Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without inspection and without valid entry documents. The Government subsequently initiated deportation proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded her removability but sought relief from removal in the form of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. The immigration judge concluded that Petitioner had not established her eligibility for asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Fourth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review and vacated the order of the BIA, holding that Petitioner had established her eligibility for asylum. Remanded. View "Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch" on Justia Law

Ashton LeBlanc, a Louisiana resident, had a son, Robert, who was born in Nigeria in 1970. In 2001, Robert and Ashton decided to file the appropriate paperwork to have Robert declared a United States citizen. Ashton completed and submitted to his attorney a Form N-600, an application for certificate of citizenship, but the attorney instead filed a Form I-130, a petition for an adjustment of status for an alien relative. The I-130 was denied in 2007. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the appeal. In 2011, Ashton contacted a second attorney to check on the status of Robert’s citizenship and was assured that the process was moving forward. Ashton subsequently hired his current counsel, who discovered Ashton’s previous attorney’s deficient performance. Current counsel moved to reopen the denial of the I-130 petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The BIA denied the motion, concluding that Ashton failed to show due diligence after contacting the second attorney. The Fourth Circuit dismissed Ashton’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the petition was from Ashton’s denied motion to reopen his visa petition, not an order of removal against Robert, and because transfer to an appropriate district court was not in the interests of justice. View "LeBlanc v. Holder" on Justia Law

Under the “fifteen-year presumption” of the Black Lung Benefits Act, if a claimant has at least fifteen years of underground coal mine employment and a qualifying respiratory or pulmonary disability, a rebuttable presumption arises that he is entitled to benefits. After working for more than twenty-one years in underground coal mines, most recently for Petitioner, Respondent suffered a totally disabling respiratory impairment for purposes of the Act. Respondent filed this claim for benefits under the Act. The administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewing his claim applied the fifteen-year presumption, concluded that Petitioner failed to rebut that presumption, and awarded black lung benefits. The Fourth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review and affirmed the ALJ’s finding that Petitioner had failed to rebut the fifteen-year presumption, holding that the ALJ’s determinations were supported by substantial evidence. View "Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling" on Justia Law

In 2007, Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was convicted of petit larceny. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. Petitioner conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), The immigration judge pretermitted Petitioner’s application and ordered her removed to El Salvador, concluding that her petit-larceny conviction rendered her ineligible for relief because it was a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the BIA’s decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of section 1229b(b)(1)(C).The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the BIA’s reading of section 1229b(b)(1)(C) was a permissible interpretation of the statute, entitling the BIA’s decision to Chevron deference. View "Hernandez v. Holder" on Justia Law

Page Bender Jr. worked as an underground coal miner for twenty-one years and suffered from a totally disabling respiratory condition. Bender filed a claim for black lung benefits. An administrative law judge (ALJ) applied to Bender’s claim the rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis, under which the burden shifted to the coal mine operator to disprove Bender’s entitlement to benefits. The ALJ awarded black lung benefits to Bender based on the ALJ’s conclusion that the operator had failed to rebut the presumption by showing that Bender’s pneumoconiosis did not in any way contribute to his disability. The Benefits Review Board affirmed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Labor acted within its regulatory authority in requiring the coal mine operator to show, where Bender met the statutory criteria for the presumption, that “no part of the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary total disability was caused by pneumoconiosis”; and (2) the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "W. Va. CWP Fund v. Bender" on Justia Law

Bonnilyn Mascio filed an application with the Social Security Administration for supplemental security income benefits, alleging that she was disabled from degenerative disc disease, carpal tunnel syndrome, and adjustment disorder. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Mascio was not disabled. The district court reversed. On remand, a second ALJ found that Mascio was not disabled and denied her application. The district court upheld the denial of benefits. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the ALJ erred (1) in assessing Mascio’s residual functional capacity because he did not conduct a function-by-function analysis; (2) by not considering Mascio’s moderate limitation in her ability to maintain her concentration, persistence, or pace; and (3) by determining Mascio’s residual functional capacity before assessing her credibility. Remanded. View "Mascio v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican national, pled guilty to illegal entry, a misdemeanor offense. After Petitioner had served his 181-day sentence and was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commenced removal proceedings against him. Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his three citizen children, especially his ten-year-old autistic son. The immigration judge (IJ) dismissed Petitioner’s application, concluding that Petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because 8 U.S.C. 1101(f)(7) precludes an alien from establishing good moral character when his offense resulted in 180 days or more of confinement. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that the applicability of section 1101(f)(&) does not depend upon the type of offense, but rather, the length of incarceration. The Fourth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Petitioner’s petition for review, holding (1) this was not one of those “exceptionally rare” instances in which the literal application of a Congressional enactment produces truly absurd results; and (2) the Court lacked jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he was not precluded from establishing good moral character. View "Tiscareno-Garcia v. Holder" on Justia Law

Relator appealed the district court's dismissal of her qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3279-3733, for lack of jurisdiction. Relator alleged that fraudulent invoices were submitted to the federal government under the Emergency Watershed Protection Program (EWP) Program in both Graham and Cherokee Counties. In relator's third amended complaint, she named as defendants Graham County, the Graham County SWCD, and the Cherokee County SWCD, along with several individuals. Although the court found no fault with the district court's factual findings, the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in reaching its conclusion as to public disclosure. Rejecting the Seventh Circuit's view, the court held that a public disclosure requires that there be some act of disclosure outside of the government. In this case, while the Audit Report and the USDA Report at issue were disclosed to government officials charged with policing the type of fraud relator alleges, nothing in the record suggests that either report actually reached the public domain. Therefore, the public disclosure bar was not triggered on this basis. That the reports were disclosed to state and local government agencies as well as federal agencies does not alter the court's conclusion. Further, the existence of public information laws does not go against the court's holding. Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction over this action and the court reversed. View "U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water" on Justia Law

Power Fuels, operator of a facility that receives, blends, stores, and delivers coals for a power plant located across the road, petitioned for review of the Commission's final order, challenging the Secretary's assignment of jurisdiction to the MSHA, rather than to the nonspecialized OSHA. The court held that the Secretary permissibly concluded that a facility that blends coal for a nearby power plant was subject to the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 802(h)(1)(C), (i). Therefore, the MSHA's assertion of jurisdiction was proper because the Mine Act covers this kind of activity. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Power Fuels, LLC v. Federal Mine Safety & Health" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a radio manufacturing and repair business and two of its managers, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the City's sign ordinance. The ordinance, which governs the placement and display of signs, was enacted by the city to enhance and protect the physical appearance of all areas of the city and to reduce the distractions, obstructions, and hazards to pedestrian and auto traffic. Plaintiffs' challenges to the ordinance relate to a protest of a certain adverse action taken against Central Radio by the Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the sign ordinance is a content-neutral restriction on speech that satisfies intermediate scrutiny. The court found no merit in plaintiffs' remaining constitutional challenges. View "Central Radio Co. Inc. v. City of Norfolk" on Justia Law