Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case involves the 68th Street Site Work Group (the "Group"), a collective of entities that had settled their liability for environmental cleanup costs with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Group sought to recoup some of these costs by filing a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several non-performing and non-settling entities, alleging that each defendant incurred arranger liability by arranging for the disposal of waste at the Superfund Alternative Site.The District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the claims against each of these defendants, concluding that the Group failed to allege that the defendants took intentional steps with the specific intent to dispose of hazardous waste and knew that the disposed-of waste was hazardous. The Group then sought to amend its complaint against seven of the defendants, but the district court denied the motion, standing by its prior interpretation of CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that under CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision, a defendant is liable whenever they intentionally arrange for the disposal of a substance and the substance is hazardous. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring the Group to allege that the defendants knew the disposed-of waste was hazardous. View "68th Street Site Work Group v. Alban Tractor Co., Incorporated" on Justia Law

The case involves four North Carolina-based citizen groups ("Petitioners") who petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to require testing of fifty-four Per- and Poly- Fluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) prevalent in their community. The EPA granted the petition, agreeing to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol. Petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA’s decision, contending it was in effect a denial of their petition.The district court dismissed Petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the EPA reasonably chose to grant Petitioners’ request to test the fifty-four PFAS as a category—PFAS generally—which the TSCA encourages the EPA to do. As to the EPA’s failure to adopt Petitioners’ specific testing program, the district court explained that Petitioners “have a right to petition [the] EPA to initiate proceedings for the issuance of rules and orders, but [they] do not have a right to compel the content of [the] EPA’s proceedings or to compel [the] EPA to issue a specific rule or order.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the EPA’s decision was a grant in fact. The court reasoned that the TSCA allows the EPA to group chemicals into scientifically appropriate categories for testing. The court also held that the TSCA does not give petitioners the unrestrained ability to force companies to conduct specific testing when the § 2603 requirements are met. The court concluded that by promptly commencing a proceeding for determining how to best test PFAS, the EPA gave Petitioners all that they were entitled to receive. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Regan" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a consent decree that was negotiated by the parties and previously approved by the district court. The decree prohibits the Receivership Estate of ERP Environmental Fund, Inc. from conducting surface coal mining at certain sites unless it is necessary for and incidental to reclamation of the site. The question presented is whether that prohibition also applies to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site—the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine in Lincoln County, West Virginia. The district court held that it did, stating that all third-party permit transferees are bound by the terms of the consent decree.The consent decree originated from a 2011 citizen suit under the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The plaintiffs alleged that now-defunct Patriot Coal Corporation and three of its subsidiaries violated federal environmental laws by discharging excessive amounts of selenium in connection with its surface mining operations. To resolve the litigation, the parties negotiated a consent decree, which the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia approved.In 2020, ERP ran out of money and ceased all operations. As a result, a West Virginia state court appointed Doss Special Receiver, LLC to administer ERP’s Receivership Estate. In 2022, the Receiver sought to finance its administration of the Receivership Estate by authorizing third parties to surface mine at a former Patriot Coal facility—the Buck Fork Surface Mine. The Conservation Groups intervened, arguing that such surface mining would violate Paragraph 63 of the Decree. The district court agreed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions. The court held that the district court's interpretation of the consent decree could not be squared with the plain text of the decree. The court found that the consent decree's prohibition on surface mining did not apply to a third-party permit transferee of a specific site. The court concluded that neither Paragraph 24 nor Paragraph 25 of the decree would bind a third-party permit transferee of the Chestnut Oak Surface Mine to Paragraph 63's prohibition on surface mining, a prohibition that expressly applies only to ERP and its Affiliated Companies. View "West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. ERP Environmental Fund, Inc" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied a motion filed by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to transfer a case brought by the state of West Virginia to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or to dismiss it due to improper venue. The case pertains to the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's State Implementation Plan (SIP), which the state had submitted as part of its obligation under the Clean Air Act to address the emission of gases contributing to the formation of ground-level ozone. The EPA had disapproved West Virginia's SIP because it found that the plan did not sufficiently reduce ozone-forming emissions that were adversely affecting air quality in downwind states. The Fourth Circuit court also granted the state of West Virginia's motion to stay the EPA's final action pending the outcome of its petition for review. The court's decision on venue was based on its interpretation of the Clean Air Act, which stipulates that the venue for review of EPA actions depends on whether the action is nationally applicable or locally or regionally applicable. The court concluded that the EPA's disapproval of West Virginia's SIP was based on circumstances particular to West Virginia and therefore was locally or regionally applicable. View "State of West Virginia v. EPA" on Justia Law

Fisheries Reform Group alleges that shrimp trawlers operating in North Carolina’s Pamlico Sound are violating the Clean Water Act by engaging in two types of unpermitted activity: throwing bycatch overboard and disturbing sediment with their trawl nets.   The Fourth circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Fisheries’ complaint. The court explained that though the Clean Water Act’s includes the term “biological materials” in its definition of “pollutant,” that is not clear authorization for the EPA to regulate bycatch under the Act. So Fisheries Reform Group’s first claim— that shrimpers are violating the Clean Water Act by discarding bycatch overboard without a Section 1342 permit—was properly dismissed. The court further explained that Fisheries’ second claim—that shrimpers are violating the Act by using trawl nets without a permit—fares no better. The shrimpers are not “dredging” the Pamlico Sound with their nets, so they cannot be discharging “dredged spoil.” And the dirt and sand that their nets kick up is not “added”—and thus not “discharged”—into the Sound. View "North Carolina Coastal Fisheries Reform Group v. Capt. Gaston LLC" on Justia Law

In passing the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (“WIIN Act”), Congress directed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design a fish-passage structure for the New Savannah Bluff Lock and Dam. The Corps settled on a design that would lower the pool of water by about three feet. The State of South Carolina and several of its agencies responded by suing the Corps and various federal officials. Their complaint alleged that the Corps’ design violated the WIIN Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, state law, a previous settlement agreement, and certain easements. The district court held that the Corps’ plan didn’t “maintain the pool” since it would lower it from its height on the date of the Act’s enactment. Corps argued that this reading ignores the clause “for water supply and recreational activities” and that a lowered pool that still fulfills these functions would comply with the Act.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for Plaintiffs on their WIIN Act claim and the resulting permanent injunction against the Corps. The court left it to the district court to decide whether the Corps’ chosen design can maintain the pool’s then-extant water-supply and recreational purposes. The court explained that it agreed with the Corps that pinning the required pool height to the “arbitrary and unknowable-to-Congress date that the President signed the legislation” leads to “absurd results.” Plaintiffs suggest that the statute only obligates the Corps to maintain the pool at its “normal operating range.” But neither the statute nor the district court’s order makes clear this permissible “range.” View "State of South Carolina v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Defendants Southern Coal Corporation and Premium Coal Company, Inc. (collectively, “Southern Coal”) asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse a district court’s order granting a motion to compel compliance with a consent decree (the “Decree”) to which they previously acquiesced. The Decree operated to resolve allegations of approximately 23,693 Clean Water Act violations, pre-litigation, levied against Southern Coal by Plaintiffs Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, and the United States of America (collectively, the “government”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court properly found the Decree’s plain language to mandate compliance with the Clean Water Act and derivative permitting obligations. The court explained that although the plain language of the Decree clearly supports the district court’s conclusion that Southern Coal was obligated to maintain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits—and that alone is sufficient basis to affirm—the court may also consider the circumstances surrounding the Decree and the general nature of the remedy agreed upon. Here, the underlying dispute revolved around tens of thousands of NPDES-permitting and CWA violations. It cannot reasonably be argued that, in formulating the Decree, the parties contemplated undermining its efficacy by authorizing the exact conduct that it sought to remedy. If Southern Coal intended such a backdoor to compliance, then it likely did not negotiate the Decree in “good faith” to forge an agreement that was “fair, reasonable, and in the public interest,” as it purported to do as a Decree signatory. View "US v. Southern Coal Corporation" on Justia Law

This appeal is the latest installment in a series of challenges to Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC’s (“MVP”) plans to build a natural gas pipeline. Because it intends to construct a portion of the pipeline in West Virginia, MVP obtained a Clean Water Act (“CWA”) certification from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”). The certification reflected the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s activities during the pipeline’s construction would not violate the state’s water quality standards. Disagreeing with that determination, landowners and members of various environmental organizations in the state (collectively, “Petitioners”) petitioned for review of the Department’s certification.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the certification, finding the Department’s justifications for its conclusions deficient. The court found that the Department’s reasonable assurance determination suffers from four interrelated failures: It did not (1) sufficiently address MVP’s violation history, (2) include conditions requiring compliance with the O&G CGP and SWPPP, (3) provide a reasoned basis for relying on EPA’s upland CGP, or (4) articulate an adequate explanation for forgoing location-specific antidegradation review. Considering these oversights, the Department’s conclusion that MVP’s in-stream construction would be conducted in a manner that will not violate state water standards were arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. West Virginia DEP" on Justia Law

Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC (‘‘MVP’’) submitted an application requesting both a Virginia Water Protection individual permit (“VWP Permit”) from Virginia’s Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”) and the State Water Control Board (the “Board”) (collectively, “the Agencies”) and a certification from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to build a pipeline. After an extensive review of MVP’s application, the Board adopted DEQ’s recommendation to approve MVP’s application. Petitioners filed this action against the Agencies and several individuals associated with the Agencies (collectively, “Respondents”), asking the court to review the Agencies’ decision.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review, concluding that Agencies’ decision to grant MVP’s application was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court explained that Petitioners’ argument that the Agencies failed to consider whether the Pipeline will comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard is belied by the record. DEQ addressed this issue in its responses to the public comments, in which it listed a host of conditions that it placed on the VWP Permit to “ensure that Virginia’s water quality is protected both during and after construction.” The court further explained that the DEQ described the indicators it uses to measure water quality, which Petitioners have not challenged. Accordingly, the court found it is clear from the record that DEQ considered a variety of factors in determining that the construction and operation of the Pipeline would comply with Virginia’s narrative water quality standard. View "Sierra Club v. State Water Control Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs—North Carolina Wildlife Federation and No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens and Visitors Opposed to The Mid-Currituck Bridge (a community organization) sued the North Carolina Department of Transportation and the Federal Highway Administration (together, “the agencies”) —asserting that the agencies violated the National  Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in approving a bridge project. Specifically, the NEPA provides that for an action “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” the Act requires an agency to prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs fault the agencies for glossing over the environmental impact of the extra 2,400 units that would be constructed under the bridge scenario. They claim that the EIS “made no attempt to evaluate the effect of the Toll Bridge’s additional development on the habitat, wildlife, and natural resources of the Outer Banks.” But the EIS does adequately account for this added development. The EIS noted that a bridge would likely lead to an increase in day visitors, which could lead to more beach driving. More beach driving may “increase the likelihood of collisions” with wild horses on the beaches, but would have “no effect on threatened and endangered species. The agencies also found no “appreciable improvement” in water quality under the no-build and existing roads scenarios. The agencies’ no-build baseline properly reflected the lower level of development that would result without the toll bridge. The agencies didn’t mislead the public about this fact. In sum, the agencies’ consideration of the no-build alternative did not violate the Act. View "No Mid-Currituck Bridge-Concerned Citizens v. North Carolina Department of Transportation" on Justia Law