Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment reducing defendant's sentence by two years, rather than the five years that defendant requested. Defendant sought a reduction in sentence under the First Step Act, and the district court rejected defendant's proportionate argument in favor of individualized consideration. The district court acknowledged that defendant had come a long way since the imposition of his original sentence but that he must take responsibility for his actions in a way that he failed to do during his initial sentencing hearing.The court held that district courts should be afforded significant discretion in addressing requests for sentence reductions under the First Step Act. In this case, the district court fully explained its decision to reduce defendant's sentence by two years, considering defendant's arguments and the nature of his offense, his characteristics, including both his post-sentencing mitigation evidence and his criminal record, his new guidelines sentencing range, and the new statutory mandatory minimum in fashioning defendant's sentence. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. View "United States v. Webb" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. Defendant was sentenced by the district court to 420-months in prison and a five-year term of supervised release.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err in denying the suppression motion because, at the time the searches were conducted, defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the two FedEx packages that were addressed to a deceased person. The court explained that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the packages addressed to the deceased because, at the time of the searches, there were no objective indicia that defendant owned, possessed, or exercised control over the packages. The court also rejected defendant's arguments regarding the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. In this case, the district court did err by applying the two-level leadership enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(c) and, even if the district court had erred, the error was harmless. Furthermore, the district court's comments at sentencing concerned defendant's actions and behaviors and did not establish that the district court was biased. Finally, the district court took care in addressing the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors and defendant failed to rebut the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable. View "United States v. Rose" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence for possession with intent to distribute a mixture containing fentanyl and heroin. The court concluded that police had probable cause to search the shoebox for drugs under the automobile exception where the officers used a reliable informant who had provided accurate information in the past and where officers corroborated significant parts of the informant's information. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a video that showed defendant opening a heroin package under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 where it was highly probative to the government's case and to undermining defendant's defense. Finally, the court concluded that there was no error in the district court's application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice under USSG 3C1.1 for perjury during sentencing. View "United States v. Gondres-Medrano" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief, finding petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim procedurally barred and his other claims without merit. In this case, a jury found petitioner guilty on two counts of first degree murder and two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied building resulting in serious bodily injury. Defendant was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murder convictions, as well as consecutive terms for the firearm convictions.The court concluded that the state court's determination that the trial court was not disproportionate or arbitrary in excluding expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Because petitioner has not established that an exception applies to excuse his procedural default, the court declined to reach the merits of his ineffective-assistance claim. In doing so, the court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not granting petitioner an evidentiary hearing on this claim. The court rejected petitioner's claim, pursuant to Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), that the jury's verdict resulted from racial animus. The court first determined that no clearly established law when the state post-conviction court rejected petitioner's claim provided a racial-animus exception to the no-impeachment rule. The court then determined that the state court's resolution of petitioner's claim reasonably applied the law that was clearly established at that time. Furthermore, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), provides an independent barrier to petitioner's claims. View "Richardson v. Kornegay" on Justia Law

A week after a gunman opened fire inside a Parkland, Florida school with an AR-15-style assault rifle, a 911 call reported a man with an assault rifle walking along Route 33 in Putnam County. Corporal Donahoe and Deputy Pauley were dispatched, knowing that a k-12 school was less than a mile ahead of the armed man (Walker), who was wearing military-style clothing. Seeing Walker, the officers believed that he could be under the age of 18. It is generally legal in West Virginia for persons over the age of 18 to openly carry firearms. Walker challenged the officers’ authority to stop and detain him and initially declined to produce identification, He relented but refused to provide information about his gun and his reason for carrying it. Donahoe did not restrain Walker, pat him down, or otherwise touch him. Donahoe called for a criminal history check, telling Walker “I have the absolute legal right to see whether you’re legal to carry that gun,” indicating that Walker could not leave. Learning that Walker was 24 and only had a misdemeanor conviction, Donahoe returned Walker’s identification papers and told him that he was free to go. The encounter lasted less than nine minutes.The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Donahoe in Walker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. There was reasonable suspicion supporting Donahoe’s investigatory detention of Walker. Lawful conduct can contribute to reasonable suspicion; the circumstances of Walker’s firearm possession were unusual and alarming enough to engender reasonable suspicion. View "Walker v. Donahoe" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for one count of illegal reentry after deportation for an aggravated felony in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a), (b)(2), holding that section 1326 is constitutional. The court rejected defendant's contention that section 1326 violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to a jury by splitting factual findings between the jury and an administrative agency. Rather, the court explained that United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 837 (1987), remains binding where section 1326 does not incorporate, as an element, the facts supporting the underlying removal order. Therefore, those facts need not be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury. The court also rejected defendant's contention that section 1326 violates the Fifth Amendment right to due process because it allows reliance on a discretionary decision by an executive officer, concluding that the Supreme Court has sanctioned such reliance in the context of section 1326.However, the court remanded for resentencing on procedural reasonableness grounds. In this case, the district court's sentence was procedurally unreasonable to the extent that it failed to consider defendant's argument regarding his stale drug convictions and his argument regarding sentencing disparities. View "United States v. Perez-Paz" on Justia Law

In 1998, defendant was sentenced to 570 months' imprisonment following his conviction on numerous counts of racketeering and related offenses. Over 20 years later, one count constituting a 360-month component of his sentence was vacated because of a change in the law. Defendant was resentenced to 360 months' imprisonment, which was an upward variance from the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, contending that his new sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Due Process Clause and that it is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit rejected defendant's ex post facto challenge and concluded that defendant's argument against the retroactive application of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), has been universally rejected. The court also rejected defendant's contention that the district court's imposition of a sentence on his remaining seven convictions that is greater than the sentence he received on those convictions at his original sentencing violated the Due Process Clause, and concluded that defendant did not receive an increased aggregate sentence and his attempt to establish a presumption of vindictiveness failed. Finally, the court concluded that defendant's law of the case argument is at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011).The court also concluded that the record demonstrates that the district court imposed the above-Guidelines sentence at issue here as a variance, not a departure; there was no ground for reversal based on defendant's claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities; the district court did not erroneously fail to take defendant's military service and PTSD into account; the district court adequately articulated its reasons for imposing the upward variance; and the record reflects that the district court considered both the mitigation and rehabilitation evidence presented and weighed it against the seriousness of the offense. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Abed" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's resentence for charges related to a series of violent carjackings, which defendant actively participated in when he was fifteen-years old.The court concluded that defendant's punishment was carefully tailored and there was no Eighth Amendment violation. In this case, defendant's 52-year sentence did not violate Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016). The court rejected defendant's contention that his sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, concluding that defendant would be released in his sixties, which allows him "a limited period of freedom."The court also concluded that defendant's 52-year sentence was procedurally reasonable where the district court discussed each of defendant's mitigating arguments; gave defendant some credit for his maturation in prison; and addressed defendant's concerns regarding sentence disparities. However, the district court also highlighted the brutal nature of the carjackings and murders. The court also concluded that the sentence was substantively reasonable where the district court imposed a sentence many years below the advisory Guidelines range; did not abuse its discretion by placing significant weight on the seriousness of defendant's offense; and weighed the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors. View "United States v. Friend" on Justia Law

In 2007, Crawley and two codefendants invaded a home and attacked and robbed a man they believed to be a drug dealer. A woman and two children were also in the home. Crawley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951 and using, carrying, and brandishing firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). Other counts were dismissed, including for attempting to possess with intent to distribute a Schedule II Controlled Substance, 21 U.S.C. 846. The court sentenced Crawley to 150 months on Count One and 84 months on Count Three, to run consecutively. Crawley later unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.The Fourth Circuit subsequently permitted Crawley to file a second 2255 motion challenging his 924(c) conviction and sentence in light of the Supreme Court’s 2015 holding that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague. While Crawley’s motion was pending, the Fourth Circuit concluded that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under section 924(c)’s force clause and the crime of violence definition in section 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit affirmed that Crawley’s 924(c) conviction remained valid because it was predicated on the use, carrying, and brandishing of firearms during the charged drug trafficking crime. View "United States v. Crawley" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendants Moody and Carter's convictions for several drug and firearm counts arising out of an early morning traffic stop in Newport News, Virginia. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute where the government established constructive possession of cocaine for both defendants. The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(2).The court further concluded that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find both knowledge of and an agreement to enter the conspiracy. And a jury could find knowing and voluntary participation in this conspiracy based on evidence that Carter drove the car containing the drugs and firearms as well as Moody’s possession of drug-related cash. The court noted its reluctance in reaching this conclusion where there is little to distinguish joint possession of the drugs and guns from some independent agreement or scheme on the part of the defendants. In this case, there is ultimately a sufficient quantum of circumstantial evidence of an agreement to justify the conspiracy conviction. Finally, the court rejected Moody's challenges to two jury instructions given by the district court regarding Rehaif-related errors and aiding-and-abetting liability. View "United States v. Moody" on Justia Law