Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Jon Oberg filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act against various student-loan companies, including Nelnet, Inc., Nelnet Education Loan Funding, Inc., Brazos Higher Education Services Corporation, and Brazos Higher Education Authority, Inc. Oberg alleged that the companies submitted false claims to the Department of Education to inflate their loan portfolios eligible for interest subsidies. The parties agreed to a protective order for discovery, and the companies filed a joint motion for leave to file confidential summary judgment materials under seal. The magistrate judge granted in part the motion to file under seal. The parties eventually settled, and the magistrate judge dismissed the actions against the companies with prejudice.On March 31, 2023, Michael Camoin—a documentary filmmaker who covers the student-loan industry—filed a pro se letter in the district court requesting access to the materials that Oberg filed under seal in connection to his opposition to summary judgment. Nelnet and Brazos eventually filed a joint brief opposing Camoin’s request. On July 3, 2023, the magistrate judge denied Camoin’s motion. The judge found that Camoin has “no common law or First Amendment right to access the sought documents and portions of documents” because “a document must play a relevant and useful part in the adjudication process for either the First Amendment or common law rights of public access to attach.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the magistrate judge’s order and remanded for consideration of whether maintaining the seal on the requested documents is “necessitated by a compelling government interest[] and . . . narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” The court held that Camoin has a presumptive First Amendment right to access Oberg’s summary judgment motion and the documents attached to that motion. The court found that the public has an interest in ensuring basic fairness and deterring official misconduct not only in the outcome of certain proceedings, but also in the very proceedings themselves. The court concluded that irrespective of whether a district court ever resolves a summary judgment motion, the public has a presumptive First Amendment right to access documents submitted in connection with it. View "Camoin v. Nelnet, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Erie Insurance Company and its affiliates (collectively, Erie) and the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA). In 2021, the MIA initiated two separate administrative investigations into Erie following complaints alleging racial and geographic discrimination. The first investigation broadly examined Erie’s market conduct, while the second focused on the specific allegations in the individual complaints. In 2023, the MIA issued four public determination letters stating that Erie had violated state insurance laws. These letters referenced documents obtained during the market conduct investigation, which had not yet concluded. Erie requested and was granted administrative hearings on all four determination letters.Erie then filed a lawsuit against the MIA and its commissioner in federal district court, alleging due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and violations of Maryland state law. Erie sought a declaration that the determination letters were unlawful, an injunction preventing the defendants from disseminating the letters, and a requirement for the defendants to publicly withdraw them. The district court dismissed Erie's complaint, citing the principles of abstention outlined in Younger v. Harris, which generally discourages federal courts from interfering with ongoing state proceedings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Erie had an adequate opportunity to raise its constitutional claims in the administrative hearings and subsequent state court review, as required for Younger abstention. The court also rejected Erie's argument that this case fell within an exception to Younger abstention due to extraordinary circumstances or unusual situations. The court concluded that Erie had not demonstrated that the MIA's actions were motivated by bias or that the administrative proceedings would not afford Erie constitutionally adequate process. View "Erie Insurance Exchange v. Maryland Insurance Administration" on Justia Law

The case involves Earl Johnson, a former inmate of the Maryland Correctional Training Center, who alleged that corrections officer Chad Zimmerman sexually harassed and abused him during strip searches, in violation of his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. Johnson also sued Zimmerman’s supervisor, Lt. Richard Robinette, alleging supervisory and bystander liability. The district court dismissed Johnson’s claims against Robinette due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies but held that Johnson’s claims against Zimmerman were exempt from this requirement. The court also granted summary judgment to Zimmerman and Robinette on the merits of Johnson’s claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that Johnson’s claims against Robinette were subject to exhaustion requirements. However, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to both defendants. The court found that the strip searches, including those involving momentary touchings of Johnson’s genitalia or buttocks, did not rise to the level of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that Johnson failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that Zimmerman had the requisite malicious intent to sexually abuse him, sexually arouse him or himself, or otherwise gratify sexual desire. Furthermore, the court found that Johnson’s evidence fell short of establishing supervisory or bystander liability against Robinette. View "Johnson v. Robinette" on Justia Law

The case involves Bacardi & Company Limited and Bacardi USA, Inc. (collectively, Bacardi) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Bacardi claimed that the PTO violated Section 9 of the Lanham Act and its own regulations by renewing a trademark registration ten years after it expired. The trademark in question is the "HAVANA CLUB," originally registered by a Cuban corporation, José Arechabala, S.A. In 1960, the Cuban government seized the corporation's assets, and by 1974, the U.S. trademark registrations for HAVANA CLUB rum had expired. Later, a company owned by the Cuban government registered the HAVANA CLUB trademark in the U.S. for itself. Bacardi, which had bought the interest in the mark from Arechabala, filed its own application to register the HAVANA CLUB mark and petitioned the PTO to cancel the Cuban government-owned company's registration.The PTO denied Bacardi's application due to the Cuban government-owned company's preexisting registration, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) denied Bacardi's cancellation petition. Bacardi then filed a civil action challenging the TTAB's denial of cancellation. Meanwhile, the Cuban government-owned company's registration was set to expire in 2006, unless it renewed its trademark. However, due to a trade embargo, the company was not permitted to pay the required renewal fee without first obtaining an exception from the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). OFAC denied the company's request for an exception, and the PTO notified the company that its registration would expire due to the failure to submit the renewal fee on time.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment that dismissed Bacardi's lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Lanham Act does not foreclose an Administrative Procedure Act (APA) action for judicial review of the PTO’s compliance with statutes and regulations governing trademark registration renewal. The court found that the Lanham Act does not expressly preclude judicial review of PTO registration renewal decisions or fairly implies congressional intent to do so. Therefore, the APA’s mechanism for judicial review remains available. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bacardi and Company Limited v. United States Patent & Trademark Office" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Angela Singleton, a former employee of the Maryland Technology Development Corporation (TEDCO), who filed a lawsuit against TEDCO alleging sex- and race-based discrimination and retaliation. TEDCO, an entity created by the State of Maryland to promote economic development, argued that it was an "arm of the State" and therefore immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits brought in federal court. Singleton countered that TEDCO was essentially a series of social impact and venture funds overseen by the corporation and did not qualify as an arm of the State.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed Singleton's complaint, agreeing with TEDCO's argument that it was indeed an arm of the State and therefore entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Singleton appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that although the State of Maryland was not legally obligated to pay TEDCO's debts, it was practically responsible for the entity's solvency. The court also noted that the State exercised significant control over TEDCO, that TEDCO's concerns were statewide, and that the State treated TEDCO substantially as an agency. Therefore, the court concluded that TEDCO was an arm of the State and protected from Singleton's suit by the Eleventh Amendment. View "Singleton v. Maryland Technology and Development Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves four North Carolina-based citizen groups ("Petitioners") who petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to require testing of fifty-four Per- and Poly- Fluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) prevalent in their community. The EPA granted the petition, agreeing to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol. Petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA’s decision, contending it was in effect a denial of their petition.The district court dismissed Petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the EPA reasonably chose to grant Petitioners’ request to test the fifty-four PFAS as a category—PFAS generally—which the TSCA encourages the EPA to do. As to the EPA’s failure to adopt Petitioners’ specific testing program, the district court explained that Petitioners “have a right to petition [the] EPA to initiate proceedings for the issuance of rules and orders, but [they] do not have a right to compel the content of [the] EPA’s proceedings or to compel [the] EPA to issue a specific rule or order.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the EPA’s decision was a grant in fact. The court reasoned that the TSCA allows the EPA to group chemicals into scientifically appropriate categories for testing. The court also held that the TSCA does not give petitioners the unrestrained ability to force companies to conduct specific testing when the § 2603 requirements are met. The court concluded that by promptly commencing a proceeding for determining how to best test PFAS, the EPA gave Petitioners all that they were entitled to receive. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Regan" on Justia Law

Three employees of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) alleged that their supervisors retaliated against them for whistleblowing on CBP's noncompliance with the DNA Fingerprints Act of 2005. The employees claimed that their supervisors failed to promote them and dismantled their division within the CBP. The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissed their appeal, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The MSPB determined that the employees had not "nonfrivolously" alleged that their supervisors' actions were "personnel actions" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the MSPB's decision. The court found that while there may be a high bar for succeeding on the merits before the MSPB, its jurisdictional bar is low, and the employees' claims cleared that lower bar. The court held that the employees' allegations, if true, could establish that their supervisors took a "personnel action" as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). The court concluded that the MSPB had jurisdiction to hear the employees' appeal. View "Jones v. Merit Systems Protection Board" on Justia Law

The case involves the South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation and Tourism (SCPRT) and Google LLC. The State of South Carolina, along with several other states, sued Google for violations of federal and state antitrust laws. Google subpoenaed SCPRT for discovery pertinent to its defense. SCPRT refused to comply, asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity and moved to quash the subpoena.The district court denied SCPRT's motion, holding that any Eleventh Amendment immunity that SCPRT may have otherwise been entitled to assert was waived when the State, through its attorney general, voluntarily joined the federal lawsuit against Google. SCPRT appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that by joining the lawsuit against Google, the State voluntarily invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court, thereby effecting a waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity as to all matters arising in that suit. And because SCPRT’s immunity derives solely from that of the State, South Carolina’s waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity equally effected a waiver of SCPRT’s immunity. The district court, therefore, properly denied SCPRT’s motion to quash. View "SC Dept of Parks, Recreation and Tourism v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel Lamont Mathis, who was convicted of multiple offenses, including Hobbs Act robbery, racketeering, and violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity, all in connection with the carjacking, kidnapping, and execution-style murder of a Virginia police officer. Initially, Mathis was sentenced to four concurrent life sentences and a consecutively imposed term of 132 years’ imprisonment. However, after an appeal and the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, which amended the sentencing structure for second or subsequent convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the district court resentenced Mathis to four concurrent life sentences, plus 48 years’ imprisonment.The district court also set forth mandatory and discretionary conditions of supervised release. One of the discretionary conditions was that Mathis would be subject to warrantless search and seizure to ensure compliance with these conditions. However, the written judgment included additional language, stating that Mathis must warn any other occupants that the premises may be subject to searches pursuant to this condition.Mathis appealed, arguing that the additional language in the written judgment constituted error under United States v. Rogers and United States v. Singletary. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with Mathis, finding that the requirement to warn other occupants was inconsistent with the orally pronounced condition. The court held that this discrepancy constituted reversible error under Rogers and Singletary. As a result, the court vacated Mathis' sentence and remanded the case for a full resentencing. View "US v. Mathis" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of incarcerated individuals who were sent from a detention center to work at a recycling facility operated by Baltimore County, Maryland. The workers alleged that they were employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Maryland state laws, and thus entitled to minimum wage and overtime pay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, concluding that no reasonable adjudicator could view the incarcerated workers as "employees" under the FLSA.The district court's decision was based on the fact that the workers were part of a work detail program run by the Department of Corrections (DOC), which the court found had a rehabilitative, rather than pecuniary, interest in the workers' labor. The court also found that the workers did not deal at arms' length with their putative employer, as they were not free to negotiate the terms of their employment and were under the control of the DOC.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court clarified that there is no categorical rule that incarcerated workers cannot be covered by the FLSA when they work outside their detention facility’s walls and for someone other than their immediate detainer. The court also held that the district court applied the wrong legal standards in granting summary judgment to the county. The court emphasized that the question under the FLSA is whether the principal or primary purpose for using incarcerated workers at the recycling center during the time frame at issue was for “rehabilitation and job training.” The case was remanded for a fresh look at the facts under these clarified standards. View "Scott v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law