Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Adonis Perry, was arrested in 2017 for possessing a firearm as a felon and for possessing marijuana after he was found with both during a traffic stop. While awaiting trial, Perry repeatedly tried to convince his girlfriend, a key witness for the government, to refuse to cooperate, leading to four witness-tampering and obstruction-of-justice charges. Perry was found guilty on all counts and was sentenced to 210 months and three years of supervised release. Perry appealed his conviction and sentence on several grounds, including that his Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights were violated, and that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. They found that Perry was not unconstitutionally seized during the traffic stop, his girlfriend had authority to consent to the search of his phone, the charges against him should not have been dismissed due to the failure to preserve dashcam footage, the evidence supporting his convictions was sufficient, his convictions did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy, his counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, and his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "US v. Perry" on Justia Law

The case involves Joel Smithers, who was a doctor of osteopathy and was convicted on 861 counts associated with his opioid prescription practices. He was sentenced to a total of 480 months in prison. Smithers was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance without authorization. Authorization is defined by Drug Enforcement Agency regulations as a prescription issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice. Following his conviction, the Supreme Court in Ruan v. United States clarified the mens rea required to convict someone of unauthorized dispensing or distributing of a controlled substance. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that, in light of the Ruan decision, Smithers' jury instructions were incorrect, and the errors were not harmless. Therefore, the court vacated the convictions and remanded the case to the district court for a new trial. View "United States v. Joel Smithers" on Justia Law

In South Carolina, the defendant Darrius Andrez King pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon after firing a handgun in the air outside a crowded nightclub. During the plea colloquy, the district court did not inform King about the significance of supervised release—that if he violated it, he could face additional prison time exceeding the statutory maximum period for the underlying offense. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 does require the district court to inform defendants who intend to plead guilty about the effect of supervised release. However, the court decided not to vacate King’s plea, concluding that the omission did not affect his substantial rights. The court reasoned that there was no indication that King would have tried to withdraw his plea if he had been correctly informed about the potential consequences of violating supervised release, especially given the strength of the case against him. The court therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "US v. King" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Curtis Davis, had been arrested and charged with drug and firearm offenses after law enforcement officers executing a search warrant observed him attempting to place baggies of controlled substances into an air vent. More baggies of controlled substances, firearms, cash, cell phones, and additional controlled substances were found in the residence. The district court denied Davis's motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause.On appeal, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision. The court found that the search warrant was valid at least as to evidence of firearms offenses. The controlled substances found on Davis's person and in his bedroom were lawfully seized either incident to Davis's arrest or because they were in plain view of the officers conducting the search. Furthermore, Davis's cell phone was lawfully seized as an instrumentality of drug trafficking found in plain view. The court emphasized that for a cell phone to be seized in plain view, the "additional evidence or indicators" of criminality have significant work to do to establish probable cause. In this case, Davis's phone was found in the residence along with substantial quantities of controlled substances that were packaged for distribution, cash, firearms, and ammunition, all found on Davis's person or in his bedroom. This evidence provided law enforcement with sufficient probable cause to seize Davis's cell phone. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "US v. Curtis Davis" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hart was convicted of drug dealing, sex trafficking, and witness tampering. He appealed his convictions, arguing that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act by failing to indict him for the witness tampering charge within thirty days of his arrest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act on the witness tampering conviction, but rejected his evidentiary challenges.The court held that the government failed to indict Hart for witness tampering within the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day window. So it vacated only Hart’s witness-tampering conviction and remanded the case for resentencing on the four counts added by the superseding indictment. Hart also contended that the district court erred by allowing certain prejudicial evidence at trial, but the court disagreed and affirmed the district court’s rulings on these evidentiary challenges. View "US v. Hart" on Justia Law

In this case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Trezith Rashad Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions. He argued that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court erred in not granting his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops.Smart was initially stopped for speeding in Louisiana in 2017. During this stop, a drug-sniffing dog was deployed and alerted officers to the presence of cocaine in Smart's car. Smart was later linked to a drug dealing operation in Virginia and further evidence of drug trafficking was gathered during a second stop in 2018. He was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine.On appeal, the court rejected Smart's arguments. It held that there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, noting that delays in the proceedings, including changes of counsel and the complexity of the case, were justified and fell within the exceptions provided in the Act. It also held that both traffic stops were constitutional. Specifically, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend the first traffic stop and deploy a drug-sniffing dog based on Smart's extreme nervousness, inconsistent answers about his travel plans, and the presence of a gas can in his car, which the officer, based on experience, associated with drug trafficking. Consequently, the court affirmed Smart's conviction. View "United States v. Smart" on Justia Law

In the case brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Reshod Jamar Everett, appealed his multiple convictions and sentences for six drug distribution and firearms offenses. The charges arose from his involvement in extensive criminal activities related to drugs and firearms in Cumberland County, North Carolina. Everett unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence seized from his residence, claiming that the authorities violated the "protective sweep" exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant mandate. He was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 480 months in prison, plus supervised release.On appeal, Everett challenged the denial of his suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of his convictions, and his 480-month prison sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected each of Everett's contentions and affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the protective sweep of Everett's residence was justified due to the circumstances, including the fact that Everett was a substantial drug dealer with a known connection to firearms. The Court also held that there was substantial evidence to support Everett's convictions, even under a plain error review. Finally, it concluded that Everett's 480-month sentence was not substantively unreasonable, given the seriousness of his offenses, his conduct between the time of the offenses and sentencing, and the need to deter similar conduct in the future. View "United States v. Everett" on Justia Law

In this case, defendant Theodore Carrington appealed from the district court's order finding him "subject to the [civil-commitment] provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246," as well as alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Carrington's claims on the merits. The district court's order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable collateral order.Carrington had been indicted for transmitting a threatening communication in interstate commerce. His erratic behavior during his detention and arraignment hearing led to a motion for a competency evaluation under § 4241(a) and (b), which concluded that Carrington was mentally incompetent to stand trial. He was subsequently committed to the custody of the Attorney General for hospitalization and treatment under § 4241(d)(1), with the intention to restore his competency for trial. Months later, the government filed a certificate for civil commitment under § 4246 in a different district court.Carrington argued that the delay in his evaluation process rendered the district court's order invalid and that this rendered him no longer in the Attorney General’s legitimate custody when the court made its finding. However, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear these claims, as the district court's order was not a final judgment nor an appealable collateral order. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court's finding that Carrington was "subject to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4246" had no legal effect on Carrington's continued custody or eventual civil commitment, and therefore was not an appealable collateral order. As such, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Carrington" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, Trezith Smart, appealed his drug-trafficking convictions, arguing that his prosecution violated the Speedy Trial Act and that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence from two traffic stops. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Smart's arguments, affirming his conviction.With respect to the Speedy Trial Act claim, the court determined that sufficient time was excluded under the Act's provisions to reduce the number of days between Smart's initial appearance and his arraignment on the superseding indictment to 70. Specifically, the court pointed to the delay caused by a continuance granted when Smart's attorney withdrew due to a conflict of interest. The court found that the continuance served the "ends of justice" and the court had set forth its reasoning on record, thereby meeting the requirements of the Act.Regarding the motion to suppress evidence from the two traffic stops, the court held that both stops were constitutional. The court found that the officer who conducted the first stop had a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying the extension of the stop and the deployment of a drug-sniffing dog. The court also found that the second stop was justified by the suspicious movements of Smart, including his handling of a trash bag that was later found to contain cocaine residue.The court thus affirmed Smart's drug-trafficking convictions. View "United States v. Smart" on Justia Law

In this case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, defendant Martrey Antwain Newby, who was initially sentenced for six non-violent drug crimes, appealed his sentence modification under the First Step Act of 2018. The district court had included discretionary conditions of supervised release in its written judgment that were not orally announced during the sentencing hearing, which was considered to be an error according to a precedent set by United States v. Rogers (2020). The main issue in this appeal was that the court during Newby's resentencing under the First Step Act, carried forward the same conditions of supervised release that were not orally announced in the initial sentencing hearing.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court could not have imposed any new discretionary conditions of supervised release in Newby’s First Step Act proceeding, as the only type of modified sentence authorized by the First Step Act is a reduced one. The court also noted that Newby's conditions of supervised release which were never announced in his presence and were part of his written judgment, were nullities according to the Rogers precedent. The court argued that because these conditions were never imposed, they could not be carried forward in the district court's amended judgment.The Fourth Circuit ultimately vacated the amended judgment and remanded for resentencing, upholding the principle that discretionary conditions of supervised release must be orally announced during the sentencing hearing. This decision may be specific to the unique circumstances of this case and may not necessarily apply to all cases involving the First Step Act or conditions of supervised release. View "US v. Newby" on Justia Law