Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Village commenced this action against the Corps to require it to honor commitments made to the Village and other North Carolina towns when developing its plan to widen, deepen, and realign portions of the Cape Fear River navigation channel. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with the district court's holding that the Corps' failure to implement "commitments" made to the Village during development of the plans for the project was not final agency action subject to judicial review. The court also concluded that the alleged contracts on which the Village relied for its contract claims were not maritime contracts that justified the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Village of Bald Head Island v. U. S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from Washington Gas' request to expand a natural gas substation (County Zoning Plans). On appeal, Washington Gas challenged the district court's order dismissing Washington Gas' mandatory referral claim and the district court's subsequent order granting summary judgment on Washington Gas' federal preemption claims. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the mandatory referral claim pursuant to Burford v. Sun Oil; the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act (PSA), 49 U.S.C. 60102, 60104, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because the PSA only preempted safety regulations and the County Zoning Plans were not safety regulations; and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 717, did not preempt the County Zoning Plans because Washington Gas was a local distributor of natural gas and, therefore, was not subject to the NGA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Washington Gas Light Co. v. Prince George's County Council" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting, inter alia, that Maryland's good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit contravened the Second Amendment. The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of section 5-306(a)(5)(ii) of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code, to the extent that it conditions eligibility for a permit to carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public on having "good and substantial reason" to do so. Because the court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement could not pass constitutional muster, the court reversed the judgment. Under the applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State had demonstrated that the good-and-substantial-reason requirement was reasonably adapted to Maryland's significant interests in protecting public safety and preventing crime. The court also rejected plaintiffs' facial challenge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Woollard v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729, alleging that defendants fraudulently billed the United States for services provided to the military forces serving in Iraq. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. Because the court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and the court found that the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (WSLA), 18 U.S.C. 3287, applied to this action, the court reversed. Because it could be appropriate for the district court to make factual findings to consider the public disclosure claim urged by defendants the court remanded so the district court could consider this issue. View "United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, thirteenth North Carolina residents who lost access to in-home personal care services (PCS) due to a statutory change, brought suit challenging the new PCS program. The district court granted plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Defendants appealed, raising several points of error. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that a preliminary injunction was appropriate in this case. The court held, however, that the district court's order failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 because it lacked specificity and because the district court neglected to address the issue of security. Accordingly, the court remanded the case. View "Pashby v. Delia" on Justia Law

MASC filed an action in the district court seeking a declaration that South Carolina municipalities were entitled to assess municipal business license taxes based on, or measured by, the total flood insurance premiums collected in the particular municipality by insurance companies under an arrangement with FEMA. The district court denied the insurance companies' motion for summary judgment on grounds of preemption and sovereign immunity. The flood insurance premiums were federal property that could not be taxed and the participating private insurance companies, in their operation of and participation with the National Flood Insurance Program, were federal instrumentalities so closely connected with the federal government that they were immune from taxation. The federal government did not consent to this tax, and it was therefore invalid. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to MASC and denial of summary judgment to the insurance companies. View "Municipal Assoc. of SC v. USAA General Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, three manufacturers of certain pesticides at issue, commenced this action challenging the biological opinion (BiOp) issued by the Service. The BiOp, which the Service provided as part of the EPA's process of reregistering the pesticides at issue, concluded that these pesticides would jeopardize the viability of certain Pacific salmonids and their habitat and that the pesticides could not be reregistered and therefore used without substantial restriction. The court concluded that the BiOp was not the product of reasoned decisionmaking in that the Service failed to explain or support several assumptions critical to its opinion. To enable a renewed agency process, the court vacated the BiOp and remanded for further proceedings. View "Dow AgroSciences LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the conduct of police officers lead to their son's death, violating his Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that all three officers involved in the incident were entitled to qualified immunity and awarded summary judgment in their favor. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that two of the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, but that the district court erred in awarding summary judgment in favor of the officer who repeatedly activated his taser at plaintiffs' son. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Meyers, Sr. v. Baltimore County, Maryland" on Justia Law

This case involved the 18 U.S.C. 2703(d) orders pertaining to the Government's request for records of electronic communications relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The underlying facts of the investigation related to the unauthorized release of classified documents to WikiLeaks.org, and the alleged involvement of a U.S. Army Private First Class. At issue was the public's right to access orders issued under section 2703(d) and related documents at the pre-grand jury phase of an ongoing criminal investigation. Because the court found that there was no First Amendment right to access such documents, and the common law right to access such documents was presently outweighed by countervailing interests, the court denied the request for relief. View "In re: 2703(d) Application" on Justia Law

The Town appealed the district court's invalidation of its municipal sign ordinance as it applied to a resident. Dissatisfied with the Town's efforts to resolve a dispute with the resident, the resident painted the words, "Screwed by the Town of Cary" across a fifteen foot swath of the facade of his home. The court acknowledged that the Town's Sign Ordinance, and in particular its application to the resident, has aggravated some town residents who believed that it was excessively restrictive. But their recourse lies with the ballot, not the Constitution. Because the Sign Ordinance had distinguished content for a constitutionally permissible purpose, the court held that it did not violate the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Bowden v. Town of Cary" on Justia Law