Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rodney Crawley was sentenced in December 2016 to 188 months in prison for a federal drug-trafficking conviction, with an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) for being a career offender due to two prior felony convictions: a 2007 Virginia drug distribution conviction and a 2009 Virginia robbery conviction. Without the enhancement, his sentencing range would have been 84 to 105 months. In 2022, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. White that Virginia robbery did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).Crawley filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that the White decision meant he no longer qualified as a career offender, creating a significant sentencing disparity. He also cited a medical condition increasing his risk for COVID-19 complications and his rehabilitation efforts. The district court denied his motion, finding that the change in law, his medical condition, and his rehabilitation did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the Sentencing Commission’s amended policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, effective November 1, 2023, applied to Crawley’s motion. The court agreed that the White decision created a gross disparity between Crawley’s original sentence and the sentence he would likely receive now. However, Crawley had not served at least 10 years of his term of imprisonment, as required by § 1B1.13(b)(6). Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Crawley’s motion for compassionate release. View "US v. Crawley" on Justia Law

Stephen Purks orchestrated a multi-state methamphetamine distribution conspiracy from his Florida state prison cell. The government indicted him on fourteen counts of methamphetamine distribution and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. A jury found him guilty on all counts. Purks appealed his convictions, challenging the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement and arguing improper venue for his prosecution.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia held an evidentiary hearing on Purks's motion to suppress. Purks claimed that his statements were involuntary due to a beating by Florida Department of Corrections officers before his interview with DEA agents. The court found that Purks was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them, crediting the DEA agent's testimony over Purks's. The court also found that the interview was conducted respectfully and without coercion, and denied the motion to suppress. At trial, the district court denied Purks's Rule 29 motion for acquittal based on improper venue, instructing the jury that venue was proper in the Western District of Virginia.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, holding that Purks's statements were voluntary and that the agents did not coerce him. The court also affirmed the district court's venue instruction, holding that the distribution of methamphetamine is a continuing offense that can be prosecuted in any district where the offense was begun, continued, or completed. The court found that the distribution was completed in the Western District of Virginia, making it a proper venue for prosecution. View "United States v. Purks" on Justia Law

Kevin Hsieh, a native and citizen of India, was convicted of inducing a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Following his conviction, an immigration judge (IJ) ordered his removal from the United States, citing his conviction as an aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and a crime of child abuse under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Hsieh appealed the removal order, arguing that the statute of conviction is broader than the generic offenses of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Hsieh's appeal, agreeing with the IJ's determination that Hsieh's conviction under § 2422(b) categorically matched both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse as defined in the INA. Hsieh then filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that a conviction under § 2422(b) does indeed categorically constitute a match for both the aggravated felony of sexual abuse of a minor and the crime of child abuse under the INA. The court noted that § 2422(b) targets conduct directed toward minors, involves a mental element focused on sexual gratification, and includes both physical and nonphysical misuse or maltreatment of minors. The court also determined that the statute's mens rea requirement and the harm caused by the offense align with the definitions of sexual abuse of a minor and child abuse.Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit denied Hsieh's petition for review, upholding the BIA's decision that Hsieh's conviction warranted his removal from the United States. View "Hsieh v. Bondi" on Justia Law

In October 2022, NCIS investigators obtained a military warrant to seize but not search Joshua Lee Ray's cell phone. Despite this, they searched the phone and found evidence of child sexual abuse material. Ray moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment as the warrant did not authorize it. The district court granted the motion.The Government appealed, conceding the warrant did not authorize the search, there was no verbal authorization, and the warrant did not incorporate an affidavit requesting authorization. The Government argued the search was justified under the good faith exception.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government could not rely on the good faith exception because the warrant was not deficient; it simply did not authorize the search. The court emphasized that the NCIS exceeded the scope of the valid warrant, and the good faith exception did not apply to such conduct. The court affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the evidence. View "US v. Ray" on Justia Law

Three defendants, Brayan Alexander Contreras-Avalos, Jairo Arnaldo Jacome, and Luis Arnoldo Flores-Reyes, were charged with various crimes related to their involvement in the MS-13 gang, including racketeering conspiracy, murder in aid of racketeering, and drug distribution conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a series of violent acts, including the murders of Anner Duarte-Lopez and Raymond Wood. After a two-week trial, the jury found all three defendants guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced each to life in prison.The defendants appealed their convictions. Jacome and Flores-Reyes argued that two misstatements in the district court’s oral jury instructions, which were corrected in the written instructions, required the reversal of their convictions for murder in aid of racketeering. All three defendants also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against them. The district court had denied their motions for acquittal or a new trial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the two misstatements in the oral jury instructions did not require reversal because the written instructions provided to the jury were correct, and the evidence against the defendants was overwhelming. The court also found that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings that Jacome and Flores-Reyes committed or aided and abetted the murders and that Contreras-Avalos was involved in the racketeering and drug distribution conspiracies. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, upholding the convictions and sentences of all three defendants. View "US v. Contreras-Avalos" on Justia Law

On January 9, 2021, Xzavier D. Hill, an 18-year-old, was shot and killed by Virginia State Troopers Seth W. Layton and Benjamin I. Bone. Hill's estate, represented by his mother, LaToya K. Benton, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging that the troopers used excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and committed state law torts. The troopers moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion, finding that the troopers' actions were objectively reasonable and that no clearly established law indicated their conduct was unconstitutional.The district court found that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity on both the constitutional and clearly established prongs. The court determined that the troopers reasonably believed Hill posed a danger by disobeying commands and reaching towards what they perceived to be a handgun. The court also concluded that there was no precedent clearly establishing that the troopers' actions were unlawful. Consequently, the court dismissed the state law tort claims, as they were dependent on the success of the federal excessive force claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the troopers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that all three Graham factors—severity of the crime, immediate threat to officers, and resisting arrest or evading arrest by flight—favored the troopers. The court also determined that there was no Supreme Court or Fourth Circuit precedent that clearly established the troopers' conduct as unconstitutional. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Benton v. Layton" on Justia Law

Samuel Joseph was convicted of drug and firearm offenses. He appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during two encounters with law enforcement. The first encounter occurred in Charleston, West Virginia, where an officer, after receiving a tip about possible drug activity, observed Joseph's suspicious behavior and items consistent with drug distribution in a motel room. Joseph was apprehended after fleeing from officers, and a search of his duffel bag, which he abandoned during the chase, revealed drugs and firearms.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Joseph's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the encounters. Joseph argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on their observations and Joseph's behavior, and that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Joseph based on their observations and his unprovoked flight. The court also found that the officers' actions following the stop, including the use of a drug-detection dog and obtaining a search warrant for the duffel bag, were permissible and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the court rejected Joseph's arguments regarding the lack of bodycam footage and the reliability of the initial tip, as well as his claim that the traffic stop in Parkersburg was impermissibly prolonged. The court concluded that the district court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and upheld the denial of the motion to suppress. View "United States v. Joseph" on Justia Law

Edwin Leo Brown was indicted in October 2016 on four counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The government had evidence of Brown selling cocaine base and discovered a firearm upon his arrest. Brown faced up to 90 years in prison. His attorney, Frank Harper, initially advised him that he was likely facing up to 120 months’ imprisonment and presented two plea agreements limiting his prison exposure to ten years. Brown, skeptical of Harper’s advice, did not trust him and Harper withdrew as counsel. Brett Wentz then became Brown’s attorney and erroneously advised him that his sentencing exposure would be the same whether he accepted a plea deal or not. Brown rejected the plea offers and later pleaded guilty to all counts, receiving a 210-month sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina found that Brown’s attorney performed deficiently but concluded that Brown failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice. The magistrate judge recommended denying Brown’s motion to vacate his sentence, stating that Brown presented no contemporaneous evidence to support his claim that he would have accepted the plea agreement if properly advised. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Brown’s motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that the district court erred in applying the standard from Lee v. United States, which concerns accepted plea deals, to Brown’s case involving a rejected plea deal. The Fourth Circuit held that Brown demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer if properly advised, given the significant disparity between the plea offer and the sentence he received. The court reversed the district court’s denial of relief, remanded the case, and required the government to re-offer Brown the same plea agreements. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

David Nutter was indicted in August 2021 for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals with convictions for misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Nutter had three prior convictions in Ohio for domestic violence and child endangerment. He acknowledged possessing firearms and did not dispute his prior convictions but moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(9) violated the Second Amendment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied Nutter's motion, applying the means-end analysis from District of Columbia v. Heller. Nutter entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion. After the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which rejected the means-end analysis, Nutter filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing that § 922(g)(9) was unconstitutional under the new framework. The district court again denied the motion, concluding that § 922(g)(9) was consistent with the Nation's history and tradition of disarming individuals deemed a threat to public safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that § 922(g)(9) is facially constitutional, finding that it fits within the historical tradition of disarming individuals who pose a credible threat to the physical safety of others. The court noted that the statute's purpose and method align with historical analogues, such as surety and going armed laws, which were designed to mitigate demonstrated threats of physical violence. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Nutter's motion to dismiss the indictment and upheld his conviction. View "United States v. Nutter" on Justia Law

Vincent Deritis was convicted by a jury of four offenses involving child sexual abuse material. Count One involved using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for producing a visual depiction, based on a video of his stepdaughter showering. Counts Two and Three involved similar charges based on photographs of his stepdaughter while she was sleeping. Count Four involved possession of child sexual abuse material. The district court sentenced him to 600 months of imprisonment and imposed a special assessment of $117,000.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Deritis's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his Google account, finding that the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court also denied his Rule 29 motion for acquittal on Counts One and Two, finding substantial evidence supported the convictions. Additionally, the court excluded exculpatory testimony from Deritis's ex-wife, which Deritis argued was impermissible hearsay. The district court instructed the jury on the definition of "lascivious exhibition" using the Dost factors, which Deritis challenged as erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, since the evidence was obtained from an independent source. The court found that the jury instruction on "lascivious exhibition" was proper and consistent with precedent. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the convictions on Counts One and Two. The exclusion of the exculpatory testimony was deemed harmless error. However, the court found that the district court plainly erred by imposing a special assessment without considering the mandatory statutory factors on the record.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions but vacated the special assessment and remanded for resentencing on that issue. View "U.S. v. Deritis" on Justia Law