Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, challenged the district court’s denial of his request for a preliminary injunction (the “Injunction Denial”). Petitioner sought— in connection with his petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2241 — to prevent the defendant government officials from carrying out his extradition to Lithuania. The district court denied Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief, deeming him unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his extradition to Lithuania would contravene the extradition treaty between that country and the United States. More specifically, Petitioner maintained that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request fails to comply with the treaty’s mandate that Lithuania produce what is called “the charging document” (the “charging document contention”). The Injunction Denial ruled, however, that the documents produced by Lithuania comply with the extradition treaty, and that Petitioner is therefore not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that it is satisfied that Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request does not satisfy the charging document mandate of the extradition treaty. The court wrote that Petitioner has demonstrated that Lithuania’s 2015 extradition request to return him to that country does not satisfy the Treaty’s requirements. And the public’s interest in the Secretary of State recognizing and fulfilling Treaty obligations outweighs any detrimental impact that the denial of an improper extradition request could have. View "Darius Vitkus v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

A South Carolina jury convicted Petitioner of voluntary manslaughter concerning the death of his girlfriend. Almost 20 years later—following three rounds of collateral litigation in state court and one 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 habeas petition in federal court—Petitioner sought permission to file a second Section 2254 petition. In that application, Petitioner claims he now remembers that his girlfriend died by suicide. According to Petitioner, his memory was repressed at the time of his trial and his regained memory satisfies the rigorous newly discovered evidence requirements of 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b)(2)(B), allowing him to file a second habeas petition.     The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that one of those requirements is that Petitioner demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that no reasonable factfinder, considering his alleged regained memory with the rest of the evidence, would find Petitioner guilty of manslaughter. Because Petitioner failed to meet this burden, the court denied his application to file a successive Section 2254 habeas petition View "In re: Weldon Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty without a plea agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At issue in this appeal is the district court’s application of two enhancements to Defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines offense level. First, the court applied a four-level enhancement for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense, specifically felony possession of drugs. Second, the court applied a six-level enhancement for the knowing creation of a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to a law enforcement officer.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the application of the six-level enhancement. As to the four-level enhancement, because the court made no findings connecting Defendant’s possession of a firearm to his felony drug possession, the court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded for resentencing. The court reasoned that battery is a general intent crime that requires only the intentional performance of the unlawful act. With these principles in mind, the court concluded the evidence on this record establishes that Defendant’s conduct encompassed the requisite intent to satisfy Section 3A1.2(c)(1)’s assault requirement where Defendant did not simply throw one reflexive punch at Jones but threw repeated punches to his head and arms. Further, the court explained that without deciding whether the application of Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is supported under the facts of the present case, the court restated that the district court must first evaluate whether evidence exists to support a finding that Defendant’s possession of the gun facilitated or had the potential to facilitate his possession of drugs. View "US v. Patrick Mitchell" on Justia Law

On July 30, 2014, a jury convicted Defendant on seven counts, including two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c). At the time of Defendant’s sentencing, his two Section 924(c) convictions carried a five- and twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence, respectively. The district court thus sentenced Defendant to thirty years in prison for his Section 924(c) convictions and, together with his other five convictions, to fifty-seven years’ imprisonment total. In July 2020, Defendant moved for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant primarily argued that his release was warranted because he was at risk of serious illness from COVID-19 and because, under the First Step Act’s amendment to Section 924(c) sentencing, he would only be subject to a combined ten-year mandatory minimum for his two Section 924(c) convictions if sentenced today. The district court twice denied Defendant’s motion, each time without addressing the disparity between his Section 924(c) sentence and the much shorter mandatory minimums the First Step Act now prescribes.   The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion because his disparate sentence creates an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for his early release, and the Section 3553(a) sentencing factors overwhelmingly favor a sentence reduction. The court explained that because Defendant was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence that is twenty years longer than it would be if he were sentenced today for the same conduct, a sentence reduction is necessary to mitigate the gross disparity between Brown and similarly situated defendants. View "US v. Kelvin Brown" on Justia Law

In November 2003, Petitioner shot and killed his estranged wife in the front seat of her car while their four-year-old son sat in the back. As part of the same incident, Petitioner also shot and killed his wife’s boyfriend. Petitioner was charged with capital murder, among other charges. The trial court rejected Petitioner’s insanity defense but cited his “severe mental illness” as a mitigating factor in declining to impose the death penalty. Petitioner subsequently attempted to collaterally attack his 2007 convictions and sentence in state court. After his state habeas petitions were dismissed, Petitioner sought habeas relief in federal court. The district court dismissed Petitioner’s 2013 federal habeas petition as untimely. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the petition’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the ground that his “multiple mental health disabilities . . . had prevented him from effectively petitioning the court for habeas relief.” The district court dismissed Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion, and this appeal followed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion and remand the case to the district court. The court reaffirmed that Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion was timely filed and found that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on whether his mental illness during the relevant period entitled him to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and equitable tolling of the statute of limitations governing his habeas petition. The court explained that Petitioner suffers from a serious mental illness. He has sufficiently alleged and provided evidence supporting the severity and continuing nature of his mental illness to at least justify an inquiry into whether and for how long his illness may have prevented him from filing his habeas petition. View "Berman Justus, Jr. v. Harold Clarke" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted—and issued three concurrent life sentences—for conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death and aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and one count of aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant’s third conviction. Defendant now appealed the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. Section 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. He argued that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that because aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under Section 924(c)(3)(A), Defendant’s 924(j) conviction must stand. The court wrote that that predicate, alone, is sufficient to support his Section 924(j) conviction. Moreover, the court concluded that post-Davis and Taylor, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a crime of violence under either Sections 924(c)(3)(A)’s force or elements clause. Due to this, the court wrote, it need not reach the validity of Defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death predicate, and the court held that his Section 924(j) conviction stands irrespective of the ambiguity in the general verdict form. View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for hire resulting in death, aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death, and aiding and abetting murder with a firearm in relation to a crime of violence. The first two convictions served as the predicate offenses for Defendant's third conviction.Defendant filed a motion to vacate, arguing that following the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), and United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), his predicate offenses no longer qualify as crimes of violence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that aiding and abetting carjacking resulting in death remains a valid predicate offense under 18 USC 924(c)(3)(A). View "US v. Michael Draven" on Justia Law

Defendant robbed the CresCom Bank in Conway, South Carolina. During the robbery, Council fatally shot the bank teller and the bank manager. Defendant was convicted of (1) bank robbery resulting in death (Count One); and (2) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in a manner causing death (Count Two). The government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The jury found Defendant guilty on both charges. The jury unanimously recommended a sentence of death on each count. On appeal, Defendant raised four challenges to the district court’s handling of the guilt phase.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. First, the court held that the district court fulfilled its obligations under Sections 4241 and 4247. The court raised the issue of competency on its own initiative several times, including before and during a pretrial conference held roughly a year and a half before trial. Further, the court explained that Defendant’s arguments about his need for more time and the preferability of alternatives to denying his motion outright asked the court to second-guess the district court’s case-specific judgments in “areas where the district court’s comparative expertise is at its zenith and ours its nadir.” Thus, the court held district court made no reversible error in denying Defendant’s fifth continuance motion. Finally, the court explained that B at least one of Defendant’s current arguments—that the Federal Death Penalty Act makes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority by incorporating state law execution practices—was plainly available when Defendant filed his first Rule 33 motion. View "US v. Brandon Council" on Justia Law

Defendant is fifteen years into his twenty-year prison sentence for conspiring to distribute crack cocaine. A few years after he was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity. If sentenced today, Smith’s mandatory minimum would be half his current sentence. Under the retroactivity provisions of the First Step Act, Defendant moved for a sentence reduction to time served. The district court denied his motion, determining that twenty years remained appropriate. Defendant appealed, claiming among other things that the district court miscalculated his Guidelines range and that our recent decision in United States v. Swain, 49 F.4th 398 (4th Cir. 2022), reveals substantive errors in the district court’s analysis.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that “The Fair Sentencing Act and First Step Act, together, are strong remedial statutes, meant to rectify disproportionate and racially disparate sentencing penalties.” The district court considered these remedial aims, as well as all other nonfrivolous arguments, before exercising its broad discretion to deny sentencing relief. Further, while the court recognized the disparity between Defendant’s new Guidelines range and his current sentence, the district court properly explained why it remained substantively reasonable. View "US v. Danny Smith" on Justia Law

Brothers pleaded guilty to conspiring to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act. The district court ordered the forfeiture of various real properties and financial accounts linked to the RICO conspiracy. Several third parties came forward to claim an interest in one or more of the forfeited assets, including the brothers’ sister, Ilana Bangiyeva (“Bangiyeva”), and one brother’s wife, Irina Alishayeva (“Alishayeva”). The court rejected most of Bangiyeva’s claimed ownership interests. As to Alishayeva the court granted a life estate in and the exclusive use of one of the properties after finding that she owned a one-third interest in that property as a tenant in common with the Government, which owned the remaining two-thirds interest. Bangiyeva appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the final order of forfeiture in that respect. Additionally, the Government cross-appealed, asserting that the district court erred as a matter of law in granting Alishayeva a life estate in the relevant property at the expense of the Government’s majority ownership interest. The court agreed with the Government and vacated that part of the final order of forfeiture and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that in granting Alishayeva full and exclusive use of the 110-37 69th Ave. property for the remainder of her life and marriage, the district court accorded the Government less than the full bundle of property rights that it would otherwise be entitled to as a tenant in common under New York state law. The district court was without legal authority to do so. View "US v. Ilana Bangiyeva" on Justia Law