Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Keyon Paylor, appealed from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which denied his petition to vacate his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Paylor had entered a guilty plea, which he later sought to vacate, asserting that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He claimed that law enforcement officers involved in his arrest planted the firearm and stole thousands of dollars from him, and that his plea was induced as a result of egregious law enforcement misconduct. The district court denied his petition, concluding that Paylor did not produce enough evidence to establish that information regarding former Detective Daniel Hersl’s misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision and vacated it, concluding that Paylor is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing in order to attempt to gather evidence to support his claim. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "US v. Paylor" on Justia Law

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In this case, Daniel N. Kemp, Sr. was charged with nine counts of sexually abusing his adopted children. Kemp pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual abuse under a plea agreement and the remaining charges were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina sentenced Kemp to life imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release. Kemp appealed his conviction and sentence. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed Kemp's conviction. The court found that the district court's plea colloquy did not comply with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in multiple respects, but Kemp failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. As for Kemp's sentence, the Court of Appeals found that the district court improperly failed to orally pronounce multiple discretionary conditions of supervised release that it subsequently imposed in Kemp's written judgment. This constituted error under United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), violating Kemp's right to be present at sentencing. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated Kemp's sentence and remanded for the district court to resentence the defendant. View "US v. Kemp" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, Eric Henderson, a convicted felon, was charged with one count of possession of a firearm, violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Henderson pleaded guilty to the charge, but objected to the sentencing enhancements applied by the district court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing.The court held that the district court erred in applying a four-level sentencing enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This enhancement was based on Henderson's possession of a firearm "in connection with another felony offense," namely, possession of a firearm while under a domestic violence protective order. The court noted that a person cannot be punished more severely for violating multiple provisions of § 922(g) with the same act of possession.The court also ruled that the district court made a mistake in applying a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines for reckless endangerment during flight. The court found that Henderson's conduct did not meet the definition of recklessness as established by prior court decisions, which require "flight-plus-something more" for the enhancement to apply. In Henderson's case, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate reckless behavior or substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury during his flight. View "US v. Henderson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, sentencing Joshua Aaron Roy to 120 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release for unlawful possession of a firearm and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl. The court rejected Roy's claim that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable, holding that the district court did not rely on clearly erroneous facts or evidence outside the record. The specifics of the case involved Roy driving his stepdaughter and her partner in the latter's vehicle, suspected by law enforcement to be transporting narcotics. Following a traffic stop, the officers seized 447 fentanyl capsules weighing 61.98 grams from the partner. Roy was subsequently arrested for unlawful possession of a firearm after being identified on surveillance footage following a report of shoplifting. The court found that the district court's statements about the lethality of fentanyl and the connection between the two offenses constituted permissible reliance on facts within the record. It concluded that any error in the reference to multiple firearms did not alter the court's understanding that Roy had possessed a single firearm and was therefore harmless. View "US v. Roy" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the case involved defendant Glenda Taylor-Sanders, a licensed insurance agent, who pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Taylor-Sanders had used her position to defraud several trucking companies and an insurance finance company, BankDirect Capital Finance, by misappropriating funds meant for insurance premiums and obtaining loans under the guise of non-existent insurance policies. She used the funds for personal expenditures, leading to the lapse of some of the trucking companies' insurance policies.In her plea agreement, Taylor-Sanders agreed to pay full restitution to all victims harmed by her relevant conduct, and she waived all rights to contest the conviction and sentence in any appeal, unless it was due to ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. However, she later attempted to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that she didn't fully understand the implications of her plea and that she never acted with the requisite intent to defraud. The district court denied her motion to withdraw the plea, concluding that her claim was not credible and that she had not provided a fair and just reason to withdraw her guilty plea.After being sentenced to 66 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay over $700,000 in restitution, Taylor-Sanders appealed her conviction, sentence, and the restitution order. She argued that her guilty plea wasn’t knowing and voluntary, that the district court miscalculated her offense level, and that the district court made several errors when awarding restitution.The Court of Appeals found that Taylor-Sanders's guilty plea and plea waiver were valid and the issues she raised on appeal fell within the scope of her appeal waiver. The court distinguished between claims that a sentence is "illegal" because the district court lacked the authority to issue the sentence (which remain reviewable despite an appeal waiver) and claims that a sentence was "imposed in violation of law" because it has otherwise merely "been touched by a legal error" (in which case the court will enforce the appeal waiver). The court dismissed Taylor-Sanders's appeal in its entirety. View "US v. Taylor-Sanders" on Justia Law

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In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Brent Brewbaker, appealed from his conviction of a per se antitrust violation under § 1 of the Sherman Act, as well as five counts of mail and wire fraud. Brewbaker had asked the district court to dismiss the Sherman Act count for failure to state an offense, but the court denied his motion. The court of appeals reversed Brewbaker’s Sherman Act conviction, finding that the indictment failed to state a per se antitrust offense as it purported to do. The court, however, affirmed his fraud convictions and remanded the case for resentencing.The legal basis for the case was Brewbaker's argument that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not state a per se Sherman Act offense, a claim that the appellate court agreed with. The court explained that the indictment alleged a restraint that was both horizontal and vertical in nature, which does not fit neatly into either category as per existing case law. The court further noted that the Supreme Court had not yet clarified how to analyze an agreement between two parties with both vertical and horizontal aspects. The court concluded that the indictment did not allege a restraint that has been previously held to be per se illegal, nor one that economics showed would invariably lead to anticompetitive effects, and thus failed to state a per se violation of the Sherman Act.The court also rejected Brewbaker's claim that the jury instructions on the Sherman Act count "infected" the jury’s consideration of the fraud counts, noting that the fraud counts were not dependent on finding Brewbaker guilty under the Sherman Act. It further cited the presumption that juries follow instructions, and found no extraordinary situation to overcome this presumption. Therefore, the fraud convictions were affirmed. View "US v. Brent Brewbaker" on Justia Law

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Defendant pleaded guilty in 2011 to possessing a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c), with the underlying crime of violence being VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon. Since his conviction, the Supreme Court has narrowed the kinds of crimes that can support a Section 924(c) conviction. At issue is whether VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon is still one of them.   The Fourth Circuit upheld Defendant’s conviction and found that VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon remains a valid crime-of-violence predicate. The court explained that the VICAR statute makes it a crime to commit any of the statute’s enumerated offenses “in violation of the laws of any State or the United States.” The court explained that it has interpreted this language to mean that one element of a VICAR conviction is that the defendant committed the enumerated federal offense, and another is that the defendant’s conduct violated an independent state or federal law. The court wrote that the federal assault with a dangerous weapon easily qualifies as a crime of violence. That this element of VICAR assault with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence is sufficient in and of itself to render the offense a crime of violence; we need not progress to the state-law predicates. The court explained that to require courts to “look through” the VICAR offense to the underlying state crimes in every instance would unnecessarily send them on a scramble through innumerable state laws across the circuit. View "US v. Dearnta Thomas" on Justia Law

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Defendant was sentenced to 123 months’ imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release after pleading guilty to drug distribution and firearms charges. At the sentencing hearing, the judge told Defendant that he would be “subject to the standard conditions” of supervised release “as adopted in the Eastern District of North Carolina.” However, the subsequent written judgment contained several special conditions of supervised release not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. These were no minor alterations. One special condition forbade Defendant from opening new lines of credit without permission. Another stipulated Defendant’s consent to warrantless searches of his person or his home whenever his probation officer saw fit. Defendant sent the district court a letter indicating his desire to appeal—223 days after the entry of judgment in his case and long after Rule 4(b)’s deadline had expired. The government promptly moved to dismiss his appeal as untimely.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss. The court explained that in United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020), the addition of such unpronounced conditions is an error that violates the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing. When a defendant timely appeals a Rogers error, the court must vacate the sentence and remand for the defendant to be sentenced anew. However, here, Defendant filed his notice of appeal well outside the time limits imposed by Rule 4(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court held that defendants who raise Rogers errors are not excused from the usual timeliness rules for filing a notice of appeal. View "US v. Gregory Brantley" on Justia Law

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While representing a client, Jane Roe , Appellant attorney John Doe engaged in settlement negotiations with the University of Maryland Medical System (UMMS). The negotiations between Doe and UMMS proceeded poorly. Among other things, Doe also made any settlement between Roe and UMMS contingent on his personal receipt of an additional $25 million that would effectuate his retention by UMMS as a private consultant of sorts. A grand jury indicted Doe, charging him with attempted extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 1951 and 1952. Shortly thereafter—at the government’s request—the grand jury issued multiple subpoenas duces tecum to the lawyers and firms that assisted in Doe’s representation of Roe—and in the formation of the alleged extortion scheme. Doe and Roe moved to quash the subpoenas. That court then granted in part a subsequent motion filed by the government to compel production. Doe and Roe now appealed asking the court to reverse the district court’s orders first denying their motions to quash and then compelling production.The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal as to Doe for lack of appellate jurisdiction and otherwise affirmed. The court held that it lacks jurisdiction to consider Doe’s arguments given the Supreme Court’s effective narrowing of the Perlman doctrine. The court otherwise affirmed discerning no reversible error and ordered the parties must proceed to comply with the disputed subpoenas duces tecum in accordance with the district court’s order compelling production and this opinion. View "In re: Grand Jury 2021 Subpoenas" on Justia Law

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After committing armed robbery with an unidentified accomplice, Defendant pled guilty to Hobbs Act robbery and a firearm charge pursuant to an agreement with the government. At sentencing, the district court warned that Defendant’s decision to name his accomplice would be a “critical part” of its sentencing determination. When Defendant declined to name his accomplice, the district court imposed a sentence at the top of Carter’s Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, Defendant asserted that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by imposing a harsher sentence due to his failure to identify his accomplice and drawing adverse inferences from that failure. He further alleged that this Fifth Amendment violation rendered his sentence procedurally and substantively unreasonable.   The Fourth Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss Defendant’s appeal to the extent he challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. The court explained that the district court had no substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice would be incriminating beyond the plea itself. Defendant was asked to name his accomplice in specific conduct for which he had already been convicted or received immunity in his federal case and for which his state charges were dismissed.   The court explained that Defendant’s self-incrimination concerns would have merited further analysis had he raised them before the district court. But he did not, and the district court was left without any substantial reason to believe that Defendant’s identification of his accomplice was likely to be incriminating. Defendant’s reliance on the Fifth Amendment privilege comes too late. Thus, his Fifth Amendment challenge fails. View "US v. Richard Carter" on Justia Law