Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendants Young and Volious were convicted of (1) a criminal conspiracy with several objectives; (2) aiding and abetting the transportation of an explosive in interstate commerce to kill an individual; (3) aiding and abetting the mailing of a non-mailable item with intent to kill; and (4) aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony. Defendants' convictions stemmed from their plan to kill Young's ex-wife by mailing her a bomb.The Fourth Circuit concluded that, as a matter of law, an inert bomb that contains explosives qualifies as a nonmailable item under 18 U.S.C. 1716, and that sufficient evidence supported defendants' convictions for aiding and abetting the mailing of a nonmailable item. Furthermore, because mailing a nonmailable item with intent to kill under section 1716(j) was the predicate felony, the court upheld the jury's convictions for aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 844(h). Finally, the court rejected Volious's challenges to the indictment, the jury instructions, and the district court's denial of his pre-trial motion to sever. View "United States v. Young" on Justia Law

Movant seeks authorization to file a successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 application based on the holding in Davis v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), that the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)'s crime-of-violence definition was unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit joined its sister circuits in holding that Davis applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. The court also found that movant has stated a plausible claim for relief that warrants review by a district court. Accordingly, the court granted the motion. View "In re: Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was convicted in 1993 for misdemeanor assault and battery of a family member, he was prohibited for life under 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) from possessing a firearm unless he obtains a pardon or an expungement of his conviction. Plaintiff filed suit seeking a declaration that section 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional as applied to him.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, holding that section 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to plaintiff. The court applied a two-prong approach in considering as-applied Second Amendment challenges. First, the court assumed without deciding that domestic violence misdemeanants are entitled to some degree of Second Amendment protection. Second, the court applied intermediate scrutiny to consider plaintiff's challenge. Applying United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2011), which rejected an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to section 922(g)(9), the court concluded that the evidence showed "a reasonable fit" between the statute and the substantial governmental objective of reducing domestic gun violence. In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted the approach of its sister circuits and declined to read into the statute an exception for good behavior or for the passage of time. View "Harley v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in an action where defendants were found liable by a jury for multiple violations of the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court denied defendants' post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and entered judgment against all three defendants.The court concluded that defendants offered no argument or evidence that required the district court to grant them judgment as a matter of law. Rather, based on all of the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendants willfully paid commissions to independent contractors and, accordingly, that they knowingly violated the Anti-Kickback Statute. The court rejected defendants' contention that commissions to salespeople can never constitute kickbacks under the Anti-Kickback Statute. The court explained that no language in the statute so provides and federal appellate courts have frequently, and indeed invariably, upheld Anti-Kickback Statute violations based on commission payments to third parties. The court rejected defendants' claims of instructional error, and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of certain experts. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not err in granting the prejudgment writ of attachment. View "United States v. Mallory" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit vacated defendant's sentence for conspiracy to possess, with intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The court found that the district court's explanation for applying the leadership enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b) precludes meaningful appellate review. The court found no basis in the record for concluding that the district court considered the seven factors for sentencing defendant as a "manager" or "supervisor." In this case, the district court cited no facts regarding defendant's instruction for another person to collect money on his behalf or for others to move money for him from prison. Furthermore, it was unclear as to what evidence the district court was referring to and why it supported the conclusion that defendant managed or supervised his sister to accept money on his behalf from prison. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court committed procedural error under United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1267 (4th Cir. 1993).Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not clearly err by determining that defendant recklessly created a sufficiently substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. Therefore, the district court did not err by applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless flight under USSG 3C1.2. The court remanded for further fact-finding and resentencing. View "United States v. Burnley" on Justia Law

A district court's finding of whether a particular false statement or omission in a warrant affidavit was made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth is a factual one, subject to reversal only upon an appellate finding of clear error.The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, pursuant to a plea agreement, for intent to distribute a quantity of hydrocodone. The court upheld the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence that was seized pursuant to warrants authorizing searches of his residence, automobile, and mobile device in connection with a robbery. Because the court found no clear error in the district court's factual findings regarding the Franks intentionality prong, the court rejected defendant's challenges and need not reach the materiality prong. Likewise, the court need not reach defendant's Lull-premised contention that all of the co-suspect's statements should be removed from the affidavit and that the affidavit, so altered, is insufficient to establish probable cause. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in its remaining findings of fact. In this case, the district court expressly credited the detective's testimony that the robbery co-suspect provided information that was found to be credible based on it having been corroborated. View "United States v. Pulley" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's 36-month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after commission of an aggravated felony. The court held that there was no error in the district court's application of a six-level sentencing enhancement for a prior felony conviction with a sentence exceeding one year and one month under USSG 2L1.2(b)(2)(C). In this case, defendant was sentenced to 6-17 months in prison for his 2018 North Carolina offenses and, under North Carolina's Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011, the last nine months of that sentence was to be served in post-release supervision. The court concluded that defendant's argument, that a post-release supervision term is the functional equivalent of a suspended sentence and should not be included in the determination of the maximum term of imprisonment imposed, is foreclosed by United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 2015). View "United States v. Velasquez-Canales" on Justia Law

In this court order, the Fourth Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Virginia: Under Virginia common law, can an individual be convicted of robbery by means of threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy? View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that a conviction under South Carolina's carjacking statute, S.C. Code 16-3-1075, which prohibits taking or attempting to take a motor vehicle "by force and violence or by intimidation while the person is operating the vehicle or while the person is in the vehicle," is a violent felony predicate under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).In this case, petitioner claims that "intimidation," as it is used in the carjacking statute, requires the threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. However, the court explained that, although South Carolina courts have not explicitly interpreted the carjacking statute, the state has given every indication that it meant "intimidation" in its carjacking statute to require the use, attempted use or threat of physical force against the person in the vehicle. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that South Carolina carjacking is a violent felony under the ACCA. View "United States v. Croft" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction for attempted sex trafficking of a minor and three child pornography offenses. The court upheld the district court's denial of a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of law enforcement's declarations in two warrant affidavits, because defendant failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that the law enforcement agent acted with the requisite intent in omitting a confidential informant's criminal history from the warrant affidavits. The court also held that substantial evidence supported defendant's attempt conviction where his words strongly corroborated his intent to recruit, entice, or solicit children to engage in commercial sex acts. The court further held that there was no error in the district court's application of a five-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 4B1.5(b) for being a repeat and dangerous sex offender against minors.However, the court vacated defendant's sentence because the district court should not have applied a four-level sentencing enhancement under USSG 2G1.1 for an offense involving a minor who had not attained the age of twelve years. The court explained that the district court erred in applying the enhancement, because neither subparagraph (A) or (B) of the application note defining "minor" for section 2G2.1 encompass a situation in which a private citizen represents that a fictitious child could be provided to engage in sexual conduct. View "United States v. Haas" on Justia Law