Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

White Coat Waste Project (“WCW”) tried to run an advertisement denouncing animal experimentation with the Greater Richmond Transit Company (“Richmond Transit”) the ad was denied for being impermissibly “political.” WCW sued, challenging that denial as a violation of its First Amendment rights. Richmond Transit responded that, as a private company, it is not bound by the First Amendment, and even if it were, its policy passes constitutional muster because it only restrains speech in a nonpublic forum.   The district court disagreed on both counts, concluding that Richmond Transit is a state actor subject to constitutional constraints and that its policy violates the First Amendment right to free speech. But the district court granted WCW only partial summary judgment, holding that it could not provide the facial relief WCW sought because public-transit political-advertising bans can sometimes accord with the Constitution.   The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly identified Richmond Transit as a state actor and held that Richmond Transit’s policy is not “capable of reasoned application” and is therefore unconstitutionally unreasonable. Further, the court held that the district court erred in denying facial relief. Even if another public-transit political-advertising ban may be constitutional, this ban is incapable of reasoned, constitutional application in all circumstances. Thus, it is facially unconstitutional and warrants facial relief. View "White Coat Waste Project v. Greater Richmond Transit Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered the United States in 2014 when he was apprehended by border patrol agents before eventually being released to his older brother (a resident of North Carolina).On or shortly before his eighteenth birthday, Plaintiff filed an application for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). SIJ status provides certain protections against removal under 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1255 and can lead to lawful permanent residency and citizenship. USCIS issued Plaintiff a Notice of Intent to Deny his SIJ application and Plaintiff appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO), which upheld the denial. Plaintiff then filed a complaint in district court seeking review of the agency’s denial of his SIJ applicationOn rehearing en banc, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant Plaintiff’s motion to set aside USCIS’s denial of SIJ status. Following his victory before the en banc court, Plaintiff sought to recover attorney’s fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The district court denied Plaintiff’s EAJA application, finding the government’s position was “substantially justified.” The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "this was a tough case" involving reasonable arguments on both sides. Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling finding the government’s position was substantially justified. View "Felipe Perez v. Ur Jaddou" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit evaluated eight distinct grounds for removal that twenty-six multinational oil and gas companies ("Defendants") argue provide federal jurisdiction over the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore’s (“Baltimore”) climate-change action.The circuit court looked to two legal doctrines that inform removal inquiries before a federal court: (1) the well-pleaded complaint rule, and (2) complete preemption. Here, the circuit court reasoned that the municipality has decided to exclusively rely upon state-law claims to remedy its own climate-change injuries, which it perceives were caused, at least in part, by the defendants’ fossil-fuel products and strategic misinformation campaign. The circuit court concluded that these claims do not belong in federal court. They declined to take a position on whether Baltimore will ultimately fail or succeed in proving its claims under Maryland law. Ultimately, the circuit court did not discern a proper basis for removal that permits a federal court to entertain Baltimore’s action; thus, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting Baltimore’s Motion to Remand. View "Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C." on Justia Law

This case arose out of South Carolina's termination of Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, concluding in relevant part that the individual plaintiff had demonstrated that she was likely to succeed on her Medicaid Act claim since the free-choice-of-provider provision conferred a private right enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and South Carolina had violated that provision by terminating Planned Parenthood's Medicaid provider agreement. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The district court then issued a permanent injunction, which South Carolina now challenges in this appeal.The Fourth Circuit first concluded that this case presents a live case or controversy and rejected South Carolina's claim of mootness. Even assuming that the court were free to reexamine its precedents, the court declined to do so in this case. Rather, the court concluded that its previous decision was handed down as a matter of law and resolved the precise legal issue upon which South Carolina now seeks review.The court reaffirmed its prior decision, concluding that the free-choice-of-provider provision confers on Medicaid recipients an individual right enforceable under section 1983. The court stated that the statute plainly reflects Congress's desire that individual Medicaid recipients be free to obtain care from any qualified provider and it implements this policy in direct and unambiguous language. In this case, all three Blessing factors in determining whether a statute creates a private right enforceable under section 1983 are met. Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not evince Congress's intent to specifically foreclose a remedy under section 1983. Finally, the Supreme Court's decision in O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), does not undermine the court's analysis. The court refused to nullify Congress's undeniable desire to extend a choice of medical providers to the less fortunate among us, individuals who experience the same medical problems as the more fortunate in society but who lack under their own means the same freedom to choose their healthcare provider. View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic v. Kerr" on Justia Law

Marsh, an employee of Petitioner New River Electrical Corporation, suffered severe burns when he picked up a live electrical wire at a job site. No one had tested, tagged, or grounded the transformer connected to the cable that shocked Marsh. Two supervisors attempted to conceal these breaches of New River’s standard safety protocols. They were subsequently terminated. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) investigated the accident, determined that New River committed three serious violations of the applicable safety regulations, and fined the company $38,802. An ALJ affirmed, finding that New River had not established the affirmative defense of “unpreventable employee misconduct,” but decreased the penalty to $12,934. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined to review that decision.The Fourth Circuit reversed. The ALJ improperly relieved OSHA of the burden of proving that New River had constructive knowledge of these violations as part of the prima facie case. When the supervisory employee commits the violation, the employer loses its “eyes and ears” to detect and prevent misconduct. To avoid unfairly imposing liability on an employer for a rogue supervisor, OSHA must prove that a supervisor’s misconduct was “reasonably foreseeable” to establish the employer had constructive knowledge. View "New River Electrical Corp. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission" on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases, petitioners seek review of the Forest Service and BLM's decisions to allow the Mountain Valley Pipeline to cross three and a half miles of the Jefferson National Forest in Virginia and West Virginia. The Fourth Circuit previously vacated the agencies' records of decision (RODs) because the Forest Service and the BLM failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (the NFMA), and the Mineral Leasing Act (the MLA). Petitioners argue that the agencies' renewed RODs after remand also violate NEPA, the NFMA, and the MLA.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Forest Service and the BLM inadequately considered the actual sedimentation and erosion impacts of the Pipeline; prematurely authorized the use of the conventional bore method to construct stream crossings; and failed to comply with the Forest Service's 2012 Planning Rule. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review as to those errors; denied the petitions for review in regard to petitioners' remaining arguments about the predecisional review process, alternative routes, and increased collocation; vacated the decisions of the Forest Service and the BLM; and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wild Virginia v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a False Claims Act qui tam suit against his employer, Forest Laboratories, alleging that it engaged in a fraudulent price reporting scheme under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Statute by failing to aggregate discounts given to separate customers for purposes of reporting "Best Price."The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, concluding that because Forest Laboratories' reading of the Rebate Statute was at the very least objectively reasonable and because it was not warned away from that reading by authoritative guidance, it did not act "knowingly" under the Act. In this case, Forest Laboratories made eminently reasonable assumptions based on the statutory text, and CMS invited assumptions precisely of this sort. The court noted that the government is not without recourse. Should Congress so wish, it can alter the Rebate Statute to require the aggregate reporting of discounts to separate entities. View "United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC" on Justia Law

Southern Power and Cleveland County, North Carolina executed an “Incentive Development Agreement” in July 2007, providing that if Southern built and operated a natural gas plant — a decision left to Southern’s sole discretion — the county would make substantial cash payments to Southern. The North Carolina legislature enacted a new law (Subsection H) 37 days later, imposing more stringent requirements on such agreements, including a mandate that they include a recapture provision allowing a municipality to recover cash incentives already paid if the private entity breaches the agreement. In November-December 2008, Southern secured contracts to supply utility companies with electricity produced at the plant. Southern then asked the county to reaffirm its commitment to the Agreement. Cleveland County adopted a resolution at its January 6, 2009, meeting stating that it was committed to the incentive grants. Southern broke ground on the plant in October 2009 and began commercial operations in December 2012. Cleveland County, however, refused to pay Southern any cash incentives, arguing that the Agreement failed to comply with Subsection H.The district court dismissed the case as barred by North Carolina governmental immunity. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Cleveland county never waived its governmental immunity from suit. View "Southern Power Co. v. Cleveland County" on Justia Law