Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A transmission development company sought to build a high-voltage transmission line across three Maryland counties to address a regional electricity shortage. After receiving federal approval, the company was required to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) from Maryland's Public Service Commission (PSC) before construction. As part of the CPCN application, environmental and socioeconomic field studies needed to be conducted on properties along the proposed route. The property owners refused access for these surveys, prompting the developer to submit desktop studies instead, which the PSC's Power Plant Research Program (PPRP) found inadequate, deeming the application incomplete. The developer then sought an injunction to enter the properties for the necessary field studies.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the developer's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the developer was likely to succeed on the merits under Maryland law, particularly Section 12-111(a) of the Real Property Article, which allows entities with eminent domain powers to access private land for surveys. The court determined that the developer had a viable claim to such power for the purposes of conducting the surveys, even though it could not condemn property until it obtained a CPCN. The court also found irreparable harm due to lost revenues from project delays, that the balance of equities favored the developer, and the public interest supported the injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision under an abuse of discretion standard. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the developer likely possessed the statutory right of access to conduct surveys prior to obtaining a CPCN, and that all four Winter factors for injunctive relief were satisfied. View "PSEG Renewable Transmission LLC v. Arentz Family, LP" on Justia Law

A Georgia limited liability company purchased property in Greensboro, North Carolina, next to a gas station and convenience store owned by the defendants. After environmental testing revealed hazardous chemicals in the soil and groundwater on the company’s property, the company installed a vapor barrier and sought to recover the associated costs from the gas station owner and its members under both CERCLA and North Carolina law. The evidence showed that both properties had a long history of commercial and automotive use, with various underground storage tanks having been installed, removed, or closed in place over several decades. Notably, a waste-oil tank installed in the 1950s was closed in 1996 after evidence of petroleum and other contaminants was found in the soil.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence that the contamination on its property was caused by releases from the defendants’ property, and that any released substances were covered by CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s later declaration referencing chromium contamination, finding it was untimely new opinion testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA covers unadulterated petroleum and its fractions, but not petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances not normally found in such products. The appellate court found that evidence regarding the leaking waste-oil tank raised a factual question as to whether a contaminant outside the petroleum exclusion was released. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and the exclusion of certain evidence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments.After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards.Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

The case centers on the operations of a chemical manufacturing facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia, owned by The Chemours Company. Chemours used hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA), a member of the PFAS class of chemicals, as a processing aid in polymer production. The company discharged wastewater containing HFPO-DA into the Ohio River under a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit that established specific effluent limits. However, from 2022 onward, Chemours exceeded these limits on multiple occasions. Local water testing showed that HFPO-DA concentrations sometimes surpassed newer, not-yet-enforceable federal health standards but did not exceed West Virginia’s own goals. Chemours entered into an administrative consent order with the EPA to address permit compliance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed a citizen suit brought by West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc., seeking a preliminary injunction against Chemours for ongoing permit violations. The district court found that the Coalition had Article III associational standing through a member who avoided boating in the Ohio River due to Chemours’ discharges. The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Chemours from exceeding permit limits and requiring remedial measures. Chemours appealed, challenging both the standing determination and the irreparable harm finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both issues. The court agreed that the Coalition had established a substantial likelihood of standing at this stage. However, it found that the district court committed legal errors in its irreparable harm analysis, including incorrectly presuming harm from permit violations and conflating harm to the public with harm to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit also found clear error in the factual findings regarding irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. View "West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC" on Justia Law

Several individuals whose livelihoods depended on interacting with spinner dolphins challenged a federal regulation that restricted human proximity to these dolphins. The regulation, known as the Approach Rule, was issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service under the authority of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. The plaintiffs included a psychotherapist who used dolphin encounters in therapy, a boat captain who operated dolphin swim tours, and a dolphin guide and photographer. They argued that the regulation was unconstitutional because it was signed and promulgated by an official who, they claimed, was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland reviewed the case after the plaintiffs filed suit seeking to invalidate the regulation and enjoin its enforcement. During the litigation, Dr. Richard Spinrad, the Senate-confirmed NOAA Administrator and a principal officer, ratified the regulation, affirming that he independently evaluated and approved it. The district court found that this ratification cured any potential Appointments Clause defect and granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, under established principles of agency law, a principal officer’s ratification of a regulation can cure any constitutional defect arising from its initial promulgation by a non-principal officer. The court found that Dr. Spinrad’s ratification was valid and not impermissibly retroactive, as it did not impose new liabilities for past conduct but merely confirmed the regulation’s validity from the time of its original publication. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the suit. View "Wille v. Lutnik" on Justia Law

The case involves two companies, Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. (Skyline) and Television Tower, Inc. (TTI), which were sued by a group of plaintiffs for allegedly causing lead paint contamination in a Baltimore neighborhood. TTI owns a TV tower that was coated with lead-based paint, and Skyline was contracted to clean the tower using hydroblasting, a process that dislodged and dispersed the lead paint. The plaintiffs, who own property within a 4000-foot radius of the tower, claimed that the hydroblasting caused lead paint chips and dust to spread throughout their community, posing health risks and reducing property values.The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in Maryland state court, asserting claims for negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, and strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity. The defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court, invoking CAFA’s local-controversy exception. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted the motion to remand, finding that the local-controversy exception applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court first determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, despite the defendants also filing petitions for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The court dismissed the § 1453 petitions as unnecessary. On the merits, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the local-controversy exception to CAFA applied. The court found that more than two-thirds of the proposed class members were Maryland citizens, and that TTI, a Maryland citizen, was a significant defendant from whom significant relief was sought and whose conduct formed a significant basis for the claims. View "Skyline Tower Painting, Inc. v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

Maryland and South Carolina filed lawsuits in state courts against 3M Company and other chemical manufacturers, alleging contamination of their waterways with per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). The states filed separate complaints for PFAS contamination from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF) and non-AFFF products, explicitly disclaiming any connection between the two in their non-AFFF complaints.In the District of Maryland, 3M removed Maryland's non-AFFF complaint to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, arguing that PFAS from its Military AFFF production was indistinguishably commingled with PFAS from its non-AFFF products. The district court remanded the case, giving dispositive effect to Maryland's disclaimer and concluding that 3M's federal work was not implicated. Similarly, in the District of South Carolina, 3M removed South Carolina's non-AFFF complaint, but the district court also remanded, crediting the state's disclaimer and finding no connection to 3M's federal work.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. The court held that the states' disclaimers were not dispositive in determining the connection between 3M's federal work and the charged conduct. The court concluded that 3M plausibly alleged that PFAS contamination from its Military AFFF production was related to the states' claims, satisfying the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. The court vacated the district courts' decisions and remanded for further consideration of whether 3M met the other elements for federal officer removal, including acting under a federal officer and having a colorable federal defense. View "State of Maryland v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the issuance of a permit by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the development of the Cainhoy Plantation in South Carolina. The plaintiffs argued that the permit violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). They claimed the permit improperly used a habitat surrogate to set the level of anticipated take of an endangered species and was issued after an Environmental Assessment (EA) rather than a more comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that they did not have a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the Corps' decision to issue the permit based on an EA was reasonable and that the use of a habitat surrogate was justified under the circumstances.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that the Corps had taken the required "hard look" at the environmental consequences of the project as mandated by NEPA and that the use of a habitat surrogate was appropriate given the impracticality of monitoring the take of individual bats. The court found that the Corps' decision to rely on an EA instead of preparing an EIS was entitled to deference and that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court also noted that the surrogate used by the Service was enforceable and set a clear standard for determining when the level of anticipated take had been exceeded. View "South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves the 68th Street Site Work Group (the "Group"), a collective of entities that had settled their liability for environmental cleanup costs with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Group sought to recoup some of these costs by filing a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against several non-performing and non-settling entities, alleging that each defendant incurred arranger liability by arranging for the disposal of waste at the Superfund Alternative Site.The District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the claims against each of these defendants, concluding that the Group failed to allege that the defendants took intentional steps with the specific intent to dispose of hazardous waste and knew that the disposed-of waste was hazardous. The Group then sought to amend its complaint against seven of the defendants, but the district court denied the motion, standing by its prior interpretation of CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that under CERCLA’s arranger-liability provision, a defendant is liable whenever they intentionally arrange for the disposal of a substance and the substance is hazardous. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring the Group to allege that the defendants knew the disposed-of waste was hazardous. View "68th Street Site Work Group v. Alban Tractor Co., Incorporated" on Justia Law