Justia U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in these three cases prevailed in district court on their appeals from the Social Security Administration's denial of their claims for disability benefits, and then, as prevailing parties, filed motions under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), for "fees and other expenses." On appeal, plaintiffs contended that their attorney's retention of out-of-state attorneys for assistance in brief writing did not preclude reimbursement for their fees under the EAJA, nor did it violate the District of South Carolina's local rules, and therefore, they argued, there were no "special circumstances" to justify the out-of-state attorneys fees. The court held that even though the District of South Carolina appropriately regulated the practice of law in its court, the court concluded that the use of non-admitted lawyers for brief writing services did not present a "special circumstance" sufficient to deny a fee award as "unjust" under the EAJA. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the fee applications.

West Virginia sued pharmaceutical manufacturers, claiming that the defendants artificially inflated the reimbursement values of certain drugs, in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W. Va. Code 46A-1-101, and a state statute prohibiting fraud and abuse in the Medicaid program. The complaint alleged that the defendants inflated the average wholesale price of certain drugs and caused the state to pay an artificially inflated amount of reimbursement for the drugs. One company agreed to pay West Virginia $850,000. After learning of the settlement in 2007, the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services notified West Virginia of a disallowance in federal funding for the state’s Medicaid program for failure to credit the federal government its share of the settlement proceeds. The Appeals Board sustained the disallowance. The district court upheld the decision. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396b(d)(2)(A), authorizes a disallowance only when the state has recovered from a "provider."

Plaintiff, operator of an electricity plant, sued defendant ("the county"), seeking to enjoin Expedited Bill 29-10, which imposed a levy on large stationary emitters of carbon dioxide within the county, on the ground that it violated the United States and Maryland Constitutions. At issue was whether a Montgomery County exaction on carbon dioxide emissions, levied only upon plaintiff's electricity-generating facility, was a tax or a fee. The court held that the carbon charge, which targeted a single emitter and was located squarely within the county's own "programmatic efforts to reduce" greenhouse gas emissions, was a punitive and regulatory fee over which the federal courts retained jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The under seal appellant ("Company 1"), a foreign company, appealed the district court's denial of its motion to quash the government's grand-jury subpoenas served on the under seal intervenor ("Company 2") where the subpoenas sought documents that Company 1 delivered to Company 2 in response to discovery requests that arose during the course of civil litigation between the two companies in district court. The court affirmed the denial of Company 1's motion to quash the government's subpoenas and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the subpoenas passed muster under Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Company 1 provided no basis for the court to craft a new procedural rule in support of its position. The court also held that there were no clearly erroneous rulings by the district court in resolving the factual issue regarding the nature of Company 2's interaction with the government and Company 1 failed to show that the issue merited any further investigation or an evidentiary hearing. The court rejected Company 1's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Company 1's motion to quash.

Appellants challenged the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1988 to appellee where appellants served an offer of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a) on appellee, which she timely accepted. At issue was whether the district court erred in holding that the amount appellants offered to settle the dispute did not include her attorney's fees and costs. The court affirmed and held that the district court properly enforced the offer of judgment as drafted and served by appellants because the offer contained no language limiting appellant's liability for appellee's recoverable pre-offer costs, including attorney's fees.

Appellee, as personal representative for her son's estate, brought a wrongful death suit against a tugboat owner, appellant, and sought contribution from the United States as co-tortfeasor, when her son was killed during a Navy training exercise where his rigid-hull inflatable boat collided with the tug boat when it was pushing an eight-barge flotilla up the James River. At issue was whether the district court properly determined that appellant was negligent for failing to post a proper lookout on the night of the accident and whether the district court properly dismissed appellant's third-party claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court declined to disturb the district court's findings as to liability for the collision and apportionment of fault where the district court understood and properly applied the appropriate legal standard pursuant to Inland Navigation Rule 5 and where appellant's additional arguments were unavailing. The court affirmed the district court's order granting the government's motion to dismiss appellant's third-party claim where the district court found that the Feres-Stencel Aero doctrine applied to appellant's action and barred its attempt to obtain contribution from the United States for damages when the government had not waived its sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff sued defendants when defendants stopped reviewing the additional signatures that had been submitted for a referendum due to a pending legal challenge filed by a third party which was unrelated to defendants' signature validating methods. At issue was whether defendants denied plaintiff's rights to freely associate, petition the government, and vote; whether defendants had denied plaintiff due process and equal protection; and whether defendants had violated plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The court held that plaintiff's right to freely associate, petition the government, and vote were not violated where there was no fundamental right to initiate legislation by means of a referendum as there is a fundamental right to vote. The court also held that plaintiff was not denied due process or equal protection where the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's right to equal protection had not been denied upon a rational basis review and where defendants provided adequate notice to invalidate petitioner signatures and adequate opportunities for review of the invalidation of plaintiff's petition signature. The court also held that the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs amended complaint for failure to state a claim for denial of any of plaintiff's constitutional rights was proper and therefore dismissal of his § 1983 was also proper.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants alleging that the seal provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)-(3) of the False Claims Act ("FCA") were unconstitutional. At issue was whether the FCA seal provisions violated the public's First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, violated the First Amendment by gagging qui tam relators from speaking about their qui tam complaints, and infringed on a court's inherent authority to decide on a case-by-base basis whether a particular qui tam complaint should be sealed and thereby violate the separation of powers. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed where the FCA's seal provisions did not violate the First Amendment when the United States has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of ongoing fraud investigations and the seal provisions were narrowly tailored. The court held that plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed for lack of standing where plaintiffs failed to identify any particular qui tam relator who was willing to speak with plaintiffs. The court also held that the seal provisions do not violate the separation of powers where the seal provisions are a proper subject of congressional legislation and do not intrude on "the zone of the judicial self-administration to such a degree as to prevent the judiciary from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions."