Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After defendant was captured and transported to a detention center in Iraq, the FBI Assistant Legal Attaché for Iraq interviewed defendant to gather intelligence about the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) without providing him Miranda warnings. Ten days later, a different team of FBI agents interviewed defendant for purposes of a potential United States criminal prosecution. Defendant was subsequently convicted of conspiring to provide material support or resources to ISIL; providing material support or resources to ISIL; and possessing, using, and carrying firearms during and in relation to a crime of violence. On appeal, defendant challenged the admission of his statements to the second team of FBI agents, contending that the midstream Miranda warnings he received were ineffective.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress his Mirandized statements and held that, even assuming the FBI deliberately used a two-step interview strategy, the agents undertook sufficient curative measures to ensure that a reasonable person in defendant's position would understand the import and effect of the Miranda warnings and waiver. However, the court vacated defendant's firearm conviction under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) in light of United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), because defendant's conspiracy offense is not a predicate crime of violence. The court remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Khweis" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from wiretaps. Defendant argued that because the wiretap orders did not include the name of each authorizing official, the orders were statutorily insufficient and therefore all evidence derived from them should have been suppressed.The court held that the wiretap orders were sufficient under the Wiretap Act because (1) the applications were in fact appropriately authorized by persons authorized by the Wiretap Act; (2) the orders on their face identified, albeit not by name, the Justice Department officials who authorized the applications; (3) the applications themselves, to which the orders on their face referred, did contain both the title and name of the official authorizing the application; and (4) the applications and proposed orders were submitted together as one package to the judge who signed the orders and later to defendant, whose communications were intercepted, such that both the judge and defendant actually knew both the title and name of the official authorizing each application. Furthermore, even if the court were to assume that the omission of the name of the authorizing official in the orders was a defect, it would not be the type of defect that rendered the orders "insufficient" under Section 2518(10)(a)(ii) of the Wiretap Act. View "United States v. Brunson" on Justia Law

The Government initiated a civil commitment proceeding under 18 U.S.C. 4248, seeking the commitment of appellee to the custody of the Attorney General as a "sexually dangerous person."The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 4248 civil commitment certification as untimely. The court held that once the Maryland district court determined appellee was incompetent to stand trial, appellee could remain committed to the Attorney General for only an additional reasonable period of time until his charges were disposed of in accordance with law. Absent a creditable explanation of the reasonableness of appellee's commitment post-December 2018 -- two years after his initial commitment and six full months after the Unrestorability Determination -- the statutory language and the court's precedent in United States v. Searcy, 880 F.3d 116, 122 (4th Cir. 2018), and United States v. Timms, 664 F.3d 436, 451–52 (4th Cir. 2012), compel the court to hold that appellee could no longer be considered legitimately committed to the Attorney General's custody in June 2019. View "United States v. Wayda" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals challenging the dismissal of petitioner's three habeas petitions, the Fourth Circuit held that petitioner adequately alleged that his due process rights were violated by (1) inadequate notice of the basis for revoking his suspended sentence, (2) undue delay in seeking revocation based on the violation, and (3) incarceration when he was previously adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity and civilly committed to receive treatment in a mental health hospital. Accordingly, the court vacated the dismissals and remanded with instructions to the district court to consider the merits of petitioner's due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. View "Farabee v. Clarke" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of state officials on petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court held that the state postconviction court reasonably denied petitioner's exhausted Strickland claims on the grounds that capital sentencing counsel thoroughly investigated and presented his available evidence in mitigation, and did not neglect a viable Confrontation Clause objection to his disciplinary record. The court also held that the district court properly denied petitioner's Strickland claim as insubstantial under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law

On rehearing en banc, at issue was whether the Fourth Amendment's exigent circumstances doctrine justified the suspicionless seizure of defendant. In this case, the police seized defendant responding to several gunshots that were fired in or near an apartment complex less than a minute earlier. When the police arrived at the scene, they encountered five to eight men, including defendant, calmly and separately walking in the public area behind the complex, as well as several other people standing around closer to the apartments and another man walking toward the rear of the officers' patrol car.The court held that the stop was not justified by exigent circumstances and thus was not reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress a firearm and other evidence based on the unreasonableness of the seizure that led to its discovery. The court explained that, to hold otherwise would create a sweeping exception to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The court stated that the exigent circumstances exception may permit suspicionless seizures when officers can narrowly target the seizures based on specific information of a known crime and a controlled geographic area. The court further stated that, by allowing officers to bypass the individualized suspicion requirement based on the information they had here—the sound of gunfire and the general location where it may have originated—would completely cripple a fundamental Fourth Amendment protection and create a dangerous precedent. View "United States v. Curry" on Justia Law

In 2015, the SEC initiated enforcement proceedings in the District of Arizona against appellant for illegitimate investment activities. In 2017, appellant entered into a consent agreement with the SEC, and the United States District Court for the District of Arizona ultimately held appellant liable for disgorgement in the amount of $4,494,900. Then the grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia returned an indictment charging appellant with, inter alia, securities fraud and unlawful sale of securities, based in part on the same conduct underlying the SEC proceeding. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, which the district court denied.The Fourth Circuit joined with every other circuit to have decided the issue in holding that disgorgement in an SEC proceeding is not a criminal penalty pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause, such that an individual cannot be later prosecuted for the conduct underlying the disgorgement. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Bank" on Justia Law

After the district court sentenced defendant to an above-Guidelines revocation sentence, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (2019)(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), that a different mandatory revocation provision, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k), was unconstitutional in an as-applied challenge. Defendant relied on Haymond and appealed the revocation of his supervised release, arguing that 18 U.S.C. 3583(g) similarly violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant also alleged that his prison sentence is plainly unreasonable.The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence, holding that any constitutional error is not plain at the time of this appeal. The court held that section 3583(g) likely does not meet Justice Breyer's controlling test, and given that no majority of the Supreme Court endorsed the application of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), in the supervised release context, the court remained bound by this court's prior decision that it does not. The court also held that defendant's sentence was not plainly unreasonable because it reflected his repeated violations of supervised release. View "United States v. Coston" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after officers discovered guns and drugs in the bedroom of a private home where defendant was arrested. The court held that, because the district court made no findings linking defendant's possession of a firearm to his felony drug possession, the district court clearly erred when it applied USSG 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)'s four-level enhancement on the ground that defendant possessed a firearm "in connection with" the felony possession of cocaine. View "United States v. Bolden" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit granted a petition for review of the BIA's decision finding that petitioner was removable because he had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude. The court held that neither of petitioner's convictions for leaving an accident in violation of Va. Code Ann. 46.2–894 and for use of false identification in violation of Va. Code Ann. 18.2–186.3(B1) is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court explained that petitioner's failure-to-stop conviction lacked the required culpable mental state and there is no morally reprehensible conduct. Regardless of the required culpable mental state, the court was not convinced that the offense of false identification has the required moral reprehensible conduct to qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. Accordingly, the court vacated the BIA's order of removal and remanded with instructions that the government be directed to return petitioner to the United States. View "Nunez-Vasquez v. Barr" on Justia Law