes of violence the conspiracy and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to the conspiracy and section 924(c) counts and was sentenced to 240 months’ incarceration for the conspiracy and 120 consecutive months for the 924(c) conviction.Taylor’s first motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 was denied. Taylor obtained permission to file a second section 2255 motion in light of the Supreme Court’s "Johnson" decision, which substantially narrowed the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act. In the meantime, the Fourth Circuit invalidated section 924(c)(3)(B), one of two clauses defining “crime of violence,” and held that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under either clause. The Supreme Court similarly invalidated section 924(c)(3)(B) as unconstitutionally vague.The Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s 924(c) conviction. The elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” so the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 924(c). View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to operating a commercial vehicle without a permit and entered a conditional guilty plea to a marijuana charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the Government has not carried its burden to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant or that the stop was a valid administrative inspection under New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). In this case, absent articulable suspicion that defendant lacked the required permit to drive on the George Washington Memorial Parkway, the officer was not entitled to stop defendant's vehicle at his discretion to check whether defendant possessed a permit. Furthermore, the officer was not acting pursuant to commercial trucking regulations when he stopped defendant's vehicle. Because the initial traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment, any evidence obtained from it, including the marijuana found in defendant's shoe, should have been suppressed. Therefore, the court vacated defendant's marijuana conviction and remanded. View "United States v. Feliciana" on Justia Law

Six years after defendant received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for crimes he committed when he was 17 years old, he moved to vacate his sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The district court resentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole after concluding that he presents "one of those uncommon cases where sentencing a juvenile to the hardest possible penalty is appropriate."The Fourth Circuit affirmed and held that, even assuming the district court plainly erred in not vacating defendant's witness tampering by murder conviction, he has not shown that the error affected his substantial rights. The court also held that defendant's sentence of life imprisonment without parole is procedurally reasonable where the district court conducted a thorough resentencing and did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of defendant's age at the time of the offense or his postconviction diagnosis and conduct. Furthermore, the district court amply explained why it concluded that "the harshest possible penalty"—life imprisonment without parole—was appropriate. Finally, the court held that defendant's sentence was not substantively unreasonable where the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant's crimes, committed when he was 7-and-a-half months shy of his 18th birthday, reflected irreparable corruption rather than "the transient immaturity of youth." View "United States v. McCain" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm in light of United States v. Medley, ---F.3d--- (4th Cir. 2020). In Medley, the court held that the failure of an indictment to provide proper notice combined with an improper jury instruction that omits an element of a crime are substantial errors that ought to be corrected under plain error review.In this case, defendant argued that Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), renders his indictment and conviction invalid where neither the indictment nor the jury instructions included a crucial element of the offense—that he knew his relevant status when he possessed the firearm. Applying Medley, the court held that the errors in this case warrant correction where defendant's indictment failed to provide him with notice that the Government would attempt to prove that he knew his prohibited status; afterwards, his conviction was predicated on an indictment that failed to allege an essential element of an offense and a verdict by a jury that was informed the Government was not required to prove that defendant knew his prohibited status; and, at trial, there was little—if any—evidence presented that would support that defendant knew his prohibited status. Therefore, the errors occurred at the inception of the Government's case against defendant and continued throughout. The court remanded with instructions to the district court to enter judgment dismissing the count without prejudice. View "United States v. Green" on Justia Law