Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a district court can reduce a sentence for both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they were sentenced as a package. The defendant, Nathaniel Richardson, was originally sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin and for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. After the passage of the First Step Act, Richardson sought a sentence reduction. The district court reduced the sentence for the crack cocaine distribution offense but left the sentence for the continuing criminal enterprise offense undisturbed.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court has the discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they function as a package. The court reasoned that since district judges often sentence on multiple counts as an interconnected process, they should be given the discretion to reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure it remains adequate to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors. The court further noted that the sentencing package doctrine is applicable here because when one count of a package is remanded, the district judge must be given the discretion to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan. The case was remanded for the district court to decide whether the counts functioned as a package, and if so, to resentence accordingly. View "United States v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Carlos Gomez-Ruotolo, a native citizen of Venezuela, was brought to the United States in 2001 and became a lawful permanent resident. He was convicted twice in Virginia for crimes involving minors: once for attempted sexual battery and another for electronic solicitation of a minor. Based on these convictions, he was found removable as a noncitizen convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude and was denied relief by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gomez-Ruotolo appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that his crimes were not morally turpitudinous and that he should receive protection against removal under the Convention Against Torture.The court disagreed. It held that attempted sexual battery and electronic solicitation of a minor both involved moral turpitude, thus making Gomez-Ruotolo deportable under immigration law. The court also affirmed the agency's decision to deny Gomez-Ruotolo protection under the Convention Against Torture, agreeing that he had not shown he was more likely than not to face torture in Venezuela. Therefore, the court denied Gomez-Ruotolo's petition for review. View "Gomez-Ruotolo v. Garland" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Anila Daulatzai, was removed from a Southwest Airlines flight after the captain received information about her dog allergy and the presence of two dogs on board. Daulatzai insisted on remaining in her seat despite the captain’s decision, leading to her physical removal by Maryland Transportation Authority police officers. She was later charged with various offenses, including disorderly conduct and resisting arrest.Daulatzai filed an action against Southwest Airlines and the State of Maryland, alleging various grounds to challenge her removal from the plane and her arrest. The district court dismissed Daulatzai’s complaint for failure to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. Daulatzai appealed that judgment and, while her appeal was pending, she also filed a motion in the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), seeking to file a fourth version of her complaint with the district court.The court denied her request, finding that her efforts were pursued in bad faith, that her repeated failures to cure defects in her pleadings had been prejudicial to the defendants, and that the fourth complaint would, in any event, be futile. Daulatzai appealed that ruling as well.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Daulatzai had failed to establish any of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Daulatzai leave to file her proposed third amended complaint. The court also found that Daulatzai had waived her challenge to the district court’s dismissal of her second amended complaint by failing to preserve it below. View "Daulatzai v. Maryland" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion, delivered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pertains to the appeals of defendants Richard Tipton and James Roane, Jr. Both were convicted in 1993 and sentenced to death and multiple years in prison for involvement in a drug-related enterprise that also included firearms, murders, and other racketeering activity. They have consistently sought post-conviction relief, and in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, they contested their sentences related to their firearm-related 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions in 1993.The court affirmed the district court's decisions, rejecting the defendants' challenges to their § 924(c) sentences. The court concluded that Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (VICAR) murder constitutes a "crime of violence" under § 924(c). The defendants failed to demonstrate that there was more than a reasonable possibility that the jury did not rely on the valid VICAR murder predicate for any of their § 924(c) convictions. Therefore, the validity of any other alleged § 924(c) predicate did not need to be decided. The court held that the defendants' § 924(c) convictions and sentences were legally sound. View "United States v. Tipton" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three South Carolina law enforcement officers who were found guilty of various abuses of power. The trio, Sheriff George Underwood, Chief Deputy Robert Sprouse, and Lieutenant Johnny Neal, were convicted on multiple counts, including financial corruption, civil rights violations, and conspiracy.Underwood used his position as sheriff to enrich himself through illegal means, including forcing deputies to perform work on his personal property while on public payroll. He also orchestrated a scheme with Neal to skim money from the extra compensation meant for deputies at drunk-driver checkpoints. Additionally, Underwood and Sprouse misused county money for personal travel expenses.The court also found that Underwood abused his authority by targeting enforcement against opponents and refusing to investigate offenses reported against friends and supporters. Notably, Underwood unlawfully arrested a citizen for recording a car accident scene, which led to a violation of the citizen's civil rights.After the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered the corruption, Sprouse and Neal conspired to lie and fabricate documents to cover up their misconduct. The jury convicted the defendants on various counts, and the appeals court affirmed those convictions. The court also ruled that the district court's calculation of restitution for the losses sustained was reasonable. View "United States v. Underwood" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) regarding whether a money laundering conspiracy conviction constitutes a "particularly serious crime" that would bar withholding of removal under immigration law.The petitioner, David Annor, a citizen of Ghana and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, had pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, related to a romance fraud scheme. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Annor, who sought withholding of removal and deferral under the Convention Against Torture. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and the BIA both determined that Annor's conviction constituted a "particularly serious crime", thus barring his eligibility for withholding of removal.Upon review, the Fourth Circuit found that the BIA had erred in two ways. Firstly, it had incorrectly applied its own precedent by analysing the elements of the wrong statute, instead of the correct one under which Annor was convicted. Secondly, it failed to consider whether the nature of Annor's offense indicated that he posed a danger to the community, a key factor in determining if a crime is "particularly serious".Consequently, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the BIA's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. View "Annor v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the defendant, Malek Lassiter, appealed his convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Lassiter argued that his convictions were erroneous due to a change in legal authority in the form of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor which altered the definition of a "crime of violence".Lassiter's convictions were based on attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity, arguing that this did not constitute a crime of violence in light of the Taylor decision. However, the court disagreed, distinguishing between the requirements for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which was the focus of the Taylor case, and murder, asserting that murder requires the use of force, therefore attempted murder necessarily requires the attempted use of force, fitting within the definition of a crime of violence.The court rejected Lassiter's arguments and affirmed his § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions. However, due to an inconsistency between the oral and written descriptions of one of Lassiter’s supervised-release conditions, the court vacated his sentence in its entirety and remanded the case for a full resentencing. View "US v. Lassiter" on Justia Law

In 2019, Michael Scott Hoover was arrested on multiple counts of indecent liberties with a minor. Subsequent investigations led to the discovery of videos and images of child pornography on his work-issued iPhone. The videos depicted two minors, both relatives of Hoover, engaging in explicit sexual conduct. Hoover was subsequently indicted on two counts of child pornography production and one count of possession of child pornography. Following a trial, Hoover was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 840 months' imprisonment. He appealed his conviction and sentence, raising several arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected all of Hoover's claims and affirmed his conviction and sentence. The court held that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings, denial of Hoover's Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, or in instructing the jury on the elements of child pornography production. The court also found that the district court did not err in sentencing Hoover to 840 months' imprisonment. The court found sufficient evidence supporting Hoover's child pornography production convictions, including the specific-intent and interstate-nexus elements of the offenses. The court also rejected Hoover's challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, finding that the district court had adequately explained its conclusion that the sentence was not unfairly harsh for Hoover. View "United States v. Hoover" on Justia Law

The appellant, Terry George, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. The government's key witness, Prince Frazier, had given inconsistent accounts of who was in the car at the time of the traffic stop leading to George's arrest. This inconsistency was not disclosed to George prior to trial. After being convicted, George sought to have his conviction vacated or a new trial ordered, arguing that the government's failure to disclose this inconsistent testimony violated his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, which requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to an accused. The district court denied George's motion, finding that the government's failure to disclose was not material to George's defense.George was also serving a term of supervised release as a result of a separate criminal conviction at the time of his felon in possession conviction. The district court revoked George's supervised release based on his new conviction.George appealed both decisions. Upon review, the court affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that while the government should have disclosed the inconsistent statement, it was not material to George's defense because George's conviction would stand independently of any question about Frazier's credibility. Furthermore, the court affirmed the revocation of George's supervised release, as it was based on a valid conviction. View "United States v. George" on Justia Law

The case involved Martin William Luther Hamilton, who pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The probation agent preparing Hamilton's presentence report determined that three of Hamilton’s prior North Carolina convictions qualified as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which mandates a minimum of fifteen years for defendants who have three prior convictions for offenses that qualify as a “violent felony or a serious drug offense.”Hamilton objected to the ACCA classification, disputing that the third conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon met the requirements of the ACCA. The district court followed a previous court's unpublished decision which held that a North Carolina conviction for attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the court concluded that Hamilton qualified as an armed career criminal and sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment.Hamilton appealed, challenging only the district court’s determination that the attempted robbery conviction was a predicate offense under the ACCA. In response, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding no error in the determination that Hamilton’s conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-87(a) qualifies as a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. View "US v. Hamilton" on Justia Law