Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Education Law
E.R. v. Beaufort County School District
E.R., the appellant, filed a complaint against the Beaufort County School District, alleging that the district failed to respond appropriately to her reports of sexual abuse and harassment while she was a student. E.R. claimed she was sexually assaulted by three male students and subsequently bullied and harassed by other students. Despite reporting these incidents to school officials, she alleged that no appropriate action was taken.The case was initially filed in South Carolina state court, asserting claims under Title IX and state law for negligence and gross negligence. The school district removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss it, arguing that the claims were untimely under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), which has a two-year statute of limitations. The district court agreed, applying the SCTCA's statute of limitations to both the Title IX and state law claims, and dismissed the case as it was filed more than two years after E.R. turned 18.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the appropriate statute of limitations for Title IX claims is the state's general personal injury statute of limitations, not the SCTCA's two-year period. The court reasoned that Title IX claims should borrow the statute of limitations from the most analogous state law cause of action, which in this case is the general personal injury statute. Since South Carolina's general personal injury statute of limitations is three years, E.R.'s claims were timely.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of E.R.'s complaint and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "E.R. v. Beaufort County School District" on Justia Law
Chollet v. Brabrand
The plaintiffs in this case are parents of children with special needs attending public schools in Fairfax County, Virginia. They allege that the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an unconstitutional "taking" of their children's Fifth Amendment property interest in public education. The plaintiffs argue that Virginia law establishes a fundamental right to public education, which they claim is a protected property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and, by extension, should be considered private property under the Takings Clause.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court reasoned that while the right to public education in Virginia may be a protected property interest under the Due Process Clause, it does not necessarily qualify as private property under the Takings Clause. The court noted that federal courts have long interpreted property interests protected by the Takings Clause as narrower than those protected by the Due Process Clause. The district court concluded that the right to public education is subject to regulation and revision by the Virginia government and cannot be bought or sold, distinguishing it from private property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs' children may have a property interest in public education under the Due Process Clause but held that this does not extend to the Takings Clause. The court emphasized that the Takings Clause applies only to private property and that public education, being subject to government regulation and not possessing the characteristics of private property, does not qualify. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim for compensation under the Takings Clause. View "Chollet v. Brabrand" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Education Law
Doe v. The University of North Carolina System
Jacob Doe, a student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH), was found responsible for two allegations of sexual misconduct and subsequently expelled from the university system. Doe sued the university and several employees, claiming violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, Title IX, and various state laws. The district court largely denied the defendants' motions to dismiss, allowing Doe’s federal and most state law claims to proceed.The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court found that the district court erred in rejecting the defendants' claims of sovereign and qualified immunity. The court held that the UNC institutions were entitled to sovereign immunity, reversing the district court’s decision to allow Doe’s claims against them. Additionally, the court determined that the individual university employees were entitled to qualified immunity regarding Doe’s due process claims for damages, as the right to cross-examination in university disciplinary proceedings was not clearly established at the time.However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow Doe to seek prospective injunctive relief for the alleged due process violations. The court recognized that Doe had adequately alleged a liberty interest due to the permanent expulsion and the ongoing harm from the erroneous disciplinary record. The court declined to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss Doe’s Title IX claim against UNC-CH, dismissing that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the district court’s rulings, allowing Doe’s claims for prospective injunctive relief to proceed while dismissing his claims for damages against the UNC institutions and individual employees. View "Doe v. The University of North Carolina System" on Justia Law
John Doe 2 v. North Carolina State University
John Doe 2, a student athlete at North Carolina State University, alleged that he was sexually abused by Robert Murphy, the university’s Director of Sports Medicine, under the guise of medical treatment. Doe claimed that the university was deliberately indifferent to prior complaints of Murphy’s sexual misconduct. The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, finding that he failed to plead facts supporting an inference that the university had actual notice of Murphy’s sexual harassment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court concluded that a report of “sexual grooming” could not provide actual notice to the university of sexual harassment. The district court assumed without deciding that the report was made to an official with the requisite authority for Title IX purposes but found that the report did not describe an incident of sexual harassment and thus could not support a plausible inference of actual notice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s judgment. The Fourth Circuit held that a report of “sexual grooming” can objectively be construed as alleging sexual harassment, thus providing actual notice to the university. The court found that the district court erred in its conclusion and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the report was made to an appropriate official with the authority to address complaints of sexual harassment and to institute corrective measures on behalf of the university. View "John Doe 2 v. North Carolina State University" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Education Law
Ricketts v. Wake County Public School System
Davina Ricketts, a sophomore at a high school in North Carolina, decided to run for student council to address its lack of diversity. She faced racial harassment and cyberbullying from peers, and the school district allegedly failed to intervene. Ricketts filed a lawsuit claiming the school district was deliberately indifferent to her harassment. The district court dismissed her complaint and denied her motion to amend, stating her proposed amended complaint also failed to state a claim. Ricketts appealed the denial of her motion for leave to amend.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially dismissed Ricketts' complaint and denied her motion to amend on futility grounds. The court reasoned that her proposed amended complaint did not sufficiently state claims for deliberate indifference, retaliation, or equal protection violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Ricketts sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference, retaliation, and equal protection claims. The court held that Ricketts' allegations of racial harassment, the school administrators' authority and actual knowledge of the harassment, and their deliberate indifference were sufficient to state a Title VI claim. The court also found that Ricketts sufficiently alleged retaliation by showing she engaged in protected activity, faced materially adverse actions, and established a causal connection between the two. Additionally, the court held that Ricketts sufficiently alleged an equal protection claim against individual defendants and the Board of Education by showing discriminatory intent and a municipal custom or policy of indifference.The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, directed the district court to allow Ricketts to amend her complaint, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Ricketts v. Wake County Public School System" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights, Education Law
R.A. v. McClenahan
R.A. filed a lawsuit against her son G.A.'s special education teacher, Robin Johnson, and several school officials, alleging that Johnson mistreated G.A. during the first and second grades. The complaint claimed that Johnson subjected G.A. to physical and emotional abuse and that the school officials negligently failed to intervene despite knowing about the abuse. The school officials moved to dismiss the negligence claims, arguing they were protected by public official immunity. The district court denied the motion, and the school officials filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina initially denied the school officials' motion to dismiss the state law claims, leading to an appeal. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals previously ruled that the school officials were entitled to public official immunity and that the state law claims against them should be dismissed. Despite this, the district court allowed R.A. to file an amended complaint with additional details from new evidence, which the school officials again moved to dismiss. The district court denied this motion, interpreting the appellate mandate as allowing dismissal without prejudice.The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case again and held that the district court violated the mandate rule by not dismissing the claims with prejudice as instructed. The appellate court emphasized that its prior decision required dismissal with prejudice and that the district court's interpretation was incorrect. The court reiterated that the mandate rule requires lower courts to follow the appellate court's instructions precisely and that no exceptions to the mandate rule applied in this case. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, reaffirming that the state law claims against the school officials must be dismissed with prejudice. View "R.A. v. McClenahan" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Education Law
G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha
Two students receiving special education services filed a class action lawsuit against the Kanawha County Board of Education, alleging that the Board denied them and other similarly situated students a free appropriate public education (FAPE) as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The lawsuit also claimed violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The district court certified a class of all Kanawha County Schools students with disabilities who need behavior supports and have experienced disciplinary removals from any classroom.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, reasoning that the plaintiffs had presented expert evidence of disproportionate rates of suspension for students with disabilities and a detailed qualitative analysis of student records. The court found that these factors revealed a cohesive pattern indicating the absence of an effective system for developing and implementing behavioral supports for students with disabilities. The Board appealed, arguing that the certification of the plaintiff class was inconsistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit held that the certified class failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. The court found that the plaintiffs did not identify a common contention central to the validity of all class members’ claims. The court noted that the claims were highly diverse and individualized, involving different practices at different stages of the special education process. The absence of a common contention foreclosed class treatment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "G.T. v. The Board of Education of the County of Kanawha" on Justia Law
G.M. v. Barnes
G.M., a second-grade student with dyslexia and ADHD, was deemed ineligible for special education by Howard County Public Schools (HCPS) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). His parents, disagreeing with this determination, pursued the IDEA’s dispute resolution process, which included a state administrative hearing. The administrative law judge (ALJ) sided with HCPS, leading G.M.’s parents to file a lawsuit in federal district court. The district court upheld the ALJ’s decision, prompting an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The ALJ conducted a six-day hearing, considering evidence from both sides. G.M.’s parents presented private evaluations indicating deficiencies in reading and writing, while HCPS provided assessments showing average performance. The ALJ found HCPS’s evidence more persuasive, concluding that G.M. did not exhibit a pattern of strengths and weaknesses necessary to qualify as having a specific learning disability (SLD) under the IDEA. The ALJ also determined that although G.M. had an other health impairment (OHI) due to ADHD, he did not need special education because he was performing adequately relative to grade-level standards.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the ALJ’s factual findings and credibility determinations were regularly made and thus entitled to deference. The court agreed that G.M. did not qualify as a “child with a disability” under the IDEA because he did not exhibit the necessary pattern of strengths and weaknesses in reading and writing, and his ADHD did not necessitate special education. The court also found that G.M. received a free appropriate public education (FAPE) without special education services, as he was achieving passing marks and advancing from grade to grade. Consequently, HCPS did not substantively violate the IDEA, and G.M. was not entitled to the requested relief. View "G.M. v. Barnes" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Education Law
Mahmoud v. McKnight
A group of parents in Montgomery County, Maryland, challenged the local school board's decision to include LGBTQ-inclusive books in the English Language Arts curriculum without providing parents notice or the option to opt their children out of exposure to these books. The parents, who held various religious beliefs, argued that the board's decision violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland denied the parents' motion for a preliminary injunction, which would have required the board to provide notice and an opt-out option. The parents appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the parents had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, a necessary requirement for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the court found that the parents had not provided sufficient evidence to show that the board's decision coerced them or their children to act or believe contrary to their religious faith. The court also found that the parents had not shown that their due process rights were likely to be violated. The court noted that the parents still had the right to instruct their children on their religious beliefs and to discuss the topics raised in the books with their children. View "Mahmoud v. McKnight" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Education Law
B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education
A West Virginia law, known as the "Save Women's Sports Act," stipulates that athletic teams or sports designated for females, women, or girls shall not be open to students of the male sex, with "male" defined as an individual whose biological sex determined at birth is male. The law was challenged by a 13-year-old transgender girl, B.P.J., who has been taking puberty-blocking medication and has publicly identified as a girl since the third grade. B.P.J. argued that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX by preventing her from participating in her school's cross country and track teams.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia initially granted a preliminary injunction, allowing B.P.J. to participate in her school's sports teams. However, upon review of cross-motions for summary judgment, the court reversed its decision, rejecting B.P.J.'s claims and ruling that the law was constitutional and did not violate Title IX.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the law could not lawfully be applied to prevent B.P.J. from participating in her school's sports teams. The court found that the law's sole purpose and effect were to prevent transgender girls from playing on girls' teams, which was not substantially related to an important government interest. The court also found that the law violated Title IX by treating B.P.J. worse than people to whom she was similarly situated, depriving her of any meaningful athletic opportunities, and doing so on the basis of sex. The court dismissed the cross-appeal, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for B.P.J. on her Title IX claims. View "B.P.J. v. West Virginia State Board of Education" on Justia Law