Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellants challenged the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 to appellee where appellants served an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) on appellee, which she timely accepted. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the amount appellants offered to settle the dispute did not include her attorney's fees and costs. The court affirmed and held that the district court properly enforced the offer of judgment as drafted and served by appellants because the offer contained no language limiting appellant's liability for appellee's recoverable pre-offer costs, including attorney's fees.

Appellee, as personal representative for her son's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against a tugboat owner, appellant, and sought contribution from the United States as co-tortfeasor, when her son was killed during a Navy training exercise where his rigid-hull inflatable boat collided with the tug boat when it was pushing an eight-barge flotilla up the James River. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that appellant was negligent for failing to post a proper lookout on the night of the accident and whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's third-party claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court declined to disturb the district court's findings as to liability for the collision and apportionment of fault where the district court understood and properly applied the appropriate legal standard pursuant to Inland Navigation Rule 5 and where appellant's additional arguments were unavailing. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the government's motion to dismiss appellant's third-party claim where the district court found that the Feres-Stencel Aero doctrine applied to appellant's action and barred its attempt to obtain contribution from the United States for damages when the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff sued defendants when defendants stopped reviewing the additional signatures that had been submitted for a referendum due to a pending legal challenge filed by a third party which was unrelated to defendants' signature validating methods. At issue was whether defendants denied plaintiff's rights to freely associate, petition the government, and vote; whether defendants had denied plaintiff due process and equal protection; and whether defendants had violated plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The court held that plaintiff's right to freely associate, petition the government, and vote were not violated where there was no fundamental right to initiate legislation by means of a referendum as there is a fundamental right to vote. The court also held that plaintiff was not denied due process or equal protection where the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's right to equal protection had not been denied upon a rational basis review and where defendants provided adequate notice to invalidate petitioner signatures and adequate opportunities for review of the invalidation of plaintiff's petition signature. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to state a claim for denial of any of plaintiff's constitutional rights was proper and therefore dismissal of his § 1983 was also proper.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants alleging that the seal provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(3) of the False Claims Act ("FCA") were unconstitutional. At issue was whether the FCA seal provisions violated the public's First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, violated the First Amendment by gagging qui tam relators from speaking about their qui tam complaints, and infringed on a court's inherent authority to decide on a case-by-base basis whether a particular qui tam complaint should be sealed and thereby violate the separation of powers. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed where the FCA's seal provisions did not violate the First Amendment when the United States has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of ongoing fraud investigations and the seal provisions were narrowly tailored. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed for lack of standing where plaintiffs failed to identify any particular qui tam relator who was willing to speak with plaintiffs. The court also held that the seal provisions do not violate the separation of powers where the seal provisions are a proper subject of congressional legislation and do not intrude on "the zone of the judicial self-administration to such a degree as to prevent the judiciary from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."